repeatedly identified as needing attention. Mr. Chairman, GAO is currently conducting reviews of physical security at selected nuclear power plants and is looking in-depth at safety issues at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio. We plan to report the results of our work later this year. Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. Contacts and Acknowledgments For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-3841. (360317) Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Slobodien. Did I get it right this time? Almost. Mr. SLOBODIEN. You did, sir. Mr. SHAYS. Good. It's a good name. Mr. SLOBODIEN. Thank you, sir. Chairman Shays, distinguished members, I am Michael Slobodien, director of emergency programs for Entergy Nuclear, Northeast. I'm honored to appear here before you today, and appreciate the opportunity to provide you with this testimony. I am a board certified health physicist with 33 years of professional experience in radiation safety, industrial hygiene, environmental programs and emergency planning. I have responsibility for the overall program management of Entergy's emergency response activities for the Indian Point Energy Center, the James A. Fitzpatrick Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plants. My offices are in White Plains, NY, and I report to the president of Entergy Nuclear in the Northeast. Entergy is the second largest operator of nuclear power plants in the United States with 10 operating reactors and it is the largest provider of nuclear power industry license renewal and decommissioning services. We managed the planning and early implementation of the decommissioning strategy for the Millstone 1 reactor in Waterford, CT, and currently manage the decommissioning of the Maine Yankee reactor in Wiscasset, ME. Today, I would like to make several points regarding the Indian Point Energy Center and the implications it has for the health and safety of the citizens of New York and the adjacent States of Connecticut and New Jersey. In these remarks, I rely on established science. A most significant point is that an accident at the Indian Point Plant involving the release of large amounts of radioactivity is extremely unlikely. Even in the event of a terrorist attack of the types we have even on civilian and military targets worldwide this includes the intentional crash of a large aircraft into our hardened facilities-the design of the Indian Point Nuclear Plant incorporates extensive safety-feature redundancy and physical protection to ensure that the reactors and spent fuel facilities can withstand a wide sphere of accidents, whether caused by human error, mechanical failure, natural disasters, or acts of terrorism. The plants are in no way dirty bombs. In fact, a nuclear power plant cannot undergo a nuclear explosion. It's a physical impossibility. According to James Kalstrom, former Director of the New York city office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who, at the request of Governor George Pataki, performed an exhaustive security study of Indian Point in the wake of the September 2001 terror attacks on this Nation, Indian Point is, "an extremely safe place," and is among the best protected and most secure civilian facilities in the country. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has frequently said that Indian Point is the best defended reactor in the country. While it is possible, although extremely unlikely, that there could be a circumstance that could lead to a release of radioactivity to the environment, the distances from Indian Point to New York City, Connecticut, and New Jersey are such that radiation doses would be lower than levels that could cause acute injury or illness. Any longterm effects would be indistinguishable from normal background levels. In short, the citizens of Connecticut and New Jersey are not at risk from an accident at Indian Point, including an event that could be caused by terrorists. In the same way, the citizens of New York are not at risk from the three Millstone nuclear reactors in Waterford, CT. These statements that I make are based on extensive worldwide experience in radiation effects gathered since the earliest use of radiation as x-rays discovered by Wilhelm Roentgen in 1895. Since that time, no environmental agent has been studied more extensively than radiation. Our understanding of radiation's transport in the environment, resulting doses, and consequent health effects is documented in many reputable sources, including the National Academy of Science's Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation; the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation; the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, which has studied and continues to follow the population in Japan in its response to the radiation exposure since 1945; the World Health Organization and the International Agency for Research on Cancer, just to mention a few. I've attached in my written statement a bibliography of reports and Internet Web sites that may be beneficial to this committee. A second key point is the analysis related to accidents and their consequences for Indian Point plants do take into consideration a wide spectrum of causes, as I mentioned before-human error, mechanical failure, natural disasters and indeed terrorism. None of the factors noted above, including a terrorist attack, would lead to a release of radioactivity different from what is already analyzed. And I think it's important that I explain why, because the amount of radioactivity in the nuclear power plant is fixed. There's a certain inventory. It's unchanging. A terrorist event neither adds to it nor subtracts. But no worse can happen as a result of that. In fact, our emergency plans and those of government are designed to deal with the challenges that might be caused by a terrorist attack and are not dependent on the cause of an accident. The plans are symptom-based; much as a physician treats a patient who comes into the hospital, based on symptoms, so do we, as emergency planners and responders, deal with symptoms. And our plans are designed to work regardless of the circumstances that could cause release of radioactivity to others. A third key point is that a release of radioactivity to the environment, regardless of the cause, would move into the air in a plume whose size and shape would be determined by prevailing weather. Plumes tend to be narrow, their concentration decreases rapidly with downwind distance and the effects diminish proportionately to the increase in downwind distance. Plumes are functions of nature; they are predictable and they are monitored easily. We know that plumes that could come from Indian Point would tend to remain in the Hudson Valley despite the fact that prevailing winds are from east to west. The structure of the valley itself keeps winds moving generally north to south or south to north in the river valley. Our knowledge of plumes, coupled with our extensive knowledge of radiation effects, enables experts such as Richard Codell and Sarbeswar Acharaya of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conclude that New York City, Connecticut, and New Jersey residents are not at risk from a serious accident at the Indian Point Energy Center. While it is possible to find nuclear power plant accident analyses that predict dire consequences, such analyses have employed grossly unrealistic or impossible assumptions. Last, I'd like to take a few moments to speak to the report on emergency preparedness at Indian Point and Millstone issued by James Lee Witt Associates. Entergy noted that the report contains useful insights and recommendations, many of which we had under way prior to the start of the Witt report study. Two of the areas noted for improvement in this Witt report are public education and outreach. We heartily agree. We believe that all of us here today share in the responsibility to improve the level of education about nuclear power and radiation safety. This is essential to counter the fears inspired by certain advocacy groups, noted by Mr. Witt, that said, "In pursuit of their agenda to close Indian Point, they have misused NRC data presumably to frighten and alarm the public. Misuse of information can lead to behavior that may endanger the public health and safety close." The fears of the public about nuclear power are largely a result of use of misinformation. This is not limited to Indian Point. This, indeed, as has already been discussed, is a national issue. We disagree with a number of points in Mr. Witt's report and do not find support for the conclusion that present radiological emergency plans are not adequate to protect public health and safety. But we believe that those plans are capable and have been demonstrated to protect public health and safety in the extremely unlikely event of a serious accident at the Indian Point Energy Center. They need to be improved, there's no doubt. And we are conscientiously working with the local government and the State of New York to improve those plans. Entergy is committed to operating all of our nuclear plants with safety as the foremost objective. With that in mind, we engaged a panel of experts, including some of the most respected scientists and engineers in the areas of nuclear engineering reactor safety, risk assessment, health physics, counterterrorism, social psychology, emergency communications, and traffic engineering to advise us as we moved forward with our emergency planning improvement efforts. This panel also provided comments to Mr. Witt on his draft report, and brief curriculum vitae of these experts is attached to the written statement. Entergy is pleased to provide this testimony, and we are prepared to work with Congress as you work toward improving the Nation's security and emergency preparedness. We invite the members of this committee to visit the Indian Point Energy Center in |