These proceedings are purely statutory and the remedies therein provided are exclusive, and cannot be extended beyond those contained in the act. The statute places the damages and compensation awarded by the jury or commissioners, and costs and counsel fees upon the same footing, and unless these are all paid within the sixty days, the title of the owner is not divested, and does not vest in the company: Stacey v. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 27 Vt. 39; Chicago & M. R. Co. v. There is no provision in the law authorexecution to enforce payment of either Bull, 20 Ill. 218. It follows that the application of the relators for a mandamus, to compel the circuit judge to issue a distringas to enforce collection of the costs, must be denied. The other Justices concurred. SAMANTHA S. ROSECRANTS V. WILLIAM SHOEMAKER AND Liquor law-Damages for sale of liquors—When wife may recover— Exemplary damages, when recoverable. 1. A wife, suing solely in her own right under act 191, Public acts of 1883, to recover damages for the unlawful sale of liquor to her husband, cannot complain of any evil she herself has caused, and if she encouraged or requested such sale, she does not stand on the footing of an innocent, injured party and cannot recover. 2. In such a case the jury have no right to consider the fact that the plaintiff has minor children, for the purpose of increasing the amount of damages awarded, as each child can sue and recover separate damages under the act. 8. Exemplary damages can only be recovered where the sale or sales complained of are shown to have been willful and contrary to the wishes of the wife. 4. Where a wife sues in behalf of herself and her children (minors), she can recover full compensation for her and their loss. Error to Oakland. (Stickney, J). Argued January 26, 1886. Decided February 10, 1886. Case. Defendants bring error. stated in the opinion. W. N. Draper, for appellants: Reversed. The facts are The statute sued upon was intended for the benefit of those who suffer innocently, and its aid cannot be invoked by any person who sanctioned or authorized the sale or gift of liquor to, or purchased it for the person using same, and whose intoxication has occasioned the injury complained of: Kearney v. Fitzgerald, 43 Iowa, 584-5; Reget v. Bell, 77 Ill. 593. Each of plaintiff's children could recover in a separate suit, for any injury to his or her means of support, occasioned by the unlawful sale of liquor to their father, hence the jury could not increase the damages recoverable by plaintiff on their account, and the court should so have instructed them in its charge: Franklin v. Schemerhorn, S Hun, 112; Huggins v. Kavanagh, 52 Iowa, 368; Ward v. Thompson, 48 Iowa, 588. iff. A. C. Baldwin (Baldwin, Draper & Jacokas), for plaint The record is so made that it shows little or nothing of the proceedings or proofs in the circuit court. It does not pretend to set forth the evidence or its substance: Barnes v. Michigan Air Line Ry Co, 54 Mich. 245. The right of a party to recover damages under a statute like ours has been too frequently adjudicated in our courts to cause a moment's hesitation as to the law, not only in Michigan, but in all states having similar legislation on the subject, which with scarcely an exception has been held valid: Kreiter v. Nichols, 28 Mich. 496; Ganssly v. Perkins, 30 Mich. 492; Friend v. Dunks, 37 Mich. 25; Steele v. Thompson, 42 Mich. 594. Plaintiff was entitled to recover exemplary damages, if the jury found the facts as stated in her fifth request: Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 555; Ganssly v. Perkins, 30 Mich. 495; Welsh v. Ware, 32 Mich. 84; Friend v. Dunks, 37 Mich. 31. The fifth request was as follows: "The plaintiff is entitled to recover, if anything in this case, her actual damages, and also such exemplary damages as the jury may deem just, considering all of the circumstances, if the defendants knew her husband's intemperate habits, and had been notified not to furnish him any spirituous or intoxicating liquor, and after such knowledge and notification persisted in furnishing him such liquor." Counsel also cited Jewett v. Wanshura, 43 Iowa, 574; Ward v. Thompson, 48 Iowa, 588; McEvoy v. Humphrey, 77 Ill. 388; Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283; Mead v. Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493; Davis v. Standish, 26 Hun, 608. CAMPBELL, C. J. Plaintiff sued defendants for furnishing intoxicating liquor to her husband, who, as she claimed, was killed, while intoxicated, by a train of cars. Among other matters, proof was given tending to show that plaintiff authorized defendants to furnish him liquor, and procured it for him herself. There was a conflict on this. There was also testimony before the jury, given by plaintiff, that when her husband was killed she was keeping house with her husband, and had four children of different ages; the oldest being 16, and the rest younger. Several errors were assigned, but on the argument there were three especially relied on, the others not being argued. The court was asked to charge, "if the jury find that defendants were authorized by plaintiff to furnish her husband liquors, she cannot recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of defendants having furnished her husband liquor, unless he was intoxicated when such liquors were furnished." This request was absolutely refused. The court also refused the following request; stating that it was refused, except as given in the general charge. In the general charge the court stated that plaintiff denied having purchased any liquor, and insisted she had forbidden defendants to let him have it, making no reference whatever to the contrary testimony, and saying nothing as to its effect. The request was: "If the jury find that, for her husband's use, as a beverage, the plaintiff was in the habit of purchasing of defendants intoxicating liquors by the bottle, they may consider that as evidence for the purpose of determining whether she authorized him to sell her husband liquor or not." In the general charge, the jury were authorized to find both actual and exemplary damages if the defendants furnished him liquors which contributed to his intoxication, without confining them (although the court probably meant to do so) to the case of willful wrong, or giving any other caution upon it. Under the statute of 1883, p. 215, it is expressly declared that whatever damages are recovered by a wife or child shall be the plaintiff's sole and separate property, and every person injured shall have a right of action in his or her own naine. As the wife sues solely in her own behalf, it is evident that she cannot complain of any evil which she has herself caused, and that, if she encouraged or requested the sale of liquor to her husband, she does not stand on the footing of an innocent injured party. The request seems to have assumed that, if the husband was drunk when defendants furnished him liquor, the action might be for damages, and upon this we need not dwell. But the charge, as requested, was correct; and the jury certainly should have been allowed to consider the habitual purchase by plaintiff as bearing on her willingness to let her husband have liquor. The court should also have told the jury that they should not consider the fact that she had children, for the purpose of increasing the damages. If the mother sued for all the family she could recover full compensation for their loss. But as each child could sue and recover separate damages, this ought to have been explained to the jury, who, it is probable from the record, gave larger damages than any one person would have recovered. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted. The other Justices concurred. THE PEOPLE v. EDWARD O'BRIEN, JR. Criminal law-Complaint under How. Stat. § 9174-Intent of entry, suffi 1. It is sufficient in a complaint under How. Stat. § 9174, to charge the intent of the entry in the words of the statute, without averring such intent to have been malicious. 2. Whether in such complaint it is necessary to particularly describe the land trespassed upon and the kind of grain intended to be destroyed, Query? If the respondent had seasonably objected to such omissions in the complaint the court would have been inclined to sustain such objection, but as he failed so to do in the justice's court and on the trial in the circuit, he must be deemed to have waived the specific information which such averments would have furnished him. 3. "The highway," in the common use and acceptation of the term, cannot be considered as the "improved land" of the adjoining Janded proprietor, and the words as used in How. Stat. § 9174 do not apply to land within the limits of a highway. 4. On the trial of a respondent for an alleged violation of How. Stat. § 9174, the only testimony connecting him with the trespass was that of an admitted accomplice, who testified that he staid at respondent's house on the night the trespass was charged to have been committed," and his wife was permitted to corroborate him by testifying "that her husband told her that he staid there." This fact was denied by respondent and his witnesses. Held, that the wife's testimony was pure hearsay, and under the circumstances of the case, most prejudicial to respondent, and its admission was error. 5 The accomplice further testified, under objection, that in going home from the commission of the trespass he and respondent pulled up a peach tree on the premises trespassed upon, and tore some boards from off the packing house of the owner of the land, the prosecution claiming to thus show the intent of the original trespass. |