sors for agents that might be used in terrorist incidents. You can type in and get a response right on the computer as to what this particular agent is you are looking at. That is being field tested right now. We have courses in development on rescue operations at a crime scene. We have a course going on in mass casualties and the Integrated Emergency Management Course, sir, which we offered to your State twice for the Olympics. The participants are State and local emergency managers-fire, police. The course is on terrorism, and we just had that in February. We are focusing in on it, but certainly in the exercise arena, it is, as you know, very costly to do a full field exercise, as mentioned earlier. We have not done that. Senator NUNN. Mr. Ambassador, I know I interrupted you. Go ahead. Mr. HOLMES. Mirage Gold did indicate there were these deficiencies, and I am pleased to report that since then the interagency group has largely corrected the deficiencies. The Presidential Decision Directive 39 has been signed which clearly delineates the responsibilities, authorities and procedures for the agencies that make up the NSC body charged with combatting terrorism here and abroad. Domestic interagency procedures are being put into place which mirror those already in effect for responding to terrorism overseas. As I said earlier, we have brought the consequence management side of the Government into the counter-terrorism community. One procedure validated during an I-TRAP exercise was used during the U.S. Government's response to the Oklahoma City bombing. The counter-terrorism community has been focusing hard on chemical and biological terrorism for some time. DOD has also made substantial changes. The Secretary of Defense directed in May of last year that a study be conducted on how DOD provides assistance to domestic civil authorities, in particular focusing on counter-terrorism. The study resulted in the most significant changes in DOD emergency response since 1968. The Secretary of Defense will personally oversee DOD involvement in terrorism incidents, whether overseas or in the United States. The chairman will assist the Secretary of Defense in such incidents. There are revised DOD procedures to respond to disasters and civil disturbances. The Secretary of Defense's involvement in a number of areas is greater than it ever has been in the past. Last Friday, we conducted the fifth I-TRAP exercise focused primarily on potential weapons of mass destruction terrorism and, in particular, how it would be handled at the Atlanta Olympics. We worked through a series of incidents that might face local, State and Federal agencies. We reviewed procedures for crisis and consequence management and how they tie together. We validated improvements and noted areas that needed continued focus and, I might add, identified very few new issues that need immediate attention. The participants involved were from all the relevant Federal agencies, the Atlanta SAC, as well as tactical units from the FBI and DOD charged to assist the Atlanta SAC in various responses. As I said earlier, the results will be used by the FBI in conducting 24-957 96-5 their own exercise with local community responders in Atlanta next month. At the end of the day, the interagency group reported its findings and recommendations to the Vice President, who attended a "hot wash" of the exercise with the Deputy Attorney General and the Deputy Director of the FBI. The Vice President charged us to make necessary corrections and to look into a few additional areas. The exercise showed that there is still some work to be done. We are working to make the corrections. Thank you. Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Holmes. [The prepared statement of Mr. Holmes follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF H. ALLEN HOLMES Thank you, Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) role in Combatting Terrorism; specifically a domestic terrorist threat involving a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon of mass destruction (WMD). As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, I am responsible for policy and oversight of activities related to combatting terrorism. These hearings provide a positive step in educating the public on the nature of the threat and how the U.S. Government will respond. I would like to organize my remarks in the following manner: first, to address the reality of the threat; second, to give a general overview of DOD's Combatting Terrorism program; and finally to discuss the specific measures DOD is taking toward countering the potential use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. The Threat Earlier this month you held hearings and heard testimony regarding both the supply and demand for nuclear materials, technologies, and technicians of the former Soviet Union. I am sure you are also aware of the low cost, easy availability of components, low technical requirement, and difficulty in detecting chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as the primary agency for foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism within the United States, has provided comment on the current threat of domestic nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism. There is no denying "the threat is real." However, we should not let ourselves exaggerate the nature of that threat. The ability to create mass casualties with a weapon of mass destruction depends on many factors, to include weaponization of the substance, an accomplishment that would challenge any terrorist group. The acquisition of proper material and technology as well as the development of an effective delivery means would further challenge a terrorist group. A more significant concern for the U.S. is the psychological fear of a WMD attack. The anxiety generated by such fear may pose far more difficult problems than the physical threat itself. The public must be made aware of the many limitations of the WMD threat and that there are methods of protection. A WMD presents difficult challenges, but the U.S. Government is working hard to deter or prevent use, and to minimize the effects by providing effective consequence management We believe with proper planning, coordination, focused research and development, and intelligence support, the U.S. Government can respond to this threat. DOD is working diligently within the combatting terrorism community to focus this effort. DOD's Combatting Terrorism Effort DOD's Combatting Terrorism effort is part of a coordinated U.S. Government interagency team response. No single federal agency possesses all the authorities or resources needed to effectively conduct the full range of operations to deter, prevent, or resolve a terrorist incident. This is the reason the U.S. Government established a "lead agency" program for combatting terrorism. In June, 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD-39), "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," which reaffirmed the lead agency concept with Department of State (DOS) responsible overseas and Department of Justice (DOJ), acting through the FBI, responsible for domestic crisis management response operations. All other agencies will support the lead agency with personnel and equipment to assist in resolution of a terrorist incident. DOD assets provide a significant supporting role to the lead federal agency. Domestically we support the FBI lead in crisis resolution with all the advice or assistance requested. DOD assets also support State and local agencies with crisis resolution through the FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team (ĎEST) and with consequence management through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Department of Defense is mandated by law, executive order, and National Security Directives to have an effective Combatting Terrorism Program. In November of 1988, the Secretary of Defense designated the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC) as the office responsible for DOD policy and oversight on combatting terrorism. Since its inception, OASD(SO/LIC) has represented DOD as a key member of the U.S. Government's interagency counterterrorism effort. OASD(SO/LIC) routinely meets with other federal agencies to discuss, plan, and coordinate the US Government response to terrorism. This interagency combatting terrorism team has been in existence since the mid-1980s. In DOD, we divide Combatting Terrorism into two components; Antiterrorism (AT) and Counterterrorism (CT). AT includes all defensive measures employed to protect personnel and facilities against a terrorist incident. CT is our offensive capability. Antiterrorism: It is DOD policy to protect its personnel, their family members, facilities, and equipment from terrorist acts. Toward that end, DOD routinely budgets for security at military installations and DOD Dependent schools. To assist in the AT effort, OASD(SO/LIC) published DOD Directive 0–2000.12, “DOD Combatting Terrorism Program” in August 1990. This directive assigns specific responsibilities to various DOD elements for briefing personnel on any known or suspected terrorist threats and informing them of security measures to be taken, as well as, ensuring prompt dissemination of intelligence information on terrorist threats, including specific warning of threats against DOD personnel and their family members. Additionally, in February 1993, OASD(SO/LIC) published DOD 0-2000.12-H, "Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence." This directive provides a comprehensive reference for all DOD components on antiterrorism awareness, education, and training activities. To highlight AT awareness and importance, OASD(SO/LIC) sponsors an annual DOD Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference which serves as a forum for DOD and other U.S. Government antiterrorism specialists from throughout the United States and abroad to identify key issues and to reach consensus on possible solutions. The ASD(SO/LIC) also established an awards program in 1993 to recognize and praise those who work quietly behind the scenes to protect DOD personnel and installations; sensitize U.S. military members and their families to the nature and dangers of terrorism; and deter and prevent terrorist acts. DOD also provides antiterrorism training. In this regard, DOD complements the Department of State's program for Antiterrorism Training Assistance by providing training to foreign military counterparts which may take the form of small unit exchanges or participation in joint training and exercises. A detailed accounting of the training that is provided to foreign governments is discussed in the DOD portion of State Department's Annual Antiterrorism Report to the Congress. This classified report is mandated under provisions of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. DOD also works routinely with the Department of State in distributing travel advisories for DOD members and families. DOD follows the U.S. Government policy on "no double standard” regarding availability of threat information. This dictates that American Government officials cannot benefit from receipt of information which might equally apply to the public but is not available to the public. Counterterrorism: Counterterrorism is DOD's support for U.S. policy to deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks against U.S. interests wherever they may occur. DOD supports the initiatives of the lead agencies in carrying out U.S. counterterrorism policy. For example, my office supports the State Department's Coordinator for Counter Terrorism in consultations with foreign governments, or in the deployment of a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) at the request of an American Ambassador to assist a host government. We also assist the Department of Justice in the extradition or rendition of indicted terrorists. In addition, DOD largely funds the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) an interagency body responsible for the research and development of CT technologies. While it is DOD's policy not to discuss the capabilities, designation, mission and locations of DOD counterterrorism special units in a public forum, I would like, however, to briefly outline how DOD responds to a terrorist incident. During such an incident, as the ASD(SO/LIC), I have two primary roles. I am the principle civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense. Additionally I serve as his representative to the interagency crisis coordinating body, which will handle the counterterrorism re sponse. The Joint Staff provides a representative as well. I provide policy advice while the Joint Staff representative provides operational comment and advice. An Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism coordinates and exercises the U.S. Government counterterrorism response capabilities routinely, from the tactical to the national level. DOD special mission units frequently train and exercise with foreign CT units. Whether supporting lead agency efforts or receiving assistance which enhances tactical capabilities from other government agencies, DŎD is an integral part of a well organized and functional U.S. counterterrorism community. DOD's Capability to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) DOD has plans for the recovery of a lost or stolen U.S. nuclear weapon. The concern over use of a nuclear weapon as a WMD during a terrorist incident, however, became a DOD issue in early 1991. At that time efforts were undertaken to prepare response capabilities in the event of a nuclear terrorist incident. This started as a DOD effort, with the cooperation of several non-DOD agencies. By early 1993 it was realized this effort required an expanded effort, and a coordinated interagency working group was established specifically to address the issue. This working group examined existing plans, interagency procedure, and capabilities to ensure the U.S. Government had the ability to respond to a nuclear weapon related terrorist contingency. The working group identified several concerns and recommended responsibility for crisis management and coordination of a federal response to a nuclear terrorist incident be conducted in accordance with national combatting terrorism policy. The group recognized that procedural guidelines required amendment to specifically cover a nuclear terrorist incident and to replace an existing MOU between DOD/Department of Energy (DOE)/DOS. As the interagency group focused on the identified issues, DOD and DOE, in close cooperation, progressed with efforts to ensure the U.S. Government had the operational capability to respond to a nuclear terrorist incident. DOD's efforts focused on tactical recovery, complementing DOE's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) capability. I have hosted a series of five senior level interagency table top exercises, the Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program (I-TRAP), several of which were focused on weapons of mass destruction. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operational units have also sponsored/conducted an increasing number of tactical field and command post exercises, coordinated through the interagency, focused on a nuclear terrorist threat scenario. DOD participated in the DOE MILE SHAKEDOWN exercise series, to include exercise MIRAGE GOLD. The training objectives of these exercises, held at both the tactical and national levels, focused on many of the issues mentioned in the DOD/DOS report to the NSC and have identified limitations and requirements with regard to policy, procedures, and technology. The combatting terrorism community is addressing each of these concerns and working to improve the U.S. Government response capability. As work progressed it became apparent, however, that the terrorist WMD threat went beyond the threat of a nuclear terrorist incident. Concern grew over the threats posed by chemical and biological weapons. This concern was validated with the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack of the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995. The combatting terrorism community further recognized that even though all WMD had some common points; production, delivery, countermeasures, and expertise required to resolve a WMD terrorist incident varied significantly with each threat. The combatting terrorism community thus separated the three types to better. focus its efforts at identifying the best available capability and procedures for responding to each unique threat. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," was signed June 21, 1995. This directive incorporated many of the recommendations made by the DOD/DOS report to the NSC of July 6, 1993. The PDD reinforces the interagency process for combatting terrorism and directs lead agency responsibilities and support requirements for both the response to domestic and overseas terrorist incidents. A significant new requirement identified in PDD-39 is the requirement for coordination between crisis and consequence management in resolving a terrorist WMD incident The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is identified as responsible for ensuring the Federal Response Plan is adequate in responding to the consequences of terrorism, to include terrorism involving WMD. DOD possesses significant assets that could, at the onset of a domestic terrorist WMD incident, support a coordinated federal resolution effort. DOD will provide response assistance to the FBI for crisis response and to FEMA for consequence management In response to Section 379, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, the Principal Director, Emergency Preparedness Policy, Office of the Deputy to The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) for Policy Support is preparing a report addressing DOD support to an attack-related civil defense emergency. Another DOD program within the interagency CT community is the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) which provides fast-track research and development of CT equipment. The TSWG is currently engaged in twelve projects aimed specifically at enhancing our response capability for nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorist incidents. Recently, we began a review of all TSWG projects to ascertain if acceleration of these projects with additional funding could bring equipment online faster for use by our response units. Mr. Chairman, we are confident of our capability to respond quickly to terrorist acts, to include those involving a weapon of mass destruction. There remain many technical challenges in responding to the use of weapons of mass destruction and I assure you that the interagency CT community is working hard each day to solve those challenges. We are committed to working closely with you to see that American people are protected against the menace of international terrorism wherever and whenever it may arise. Senator NUNN. In the Mirrored Image exercise, the after_action report of the Defense Nuclear Agency1 says here, "Federal operational plans and guidance are not fully integrated to provide a coordinated response to a weapons of mass destruction incident." Are you familiar with that? Mr. HOLMES. I am familiar with the charge, and today that situation has been corrected. Senator NUNN. You are saying that has been corrected since this incident? Mr. HOLMES. Yes, it has. Senator NUNN. This was done in March of 1996. Mr. HOLMES. Oh, I am sorry. I thought you were talking about the other one. Senator NUNN. This is March of 1996. Mr. HOLMES. I am sorry. I was thinking about Mirage Gold. Mr. HOLLISTER. We have not seen that, sir. Mr. HOLLISTER. No, sir, FEMA has not seen it. Senator NUNN. Well, maybe you can answer that for the record and take that for the record. Mr. HOLMES. We will take it for the record. Senator NUNN. Mr. Blitzer, you described the FBI's recent response to a threatened chemical attack at an industrial park. Our staff was told by the fire chief in that local community that, "his office was not advised of the pre-warn threat until after troops and the FBI had been mobilized, and that then it was only a courtesy call." He said he was the last to know. I know you cited this as an example of coordination, but that is not the local perspective. Mr. BLITZER. Again, I kind of-I don't kind of-I divide it into two different sides. In this particular case, we had a responsibility of getting in there with the crisis team and preventing this thing from happening, which we did. On the consequence team and I see it more in the consequence; that could be a potential consequence we did work extremely closely with Public Health and the other consequence agencies on that particular situation. Why the fire chief wasn't advised, I can't answer that question. I don't know the answer. Senator NUNN. If you don't test consequence management during the test of crisis management, how do you determine really when the hand-over occurs? This has been pointed out consistently as a 1 Exhibit #19 is retained in the files of the Subcommittee. |