these RAP teams, and that grows and, you know, we have found that to be a very successful way to do it.

Of course, the difference between counter-terrorism and accidents is the timing is very, very different, but many of the procedures you go through in terms of the expertise you need in terms of working with the local people are very, very similar and I think, you know, we have found that to be a very helpful experience.

Senator NUNN. I think that is a good point. I think the other key distinction between accidents and terrorism is the terrorist uses a locale and in accidents you have an idea in advance where they might occur because of the location of various materials. Is that right?

Senator NUNN. That would be true in nuclear, as well as chemical and biological. That is a big difference. Trying to protect 50 cities and 120 cities, let alone several hundred more, is totally different than protecting around the sites of certain key areas, which is a much bigger job.

I thank all of you for being here. We appreciate your good work and we welcome your suggestions as we try to put together an overall legislative framework package. Thank you.

I would like to thank staff for an excellent job. You all have put a very significant series of hearings together and a tremendous amount of information, and I know a lot of late nights and a lot of weekends of work. So we thank all the staff.

[Whereupon, at 1:48 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROTH

Our hearing today opens another volume in the Subcommittee's series on weapons of mass destruction. In our previous hearings, we have learned that the potential demand for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons extends from rogue nations to terrorist groups to criminal organizations and even to individuals; and we have analyzed the successes and failures of our nation's efforts to control both weapons and potential buyers.

Today, the Subcommittee will focus on response-specifically, on the ability of our federal, state and local authorities to handle a nuclear, chemical or biological incident.

Two years ago, we began this series of hearings on the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At our first hearing, the FBI Director, Louis Freeh, offered the following words of caution: "The time to move against such threats as nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists is now, not after there has been an incident of mass destruction in our country." This statement-meant to describe the FBI's mission in preventing terrorist activity-is also an appropriate opening for this morning's hearing. It is a distillation of the testimony to follow, warning us of the imperative to counter the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons before there is an incident.

We will hear today from those federal agencies primarily responsible for crisis and consequence management following a terrorist incident involving a weapon of mass destruction. In the aftermath of such an event, the degree of coordination among these various agencies will largely determine their effectiveness. Thus, it is essential that all agencies work together to carry out this mission. Bureaucratic turf battles have no place where the lives of Americans are at stake.

We will also hear from representatives of those who would be called upon first to respond to such an incident-local emergency personnel. I would like to single out one particular witness who deserves our praise and respect. He is Gary Marrs, Chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department. From the efforts of Chief Marrs and countless others in the aftermath of the tragic bombing of the federal building last spring, we learned invaluable lessons not found in any handbook, manual, or training exercise. We learned that local, state and federal responders can successfully work together to manage the consequences of a terrible disaster. We also learned to provide for the unexpected, such as the complicated coordination required by the fact that the disaster site in Oklahoma City was also a crime scene. Perhaps most importantly, we learned humility at the terrorist's hand. And, inspired by this lesson, we must now make certain that our crisis and consequence management capabilities are equal to the task.

Our nation has not faced a terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon or the introduction of a deadly biological or chemical toxin. Nevertheless, we must not allow good fortune to breed complacency. And leadership must come at the federal level, where the expertise and ability to coordinate efforts reside.

No state can afford to ignore this problem. Sean Mulhern, the Emergency Director in my home state of Delaware, has voiced concerns similar to those we will hear from witnesses today. He has advised that federally-sponsored training and awareness programs are important steps towards effective preparedness, but that they must be expanded, particularly in the biological and chemical areas. Mr. Mulhern also has observed that work needs to be done drafting and fine-tuning response plans and acquiring the equipment necessary to confront incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

While there is work to do, there are also people willing to roll up their sleeves and apply their ideas to the tasks at hand. Our job is to ensure that these dedicated individuals, like Delaware's Emergency Director, and like those from whom we will (139)

hear today, be provided the tools and training they need to do their jobs. They are working for all of us; what they tell us today demands our attention.

Again, let me thank my colleague, Senator Nunn, and his staff for elevating this issue to its proper level of importance. I look forward to working with Senator Nunn, Senator Lugar and others in developing and implementing solutions to the exigent problems this series of hearings has exposed. The time to move is now.

One of the critical missions of the Department of Energy (DOE) is to provide
timely and effective technical response to major radiological emergencies.
An element of this program is the operational/technical support that the
Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) provides in our efforts to support the
United States Government's (USG) policy and commitment to combatting
terrorism. Because of this vitally important role of our organization and
DOE/Nevada Operations Office (NV) responsibility to carry out the operation
of this national asset, it is our collective responsibility to ensure that
the commitment we have made to the USG is satisfied.

Over the past several weeks, I have directed my staff to review the overall
status of the readiness capabilities of NEST, focusing specifically on the
recent full field exercise series, Mile Shakedown. The initial indications
of this review are not promising, having indications that our overall stated
capabilities are not as refined as they are required to be. Alleged
shortcomings in the program focus on time lines, deployment logistics, and
overall integration of resources within DOE and the interagency community:
I also have concerns about the integrity of the exercises we have conducted.

As I am certain you appreciate the gravity of this potential problem, I am
requesting that you conduct a general assessment of NEST with respect to the
aforementioned concerns. It is vital that our technical response to nuclear
terrorism manifests the full expertise of the DOE community. Priority must
be given to effective utilization of the unique technical capabilities which
reside within the DOE nuclear weapons program, the cornerstone of DOE's
technical response.

In general terms, the assessment should include an analysis of:

· DOE/NV assessment of the strong and weak points of the NEST program;
DOE/NV plan to address the weaknesses and maintain the strengths,
including milestones; and

A statement of the current NEST capability that can be advertised with
accuracy and integrity today and a statement of projected target.
capability and operational date.

In the area of exercise review, it has come to my attention that NEST exercises have been allegedly conducted in a manner to "stack the deck" in favor of unrealistic success. Some of the particular areas of concern include:

The amount of time required in a real evolution will be less than
allocated in the exercise, requiring expedited procedures and not.
consistent with actual practices;

Rapid decisionmaking and action is inhibited by the huge NEST
structure;

Some information was inappropriately leaked to the players during
Mirage Gold and the June Emergency Deployment Readiness Evaluation.
Specifics include device location, type of source, attempts to provide
out-of-exercise radiographs, and premature recall notification;

Erroneous information/data were given to disablement teams;

The disablement procedure for the device was not appropriate, and Tessons learned from the Mini-Jigsaw conducted in the summer have not resulted in improvements. In fact, it is noted that, in general, the NEST community has neglected to incorporate shortcomings which were brought out at past exercises into the program; and

Pre-deployment of communications capabilities created optimistic and
unrealistic results, which allowed attempts by the Advance Party to
deploy prestaged equipment before it could have realistically
arrived;

Airlift resource expectations are unreasonable and appear to be
extremely out-of-date;

- Safety considerations of the Search Team in a hostile environment need
considerable improvement and thoughtful consideration;

Interactions with and communications between our other emergency
response assets and Federal agencies require improvement.

While my staff's initial review of only a fraction of documents proved disconcerting, I am requesting that your assessment not be limited only to these issues; you are encouraged to address other issues of concern you

uncover:

Since the information that led me to issue this request was provided by DOE/NV, I am sure that you have also noticed similar comments in the Mirage Gold after action reports. While it is certainly expected that some exercise artificialities are unavoidable, it is clear to me that there are some serious concerns about NEST capability. It should also be noted that I recognize the hard work and dedication by the NEST community, who consistently display great technical skill in pursuit of their duties. It is, therefore, our responsibility to ensure that the system is fixed, making it possible for those efforts and talents of our nuclear weapon program personnel to be utilized as effectively as possible.

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