Page images
PDF
EPUB

or wherever people have been stricken that have some idea of how to respond.

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, along that line, we were told that things as simple as household bleach make a tremendously good and effective disinfectant for a lot of these chemical elements. Just telling the local police, you know, use that-you know, that itself could be useful. These are the types of very simple questions that the first responders are telling us.

I could just add the 1-800 number on these oil and chemical spills. We address the problem of pollution and these spills by putting this on every tank truck. Every tanker out there will have one of these. When the first responders show up, they will call. They will identify it and somebody will tell them what to do with hydrochloric acid or something like that.

Probably, a fireman, if there was a bio or chem incident, would call the same people. The guy on the other end of the phone knows nothing about bacteriological incidents, knows nothing about chemical weapons, and that is the problem. I mean, they will call this number and it is very useful if it is a Dow chemical product, but it is not going to be very useful if it is a bio/chem incident. That is what we are talking about. You need this for bio/chem.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Have we had any conferences at either the Federal level or the local level with the counterparts in terms of responsibility in Israel, where they have probably had more alerts, more exercises and more real-life problems and consequences to deal with than any place in the world? Certainly, chemical and biological, and even nuclear is always on their mind. How much have we learned from our friends in Israel?

Mr. EDELMAN. Well, that is something, Senator, that the International Association of Fire Chiefs has been pushing for quite some time, getting that kind of forum where they could learn from experts in other countries who have actually had to face these kinds of situations. They were pushing FEMA to try to organize this kind of conference for a number of years. Unfortunately, it took the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City before FEMA finally decided that this was, in fact, a good idea. Such a conference was finally held late last year. I believe at that conference they brought in responders from not only Israel, but London, Northern Ireland and France, all of which are areas which have had to face terrorist incidents in their pasts.

Senator NUNN. I think, Senator Lugar, you are absolutely right in terms of the educational aspects of this. Of course, all of us know, operating with tight budgets, we are not going to be able to just absolutely throw money at the problem and deal with it that way, but the essential educational aspects and training aspects— it seems to me that the United States military that knows more about this than certainly any institution or group of people in this country has some responsibility for the next few years to share their knowledge with other Federal agencies, and certainly also with the State and locals, perhaps having State and local police and fire people have access to go, if they choose to, to some of the military bases where they are training for the battlefield chemical

response, as well as biological, and having our military broaden the scope of what they are able to convey and teach. Maybe there is someone else that can do it. Maybe the FBI can go get trained by the military and form units and do the training themselves and keep it all domestic. But something has got to be done. This just cannot be ignored.

I say another educational aspect is in prevention. We have got to have Federal people who are really experts draw up lists of precursor materials for both chemical and biological so that the business community and the health community, in the case of biologicals, and laboratories understand when someone may be procuring this kind of material for illicit purposes and at least alarms start going off so they begin to turn in that kind of a suspicion and let people react to it. We have had a couple of cases where biological weapons have been procured by people who had no explanation, at least, for why.

Just one example. Since this set of hearings started, we received information from a businessman who was offered several kilograms of highly enriched uranium. At least that was the offer he got; he never saw the material itself. We don't know whether it was a hoax or whether it was the real thing, but he got in touch with the Committee and we got in touch with the appropriate law enforcement officials. This is just one example of an alertness in our population. Government officials are not going to be able to handle all this.

Fertilizers that can basically be used to grow crops can also the ingredients can be used to cause chemical explosions. Pharmaceuticals that have legitimate purposes and save lives can also be used as weapons of mass destruction. So these are difficult areas. In some ways, the nuclear is more certain in terms of dealing with it than the biological and chemical because of all the multiple legitimate uses of these materials.

I thank both of you for your testimony and your continuing hard work.

Senator LEVIN. Could I ask just one question?

Senator NUNN. Sure, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Actually, just two questions, if you would. If you could increase the role of the Department of Defense in terms of the domestic effort against terrorist threats which involve biological, chemical or nuclear materials, would you do so, given the fact that the DOD knows so much more about those threats than any domestic agency does?

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, Senator. There is no need to duplicate their efforts or reinvent the wheel. They have that capability. It just needs to be more focused toward a domestic terrorist event. Senator LEVIN. Is there an ongoing effort to weave the DOD into the domestic effort?

Mr. SOPKO. They are starting to do that.

Senator LEVIN. Who is in charge of that for the administration? Senator NUNN. Senator Levin, there was a provision in the antiterrorist bill that passed the Senate that, in emergency situations, got the military more involved in a chemical and biological response. That has been knocked out of the House bill and is now in conference between the two. So the statutory part of it is a pending matter legislatively right now.

Mr. SOPKO. I believe that comes through SOLIC, if I am not mistaken, Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and it may also be I would have to get back to you, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. If you would. The only other question I have is this. We spend a lot of money in terms of countering the potential threat of a missile attack. We are working on some anti-missile capability, and spending a lot of money in doing it. We spend a lot less in terms of a greater threat, which are chemical and biological weapons. Could you provide for the record some measure of the dollars that are being spent in all three of those efforts so we could compare the relatively large number of dollars we are spending against the least likely of the threats to the smaller dollars that we are spending against the more likely threats, if you can figure that out dollar-wise? It is kind of hard to do.

Mr. SOPKO. We will have a Defense Department witness testifying later-Dr. Holmes. He may have those figures with him right

now.

Senator LEVIN. If not, maybe you could supply them for the record.

Mr. SOPKO. We will check with the record.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin. We would carry your question over to the panel of government experts so they could give us their assessment on that, too, because they would have the best information.

[The prepared statement of Messrs. Sopko and Edelman follows:]

STAFF STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 1 year ago last Wednesday, the world awoke to an unprecedented act-the first large scale use of a lethal chemical agent for terrorist purposes. On the morning of March 20, 1995, at the height of the morning rush hour, several members of a religious cult, the Aum Shinrikyo, unleashed a sarin gas attack on the innocent patrons of the Tokyo subway system. The poison gas killed 12 commuters and injured more than 5,000 others. If the cult had crafted a more efficient delivery system prior to their attack, the death toll could easily have soared into the tens of thousands.

By this act, the Aum revealed the extreme vulnerability of urban areas to the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 1 This cult thus gained the distinction of becoming the first group, other than a nation during wartime, to successfully use chemical weapons on a major scale against a civilian population. Its use shattered a psychological taboo and raised the specter of other such attacks involving weapons of mass destruction in the future.

At Subcommittee hearings last Fall on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, Senator Nunn articulated the concerns surrounding such a future:

"The ease with which the Aum accessed the vast international supermarket of weapons and weapons technology is particularly troubling. The inexorable advance of science and communications has made the technology of these instruments available to an ever-widening audience. The ingredients for sarin and other chemical weapons are easily accessible over the Internet, as is information about biological weapons and even instructions as to how to make a nuclear device. The scenario of a terrorist group either obtaining or manufacturing and using a weapon of mass destruction is no

1Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are commonly referred to by the term "weapons of mass destruction" or "WMD;" they are also sometimes call "NBC" weapons, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. Another term used by many of the individuals in the investigation is "CBW," which means all chemical and biological weapons.

longer the stuff of science fiction or adventure movies. It is a reality which has already come to pass, and one which, if we do not take appropriate measures, will increasingly threaten us in the future." [Emphasis added.] Indeed, if chemical or biological agents had been successfully used in addition to the explosives at the two most dramatic terrorist incidents in the United Statesthe World Trade Center and Oklahoma City-the results would have been even more catastrophic. 2 Likewise, as noted in a prior Subcommittee hearing, if the terrorists in those incidents had utilized merely a radiological device3 containing plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or other radioactive substance, they would have rendered large parts of both cities uninhabitable for years to come. An actual nuclear weapon would have destroyed a good part of both cities killing tens of thousands.

Just how well prepared is the United States to respond to such events is the subject of today's hearing. The need for a review of U.S. government counterterrorism programs and policies was highlighted last November by a number of witnesses at the Subcommittee's hearing on chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In particular, the testimony of Admiral Frank E. Young, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness of the U.S. Public Health Service, raised serious concerns about the effectiveness of the current government efforts to respond to these new weapons of terrorism. He noted that many States and local communities appeared unprepared for such a contingency and that the Federal agencies involved were lacking adequate funding.

As a result of such revelations, Senator Nunn tasked the Minority Staff with conducting a survey of our Nation's ability to respond to a nuclear, biological or chemical terrorist incident within the United States. Our inquiry examines two aspects of this response: how equipped the government is to manage the crisis posed by a credible threat of deployment of a WMD (crisis management); and how ready the government is to manage the unthinkable consequences of the actual use of a WMD (consequence management).

4

On the basis of its inquiry, the Staff believes that, despite tremendous improvements made within the last few years to respond to such incidents, overall our Nation is not adequately prepared to respond to a WMD terrorist event. Much improvement is necessary in support of our country's "first responders"-local fire, police, rescue and emergency room personnel. Government efforts need to be better coordinated, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities must make greater strides in information-sharing.

In contrast, the Staff found that our government appears adequately prepared to respond to terrorist incidents at special events where authorities take unique precautions, such as the upcoming Olympics, planned events of the United Nations, or visits of foreign dignitaries. In anticipation of those incidents, Federal authorities marshal great resources and demonstrate extraordinary coordination on the Federal, State and local level. The response to such discrete events is remarkable and deserves tremendous praise. The Staff's focus thus is not on protection afforded special events; but rather, on the efforts, operation and coordination that exists to respond to a terrorist incident occurring at other times.

The Staff's report is a culmination of a 5 month study which included numerous interviews and briefings with Federal, State, and local officials who would be involved in the response to a terrorist incident. The Staff also received and reviewed hundreds of documents that relate to our government's response mechanism to such an incident. Although extensive, our review is not intended to be comprehensive. The following Staff findings, however, were shared by most of the experts we consulted:

2 In fact, it appears that the defendants in the World Trade Center case may have tried to use a chemical device but failed in their attempt to create a contemporaneous cyanide gas at

tack.

3 A radiological device is any conventional weapon containing radioactive material in addition to an explosive or mechanical disseminating device. It is intended to scatter highly radioactive material and contaminate the surrounding area. Thereby earning itself the sobriquet as a "dirty bomb". It resembles a chemical weapon much more than a nuclear weapon in its effect, since it contaminates territory and poisons living organisms but does not destroy physical structures. It is not a nuclear weapon and does not create a fission reaction, extreme heat or blast effect except to the extent of the conventional charge attached to it.

4 This is the Minority Staff's third such report. On October 31, 1995, the Staff issued a report focusing on chemical and biological WMD and highlighted as a case study the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Tokyo (see Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I, October 31 and November 1, 1995). On March 22, 1996, after receiving extensive testimony on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, the Staff issued its second report (see Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Parts II, March 13, 20 & 22, 1996).

• The threat of a terrorist group using a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction in the United States is real. It is not a matter of "if" but rather "when" such an event will occur.

• Government efforts on the Federal, State and local level need to be better coordinated to respond to such events despite improvements from the recently issued Presidential Decision Directive 39.

• Intelligence is our best and first line of defense against terrorism, but problems of coordination and information sharing among agencies still appear to continue despite recent efforts to resolve them.

• The local government entities such as fire, police, ambulance, rescue and emergency rooms, who will be called to respond in the first critical hours of a WMD terrorist incident, are generally inadequately trained and ill-equipped to handle the difficult challenges posed by WMD incidents.

• Our ability to respond to a nuclear incident, although significantly improved within the last 2 years, still needs greater attention and increased financial support.

• The use of chemical and biological weapons, in a civilian setting, which most experts agree is more likely, presents unique problems and requirements that do not appear to be adequately addressed under current Federal policies and

programs.

• Overall funding needs to be increased to prepare for the consequences of a WMD terrorist incident, especially for joint training and field exercises.

Finally, the Staff would note that concern for our Nation's preparedness was especially acute at the State and local level. The concerns of these local officials were echoed by terrorism experts, many of whom previously had extensive government experience. At the senior levels of the Federal Government, however, the Staff received assurances that any such concerns were overstated or were being remedied. Nonetheless, recommendations which merit consideration by Congress and the Administration are set forth in this Statement. 5

II. THE CHANGING THREAT OF TERRORISM

In recent years a number of terrorism trends have emerged that are of significance to our government's response. The overall number of incidents worldwide has declined while the lethality of such attacks has increased. Although zealotry for a cause is not a new phenomenon, the availability of weapons of mass destruction is relatively new and disturbing. Furthermore, whereas many terrorist acts in the past involved political objectives, more recent incidents including the Pan Am explosion over Lockerbie, the World Trade Center, the Oklahoma City bombing, the Tokyo subway sarin attack, the rash of bombings in Paris and the Israeli suicide attacks, appear to be aimed solely at punishing a country or government by causing as many civilian casualties as possible.

Many of the terrorist groups of today appear more likely to utilize weapons of mass destruction notwithstanding public opinion or a political debate. In part, these terrorist groups may be religiously based and/or, as in the case of the Aum Shinrikyo, under the control of a megalomanic, charismatic leader. These terrorist groups have no qualms about mass casualties since, in their minds, they are fulfilling a divinely inspired agenda that, as in the case of the Aum Shinrikyo, may include bringing about an Armageddon.

Testimony from the New York trials connected to the World Trade Center bombing confirms that the defendants were intent on punishing the United States by causing as many casualties as possible. They contemplated blowing up one tower of the World Trade Center in such a manner as to collapse it into the other tower, bombing the United Nations, and blowing up various tunnels into Manhattan. To them, the United States represented a "devil" that could be punished at will. The defendants in the Oklahoma Federal building bombing appear to have been directed by a similar desire to punish the Federal Government by causing as much damage and human carnage as possible.

Although in the past, such zealots would be of concern, their ultimate threat was limited by their capabilities. Today, the advent of the information age and the dis

5 The anti-terrorism bill passed by the House, H.R. 2703, authorizes $5,000,000 for specialized training and equipment for metropolitan fire and emergency departments. The Senate bill, S. 735, contained no similar provision when it passed on March 2, 1996. House and Senate have appointed conferees, but no date has been agreed upon for the conference.

« PreviousContinue »