Recommendation 4: It is recommended that the FBI continue to participate in future interagency exercises, not only to test and train FBI personnel, but to inform participants from other Federal agencies of the FBI's lead role in responding to terrorist and/or malevolent nuclear incidents. This type of exercise exposes FBI personnel to the challenge of this unique threat and provides for basic crisis management training which is useful in other crisis situations faced by the FBI.

Recommendation 5: Given the realities of an actual

nuclear terrorist incident, consideration should be given for involving the National Security Counsel in future nuclear-related field exercises.

The role of the EU, LD, during "Mirage Gold" was to provide forensic advice to the FBI command post and operational elements and to manage and

conduct the post-disablement/

detonation forensic operations

The exercise objectives of the EU, LD, were:

for the

a) to evaluate the plans, procedures, and capabilities

on-site forensic functions of the FBI; and

b) to evaluate and test the elements of which are needed to support on-site forensic functions or спе

EVALUATION

Neither of the above-mentioned objectives were met during the "Mirage Gold" exercise. The EU, LD, primarily participated in the portion of the exercise which involved the placement of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) in the New Orleans area by a terrorist organization. The scenario would have been of sufficient complexity to adequately exercise and evaluate all the elements of the which would support on-site forensic functions of the FBI as well as the FBI forensic operation itself. Unfortunately this did not take place.

the

exercise.

It soon became obvious that no contingency plans for had been considered prior to the

As the actual detonation had been simulated, a simulation of the should have been requested. However, no simulation was requested by the

Instead, the

The

command element embarked on a debate of several alternatives for dealing with this EOD team, in full protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus,

This exceeded

the personnel safety limit for wearing of the protective equipment. Several heat casualties were experienced by personnel. The Exercise Director subsequently terminated this portion of the exercise for safety concerns.

players' comments with regards to their expected involvement in the FBI forensic operations was very positive. They indicated a willingness and enthusiasm for assisting in the collection of evidence in the contaminated environment under the direct supervision of FBI Laboratory EU personnel.

The local FBI Evidence Recovery Team (ERT) was mobilized and brought with their equipment. This occurred at the request of EU personnel (prior to this request the ERT was not put on alert for possible involvement in the exercise). DOE Health Science personnel began making preparations for outfitting EU and ERT personnel with full protective clothing and were very helpful in the explanation of the use of this equipment.

All equipment, personnel and preparations were ready for the beginning of forensic operations. However, due to the no forensic collection efforts could be conducted.

Recommendation 8: It is recommended that the FBI's Laboratory Division, in conjunction with the development of a protocol for managing evidence collection

organized and conducted at a suitable

coordinate the

should be

facility involving the

Recommendation 9: Any future operations or exercises of this type should include staffing of the with FBI

representatives. Additionally, local Evidence Response Team (ERT) representatives should be involved in planning for such an event and be brought into play as their mission dictates.

The FBI, as the lead Federal agency in charge of the entire crisis management response to a terrorist or criminalrelated nuclear crisis, is responsible for coordinating the Federal response to such incidents. This involves the establishment of a

i

EVALUATION

Bringing additional SAC's and ASAC's to a prolonged exercise crisis such as "Mirage Gold" provided a very beneficial training opportunity for participating managers. It also made a more efficient "joint agency" command post. FBI managers efficiently delegated responsibilities and defined objectives throughout the exercise. The shift changes were also handled in a manner that led to a smooth transition from one group of players to the next. The FBI was set up well considering the space limitations and functioned very effectively. The interface between the command elements also worked out well. However, it would have been helpful if representatives of DOE/DOD/FEMA had received briefings on how the to their entry into that environment.

worked prior

Overall,

on-scene command post operations and management staff were
determined to be well organized and well managed.
conferences were held when needed, not too often to be
disruptive, were properly focused on the immediate issues, and
handled in a manner that promoted effective decision making.
Interaction between the and FBIHQ was timely and responsive.
Compliance with existing MOU's and applicable Federal statutes
relating to nuclear incidents was appropriate.

by the

Preparatory briefings were provided for FBIHQ personnel throughout the crisis in anticipation of planned action and as a follow-up to those events. These briefings were often unsolicited and provided with sufficient frequency to insure FBIHQ was fully aware of most significant events. For example, briefings were provided in anticipation of seeking authorization to utilize the and also when requesting FBIHQ to confer with the Attorney General

In all cases, the briefings were comprehensive and
accurate. Additionally, situation reports were regularly
provided as a follow-up to
the conclusion of

and prior to and at