The final topic I'd like to offer a few comments on is the need for an overall strategy. Our reviews of various aspects of counterterrorism issues over the past few years have clearly demonstrated a need for government-wide priorities, and a well-conceived, overarching strategy for achieving a defined end-state. Such a strategy could provide a roadmap for the $7 billion that is being spent on counterterrorism programs annually. We see a growing number of training programs and courses, multiple programs with equipment segments, and more response units being formed.

The Domestic Preparedness Program is one of many Federal programs among the growing list. Some local officials view the growing number of WMD consequent management training programs as evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful approach toward combating terrorism.

Similarly, multiple programs with equipment segments, such as the separate DOD and Public Health Service programs and a new Department of Justice equipment grant program, are causing frustration and confusion at the local level and are resulting in further complaints that the Federal Government is unfocused and has no coordinated plan or defined end-state for domestic preparedness.

As noted in our December 1997 report and in our April 1998 testimony before this committee, the many and increasing number of participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area across the Federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a difficult management coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation, and gaps. We believe that the National Security Council's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, established in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62, should review and guide the growing Federal training equipment and response programs and activities. We understand that the National Coordinator recently has formed several senior management groups and related subgroups to coordinate the growing number of Federal WMD consequence management training equipment and response programs.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my remarks. We'll be prepared to answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work and observations on the NunnLugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and related issues. This interagency program, led by the Department of Defense (DOD) provides training and equipment intended to better prepare selected cities to manage the consequences of a possible attack by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).' We expect to issue a report on these matters within the next few weeks. It is worth noting that very recently, under a National Security Council initiative, DOD, Department of Justice, and other agency officials have been considering transferring lead responsibility for the Nunn-LugarDomenici Domestic Preparedness Program from DOD to the Department of Justice.

Today, I will discuss program objectives and costs,the training DOD is providing to local emergency response personnel, issues we identified on the way the program is structured and designed, the equipment segment of DOD's program, and interagency coordination of this and other related programs. As requested, we also have some observations about the congressional committee structure for oversight of counterterrorism and other crosscutting issues.

'The program was authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. For purposes of this statement, WMD refers to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices.

OBJECTIVES AND COSTS OF

THE DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

The Domestic Preparedness Program is aimed at enhancing domestic preparedness to respond to and manage the consequences of potential terrorist WMD incidents. The authorizing legislation designated DOD as lead agency, and participating agencies include FEMA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Health and Human Services' Public Health Service, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Command designed a "train-the-trainer" program to build on the existing knowledge and capabilities of local first responders-fire, law enforcement, and medical personnel and hazardous materials technicians-who would deal with a WMD incident during the first hours. The legislation also designated funds for the Public Health Service to establish Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams to help improve cities' medical response to a WMD incident. Other aspects of the program included systems to provide information and advice to state and local officials and a

chemical/biological rapid response team.

DOD received $36 million in fiscal year 1997 to implement its part of the program, and the Public Health Service received an additional $6.6 million. DOD's fiscal year 1998 and 1999 budgets estimate that $43 million and $50 million, respectively, will be needed to continue the program. DOD expects the last 2 years of the 5-year program to cost about $14 million to $15 million each year, and continuing an exercise program for 2 more years

could add another $10 million. Thus, the total projected program cost for the DOD

segment could exceed $167 million. This does not include the costs of the Public Health Service, which hopes to establish and equip (an average of $350,000 of equipment and pharmaceuticals per city) Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams in all 120 program cities. In addition to the $6.6 million that the Public Health Service initially received, it spent $3.6 million in fiscal year 1997 to expand the number of strike teams. The Public Health Service received no additional funding in fiscal year 1998, but it estimates program

requirements at $85 million for the remaining 93 cities.

TRAINING PROGRAM IS BENEFICIAL

Domestic Preparedness Program training gives first responders a greater awareness of how to deal with WMD terrorist incidents. Local officials in the seven cities we visited praised the training program content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD's willingness to modify it based on suggestions from local officials. They also credited the program with bringing local, state, and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship. By December 31, 1998, DOD expects to have trained about one-third of the 120 cities it selected for the program. All training is to be complete in 2001. The first responders trained are expected to train other emergency responders through follow-on courses. The cities we visited were planning to institutionalize various adaptations of the WMD training, primarily in their fire and law enforcement training academies. A related field exercise program to allow cities to test their response capabilities also has begun.

CITIES WERE SELECTED BASED

ON POPULATION SIZE

DOD decided to select cities based on core city population. It also decided to select 120 cities, which equates to all U.S. cities with a population of over 144,000 according to the 1990 census.2 The 120 cities represent about 22 percent of the U.S. population and cover at least one city in 38 states and the District of Columbia. Twelve states and the U.S. territories have no cities in the program, and 25 percent of the cities are in California and

Texas.

DOD took a city approach because it wanted to deal with a single governmental entity that could select the most appropriate personnel for training and receive equipment. In selecting the cities DOD did not take into account a city's level of preparedness or financial need. There was also no analysis to evaluate the extent to which the cities selected for the program were at risk of a terrorist attack warranting an increased level of preparedness, or whether a smaller city with high risk factors might have been excluded from the program due to its lower population. In fact, in none of the seven cities we visited did the FBI determine there was a credible threat of a WMD attack, which would be one factor considered in a threat and risk assessment.

"Three locations on DOD's list of 120 cities are not technically cities.

'Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.