loss of coolant accident while the reactors are operating at However, DOE did not make public the National Academy recommendation, even though the Department testified before this Committee on March 12 and 17, 1987, at two hearings on DOE nuclear facilities, one of which specifically addressed reactor safety. Nor did DOE reduce the power levels of the reactors until after this Committee independently became aware of the situation. Only then did DOE reduce the power levels of the Savannah River production facilities to its current level of 50 percent capacity. The fact that independent reviews of DOE's reactor operation confirm or uncover serious safety problems is another strong indication of the need to institutionalize independent oversight of DOE nuclear facilities. The Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings in March and June, 1987, at which several witnesses testified to the need for independent, outside oversight of DOE nuclear facilities. Louis H. Roddis, Jr., who headed the panel appointed by DOE Secretary Herrington to review the safety of DOE's troubled N-reactor in Hanford, Washington, stated: There is a need for a credible permanent outside review of the DOE activities in the nuclear safety area. Both the independent consultants group review of the N-reactor and the NAS [National Academy of Sciences] review committee are ad hoc in nature, and while I believe them to be credible in themselves, there is no question in my mind but that a permanent overview body should be established. In addition, J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, testifying at this Committee's hearing on June 16, 1987 on the need for outside, independent oversight of DOE, stated: We have had a long history at GAO of supporting the need for independent oversight of various aspects of DOE's nuclear facilities. Peach also stated: We believe that any oversight approach, to be effective, should have five key elements: independence, technical expertise, ability to perform reviews of DOE facilities as needed, clear authority to require DOE to address the organization's findings and recommendations, and a system to provide public access to the organization's findings and recommendations. The legislation you [Senator Glenn] have submitted creating a Nuclear Safety Board does address each of these elements and has, therefore, the potential to be an effective mechanism for oversight of DOE's nuclear facilities. Based on this record, the DOE itself has come to recognize the need for independent, outside oversight. At a hearing held by this Committee on June 17, 1987, DOE Under Secretary Joseph F. Salgado testified: *** we may differ in our approach, but the fundamental philosophy of your bill, the fundamental approach of your bill, its findings and its purpose we are in agreement with and look forward to working with you to solve and reestablish the credibility of our Department. Under Secretary Salgado also testified: [DOE's] Secretary Herrington endorses the establishment of an independent body outside of the Department that would oversee the safety of these nuclear facilities, and has stated so publicly. However, since providing that testimony, DOE has circulated draft legislation calling for a safety board that would be advisory only, with the Secretary of Energy making the final determination on board recommendations. However, the Committee has determined that keeping safety solely in the hands of those whose primary responsibility is production constitutes, at a minimum, a potential conflict of interest. The independence of a statutory safety board that is more than simply advisory is essential to assure safety at DOE nuclear facilities. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY The impetus for Title I grew from an investigation by the minority staff of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes during the 99th Congress, which revealed a series of mishaps resulting in releases. At the request of Senator John Glenn, the Subcommittee held a hearing in Cincinnati on April 22, 1985 on the Department of Energy (DOE's) Feed Materials Production Center at Fernald, Ohio. Witnesses at the hearing testified that the emphasis at Fernald was on production, with far less emphasis on safety or environmental protection. The contractor operating the plant continued to receive large award fees from DOE based upon meeting production goals, despite serious performance deficiencies in the areas of environmental protection and radiation exposure. Those findings prompted Senator Glenn to request the General Accounting Office (GAO) to perform a number of investigations of DOE facilities and safety procedures in Ohio and other areas of the United States. In all, twenty-one GAO reports requested by Sena 1 Nuclear Waste: Unresolved Issues Concerning Hanford's Waste Management Practices (GAO/ RCED 87-30; Nov. 1986) Nuclear Energy: Environmental Issues at DOE's Nuclear Defense Facilities (GAO/RCED 86192; Sept. 1986) Nuclear Safety: Comparison of DOE's Hanford N-Reactor With the Chernobyl Reactor (GAO/ RCED 86-213BR; Aug. 1986) Nuclear Waste: Impact of Savannah River Plant's Radioactive Waste Management Practices (GAO/RCED 86-143; July 1986) Nuclear Energy: A Compendium of Relevant GAO Products on Regulation, Health, and Safety (GAO/RCED 86-132; June 1986) Continued tor Glenn and other members of Congress on safety, health, and environmental issues at DOE facilities cumulatively demonstrate the need for independent oversight of DOE nuclear operations. In the 100th Congress, the Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on March 12, 1987 devoted specifically to reactor safety issues at Department of Energy facilities and another hearing on March 17, 1987 on environmental problems at these DOE facilities. Chairman Glenn introduced the Nuclear Protections and Safety Act of 1987 (S. 1085) on April 23, 1987, Title I of which establishes the independent Nuclear Safety Board that is now being reported. The Committee held legislative hearings on S. 1085 on June 16 and 17, 1987. III. TITLE II: APPLICATION OF OSHA AND NIOSH TO DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES PURPOSE The purpose of Title II is to provide for oversight by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) over Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. It would establish that OSHA and NIOSH conduct health, safety, and hazard assessment of DOE nuclear facilities throught the elimination of DOE's exemption from the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. All existing occupational safety and health standards in effect in DOE facilities would be maintained until the Secretary of Labor provides superseding standards. The DOE nuclear facilities covered by this legislation will be inspected at least once a year. Title II is also intended to assure adequate enforcement of health and safety standards at DOE nuclear facilities. Nuclear Safety: Safety Analysis Reviews for DOE's Defense Facilities Can be Improved (GAO/ RCED 86-175; June 1986) Environment, Safety, and Health: Status of Department of Energy's Implementation of 1985 Initiatives (GAO/RCED 86-68FS; Mar. 1986) Nuclear Waste: Department of Energy's Transuranic Waste Disposal Plan Needs Revision (GAO/RCED 86-90; Mar. 1986) Environment, Safety, and Health: Environment and Workers Could Be Better Protected at Ohio Defense Plants (GAO/RCED 86-61; Dec. 1985) Environment, Safety, and Health: Information on Three Ohio Defense Facilities (GAO/RCED 86-51FS; Nov. 1985) DOE's Plutonium Facility (GAO/RCED 85-3; Sept. 1985) Department of Energy Acting To Control Hazardous Waste At Its Savannah River Nuclear Facilities (GAO/RCED 85-23; Nov. 1984) DOE's Safety and Health Oversight Program At Nuclear Facilities Could be Strengthened (GAO/RCED 84-50; Nov. 1983) Decommissioning Retired Nuclear Reactors At Hanford Reservation (GAO/RCED 83-104; Apr. 1983) Cleaning Up Nuclear Facilities-An Aggressive and Unified Federal Program Is Needed (GAO/ EMD 82-40; May 1982) GAO's Response to DOE on EMD-81-108, "Better Oversight Needed for Safety and Health Activities at DOE's Nuclear Facilities" (EMD 82-36; Jan. 1982) Congress Should Increase Financial Protection to the Public From Accidents at DOE Nuclear Operations (EMD 81-111; Sept. 1981) Better Oversight Needed For Safety and Health Activities At DOE's Nuclear Facilities (EMD 81-108; Aug. 1981) GAO's Analysis of Alleged Health and Safety Violations at the Navy's Power Training Unit at Windsor, Connecticut (EMD 81-19; Nov. 1980) Department of Energy's Safety and Health Program For Enrichment Plant Workers Is Not Adequately Implemented (EMD 80-78; July 1980) Decommissioning Hanford Reactor (EMD 79-20; Jan. 1979) NEED FOR LEGISLATION This title of the legislation grew out of long-term concerns about the safety and health of workers in the DOE defense facilities. On July 21, 1980 the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services held a hearing on DOE's occupational safety and health program as it applied to workers at the Portsmouth nuclear enrichment facility in Ohio. Following the hearing, at the request of Senator Glenn, then Chairman of the Subcommittee, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an investigation into the adequacy of DOE's producers for ensuring that its health and safety standards were being met. GAO concluded that DOE was not adequately monitoring and enforcing its health and safety standards for workers at the facilities it examined. DOE's three-tiered system of checks-inspections, appraisals, and complaint investigations-was effective in assuring compliance with DOE health and safety regulations. The GAO found: In not conducting inspections, DOE cannot maintain awareness of potential hazards and take prompt action to eliminate or mitigate the risk of accident. The March 7, 1978, release of more than 10 tons of liquid uranium hexafluoride from a ruptured storage cylinder at the Portsmouth plant may have been avoided had DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office conducted onsite inspections and discussed safety and health concerns with employees. DOE's subsequent investigation of the accident revealed that dropped storage cylinders occur so frequently that they are not even reported unless damage results. In addition, the GAO reported: * Appraisals are conducted too infrequently and do not provide adequate coverage to fill the void created by the lack of inspections. The GAO report described the situation that it found and recommended: If DOE's program is to meet its objective of ensuring the safety and health of all employees, it is imperative that employees be offered objective, independent reviews of their complaints and that the complaints not be recycled to the contractor which may be responsible for the situations giving rise to the complaints. The GAO found: The present structure and operation of the Operations Office combines production with safety and health to interface with the contractor as one entity. While conscious trade-offs of safety and health concerns for production goals have not been detected, the oneness of the organization, at a minimum, detracts from the status and perceived authority of the safety and health program. The closeness of the safety and health program to all phases of contractor relations may have also led to situations where DOE relies on the contractor to carry out DOE's safety and Since that hearing, an already hazardous situation at the DOE plants was exacerbated by the large increase in nuclear weapons production. Between 1979 and 1985 the production of nuclear weapons materials doubled, but relatively little money was spent to improve safety or modernize the facilities. J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, testified about this at the Committee's hearing on March 12, 1987: * the Fernald plant in Ohio demonstrates this problem. During the 1970s DOE considered closing this plant. As a result, it did not make capital improvements, and equipment became obsolete. In the 1980s production goals increased, putting a strain on the plant's resources. According to DOE's own documents, Fernald management emphasized production over worker safety and health con cerns. The workplace hazards in DOE defense facilities are diverse. In addition to the risks of working closely with radioactive materials, workers at these DOE facilities are exposed to a wide range of other toxic and hazardous substances, exposure to which in comparable workplaces is carefully regulated by OSHA. The extent of these dangers was emphasized at the Committee's June 17, 1987, hearing by witnesses who represent employees at many of the DOE defense facilities: Joseph Misbrener, President, Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union, testifying on behalf of the AFL-CIO and the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department; James Kelly, President, Local 8031, United Steelworkers of America; and A. L. O'Connor, President, District 34, International Association of Machinists. Their testimony was replete with examples of DOE's failure to adequately address problems of safety and health at the facilities. Moreover, as these witnesses explained, the problems are recurring. At present, DOE has the statutory authority for the occupational safety and health of contractor employees at Government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities. These contractors are required to comply with applicable OSHA standards that DOE has elected to adopt. This is very different from requiring DOE to meet all OSHA standards-with inspection by OSHA and enforcement by OSHA. The Committee believes that there is no justification for continuing DOE exemptions to federal laws regulating health and safety. This title would also give the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) access to DOE defense facilities to do on-the-spot health hazard evaluations. Although NIOSH is mandated to conduct epidemiological field research in general industry through OSHA, it needs the cooperation and assent of DOE for right-of-entry into DOE defense facilities. Requests for NIOSH assistance to evaluate potential problems can come from an agency, |