I just would tell our witnesses that we ask you to limit your statement to 5 minutes, but we will allow you to go up to 10. Our preference is that you finish closer to the 5, but what you have to put in the record is more important than just 5 minutes.

So, we do the clock this way. It is a 5-minute clock, and then we turn it on for another 5 minutes, and you never want to get up to 10, though. OK.

Mr. Conklin.

STATEMENTS OF W. CRAIG CONKLIN, TECHNOLOGICAL SERVICES DIVISION, OFFICE OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND HUBERT MILLER, NRC REGION 1 ADMINISTRATOR, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY LAWRENCE CHANDLER, ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL FOR HEARINGS, ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Mr. CONKLIN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am Craig Conklin, Director of the Technological Services Division of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. My division administers FEMA's Radiological Emergency Program [REP]. I am pleased to be with you today to talk about the REP program and the issues relating to offsite emergency preparedness for nuclear power facilities.

I will discuss the establishment of the program, Federal, State and local program responsibilities, program guidance and regulations, FEMA's revised exercise evaluation methodology, the results of the September 24 exercise, the status of the offsite plans around Indian Point; and then I will talk about the two reports concerning Indian Point and Millstone that were prepared by the New York State contractor, and the July 2001 GÃO report on Indian Point. FEMA recognizes and respects the concerns of the people of New York regarding the health and safety of those living and working in the vicinity of the Indian Point Energy Center. The health and safety of the public is our primary concern.

It is FEMA's responsibility to assure that the emergency plans in place provide a reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the people around the plants can be protected. Exercises of the plants are an important component of that process, as they allow participants to identify strengths and weaknesses in the plans so that corrective actions can be taken.

FEMA believes that the emergency response plans must be flexible and dynamic. We expect them to be continually updated based on changing circumstances or improved procedures. For example, the plans should be updated based on the 2000 census population figures and the new evacuation time estimates that are currently being developed.

In an Executive order dated December 7, 1979, President Carter transferred the Federal lead role in offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, now the Emergency Response and Preparedness Directorate of the Depart

ment of Homeland Security. In response to this new role, FEMA established the REP program. It is important to note that the REP program responsibilities encompass only offsite activities; that is, State, tribal and local government emergency planning preparedness activities that take place beyond the physical boundaries of the power plants. On-site activities continue to be the responsibility of the NRC.

The REP program works closely with 450 State, tribal and local governments to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that offresponse officials can protect their citizens in the event of a nuclear power plant accident.

site

FEMA's responsibilities are to review and evaluate offsite response plans, evaluate the exercises conducted to determine whether such plans can be implemented, make findings on the adequacy of those plans and exercises, and submit those to the NRC.

We also provide radiological emergency response training to first responders and other officials, and at the national level we chair the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee. At the regional level, we chair the Regional Assistance Committee, which has Federal agency membership in the nine FEMA regions with power plants; respond to requests to the NRC; and of course we provide regulatory oversight, rulemaking, and guidance as necessary for effective program implementation.

State, tribal and county responsibilities are to prepare plans and procedures for responding to an accident at a nuclear power plant and review and update them annually as necessary; conduct biennial exercises; ensure that first responders and State, local and tribal officials are trained properly; and finally, to ensure that a response organization's facilities, equipment and supplies are adequate for response to a radiological incident.

In 1980, we issued joint guidance between FEMA and NRC, which establishes the basis for the REP program in a document called Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. This document contains the planning standards and related criteria that we use in evaluating and reviewing offsite response organizations' plans, as well as guidance for onsite aspects addressed by the NRC.

In 1996, we published a Federal Register notice addressing a strategic review of the REP program and requested comments on the REP program. Based on comments received, one of the major recommendations made to FEMA-made by FEMA was to streamline the program and eliminate the exercise checklist and inconsistences among regions. As a result, a new exercise evaluation methodology was developed that is more results-oriented and does not depend on a checklist.

The September 24, 2002, exercise conducted at Indian Point was done to evaluate the offsite emergency response, and NRC evaluated the onsite emergency response. The purpose of the exercise was to determine whether the offsite plans and procedures for responding to an emergency at Indian Point could be implemented to protect the general public. Exercise participants included responders and emergency managers from Westchester, Rockland, Orange

and Putnam Counties in New York; Bergen County, NJ; and the State of New York.

The exercise scenario that was used to drive the players' actions involved a series of mechanical malfunctions that hypothetically resulted in the degradation of plant operating systems and within 4 hours a release of radioactive material from the plant that forced the offsite response organizations to take actions to protect the public.

The specifics of the scenario and the offsite extent of play were developed and agreed upon by a scenario development team. This team consisted of representatives from the licensee, State and local governments, the NRC and FEMA. Although we recommended several times that the exercise contain a terrorism component, the other members of the team decided that such a component should not be incorporated into an exercise at this time, but should be considered for future exercises.

The State and local organizations participating in that exercise demonstrated the satisfactory knowledge of the emergency response plans and procedures, their actions were implemented adequately, and there were no issues that arose to the level of a deficiency. However, evaluators did identify 13 areas requiring corrective action during this evaluation. None of these, though, were raised to an issue that would have endangered the general public. Historically we work closely with our State and tribal partners to ensure the public health and safety remains the focal point of the program. We will continue to do so for the future.

Specific to Indian Point, we have worked closely with them to prepare for the exercise, as well as upgrade local plans and procedures. We have participated in or supported over 50 other activities, including meetings of out-of-sequence exercises, training opportunities, planning sessions, and other independent communications between the FEMA regional office and the State and counties. In January 2002, we provided the State and counties an extensive matrix identifying plant information that we need in order to conduct our review. However, we did not receive that information until a few weeks before the September exercise, thus limiting our ability to thoroughly evaluate these plans for consistency with our regulations. In recognition of the constraints and limitations on the State and local governments, we proceeded with the exercise with the understanding that we would complete this review after the exercise.

In November 2002, we had such a meeting with the States and established a May 2003 timeframe for completion of State and county plan updates that would permit inclusion of the critical evacuation time estimates into the process.

In February 2003, we provided the State and counties opportunities to submit the updated plans as previously agreed upon. If the State and county submitted the information before this date, FEMA will evaluate it and then decide if we can make a determination of reasonable assurance. This deadline provides FEMA with an opportunity to review the final State report that is due shortly and the State plans for distribution of KI that was submitted in February 28, 2003.

1

The most significant remaining issues include the letters of agreement, the updated evacuation time estimate, study of the Joint News Center procedures; school district, preschool, day care center plans for the children.

Two reports on Indian Point, the review of the emergency preparedness on Indian Point and Millstone, issued-that recently finalized, I believe that appendix came out today, validated our findings, especially those specifically identified in January 2002 and December 3, 2002, and February 21 correspondence. Examples of valid information contained in the report include an improved public outreach effort should be used to better educate all sectors of the public on their role. FEMA should develop an outcome-based exercise program for exercise evaluation, and we have developed such an approach, and it was used in the exercise. However, the report may contain information that will help us to better attain this goal, and planning must account for the strong possibility of spontaneous evacuation.

FEMA is committed to continuous improvement of the REP program, and will evaluate each recommendation in the report to determine its validity with regard to the level of emergency preparedness at Indian Point, or to its applicability programwide. FEMA is looking forward to evaluating the final report that came out today.

The GAO report in 2000 was as a result of a steam generator or tube rupture accident at Indian Point. The GAO report included suggestions for improving the program, and concluded that some improvements had been made to the lessons learned since the accident, but further improvement was needed.

The final report was published in 2001. There are several recommendations I would be pleased to discuss with you. The report concluded overall that the Director of FEMA determine the reasons why the four counties responsible for the response at the plant are not knowledgeable about FEMA's initiatives and, if necessary, reassess its current practices of communicating through the State during nonemergency situations. After completion of the report, FEMA responded to the recommendations by communicating with the counties and States simultaneously, and, as detailed in my written testimony, greatly increased communications with the four risk counties.

In conclusion, the REP program is committed to diligent support of the efforts of the State and local governments to improve the REP planning and exercise process.

Again, I would like to thank you, Chairman Shays and Representative Kucinich, for the opportunity to appear before you today. And I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Conklin.

Written Statement of

W. Craig Conklin

Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of the

Department of Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations March 10, 2003

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am W. Craig Conklin, Director of the Technological Services Division in the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. My Division administers the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program. I am pleased to be with you today to talk about the REP Program and the issues relating to offsite emergency preparedness for nuclear power facilities. I will first discuss the (1) establishment of the REP Program, and (2) the program's responsibilities, (3) guidance and regulations; then (4) describe FEMA's revised exercise evaluation methodology, (5) the results of the September 24, 2002 Indian Point exercise, and (6) the status of the Indian Point offsite response plans; and, lastly, address (7) the draft report on Indian Point and Millstone emergency preparedness commissioned by the State of New York and (8) the July 2001 GAO report on Indian Point.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency recognizes and respects the concerns of the people of New York regarding the health and safety of those living and working in the vicinity of the Indian Point Energy Center. The health and safety of the public is our primary

concern.

It is FEMA's responsibility to ensure that the emergency plans in place provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the people around the plants can be protected. Exercises of the plans are an important component of that process; they allow participants to identify strengths and weaknesses in the plans so that corrective actions can be taken.