state-created parole system serves the public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence, the state may be specific or general in defining the conditions for release and the factors that should be considered by the parole authority. It is thus not surprising that there is no prescribed or defined combination of facts which, if shown, would mandate release on parole. Indeed, the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage. In parole releases, like its siblings probation release and institutional rehabilitation, few certainties exist. In each case, the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate and for the community. This latter conclusion requires the Board to assess whether, in light of the nature of the crime, the inmate's release will minimize the gravity of the offense, weaken the deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for the administration of justice. The entire inquiry is, in a sense, an "equity" type judgment that cannot always be articulated in traditional findings.

IV

Respondents suggest two theories to support their view that they have a constitutionally protected interest in a parole determination which calls for the process mandated by the Court of Appeals. First, they claim that a reasonable entitlement is created whenever a state provides for the possibility

3 These are the traditional justifications advanced to support the adoption of a system of parole. See generally A. von Hirsch & K. Hanrahan, Abolish Parole? 3 (1978); N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 47 (1974); J. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 171 (1975); D. Stanley, Prisoners Among Us 59, 76 (1976); Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966 Wash. U. L. Q. 243, 249.

* See Stanley, supra n. 3, at 50-55; Dawson, supra n. 3, at 287-288.

of parole. Alternatively, they claim that the language in Nebraska's statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (1) (1976), creates a legitimate expectation of parole, invoking due process protections.

A

In support of their first theory, respondents rely heavily on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we held that a parole-revocation determination must meet certain due process standards. See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973). They argue that the ultimate interest at stake both in a parole-revocation decision and in a parole determination is conditional liberty and that since the underlying interest is the same the two situations should be accorded the same constitutional protection.

The fallacy in respondents' position is that parole release and parole revocation are quite different. There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires. The parolees in Morrissey (and probationers in Gagnon) were at liberty and as such could "be gainfully employed and [were] free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life." 408 U. S., at 482. The inmates here, on the other hand, are confined and thus subject to all of the necessary restraints that inhere in a prison.

A second important difference between discretionary parole release from confinement and termination of parole lies in the nature of the decision that must be made in each case. As we recognized in Morrissey, the parole-revocation determination actually requires two decisions: whether the parolee in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of parole and whether the parolee should be recommitted either for his or society's benefit. Id., at 479 480. "The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual question." Id., at 479.

The parole-release decision, however, is more subtle and

depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release. Unlike the revocation decision, there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable to the individual. The parole determination, like a prisoner-transfer decision, may be made

"for a variety of reasons and often involve[s] no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 225.

The decision turns on a "discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done." Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 803, 813 (1961).

The differences between an initial grant of parole and the revocation of the conditional liberty of the parolee are well recognized. In United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Board of Parole, 443 F. 2d 1079, 1086 (1971), the Second Circuit took note of this critical distinction:

"It is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom so long as he abides by the conditions of his

release, than to his mere anticipation or hope of freedom." Judge Henry Friendly cogently noted that "there is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants." Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975). See also Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F. 2d, at 1053; Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 477 F. 2d, at 282; Franklin v. Shields, 569 F. 2d, at 799 (Field, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New

York State Board of Parole, 500 F. 2d 925, 936 (CA2 1974) (Hay, J., dissenting).

That the state holds out the possibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 577. To that extent the general interest asserted here is no more substantial than the inmate's hope that he will not be transferred to another prison, a hope which is not protected by due process. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 225; Montanye v. Haymes, supra.

B

Respondents' second argument is that the Nebraska statutory language itself creates a protectible expectation of parole. They rely on the section which provides in part:

"Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:

"(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;

"(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;

"(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or

"(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (1) (1976).5

Respondents emphasize that the structure of the provision together with the use of the word "shall" binds the Board of

5 The statute also provides a list of 14 explicit factors and one catchall factor that the Board is obligated to consider in reaching a decision. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 83-1,114 (2) (a)-(n) (1976). See Appendix to this opinion.

Parole to release an inmate unless any one of the four specifically designated reasons are found. In their view, the statute creates a presumption that parole release will be granted, and that this in turn creates a legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite finding that one of the justifications for deferral exists.

It is argued that the Nebraska parole-determination provision is similar to the Nebraska statute involved in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), that granted good-time credits to inmates. There we held that due process protected the inmates from the arbitrary loss of the statutory right to credits because they were provided subject only to good behavior. We held that the statute created a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees. The Board argues in response that a presumption would be created only if the statutory conditions for deferral were essentially factual, as in Wolff and Morrissey, rather than predictive.

Since respondents elected to litigate their due process claim in federal court, we are denied the benefit of the Nebraska courts' interpretation of the scope of the interest, if any, the statute was intended to afford to inmates. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345 (1976). We can accept respondents' view that the expectancy of release provided in this statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. However, we emphasize that this statute has unique structure and language and thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case basis. We therefore turn to an examination of the statutory procedures to determine whether they provide the process that is due in these circumstances.

It is axiomatic that due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162–