tion statistics show that one of the safest places one can be
is not at home or on trips but working at ORNL.

The discrepancies in both claims and analyses between DOE and its critics regarding health and safety issues, coupled with DOE's admittedly poor record on environmental protection, have eroded DOE's credibility on such issues over the years, particularly among the employees at the plants. This has had a corrosive impact on the workers' acceptance of research results funded by DOE, which is perceived as having a conflict because of its mission of production while at the same time being the agency which conducts or sponsors the largest portion of research into the health effects of ionizing radiation.

The Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on the subject of radiation research on June 17, 1987, at which Dr. Philip Landrigan, Director, Division of Environmental and Occupational Medicine, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, testified. Dr. Landrigan, who is a reviewer of DOE studies, has found the majority of these studies to be technically competent, but acknowledged:

These studies are flawed and tainted all too often in the eyes of the public, and that tainting derives from the fact that DOE is in a dual role in sponsoring these studies. On the one hand, they are advocates for nuclear production, and on the other hand, they are attempting to protect their workers. This is a position that I think is inherently untenable.

The related serious safety, health, and environmental concerns at DOE nuclear facilities point to the need for legislative correction. For this reason, S. 1085 offers four titles which address the outstanding problems facing the Department of Energy nuclear facilities. Title I of this bill will create an independent oversight board to ensure the safe operation of Department of Energy facilities. Title II will protect workers by applying the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to employees at DOE nuclear facilities. Title III will protect the environment by clarifying the jurisdiction and powers of the Environmental Protection Agency in dealing with mixed radioactive and hazardous wastes. Title IV will protect the integrity of radiation research programs by providing independent oversight of DOE's research program on the effects of radiation on human health.

More detail and background on each of the titles follow in separate sections.

II. TITLE I: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1987

PURPOSE

The purpose of this title is to establish an independent Nuclear Safety Board to improve oversight and to promote the safety of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) nuclear facilities. The three members of the Board would be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for six-year terms.

The functions of the Board would be to review and evaluate the implementation of current health and safety standards and Department of Energy Orders at DOE nuclear facilities as well as the adequacy of the standards and Orders themselves. The Board would also conduct independent investigations of accidents and other events that occur at Department of Energy nuclear facilities which the Board determines to be important because of actual or potential adverse effect on the health and safety of the public. The Board would recommend to the Department of Energy changes in operating procedures or health and safety standards to improve the safety of its facilities or reduce the radiation exposure of workers or the public and issue periodic unclassified public reports on its recommendations. The Board would also make recommendations to ensure that the standards for the design and construction of any new DOE nuclear facilities be commensurate with the standards that are imposed on comparable private-sector facilities.

NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The operation of nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities entails great potential risks to the health and safety of workers and the general public. In recognition of those potential risks, Congress has long seen the need to provide independent oversight of those responsible for operating commercial nuclear facilities. However, Government-owned nuclear reactors and facilities, in contrast, have not been subject to outside independent scrutiny. The reasons for this date to the legacy of secrecy surrounding the development of the first atomic bombs.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-585) gave the Atomic Energy Commission authority to operate the Government's nuclear facilities, including those used in the production and use of materials for nuclear weapons.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703) required all commercial nuclear facilities to be licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The Government's nuclear facilities were not subjected to the same or a comparable requirement. Later, when the AEC's dual role as a promoter and regulator of commercial nuclear power was perceived to be in conflict, Congress (in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, P.L. 93-438) created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), with the sole responsibility for regulating commercial nuclear activities. Again, no comparable outside safety authority was put in place for Government-owned nuclear facilities. Instead, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 also created the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), which subsequently evolved into the Department of Energy (DOE). Then and now DOE has assumed the dual responsibility for nuclear production and safety.

Although the licensing requirements set up in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act did not extend to Government-owned facilities, that Act established an independent 15-member panel of experts, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), to review safety studies, make reports, and advise the AEC with regard to the hazards of existing or proposed nuclear facilities and the adequacy of proposed reactor safety standards.

Before passage of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, ACRS provided an important measure of independent expertise of the Government's as well as commercial nuclear activities. It participated in reviews of many AEC facilities, including performing periodic safety reviews of the N-reactor at Hanford and the Savannah River production reactors, and provided comments on safety standards and other generic safety matters. However, with the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the ACRS function was transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to focus on commercial nuclear activities, leaving the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA, now DOE), without independent safety advice. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DOE and NRC established procedures for DOE to request ACRS reviews of its nuclear facilities. This MOU has been used to request reviews of a number of DOE's nuclear research facilities, including the now defunct Clinch River Breeder Reactor.

Since 1974 the Department of Energy has been without any regular outside expert review of the safety of its nuclear facilities, nor does it have independent outside oversight. Throughout most of that period, the responsibility for the safety of DOE nuclear facilities resided in DOE's programmatic offices, which had an interest in the uninterrupted operation of the facilities to meet mission objectives. The situation was improved in September 1985, when a new Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health, reporting directly to the Under Secretary of Energy, was given lead responsibility for DOE headquarters safely activities, including review of DOE field operations. That step raised safety to a more equal footing with operations in the DOE organizational structure. Improvements in DOE's internal safety, health, and environment structure are, of course, encouraged. However, the Committee believes that in order to assure that safety will not play a secondary role to operations within DOE, it is necessary that oversight of safety activities be accomplished on a continuous basis by a group completely independent of the Department.

Independent oversight had been suggested in 1981 by the Crawford Committee, which was established by the Under Secretary of DOE to assess the Department's response to the accident at Three Mile Island. In addition to recommending that DOE's operational and safety functions be organizationally separate, the Crawford Committee recommended that:

A Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee made up of nonDOE employees should be established and report to the Secretary. This committee should periodically evaluate the performance of DOE's independent overview and programmatic safety functions and advise the Secretary of Energy on its findings.

Outside assessments of the safety of DOE facilities have revealed troubling facts and bolstered the argument for independent outside oversight of DOE nuclear facilities. A series of GAO investigations detail serious deficiencies in the areas of nuclear safety and environmental protection at nearly all the DOE nuclear facilities surveyed.

For example, a June 16, 1986, GAO report, "Nuclear Safety: Safety Analysis Reviews for DOE's Defense Facilities Can Be Improved", found that safety analysis reports for a number of DOE's nuclear reactors had not been completed or were inadequate. The safety analysis reviews are the basic tool used to determine whether a nuclear facility can operate safely and without posing an unacceptable risk to the public. Three of eight facilities that the GAO examined did not have approved safety analysis reviews. The report stated:

These three were the plutonium fabrication facility at Rocky Flats, Colorado; the fuel fabrication facility at Savannah River, South Carolina; and the reprocessing facility at Savannah River, South Carolina. All three facilities have been designated high-hazard facilities by DOE, which means they have the potential for significant on-site or offsite releases of radioactive material in a major accident. This report further stated:

Although DOE's recent initiatives have the potential for improving safety oversight of DOE, this oversight remains an internal function within DOE. Thus, programmatic objectives and safety considerations will continue to be assessed internally within DOE. Trade-offs between the two, undoubtedly, will have to be made during the budget process. Further, DOE will remain open to criticism in regulating itself in regard to the safety aspects of its operations. The GAO report called for outside, independent reviews of DOE's safety analysis reviews. The report stated:

DOE Orders require that independent reviews of safety analysis reviews be performed but allow DOE field offices to carry out ths function. While DOE headquarters staff and DOE contractors have assisted in the review process, the preocess remains an internal DOE function carried out primarily by DOE field offices. *** It is our view that DOE should make appropriate arrangements to have an outside independent organization review its safety analysis reviews. Among other things, it would help prevent safety concerns from conflicting with programmatic interest such as production goals.

In another investigation performed at this Committee's request, the GAO found that for nearly seven years, from 1979 to 1986, DOE had been operating four nuclear reactors at the Savannah River Plant at a power level substantially higher than what the emergency core cooling system could handle in an accident. A preliminary laboratory report from DuPont, the DOE contractor at Savannah River, indicated that "the model used to calculate the power limits had a number of limitations," according to testimony before this Committee on March 12, 1987, by Keith Ŏ. Fultz, Associate Director, U.S. General Accounting Office. In an attempt to correct the situation, DOE reduced the power level by 20 percent in November 1986 and another 6 percent in December 1986, but it did not make its finding public.

Mr. Fultz also testified that a DuPont reactor safety evaluation committee at Savannah River concluded:

No effective management system exists to ensure timely clearance of action items related to reactor operations. Its [the committee's] June 1986 report points out that the backlog of recommended actions for the reactor incident report system is large and growing. As of the end of 1985, 198 recommendations, some dating back to the late 1970s, were still outstanding. In addition, in a November 1986 letter the reactor safety advisory committee stated their concern about the backlog of reactor incident report recommendations, and I think this is a very important quote. They believe that the backlog may indicate a trend toward a gradual deterioration of safety at Savannah River operations.

Mr. Fultz also testified:

We are concerned that inexperienced personnel are maintaining the reactors without adequate training and, in some cases, without proper written procedures. Just summarizing, we are concerned that management inattention contributed to the operations and maintenance pro

grams.

Other outside assessments of safety at DOE nuclear facilities also present a disturbing picture of unsafe and potentially dangerous conditions. In 1986 DOE Secretary Herrington appointed six independent consultants, who comprised "the Roddis panel", to report to the operations of the N-reactor at Hanford, Washington. The Nreactor is the U.S. reactor most similar in design to the Soviet Union's Chernobyl reactor. Both are graphite core reactors, and both lack the reinforced steel containment dome found on most commercial reactors. Each consultant was asked to submit an individual report (all six reports are available from the Committee). In giving his individual report, Louis H. Roddis, Jr., stated:

I recommend that the Department shut down the N-reactor unless a positive judgment is made that the requirements for defense material warrants accepting public hazards exceeding those of commercial reactors.

In a separate study, DOE asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the safety of DOE's largest nuclear reactors in light of the Chernobyl accident. In the course of conducting its review, the National Academy found that the margin of safety provided by the emergency core cooling system for the Savannah River production reactors was so uncertain that on Mach 9, 1987, NAS strongly advised DOE to further reduce the power levels beyond the 26 percent reductions that DOE had already made by December 1986. The National Academy believed that the problem was serious enough that its information and recommendation should not be delayed until the release of its formal report. The NAS letter stated:

We are not able to conclude with confidence that significant core damage would be avoided if there were a severe