FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Objective 5: Evaluate the operation of a joint information system during a situation which begins as a law enforcement problem and evolves into a consequence management problem. Discussion: This objective, more than any of the others, served to highlight the problems that exist at the operational level (i.e., the local level) in understanding the concept of consequence management and the planning that must be done in ensure the safety of the population in this type of scenario. The initial reluctance by the FBI SAC, functioning as the tead Federal agency for the incident, to provide information to any other agencies or organizations, except DOE, created an exercise media problem that continued to grow as the exercise progressed. Not only did it cause a media problem, it resulted in a situation where there was concern that the exercise timeline might be affected if aggressive play by the State continued; play that was driven by the State's inability to get information from the FBI and the developing feeling that they (the State) were being "stonewalled" regarding the actual status of the situation. While it may be argued that the amount of interest and information generated by the exercise media may have been unrealistic (the media would not have had as much information as they did based on the situation) the fact that the media must be dealt with is an inescapable fact, particularly in an environment where the electronic media can and will provide "instantaneous news." Consideration must also be given to the fact that if the media perceives that something is happening and it is unable to obtain information from a credible source, it may very well began to speculate. This speculation may cause undue concern among the general public and result in a situation worse than that which would occur if less than complete information was provided by a credible source. Evaluation: The operation of a joint information system under the conditions portrayed in the scenario of Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was unsatisfactory. It is considered unsatisfactory primarily due to the manner in which media and State requests for information were responded to and the fact that a Joint Information Center (JC) was not formed until approximately mid-way through the exercise (182322). Recommendation: The operation of a joint information system should be considered as a subject to be addressed in a tabletop exercise where the advantages and disadvantages of various information release policies can be thoroughly examined. The tabletop could also be used to further discuss the point in an ongoing operation when responsibility for the joint information system should shift from one agency to another. FEMA's opportunity to participate in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD proved to be a valuable experience in several respects. The exercise clearly demonstrated the lack of understanding that exists in agencies not familiar with the FRP regarding the concept of consequence management in an environment where a catastrophic emergency/event is possible but has not yet occurred. It FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY was also evident that the channels of communication between the FBI and other organizations and agencies not directly involved in investigative, tactical, or technical operations in a domestic terrorist environment such as that portrayed in the exercise scenario would be difficult to establish. While the Bureau's reluctance to share information outside of these elements is understandable from an operations security standpoint, it is a matter that needs to be addressed at the headquarters level where mutually agreeable procedures can be developed that will enable the FBI and FEMA to do their respective jobs. The concept of State sovereignty and an appreciation of the actions that a governor might be expected to take to ensure the safety of the population of his State must be understood by representatives of Federal departments, agencies, and organizations who may be called upon to respond to a domestic terrorist situation. Questions that were asked and discussions that were held regarding the FRP and the FRERP applicability in this type of situation points out another problem that exists in structuring a Federal response to a domestic terrorist situation where nuclear materials may be involved. The issue of what plan is applicable at what point in time was discussed and no firm conclusions were reached. This is an issue that needs resolution. On a positive note, the coordination between FEMA Region VI, the State, the DSR staff · and the FRMAC representatives appeared to be very good. Planning for support of potential State requirements under several different possible scenarios proceeded in spite of the lack of information on the current situation. The relative ease with which this planning proceeded can be attributed in large part to the experience gained by emergency management planners from these organizations under the FRP and, in the case of DOD, planning procedures and relationships developed for their MSCA mission. Participation in exercises of the FRP obviously contributed to this base of experience. Corrective actions that can be taken to address the problems noted during Exercise MIRAGE GOLD are generally straightforward. The concept of consequence management and the role that FEMA plays needs to be presented to senior management and planners of all departments and agencies. Not only must the concept be understood, but the manner in which planning is accomplished, the participants, and their information requirements must be recognized. Initiatives to finalize an MOU or other procedural agreement between FEMA and the FBI should continue and efforts to modify the FRP and make it the single Federal Response Plan (the National Response Plan) should be aggressively pursued. As these initiatives are carried forward, FEMA should continue to participate in appropriate nuclear accident/incident exercises. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ATTACHMENT EXTRACTS FROM "MILE SHAKEDOWN: A SERIES OF EXERCISES AFTER ACTION REPORT," First Draft, January 28, 1995, Published by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY This attachment to the Exercise MIRAGE GOLD After Action Report (AAR) provides additional observations/problems noted by planners and participants from organizations and agencies other than FEMA. The source of these comments is the Department of Energy document, "MILE SHAKEDOWN: A SERIES OF EXERCISES AFTER ACTION REPORT," First Draft, January 28, 1995, published by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada. Due to the length of the report (116 pages), only those items of interest to FEMA have been selected for inclusion here. In the Executive Summary of the report, MILE SHAKEDOWN is described as an inter-related series of four interagency exercises that were designed to evaluate the federal capabilities to deal with domestic nuclear terrorism. The first exercise in the series was MICA DIG, a seminar held in Washington, D.C. in December 1993, intended to highlight interagency policies that might affect plans and the execution of a field exercise (MIRAGE GOLD). Issues arising out of MICA DIG were to be brought to the attention of appropriate interagency councils for possible resolution prior to MIRAGE GOLD. The overall objectives for MICA DIG were: Examine existing federal agency policies concerning response to malevolent nuclear weapons emergencies. Familiarize participants with issues and options that may arise as the result of a malevolent nuclear weapons emergency. Provide a forum for open discussion of policies among senior decision makers. Facilitate senior officials from each agency meeting their counterparts from other key federal agencies. Identify issues that must be resolved before MIRAGE GOLD. The second event in the series was a no-notice Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) in June 1994. While the primary objective of the EDRE was to exercise alert, notification, and deployment plans and procedures up to airlift readiness, there was a secondary objective to the exercise. This objective was to develop a realistic schedule for the arrival of various DOE assets in the exercise area since many of them (people and equipment) would be prepositioned prior to the exercise. FEMA was not a participant in this event. In September 1994, the third event, a communications exercise was conducted. Exercise MILD COVER was used to establish the communications systems that were to be used during Exercise MIRAGE GOLD. Since FEMA was not responsible for providing any communications capabilities for the exercise (MIRAGE GOLD), the Agency was not involved in this event either. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was the fourth and final event in the MILE SHAKEDOWN series. It was held in October 1994, in New Orleans, Louisiana. Approximately 850 people from four major Federal agencies, the FBI, DOE, DOD, and FEMA participated in the exercise as players, controllers, and observers. Representatives from the State of Louisiana also participated. Gathering this number of people from various elements of four agencies to take part in the exercise provided an excellent forum for developing an understanding of and participation in the varied command and control relationships typical of a multi-agency operation. The remainder of this attachment will deal with the problems noted during the exercise that have a direct or indirect effect on FEMA or are of interest to the Agency. It should be noted that several of the problems are either directly stated or implied in the Exercise MIRAGE GOLD AAR, the document to which this attachment is appended. In addition, the FEMA exercise objectives are stated in the AAR and will not be repeated here. In order to keep this document unclassified, the problems noted will not be quoted verbatim, but will be paraphrased. The problems noted, with recommended corrective action where provided, are as follows: Problem: The planning period for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was very lengthy (over a year in duration). As a result, planners changed as did many key ⚫issues. Recommendation. A shorter planning period (one year or less) with senior agency planners providing exercise agreements, requirements, and guidance should be used to avoid large numbers of changes. Problem: Many of the same issues and problems are encountered by planners for major exercises. Recommendation: A repository of planning documentation for similar exercises should be established. In addition, the same planners should be used for similar type exercises, where possible. Problem: Exercise objectives established early in the planning process were Recommendation: Exercise objectives must be considered any time there are FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |