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(U) Our information largely is limited to intercepted materials and may not necessarily present a true picture of the black market. Many smuggling attempts end with the capture of the smuggler, but yield no information on the buyer, if any, and we have no way of knowing how many or what kind of transactions go undetected.

Figure 1: (U) Reported smuggling cases of Russian-origin nuclear materials.

(U) Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was reason to suspect that Russian entities with connections to organized-crime or black-markets would be interested in brokering biological weapon technologies and expertise. We have no evidence, however, of any transfer unique to biological weapons. During the mid 1980's, Russia eliminated its standing arsenal of biological weapons in favor of mobilizationproduction in time of war. Consequently, no agent stockpiles are believed extant to serve as a basis for proliferation. The dual-use nature of the technologies required for biological warfare has enabled those seeking such technologies from Russia to do so under an umbrella of legitimacy, largely eliminating a role for criminal elements in biotechnology transfers.

(U) Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian press has alleged that some chemical materials were sold to organized criminal groups. We can not substantiate these claims. It is entirely possible, however, that criminal elements have acquired toxic industrial chemicals, poisons, riot-control agents, and even actual chemical warfare agents from various sources. We cannot rule out that thefts or illicit transfers of materials have occurred from military units, commercial facilities, and even from CWrelated research, production and storage facilities -- either active sites or those that were

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abandoned after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The mafia could readily market such chemical materials to insurgents or to countries of concern seeking to enhance their chemical warfare capabilities, as well as to terrorist groups. Other press reports claimed that al-Qaida operatives were seeking chemical and biological materials and expertise in the Central Asian states. There is no information to substantiate whether or not al-Qaida obtained any chemical or biological warfare related material or expertise from former Soviet or Russian entities.

ANSWER C: (U) Even though the black market may not play a large role, the biological weapons threat to U.S. security likely will increase over time. Countries and entities seeking BW-enabling technologies are expected to become more adept at using legitimate acquisition of dual-use technologies and their applications for biological weapons-related purposes. DIA also judges that advancements in biotechnology will further complicate the capability to control or prevent their abuse.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing

6 February 2002

QUESTION AREA: (U) The Situation in North Korea

QUESTION 13: A) (U) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next 5 years and what is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process?

B) (U) Under what circumstances would a war be likely?

C) (U) How strong is Kim Jong-il's hold on power?

D) (U) Who will likely succeed him?

ANSWER: A. (U) The likelihood that North and South Korea will reunify in the next 5 years is very low. North Korea shows few signs of meaningful economic reform or engagement with Western economies, choosing instead to emphasize its socialist ideology and military capabilities. Over the past year, Pyongyang has backed away from its willingness to engage the South and, for its part, Seoul now is less willing to provide economic assistance without reciprocal political concessions on the part of the North. It also appears unlikely that the next administration in Seoul, which will take office in February 2003, will pursue openings to the North with the determination that has been the hallmark of the now lame-duck Kim Dae Jung administration. Together with North Korea's growing anxiety (and retrenchment) over U.S. intentions associated with the global war on terrorism, these developments make it extremely unlikely that significant progress toward peaceful reunification will occur over the next five years.

ANSWER: B. (U) North Korea probably will not attack South Korea, unless the strategic environment on the peninsula changes significantly. An attempted North Korean unification by force is unlikely unless U.S. resolve and ability to defend the peninsula change and South Korea's political will to resist weakens. The greatest risk of conflict would occur if Pyongyang miscalculates the strategic equation, perhaps as a result of an internal crisis, a regional conflict, or a belief that military action by the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command was imminent.

ANSWER: C. (U) Kim Chong-il exercises firm control over North Korea and its military establishment. Kim has been careful to place staunch loyalists in positions of authority, has cultivated favor with military leaders, and has not allowed other officials to build large followings of their own. Any sudden incapacitation of Kim Chong-il, therefore, most likely would occur as the result of illness, accident, or an individual attack on his person. The institutions of government, including the armed forces, are unlikely to be threatened and, like Kim himself, other senior

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officials risk loss of privilege and power should they attempt substantial change to the system. Thus, party and government officials probably would support a successor who would command, while ensuring internal stability and a continuation of the status quo.

ANSWER: D.(U) Kim Chong-nam, 30, Kim Chong-il's oldest son, is rumored to be the eventual heir, assuming North Korea adheres to a hereditary succession formula, but he has not yet assumed any high-profile government or Party positions. If Kim Chong-il is incapacitated in the near term, before Kim can groom a successor, it is more likely that power will be assumed by one of the high-ranking members of the National Defense Commission, someone possessing both strong Party affiliations and the loyalty of the military. Possible candidates include Vice Marshals Cho Myong-nok, 79, and Kim Young-chun, 69, although age and health problems may limit Cho's role. It is also possible that someone like Chang Song-taek, Kim's influential brother-in-law, could assume power, provided the military remained loyal.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing

06 February, 2002

QUESTION AREA: (U) Trends in Conventional Arms Transfer Activities

QUESTION 14:

A) (U) What are the most recent major trends you have identified in
conventional arms transfer activities with respect to sales to:
the Middle East from foreign suppliers,

to China by Russia, and

☐all suppliers to Iran?

B) (U) What specific major conventional weapons systems have been transferred from Russia to:

Iran, and ■China?

ANSWER A: (U) The Middle East. The Middle East generally has been the largest arms market in the developing world. In 1993-1996, it accounted for 55 percent of the total value of all developing nations' arms transfer agreements ($46 billion in current dollars). During 1997-2000, the region accounted for 47 percent of all such agreements ($38.4 billion in current dollars).

(U) The U.S. dominated arms transfer agreements with the Middle East during 1993-2000, with 55 percent of their total value ($46.5 billion in current dollars). France was second during these years, with 23 percent ($19.2 billion in current dollars). From 1997-2000, the United States accounted for 61 percent of arms agreements with this region ($23.4 billion in current dollars), while France accounted for 16 percent of the region's agreements ($6.2 billion in current dollars), representing most of the arms transfer agreements by the major West European suppliers with the Middle East.

(U) Future arms sales in the region will involve advanced fighter aircraft, tactical air launched missile systems, tactical air defense systems. Europe, Russia and the United States will be looked to as sources of these weapon systems.

(U) China. China's current and future arms acquisitions include fighter aircraft, major surface combatants, and advanced air defense systems. China relies heavily on Russian military technology, which can be found in all major categories of Chinese advanced conventional weapon systems. Russian technology transfer will make the lethality of China's currently deployed conventional weapons at least one generation more advanced.

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