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1. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: The Mile Shakedown Series of Exercises: A Com-
pilation of Comments and Critiques, February 8, 1995, U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, Nevada Operations Office

b. Redacted Copy: The Mile Shakedown Series of Exercises: A Compila-
tion of Comments and Critiques, February 8, 1995, U.S. Department
of Energy, Nevada Operations Office

2. Memorandum to Manager, Nevada Operations Office, Department of En-

ergy, prepared by Charles J. Beers, Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Deputy

Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Support, De-

fense Programs, Department of Energy, dated January 25, 1995, regard-

ing Nuclear Emergency Search Team, Reviewed Version, Does Not Con-

tain Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

3. Executive Summary, Mile Shakedown After-Action Report, dated June
30, 1995

4. Consequence Management For Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical (NBC)
Terrorism, The Federal Response Plan, A Status Report To The Presi-
dent, Submitted by Federal Emergency Management Agency, dated Janu-
ary 19, 1996

5. a. Memorandum to the NEST Community from Terry Vaeth, Acting

Manager, Nevada Operations Office and Charles J. Beers, Jr., Rear

Admiral, U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Applica-

tion and Stockpile Support, Defense Programs, Department of Energy,
dated July 24, 1995, transmitting July 12, 1995 NEST Assessment
Team Report

b. Department of Energy, NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Team) As-
sessment Team Report, July 12, 1995, Duane C. Sewell, Chairman
(Referred to as "Sewell Report")

6. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: Navigating the Course of Emergency Planning
in New York City, An Analysis of Chemical Disaster Preparedness,
Response and Planning, Based on the New York City No-Notice Mobi-
lization Exercise, April 11, 1995

b. Redacted Copy: Navigating the Course of Emergency Planning in New
York City, An Analysis of Chemical Disaster Preparedness, Response
and Planning, Based on the New York City No-Notice Mobilization
Exercise, April 11, 1995

7. Memorandum to John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, dated March 8, 1996, from
National Security Council, regarding Unclassified FEMA Abstract on
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39

141

9. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: "Mirage Gold" Full Field Exercise, 10/16-21-94,
New Orleans, Louisiana, FBI After-Action Report

12. Letter from Gary L. Briese, Executive Director, International Association
of Fire Chiefs, dated January 31, 1995, to Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA), regarding preparedness for U.S. fire and emer-

13. SEALED EXHIBIT: "Mirrored Image After-Action Report" dated March

10, 1996

14. Department of the Army Memorandum, dated November 15, 1994, re-

garding Exercise Mirage Gold After-Action Report

15. Report, "Comprehensive Exercise Program-Policy Overview, July 1995,"
prepared by Federal Emergency Management Agency

16. Memorandum received from International Association of Fire Chiefs re-
garding estimated cost to support firefighter and emergency service train-
ing

17. Nuclear Emergency/Terrorism Response Plan, State of California, Gov-
ernors Office of Emergency Services, September 1991

18. Letter to Senator Sam Nunn, dated November 15, 1995 from Robert

H. Kupperman, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International

Studies, regarding comprehensive terrorism policy

*

19. Briefing slides from Defense Nuclear Agency regarding Mirage Gold and
Mirrored Image Exercises

22. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: Letter to John F. Sopko, Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations, from Environmental Protection Agency, regard-
ing chem/bio terrorism

b. Redacted Copy: Letter to John F. Sopko, Permanent Subcommittee

on Investigations, from Environmental Protection Agency, regarding

chem/bio terrorism

23. Joint Report to Congress, Preparedness and Response To A Nuclear,

Radiological, Biological, or Chemical Terrorist Attack, prepared by the

Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, June 1996

24. Chart, U.S. Army Response to Chemical/Biological Terrorism

25. Briefing slides, Technical Contingency Response To A CB Terrorism Inci-
dent

26. Making Intelligence Smarter, The Future of U.S. Intelligence, Report of
an Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, 1996
27. Laurie Mylroie, "The World Trade Center Bomb: Who is Ramzi Yousef?
And Why It Matters." The National Interest, Winter 1995/96

28. Sentencing statement of Judge Duffy, trial judge of World Trade Center

bombing case

*

*

*Retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF

MASS DESTRUCTION

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1996

U.S. SENATE,

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn, Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Levin, and Lugar [ex officio].

Staff Present: Dan Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority; John Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Alan Edelman, Counsel to the Minority; Mark Webster, Investigator to the Minority; Mary D. Robertson, Assistant Chief Clerk to the Minority; Richard Kennan, Customs Detailee; Renee Pruneau Novakoff, CIA Detailee; Zachary Davis, Library of Congress; Harold Damelin, Chief Counsel to the Majority; Michael Bopp, Counsel; Carla Martin, Chief Clerk; Stephen Levin, Counsel; Ken Myers (Senator Lugar); Rick Valentine (Senator Smith); Ian Brzezinski (Senator Roth); Richard Fieldhouse (Senator Levin); Max H. Della Pia (Senator Levin); and John Guest (Senator Lieberman).

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN

Senator NUNN. The Subcommittee will come to order.

Just over 1 year ago, on March 20, 1995, the world was shocked by reports from Japan that a little-known religious cult had carried out a sarin gas attack on the unsuspecting passengers of the Tokyo subway system. Twelve people were killed in that attack and over 5,000 injured. With a more efficient delivery system, tens of thousands would have perished in that attack. Yet, the damage of the Tokyo attack went far deeper than the mere number of casualties, as tragic as they were. With the Tokyo attack, the world crossed a historic and awesome threshold. Weapons of mass destruction were used for the first time on a civilian population for terrorist purposes. On March 20, 1995, what had previously been unthinkable became a reality.

Could such an attack happen here in the United States? Until a few years ago, most Americans probably would have answered no. Terrorism was thought of as something that happened overseas, not on the streets of America. But that confidence was badly shaken on February 26, 1993, when an explosion struck the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six and injuring over 1,000.

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It was clear that America was no longer immune to the threat of foreign terrorists.

Two years later, on April 19, 1995, a bomb made of 5,000 pounds of a fertilizer and fuel oil mixture tore apart the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 and injuring over 500. The Oklahoma City bombing forced America to realize that the threat of terrorism could come not only from foreign sources, but from domestic sources as well.

What has become apparent is that we live in an age when terrorism can strike anywhere at any time, even right here in America. We must also recognize that terrorists today may no longer feel constrained to use only conventional weapons and explosives. As this Subcommittee discussed in its earlier hearings and reports, the information age and the disintegration of the Soviet empire have combined to make available some of the most deadly weapons known to man, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Unfortunately, terrorist groups and even individuals with terrorist ambitions can obtain these weapons. Unlike our foes of the Cold War, these enemies aren't pursuing these weapons to promote a deterrence strategy. They are much more likely to use them. That is why I have asked the Subcommittee minority staff months ago to examine how well equipped we are as a Nation to respond to that horrendous moment, God forbid, when we receive a credible threat that a weapon of mass destruction is here in the United States or, worse, how prepared we are to deal with the unthinkable consequences should such a weapon be detonated.

The results of the staff's examination which we will hear today are disconcerning. They include the following major findings. Despite recent improvements, government efforts on the Federal, State and local level must be better coordinated in order to respond to a potential terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction. Our agencies in some respects are still suffering from their own inability to transcend age-old turf battles.

Number two, the local government entities such as fire, police, ambulance, rescue and emergency rooms, who will be called upon first to respond in the very critical early hours in a weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident, are inadequately trained and ill-equipped to handle the difficult challenges posed by such incidents, and we will hear testimony on exactly that point this morning.

Third, our ability to respond to a nuclear incident, although significantly improved within the last few years-and the people who have made those improvements deserve considerable credit and I think praise-still needs greater attention and it needs greater and increased financial support.

Fourth, the use of chemical and biological weapons in a civilian setting has been virtually ignored by current Federal policies and programs. This is of great concern because the terrorist use of a chemical and biological weapon is generally recognized as the most likely scenario.

While the staff has identified certain shortcomings, it is also important to recognize where things do work well and where improvements have been made. From all accounts, the response to the Oklahoma City bombing was phenomenal. Resources were avail

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