GAO Highlights Highlights of GAO-03-528T, a report to the March 2002 NUCLEAR REGULATION Emergency Preparedness Issues at the Why GAO Did This Study commercial nuclear power plants Since 2001, the Entergy Corporation has assumed ownership of the Indian Point 2 plant from the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (ConEd). www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getpt?GAO-03-528. To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Jim Walls at (202) 512-3841 or welis@gao.gov. What GAO Found In 2001, GAO reported that, over the years, NRC had identified a number of emergency preparedness weaknesses at Indian Point 2 that had gone largely uncorrected. ConEd had some corrective actions underway before a 2000 event raised the possibility of a leak of radioactively contaminated water into the environment. ConEd took other actions to address problems during this event. According to NRC, more than a year later, the plant still had problems similar to those previously identified-particularly in the pager system for activating emergency personnel. However, NRC, in commenting on a draft of GAO's report, stated that ConEd's emergency preparedness program could protect the public. Four counties responsible for responding to a radiological emergency at Indian Point 2 had, with the state and ConEd, developed a new form to better document the nature and seriousness of any radioactive release and thus avoid the confusion that occurred during the February 2000 event. Because they are the first responders in any radiological emergency, county officials wanted NRC and FEMA to communicate more with them in nonemergency situations, in addition to communicating through the states. However, NRC and FEMA primarily rely on the states to communicate with local jurisdictions. Since GAO's 2001 report, NRC has found that emergency preparedness weaknesses have continued. For example, NRC reported that, during an emergency exercise in the fall of 2002, the facility gave out unclear information about the release of radioactive materials, which had also happened during the February 2000 event. Similarly, in terms of communicating with the surrounding jurisdictions, little has changed, according to county officials. County officials told GAO that a videoconference systern-promised to ensure prompt meetings and better communication between the plant's technical representatives and the counties-had not been installed. In addition, NRC and FEMA continue to work primarily with the states in nonemergency situations. Although they note that there are avenues for public participation, none of these is exclusively for the county governments. GAO did not evaluate the draft Witt report or verify the accuracy of its findings. The draft Witt report is a much larger, more technical assessment than the 2001 GAO report. While both reports point out difficulties in communications and planning inadequacies, the draft Witt report concludes that the current radiological response system and capabilities are not adequate to protect the public from an unacceptable dose of radiation in the event of a release from Indian Point, especially if the release is faster or larger than the release for which the programs are typically designed. GAO is aware that, in commenting on a draft of the Witt report, FEMA disagreed with some of the issues raised but said the report highlights several issues worth considering to improve emergency preparedness in the communities around Indian Point and nationwide. NRC concluded that the draft report gives "undue weight" to the impact of a terrorist attack. United States General Accounting Office Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss emergency preparedness at operating commercial nuclear power plants. Twenty-four years ago, in March 1979, the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania created considerable alarm and uncertainty in the surrounding areas about the plant's safety and the adequacy of emergency planning. On the broader front, the American public focused not only on Three Mile Island but also on safety and emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants nationwide. With the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, public concern about the plants has increased again. Concerns have focused principally on ensuring the plants' physical security and then on emergency preparedness in case terrorists are successful in their attacks. The nation currently has 104 commercial nuclear power plants licensed to operate at 64 sites in 32 states. These plants provide about 20 percent of the nation's electricity. To protect the public should a commercial nuclear power plant accidentally release radiation to the environment, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires the plant owner/operator to prepare for NRC's approval a radiological emergency preparedness plan. This on-site plan describes what is to be done in an emergency, how it is to be done, and who is to do it. Among other things, the plan identifies the process for notifying and communicating with the operator's own personnel as well as with federal, state, and local agencies and the media during an emergency. The plan also identifies the circumstances and the actions such as evacuating the local population— the plant owner would recommend that off-site officials take to protect the public. NRC conducts inspections to ensure that the plant owner can effectively implement the onsite plan. In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for ensuring that state and local communities develop emergency preparedness plans to address the off-site effects of a radiological emergency. FEMA oversees the conduct of periodic exercises to determine whether the off-site response would adequately protect public health and safety. My testimony today is grounded in a report we issued in July 2001 to the Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform and to Representatives Gilman, Kelly, and Lowey on emergency preparedness at the Indian Point 2 plant in New York State.' The Indian Point facility is located within the Village of Buchanan in upper Westchester County, approximately 24 miles north of New York City along the east bank of the Hudson River. About 300,000 people live within 10 miles of the plant and millions more live in New York City and within 50 miles in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Concerns that nuclear power plants may be targets for terrorists and Indian Point's close proximity to these large populations have increased public interest in the adequacy of the plant's security and emergency preparedness-leading some to call for closing the plant. A draft report (the Witt report) commissioned by the Governor of New York questions the adequacy of emergency preparedness at Indian Point and raises broader issues about emergency preparedness at other nuclear power plants.❜ In my testimony today, I will discuss the (1) findings and recommendations of our 2001 report on emergency preparedness at the Indian Point 2 plant and (2) subsequent progress made by the plant, NRC, and FEMA in addressing problems noted in our report. You also asked for our thoughts on the findings of the draft Witt report and its potential implications for emergency planning at other facilities. To follow up on the progress made to address the problems we identified in 2001, we reviewed relevant NRC inspection reports prepared since our 2001 report and held discussions with officials of NRC, FEMA, and the four counties responsible for emergency preparedness in the surrounding areas. We did not conduct a comprehensive update of emergency preparedness at the Indian Point 2 plant nor verify the accuracy of the draft Witt report's findings and conclusions. We should also note that, since our 2001 report, the Entergy Corporation has assumed ownership of the facility from the Consolidated Edison Company of New York. NUCLEAR REGULATION: Progress Made in Emergency Preparedness at Indian Point 2, but Additional Improvements Needed, GAO-01-605 (Washington, D.C., July 30, 2001). James Lee Witt Associates, LLC, Review of Emergency Preparedness at Indian Point and Millstone (Draft) (Washington, D.C., Jan. 10, 2003). The Witt report was commissioned by Governor Pataki to be a comprehensive and independent review of emergency preparedness in the areas around Indian Point and for that portion of New York State in proximity to the Millstone nuclear power plant in Connecticut. In summary: In 2001, we reported that, over the years, NRC had identified a number of We reported in 2001 that the four New York counties responsible for responding to a radiological emergency at Indian Point 2 had strengthened their emergency preparedness programs as a result of the lessons learned from the February 2000 event. These lessons included the need for better coordination and communications (1) between the counties in responding to a radiological In February 2000, a tube ruptured in a steam generator and Consolidated Edison temporarily shut down the plant because of the possibility that radioactively contaminated water could leak into the environment. According to Consolidated Edison and NRC, the total amount of radioactivity released posed no threat. emergency and in providing the media with information and (2) between Consolidated Edison and the counties about the emergency and its potential impact on the public. We reported that Consolidated Edison had not clearly communicated with the state and counties about whether a radioactive release had occurred and, if so, its magnitude. Consolidated Edison reported that a release had occurred but posed no threat to the public, while county officials reported that no release had occurred. This contradictory information led to credibility problems with the media and the public. Consolidated Edison, the state, and the counties revised the plant's radiological emergency data form to more clearly show whether a release had occurred. As we also reported, county officials suggested changes to improve communications among NRC, FEMA, and nonstate entities. In particular, county officials said that since they are responsible for radiological emergency preparedness for Indian Point 2, NRC and FEMA should communicate directly with them during nonemergency situations. In New York and 16 other states-where more than half of the nation's operating nuclear power plants are locatedcounties or other local governments are responsible for radiological preparedness, but NRC and FEMA communicated primarily with the states and relied on the states to communicate with local jurisdictions. In response, NRC said that meeting with local officials would require considerable resources, and FEMA said that some states limit its communications with local officials. However, NRC had not assessed the costs and benefits of routinely meeting with local officials, and FEMA's method of communicating with the states had not effectively provided the four counties with information on various initiatives that would affect their programs. Since effective communication is critical to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency, we therefore recommended that NRC and FEMA reassess their policies for communicating primarily with the state in those instances where other entities have a major role for responding to a radiological emergency. |