csis Center for Strategic & International Studies February 1, 1999 The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert The Speaker of the House of Representatives Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to your request, I am attaching my short responses to your follow-up questions With best regards, Frank J. illuffo Director Terrorism Task Force (1) What do you think of the Administration's plan to develop national vaccine As I referenced in my prepared testimony, I firmly support initiatives aimed at assuring a 1. Success is contingent upon leveraging advances in the biotechnology, с sustaining R&D efforts aimed at preventing and protecting the U.S. against biological threats. Such R&D programs could include accelerated sensor development (to provide detection and identification of biological agents), and producing antidotes and vaccines. I would like to close with some words of caution. At this time next year, the funds for the Defense Preparedness Program run out. I think it is imperative that Congress recognize the importance of this program and the spirit of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation. The keys to success are continued leadership as a policy priority and sustained funding through the outyears to ensure that all agencies local, state, regional and federal, are sufficiently equipped, trained, exercised, and prepared to respond effectively to a WMD terrorist event. This requires long-term capital investment strategies, which project into the future. We simply cannot afford to wait "until they are coming over the hill," to embark on an upgrade program. Nothing less than a seamless integration of such efforts must be achieved. This requires re-examining how we as a nation perceive national security and in making sure that all of the proper parties have a seat at the policy planning table. Given the Department of Defense's experience, expertise, capabilities and resources, I would suggest that its mandate be extended beyond FY 1999, as initially required by the Defense Authorization Bill and that it remain the Executive Agent. Thank you for your time. I welcome any questions you may have. antibiotics, as there is no true market for them (and hopefully never will be) and the return on investment is limited. This must incorporate producing vaccines for known toxins and agents, as well as devoting research toward unknown or "designer" toxins or agents including strains for which there currently are no vaccines. 2. Any stockpiling initiative must be part of a larger systems prevention and response process including research; detection (indications and warning); epidemiological surveillance and symptom recognition; and administering aid. An integral part of this process requires sustaining long-term R&D efforts such as accelerated strategic and tactical sensor development to provide early warning (for example, on the tactical side, the first responder community needs access to cheap, hand-held devices, with low false alarm rates to identify potential agents or toxins') and training EMT's and primary care physicians in symptom recognition which would ultimately be disseminated between hospitals at the local, state, and federal levels. (2) Are there any departments, agencies or bureaus that you believe should not have any terrorism-related missions? Among the contemporary challenges for U.S. antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts is that terrorism inherently extends the battlefield to incorporate all of society and that the terrorist often takes the path of least resistance striking when and where you least expect them to. The "changing face in terrorism" and the increasing terrorist use of advanced technologies (to obtain information, plan attacks, protect their information, and conduct attacks) necessitates the involvement of agencies which traditionally have not had a role in antiterrorism and counterterrorism to feed into the overall process and to sit at the national policy-planning table. For example, with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism or information assurance and critical infrastructure protection certain agencies possess unique skills, capabilities, assets and experience (which support their core missions) that could take generations to re-engineer. Furthermore, while U.S. persons and property have always served as a "lightening rod" for terrorist activity abroad, there is increasing recognition that the terrorist threat within the continental United States is very real - whether committed by foreign or domestic perpetrators. This too prescribes additional agencies, especially state and local, also play a major role in preventing, deterring, managing the consequences of, and responding to terrorist attacks. (Along these lines I would like to submit for the record an op-ed I co-authored with a Washington D.C. Battalion Chief on the role of the first responders.) The greatest challenge from my perspective is not only determining which departments or agencies should or should not have a terrorism-related mission, but also assuring effective coordination between the many federal, state and local departments and agencies. There is no question in my mind that coordination can be improved. While I think its premature to gauge the effectiveness at this stage, perhaps the recently created 1 The Department of Energy's "Felix" is an example of one such exciting new national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism (promulgated by Presidential Decision Directive 62), will help. As I suggested in my prepared testimony, one option – which is currently being discussed to better protect the continental United States from WMD terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, and missile defense would be to designate a Commander-inChief for "homeland defense." Clearly the CINC/America would only be responsible for Department of Defense-related issues in support of civilian authorities and would not overturn current "lead federal agency" status. Nonetheless, it would streamline Department of Defense "terrorism-related" missions. THE WASHINGTON POST Frank J. Cilluffo and Thomas I. Herlihy FRIDAY, JUNE 26, 1998 A27 First Responders to a Sneak Attack Terrorism is, of course, a world and national problem, one to which the federal government has devoted a great deal of attention. But it is also a very local thing. Consider. A chemical warfare agent released in downtown Washington would likely result in imme diate casualties, with a large and growing number of contaminated victims. There would be a real concern to Himit further chemical exposure and minimize secondary cross-contamination. The window of opportunity would be measured in minutes, not hours. Emergency rescue personnel would be needed immediately to administer first aid, identify the chemical agent, decontaminate victims for safe transport to area hospitals, administer lifesaving antidotes, deal with the dead, isolate the contami nated area and evacuate downwind areas. This initial emergency response would not, however, involve federal or military forces. It would consist of "first responders": local fire, police and emergency medical personnel. The fire department, which has limited ability to operate in chemically contaminated areas, would be challenged to undertake the rescue of victims while attempting to identify the chemical substance used so that appropriate medical care could be undertaken. The huge task of decontaminating masses of victims also would have to be undertaken by the fire department, with emergency medical personnel providing triage, treatment and transportation after victims had been decontaminated. The police would have a key role in estabHishing a controlled perimeter around the affected area while conducting searches for secondary and tertiary terrorist devices. They would be called on to coordinate street closings and help transport victims while also attempting to preserve the crime scene and gather evidence. The staff at hospital emergency rooms would have to prepare for an onslaught of patients while at the same time acting to prevent contamination and forced shutdown of their own facilities because of contaminated victims coming in on their own to seek help. Assistance from surrounding jurisdictions would be requested and would involve hazardous-material and support teams being called on to assist in the mass decontamination of victims and secondary identification of chemical agents. More ambulance units would be used to treat and transport the potentially large number of victims. The first wave of outside support would be Team, which would provide decontamination equip ment, pharmaceuticals, specialized detection equipment and trained and equipped medical, hazardous-material and support personnel. It is impor tant to note that while this regional response team was outfitted using federal funds, it is largely composed of off-duty local fire, police and emergency medical personnel. The second wave would involve highly trained and equipped federal and specialized military forces such as the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force and the Army's Technical Escort Unit. But these units, which are extremely valuable when they are prepositioned, as they were during the last presidential inauguration and the State of the Union address, would be of Hunited value in a no-notice terrorist attack. The North Carolina-based Chemical Biological Incident Response Force would in all probability arrive after the last viable victim had been removed from the scene. Moreover, terrorism by its nature extends the battlefield to incorporate all of society. And as the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City revealed, terrorists often take the path of least resistance and strike when and where least expected. The task of mitigating a chemical warfare agent terrorist attack in the District of Colum bia would be an overwhelming and extensive operation. Federal and military assets, all of which have an important role in these types of events, would prove to be indispensable, and their value cannot be overestimated. But it would be extremely difficult to marshal and deploy these assets rapidly in the critical rescue phase of an unannounced chemical attack, given the severely compressed time constraints. Basically, even in the nation's capital, the battle will be either won or lost by the first responders. And yet, in a biological incident, their roles are not now clear-cut. One key program that appreciates the role of the first responders is the Department of Defense's Domestic Preparedness Program. Originally prescribed in the Defense Against headed by Sena. Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar and Pete Domenici-the program's aim is to train and educate the first responders in 120 selected cities across the country about chemical and biological response concerns. Similar efforts are progressing on the House side under the leadership of Rep. Curt Weldon. The Washing ton area first responders received this needed training in January. This federal recognition should be supported by funding so that specialized equipment and protective gear can be purchased and expanded training opportunities undertal Those involved in local response als reater access to intelligence data ings that affect their communities as new and better equipment-as it oped-for monitoring and detecting and biological substances. The barriers to acquiring and using military-type pharm tical antidotes for chemical warfare agent exposure must be removed. Nothing less than a seamless integration among all entities at the federal, state and local levels responsible for antiterrorism efforts needs to be achieved. This requires reexamining how we as a nation perceive national security and making sure that all of the proper parties have a seat at the policy planning table. Prank J. Cilluffo is a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thomas 1. Herlihy is a battalion chief with the D.C. Fire Department and |