Ponder and vote all 13 of them under the existing rules, bring each one right to the point of final passage. When the Speaker went to put the question, you would stop and suspend right there. You would not have a final passage vote on each of the 13, but all the work would have been done right up to final passage.

The deliberative process would have worked. Bear in mind you did not start on the first one until all 13 were reported. Parenthetically, I can offer some objections to this myself.

Maybe the rules could provide that at that point, within say 2 days, the rules could direct the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations to prepare a consolidated single package bill. It would really be 13 chapters and it would be a reprinting of the 13 bills exactly as the House had worked its will on each.

That has afforded the House the opportunity to work its will on a noble objective. No. 1, which is, let us say, cut defense, add to education, and so on-reorder the priorities, if you please.

It may be the single package bill in the first place would have been the best vehicle, but this is a reasonably close substitute.

Then, provide in the rules that the Committee on Ways and Means within a given number of days or weeks after all this has happened— this wouldn't happen until July probably-by which time the President would have under the Reorganization Act of 1970 that Mr. Sisk referred to, he would have recast his economic outlook and sent the so-called midsession budget updating to Congress. Ways and Means would have the advantage of that. Provide in the rules that the Ways and Means Committee would bring to the House a bill on the way the revenue outlook is and the revised expenditure outlook. The debt ceiling would be in the same bill. Maybe added taxes would be recommended.

Then on the floor, you would marry those two bills after a full debate; the rules could cover that.

There probably should be an opportunity for a motion to recommit, maybe two motions to recommit. Maybe one by the majority so it can have the opportunity for a recounting on the appropriation side if that seems in order. Maybe one by the minority as usual. Then, vote it up or down and send the whole works to the Senate.

Mr. PEPPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Matsunaga?

Mr. MATSUNAGA. I have one question. It is a question relative to the shift from the fiscal year to the calendar year. One important difference between our present fiscal year and a calendar year would be this, would it not, that under the calendar year, if we stay in session until December 31, the session will then have ended and we would not be in session so we wouldn't need any continuing resolutions as we do now whenever we remain in session past June 30 and into the next fiscal year?

Mr. WILSON. That is the premise.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. At least there would be that improvement?

Mr. WILSON. I recall saying to Mr. Mahon, when we talked about it, that if you don't assume that Congress has concluded all of its appropriations matters by sine die day, forget about changing the fiscal year. I think we have to assume that.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. At least in that respect the committees would be forced to finish their work, whereas under the present fiscal year schedule, because we are in session even after July 1, they are not forced to finish their work before the next fiscal year begins.

Mr. WILSON. More than that, Mr. Matsunaga, but the HEW bill has held over and the transportation bill held over a couple of years ago because of the SST battle. Foreign aid has also held over. We did not finish those even by sine die day.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clawson?

Mr. CLAWSON. That eliminates the argument for a change in the fiscal year.

Mr. WILSON. I don't think it does.

Mr. CLAWSON. It poses some problems.

Mr. WILSON. One could almost ask, why have a December adjournment? Why not go on for 2 years without adjourning? More seriously, we have to assume Congress will find ways to complete its fiscal business by sine die day.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Long?

Mr. LONG. In view of your recommendation with respect to someone doing a long range study as to what amounts of money would be available, maybe crystal-balling it and recognizing that it is crystal-balling it, after you had advocated that, your answer to Mr. Bolling's question with respect to the macroeconomic question seemed a little contradictory.

Mr. WILSON. I would underscore your words, "crystal-balling." I understood what Mr. Bolling was saying to be based on the premise that you would somehow deal with his suggestion legislatively each year in a bill.

The crystal-balling things would not be dealt with in a bill. You would have an expert staff to deal with that under a committee.

Mr. LONG. In answer to Mr. Matsunaga's question you said you were legislating by the Ways and Means Committee coming up with a specific recommendation as to how much money would be available for a particular year?

Mr. WILSON. Indirectly. When you now adopt the debt ceiling, for example, you do more than just set a debt ceiling number. The truth of the matter is, you first estimate the spending, then the revenues. under the tax structure, thus arriving at the deficit or surplus difference, and finally setting the resulting debt ceiling number.

Mr. LONG. Macroeconomics is one section of which Mr. Bolling was speaking.

Mr. WILSON. If you could somehow bring the Joint Economic Committee in at that point, in view of my remarks to Senator Pepper, this is where you could have a fiscal and economic debate, improve the congressional control debate and decision on overall fiscal and economic policy.

Mr. LONG. I think this has some real possibility, but you don't necessarily see an inconsistency between the two?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Mr. LONG. It appears to me your answers were inconsistent with what you said to Mr. Bolling.

Mr. WILSON. I think it can be dovetailed.

Mr. LONG. You have continually stayed away from the political aspects of whether or not this is practical.

Mr. WILSON. I have tried to stick with what I see as logical and sound, given the premises of the bill.

Mr. LONG. Exercises in futility from a political point of view are some things we sometimes undertake that are less productive than other things.

Mr. WILSON. I would rather see you not adopt anything than to adopt a lot of less than meaningful changes.

Mr. LONG. In 1920, didn't we really adopt what you are suggesting that we adopt today? It didn't work then. What makes you feel it would work now?

Mr. WILSON. I am saying that you should nail up the back doors. I am saying that the idea of one committee handling all the spending business is so inherently sound that you ought to get back to it. And. finally, I am saying find a way to closely coordinate revenues and spending.

I discovered years ago you can put any members on the Committee. on Appropriations that you want to, and in a few years they will be unpopular.

Mr. BOLLING. Why is it that so many Members seek that assignment? Mr. WILSON. My short answer is the pervasiveness of the Federal Government in every facet of our lives and our communities. It touches everywhere, so closely and in almost countless ways.

Mr. BOLLING. Politics?

Mr. WILSON. The mechanisms and the rules of the House do not so explicitly and openly deal with these. They are secured in other

ways.

Mr. LONG. I have one further comment. You quoted Mr. Mahon and Sam Rayburn. Francis Bacon said that it would be unsound in the first place, and contradictory in the second, to suppose that that which has never been accomplished under one way can be accomplished by the same without change.

Mr. WILSON. Mark Twain was once asked in respect to a difficult question, "Mr. Clements, what would be your recommendation?" He said, "Do what is right, it will please a few and astonish the rest.”

I often think about what Calvin Coolidge once said. He said, "Nothing is easier than the expenditure of public money. It does not appear to belong to anybody. The temptation is overwhelming to bestow it on somebody."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McSpadden.

Mr. MCSPADDEN. I have no quotes, Mr. Chairman.

I enjoyed your testimony very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to commend you, Mr. Wilson. You were factual. You have had a barrel of experience and it is too bad that you are down there in Maryland fishing all the time. You should be here, helping us out.

Mr. WILSON. If I may conclude with this. A court case was going on and a novel and unprecedented question of courtroom procedure arose. The judge didn't want to be hasty in his ruling so he adjourned the

court for an hour and asked the opposing attorneys to come to his chambers and counsel with him as to how he should rule.

He said to one of the lawyers, who was a pompous sort of fellow, "Counselor, have you ever run into this question in your long and distinguished experience?" The attorney said, "No, sir, your Honor, I have not." The judge then asked, "What is your opinion of it?"

The attorney launched into a long dissertation on the subject and the judge listened for about 20 minutes and when the lawyer finished the judge said, "Counselor, I am none the wiser."

The attorney then said, "Your Honor, that may be true, but at least you are better informed."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say this: If you had some bushy eyebrows and a Southern dialect, you would give Senator Ervin a good run for the money.

Thank you.

Our next witness will be Dr. Saloma. Doctor, you may proceed. Do you have a statement?

STATEMENT OF JOHN S. SALOMA, INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. SALOMA. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your statement in whatever manner you wish.

Mr. SALOMA. I will abbreviate my statement, Mr. Chairman. Let me say I enjoyed hearing Paul Wilson. I remember as a student some years ago asking him about the appropriations process in the House. He is part of the history of the appropriations process.

I have again learned a great deal listening to him today.

Mr. Chairman, I would like my formal statement inserted in the record and I will make a few points.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be inserted in the record. [The statement referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF JOHN S. SALOMA, INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the invitation to present views on the important budget reform legislation you have under consideration. Many provisions in the Budget Control Act of 1973 as currently drafted are highly commendable in correcting long-standing problems in the way Congress acts on the Budget. H.R. 7130, based in large part on the Report of the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, is obviously a highly sophisticated and carefully constructed legislative proposal. However, if it is to succeed in instituting a major new role for the Congress in the budget process it must meet the tests of operational and political feasibility. In my view the legislation is in some trouble on both counts.

Let me preface my suggestions for changes in the bill with a strong endorsement for Congressional action on budget reform. The Congress is, as it were, facing its "moment of truth." Opportunities such as the current demand for Congressional innovation and initiative come all too rarely. I hope you will be willing to risk some major departures from existing Congressional procedures. No one, of course, can fully foresee the consequences of reforms on the scale of those included in H.R. 7130. But you can commit yourselves to trying them or some alternative proposal on at least an experimental basis.

THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY-THE NEED FOR AN ADEQUATE

INFORMATION BASE

While the Congress has wrestled with the political problem of how to structure an authoritative Congressional mechanism for budgetary decisionmaking since at least the Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget attempted under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, it has paid relatively little attention to developing current budgetary information suitable for its internal use. The legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 does include provisions for meeting the information needs of the Congress but, as a recent study by the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations indicates, the Executive, notably the Office of Management and Budget, has shown limited interest and energy in meeting these needs. Part of the problem, in fairness to the Executive, has been the inability of the Congress to define its information needs more precisely. To correct this deficiency, Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana has introduced S. 1215, the Federal Fiscal and Budgetary Information Act of 1973, which would shift the responsibility for building Congressional requirements into Federal information systems to a new Congressional facility charged with acquiring and processing fiscal, budgetary and program-related information.

H.R. 7130 proposes that the Congress undertake major budgetary analysis and ordering of priorities before a Congressional budgetary data base has been developed and tested. At best the Legislative Budget Director and his staff would gradually develop budgetary data suitable for program comparison while they were implementing the new procedures. At worst, the House and Senate Budget Committees would have to set their ceilings and make allocations to committees and programs arbitrarily without developed budgetary information.

Budgetary information and analysis by themselves will not solve the problem of interprogram comparison and evaluation. The weighing of priorities is ultimately a value or political choice. But intelligent rational action on the budget presupposes that decision-makers have fairly comprehensive information on how funds are being or will be expended and some information on their effectiveness in achieving stated objectives.

It is frequently argued that Congress has adequate staff and, if anything, is deluged with too much information. With regard to Congressional handling of the budget, that is clearly not the case. H.R. 7130 in its concluding paragraph mandates the Joint Legislative Budget Staff to "develop methods of using computers and other techniques for the analysis of information to improve not only the quantitative but the qualitative evaluation of budgetary requirements." If the experience of the House Information Systems unit is any indication, the Congress will have to recruit a sizable professional staff to implement this provision. Information requirements for computer analysis will become both more precise and more extensive.

By not facing the information problem more squarely, i.e., by not emphasizing the priority need for a Congressional Budget Office facility, H.R. 7130 runs the added risk that if its political mechanism proves unworkable, budget reform may be discredited without leaving any substantial improvements in budgetary information available to the Congress.

An alternative approach would be to go ahead definitely in establishing a Congressional Budget Office but to recognize in the legislation that it will take two or three budget cycles to develop and test new Congressional budget information requirements. The mechanism of formal budget committees and concurrent resoIutions and the complicated timetable and inter-committee cooperation they entail could be tested on a two- or three-year pilot basis with an evaluation report to the Congres from the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control or a successor committee.

An added complication that would appear to support this approach involves the work of the Select Commitee on Committees, chaired by Congressman Richard Bolling of Missouri. The Select Committee, in studying the jurisdictions of both the legislative and financing committees, may well recommend basic changes in the committee system that could alter the current operations of the committees in ways not anticipated by the Joint Study Commitee. An experimenal approach to budgetary reform would facilitate other changes in committee structure the Congress might later want to make on the basis of the Select Committee Report.