area also includes state-of-the-art technology used to detect and assess any attempt by unauthorized persons to make entry. Trained and armed responders are positioned to ensure that areas vital to nuclear safety will remain secured. In addition, licensees maintained regular dialogue with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies as a normal part of station security.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the very high level of security within the protected area was further heightened. Additionally, security was expanded to provide an armed responder presence and surveillance capability throughout the overall plant site, also known as the owner controlled area. To give you an idea of the impact of this, the protected area for Millstone is approximately 53 acres. The owner-controlled area is approximately 542 acres, or ten times the size of the protected area.

The NRC has issued orders requiring significant increases in the requirements for physical security, for the process used to determine access authorization for those allowed to enter a nuclear site unescorted, and for decommissioning reactors. Additional NRC security orders are pending.

These new NRC requirements are intended not only to fortify a plant site but also to ensure that plans are in place to respond to a terrorist attack. A great amount of time has been spent on 'table topping' terrorist attack scenarios and how law enforcement resources would be integrated into such a response. Plan and procedural modifications have been made. Corresponding training has been provided.

These changes, taken in total are quite far-reaching and comprehensive.

The attacks of September 11 have also forced licensees to considerably strengthen relationships with the intelligence community, install counter surveillance measures and work toward the common protection of this critical infrastructure.

In many cases, the relationships formed in the integrated emergency planning efforts of the past 20 years were successfully leveraged to improve relationships with law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community. Without regard to NRC or FEMA regulatory oversight, coordination between all levels of government and industry pertaining to intelligence gathering and threat assessment activities has been nothing short of extraordinary. Active participation in homeland security planning activities has also become part of our process moving forward. Examples of these new and forming public/private partnerships include the following:

Dominion now sits on the Critical Infrastructure Sub-panel on Virginia Gov. Mark Warner's Secure Virginia Initiative and works closely with other companies and industries and with all levels of government in an effort to improve the security of critical infrastructures within the Commonwealth. This includes the development of homeland security strategies as they relate to critical infrastructures.

• The National Capital Response Squad of the FBI's Washington Field Office recently came to the North Anna Power Station in Virginia and attended a six-hour training session designed

to familiarize the team with our security program. Without a doubt, that team left the site with a much higher appreciation for the level of security at North Anna and for the level of security throughout the nuclear industry.

• Training exercises prompting a response to a security-related event have been conducted. On July 11, 2002, an exercise conducted at the Millstone Power Station provided an integrated training opportunity for the Millstone emergency response organization to coordinate with the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management; the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection; the Connecticut State Police Emergency Services' bomb squad unit; the Connecticut Department of Transportation; the National Guard, the Waterford Police Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

We participate in monthly Connecticut state and local law enforcement planning and strategy meetings regarding Millstone security and emergency planning. We participate in quarterly emergency planning zone Connecticut and New York community Emergency Management Director meetings. We participate in periodic Connecticut, New York and Rhode Island state emergency management meetings. We take full advantage of these as well as a number of other scheduled and unscheduled opportunities, throughout all levels of the Millstone team to continue the process of joint continuous improvement between the States of Connecticut, New York and Millstone Station in face-to-face settings.

With respect to FEMA and NRC oversight, the existing emergency planning regulatory framework in place enables the company and offsite response organizations to continue to assure public health and safety around nuclear power plants. This framework serves as a solid foundation for an increasing level of emergency preparedness due to a higher level of integration with law enforcement agencies and intelligence assessment functions. While emergency planning regulations have not directly been changed, the regulatory oversight for nuclear emergency preparedness programs has certainly been increased since September 11, 2001.

In the area of nuclear security, the NRC continues to raise the level of regulatory oversight. In addition to NRC issuing a series of orders to increase requirements, the NRC is currently considering a significant expansion of the existing design basis threat and the corresponding adversary characteristics. NRC efforts, while well intended, appear to be looking for the industry to compensate for the federal government's responsibility to defend against an enemy of the state. We believe that any change to the existing design basis threat should be coordinated with the President's recently issued plan for homeland security. It should also recognize the substantial security measures already in place at nuclear plants and take into account the relative vulnerabilities and risks of other elements of our nation's critical infrastructure.

It should be noted that improvements can be made with respect to the integration and timely sharing of intelligence information and the timely sharing of event information. Today, there is no prompt notification process in place to notify licensees of significant information. An advisory alerting us to an upgrade in the national threat level can be issued hours after the upgrade is made effective.

With regard to the Witt report, it is unclear to what degree this review took into consideration the new efforts being taken by the industry and all levels of government in the charge of better securing the country's nuclear power stations. Nevertheless, we are in the process of working with our stakeholders to improve the level of offsite emergency preparedness in Connecticut and Virginia based on the recommendations provided in the report.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the existing emergency preparedness regulatory framework and our public/private partnerships in Connecticut and Virginia provide reasonable assurance of public health and safety. The increased coordination with law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community has substantially strengthened emergency preparedness programs throughout the industry.

Again, I thank you for this opportunity.

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Howard.

Ms. HOWARD. Thank you. Chairman Shays, members of the committee, thank you. My name is Angelina Howard. I am the executive vice president of the Nuclear Energy Institute.

Congressman Shays, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Turner, Mr. Tierney, thank you for letting us be here this afternoon.

The focus of my statement is twofold. First, I will address the proven security of our Nation's nuclear power plants. Our industry's security was second to none in the industrial sector prior to September 11, 2001; and our facilities are even safer and more secure today.

Second, I will discuss the industry's emergency preparedness programs, which are really the gold standard worldwide. They have been tested and proven in scores of nonnuclear emergencies for more than 20 years.

Today, we can discuss nuclear power plant security and emergency preparedness plans, because this industry has had these plans in effect since its inception. Although the industry's commitment to these two facets of our business spans more than 2 decades, our vigilance is even more important today to ensure the safety of our work force, the public, and the security of the 103 reactors that provide electricity for one of every five homes and businesses in our country.

Clearly, nuclear power plants are major contributors to regional electricity supplies. Indian Point, for example, produces nearly 2,000 megawatts of electricity, about 20 percent of the electricity that is used in the New York City area.

Critics have said the plants are not needed and closing the plants would raise consumers' electricity bills a marginal amount, $50 to $100. We can debate whether the price and how the price could change, but just looking historically at the past 2 years, when on-peak power prices in the New York City area hub have increased substantially, when just one Indian Point reactor was shut down, from 43 percent it went up to 50 percent in the following summer. Shutting down both reactors would have an even greater effect on prices, and it is not likely to be minimal.

Nuclear plant safety and security is based on the philosophy of defense in depth. This includes plant design, construction and operating, as well as exacting Federal security requirements that are met and must be met by all of our nuclear plants in this country. After September 11, the industry and the NRC conducted independent reviews of how best to improve our already high levels of security. Since then, as Mr. Renz and others have testified, the industry has increased the security force by one-third, to more than 7,000 highly trained, well-armed officers. We have expanded and fortified the perimeter security zones, increased patrols within those zones. We have tightened access to tour plants and strengthened vehicle barriers. Overall, the industry has spent nearly $400 million on security improvements.

We have conducted in-depth studies of the aircraft analysis and looked at the impact of aircraft on both the containment buildings, spent fuel pools and dry cask storage facilities at these plant sites. We would be pleased to give you a separate briefing on the results of those analyses.

We have also enhanced our frequency and coordination with local and State law enforcement, the intelligence community and the military.

A recently released White House report recommends conducting comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessments of the Nation's critical infrastructure so that resources may be applied to those areas that represent the greatest risk. The nuclear energy industry supports such a recommendation and encourages the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to coordinate its review of nuclear plant security with the Department of Homeland Security.

Daily operation of nuclear energy facilities is based on an integrated approach to protect public health and safety. This includes programs to respond to any emergency, whether an operational event or the response to a potential terrorist attack. As with security, the plant safety begins with its design. Safety features are built into the plant. Several separate steel and concrete barriers protect the reactor. Highly trained, federally licensed reactor operators are responsible for safe operations on a daily basis, and they are an integral part of the facility's emergency response plan.

Emergency exercises and drills test emergency response capabilities, both at the plant and in nearby towns. The industry, State, and local governments participate in these exercises, which are evaluated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

We know that the emergency response programs work, because they have been used to evacuate residents both during natural disasters like hurricanes and floods or in other nonnuclear industrial accidents.

You asked for comments on the Witt Report. The Witt Report on Indian Point and Millstone's emergency preparedness is now final. While we still would take issue with the overall conclusions in the report, I note the report acknowledges that the two plants' emergency plans comply with Federal requirements. The report just takes issue with those requirements.

So if Federal agencies pursue additional review of emergency preparedness of nuclear facilities as part of a national infrastructure protection, this industry will willingly and gladly participate in that review. The nuclear industry is constantly reviewing, drilling, and improving its emergency preparedness plans; and we will, as a matter of course, consider further improvements as our efforts in this area continue.

In conclusion, security and emergency preparedness, just like safe operation, are fundamental components of a thriving nuclear energy industry; and in all three areas we have an exemplary record. As America's consideration of energy security and national security grow more and more urgent, we must continue to rely on reliable, affordable, clean energy, generated at our Nation's 103 nuclear power plants in Connecticut, Ohio, and across the Nation. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Howard follows:]