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age group and rank structure, always be in a second-rate pay class. Even if Abel be highly motivated for a service career, it is doubtful whether he will want to subject his wife and children to the financial burden the situation entails.

I might interject at this point from my prepared statement that it is a wonder to me not that the services can get an adequate number of lawyers applying for a career in the Navy, but that they are able to get any at all. And so I made some inquiries on it, talked to a young lawyer who had integrated into the Regular Navy, and his answer gives you something to think about. He said: "Of course, when we come in the Navy we do not care about the pay. We do not know really what the other man is getting.

"Unless you are lucky or happen to look into the matter, the chances are these people that integrate do not know of the discrimination which results, but they find it out several years later, and then a certain bitterness sets in."

Section 4 of H.R. 3006, entitled "Constructive Service Credit Purposes of Appointment, Promotion, and Basic Pay," was somewhat cumbersome, and the standards as to who would receive constructive credit were not wholly spelled out. The section was criticized in considerable length by the counsel, Mr. John R. Blandford, of the Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee of Armed Services of the House of Representatives considering H.R. 3006. In substance, these criticisms were as follows:

1. Section 4, as written, would vest in the Secretary concerned the authority to determine what postgraduate degrees would be recognized. It was not believed that such authority should be deleged, but, rather, that Congress alone should make the determination as to what postgraduate degrees should be so recognized.

2. Section 4 would not benefit those who have been in the service for more than 3 years.

3. Section 4 would give to certain types of officers not now covered constructive credit for promotion, as well as for pay purposes, which did not properly belong in a pay bill and should be studied separately. These are not considered unsound criticisms.

It would appear that section 4 of H.R. 3006 did involve certain areas of authority which might be better taken up in separate legislation. But, it is submitted that complete elimination of the section was also not the solution since it does not come to grips with the present urgent needs of the services to retain competent officers in clearly defined skills requiring postgraduate training wherein constructive service is already authorized by law. Accordingly, appended hereto is a proposed section 15 for H.R. 5555, which, if adopted, would alleviate the present problem alluded to before in the AbelCharley example, and which at the same time avoids the criticisms which led to the elimination of section 4 from H.R. 3006.

The need for competent, high-caliber uniformed lawyers is becoming increasingly urgent. Public interests demand that in our relatively large peacetime Armed Forces, servicemen accused of serious misconduct have qualified counsel available to them.

Disabled servicemen involved in complex hearings before physical evaluation boards should have nothing but the best qualified attorneys to represent them.

The interests of the country require that in matters involving international law, contract law, admiralty law, aeronautical law, and the like, that the Government have the advice of competent, seasoned, and knowledgeable uniformed attorneys.

The equalization of the pay of service lawyers with their line contemporaries will eliminate a significant existing handicap to retention of seasoned attorneys. Most certainly, we cannot expect to retain high-caliber lawyers on a career basis in the armed services as long as the present pay discrimination persists.

(Proposed section 15 for H.R. 5555 follows:)

EQUALIZATION OF SERVICE CREDITABLE IN COMPUTATION OF BASIC PAY

SEC. 15. Section 205 of title 37, United States Code, is amended as follows: (1) Subsection (a) is amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of clause (8), redesignating clause (9) as clause "(13)" and inserting the following new clauses:

"(9) In the Army, for an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, an officer designated as a chaplain, and an officer of the Medical Service Corps who holds a degree of doctor of philosophy or a comparable degree designated by the Surgeon General, in a science allied to medicine-not more than three years, as determined by the Secretary of the Army.

"(10) In the Navy, for an officer designated a law specialist, an officer of the Chaplain Corps, and an officer of the Medical Service Corps who holds a degree of doctor of philosophy or a comparable degree designated by the Secretary of the Navy, in a science allied to medicine-not more than three years, as determined by the Secretary of the Navy.

"(11) In the Air Force, for an officer designated as a Judge Advocate, an officer designated as a chaplain, and an officer designed as a Medical Service officer who holds a degree of doctor of philosophy or a comparable degree designated by the Secretary of the Air Force, in a science allied to medicine— not more than three years, as determined by the Secretary of the Air Force. "(12) For an officer of the Public Health Service who holds a degree of doctor of philosophy or a comparable degree designated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and who is not covered by clause (7) or (8)— not more than three years, as determined by the Secretary of the Navy."

(2) Subsection (d) is redesignated as subsection "(e)" and the following new subsection is inserted after subsection (c):

"(e) Notwithstanding any other law, service credited under clauses (9), (10), (11), and (12) of subsection (a) of this section may not:

"(1) be included in establishing eligibility for voluntary retirement from a uniformed service; or

"(2) be counted in determining years of service to be used as a multiplier in computing retired pay."

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I might call the chairman's attention to the statement which has been submitted by General Harmon by the American Bar Association. I think it is an excellent statement that goes into the same problem, although taking it more from the Air Force's point of view, and it gives on page 6 of such statement some actual examples of the pay differentials which exist because of the existing inequity. Senator CANNON. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. Albright.

In this proposed amendment that you have attached, have you covered so far as you know all of the areas of comparability where the postgraduate degree is required?

Mr. ALBRIGHT. As far as I know except for one, and this could be covered by simply inserting it if it is believed necessary, and that is the members of the Veterinary Corps in the Army and the Air Force. These people do now, as you know, receive the $100, $200, and $250. Senator CANNON. No, the veterinarians do not.

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It is just the hundred, I beg your pardon.
Senator CANNON. Just the hundred for veterinarians.
Mr. ALBRIGHT. Now this is not covered in my bill.

I say "my bill." This is not covered in the bill submitted with my statement. It could be inserted very easily.

On the other hand, this does cover an officer of the Public Health Service.

With General Harmon's statement there is also presented an amendment which is very similar. General Harmon's would cover members of the Veterinary Corps. It does not, however, cover those in the Publice Health Service.

Senator CANNON. The Department of Defense, as I understand it, took the position on this proposal that it should be left within the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.

Are you familiar with that?

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I am not familiar with the position that was taken by the Department of Defense on this case.

I do know, however, what is contained in H.R. 3006. What they did in the case was that they actually did cover a number of the officers who are covered here, and then in addition they gave to the Secretary concerned, not the Secretary of Defense but the Secretary concerned, the power to determine other sciences where the service should be awarded both for promotion purposes and for pay purposes. This was one of the major criticisms that was levied at this bill in the House, and we have cut this out.

I am not stating that this is not something that should not be taken up. I am stating that the bill that we have presented does not have this objection to it.

Senator CANNON. Thank you very much. We appreciate you appearing here and presenting your views, and we will certainly give full consideration to it.

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I certainly appreciate this.

Senator CANNON. The next witness will be Mr. Paul H. Robbins, director of the National Society of Professional Engineers.

Mr. Robbins, we are happy to have you here today. You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF PAUL H. ROBBINS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS

Mr. ROBBINS. My name is Paul H. Robbins. I am executive director of the National Society of Professional Engineers, a nonprofit membership organization composed of registered professional engineers in virtually every specialized branch of engineering practice and type of employment, including the military services. All of the society's approximately 600,000 members are licensed under applicable State engineering registration laws, and are affiliated through 53 State and territorial societies and about 450 local community chapters.

The national society was organized in 1934 and is dedicated to the advancement of the public welfare and the promotion of the profession of engineering as a social and economic influence vital to the a ffairs of the Nation.

The society has for a number of years devoted attention to the problems and factors involving recruitment, retention, and utilization of engineers in the uniformed services. We have worked closely with key leaders in the commissioned engineering components of all services with the objective of achieving high-quality engineering on projects vital to the national defense and welfare. These activities have covered a wide range of subjects, including the need for improvement in professional development, environment, and compensation.

Of primary concern to the society during the current congressional consideration of military pay legislation are the questions of whether the duties of military personnel can be realistically compared with those of civil servce and industrial employees and whether, on this basis, some degree of comparability between the various pay schedules should be established.

Those who have spoken in favor of the comparability principle, including the President, point out that only through such a provision can the alarming loss rate of highly qualified and trained military personnel be significantly reduced. Those in opposition to the comparability principle argue that it is too difficult to establish a meaningful basis of comparison between the occupational duties of miltary, civil service, and industrial positions.

We agree that it is difficult to establish a direct linkage between the uniformed services pay schedule and any other pay scale. It is true that the duties are often hard to compare, and that within the military, the responsibilities of individuals holding the same rank may vary widely.

The overriding consideration, however, is the statistically undeniable fact that individual members of the uniformed services have little difficulty in determining how much their qualifications and training are worth in the civilian economy.

While it may be inaccurate to state categorically that the rank of first lieutenant is worth a specific dollar figure in the civilian economy, there are literally tens of thousands of former first lieutenants who have found, to the detriment of the uniformed services, just how much they are worth to civilian employers. The comparability principle may be discussed in philosophical terms either pro or con. The law of supply and demand, however, is a very real fact of life, one which will continue to deprive the services of vitally needed personnel until corrective action is taken.

In testimony before this subcommittee, and before the House subcommittee, the Department of Defense and the individual services have graphically portrayed the effects of the law of supply and demand upon retention rates among all categories of officer personnel, particularly among the younger officers and those completing obligated terms of service. The situation is most acute among the younger engineering and scientific officers.

In testimony before the House subcommittee, the Air Force witness stated that only 41 percent of their young officers remain on active duty past the obligated service period. Among engineering and scientific officers, this retention rate was only 20 percent, with some specialized categories as low as 7 percent.

Evidence indicates that the other services have experienced similar difficulties.

It is clear that such exceedingly high loss rates are costly, inefficient, and destructive of the manpower base needed for the future development of vital professional and administrative leadership.

There are obviously a number of reasons for high loss rates among engineering and scientific officers. Some do not like military life and would not remain on active duty even if their compensation were equal to that which they could command elsewhere. Similarly, some feel that their chances for professional development, achievement, and recognition are greater in nonmilitary employment. In too many cases, however, the decision to return to civilian life is influenced almost entirely by economic pressures.

As an example, the College Placement Council reports that starting salaries for recent graduates in engineering, physical science, and mathematics averaged $592 per month. This is approximately $170 per month more than the total compensation of a second lieutenant including base pay, quarters allowance, subsistence allowance, and tax advantage.

At the end of his 3 years of obligated service, the typical ROTC engineering officer, under the rates proposed in H.R. 5555, would receive a total compensation of approximately $635 per month. According to Bureau of Labor statistics figures, the average engineering graduate with the same 3 years of experience could expect an industrial salary of about $716 per month.

Thus, even with the proposed increase, the engineering graduate, completing his obligated military service, could step into a job in private industry at a raise in pay of about $80 per month, or almost $1,000 per year.

In the case of engineering and scientific personnel, the military service is at its greatest competitive disadvantage during that period when its younger officers do not have enough time invested to consider themselves committed to a military career.

In terms of base pay and allowances, the national society strongly supports upward adjustments as recommended originally by the administration. We, particularly, feel that officers with less than 2 years of service should be given substantial increases; for it is during this period, more than any other, that the young officer will make his decision on whether or not to pursue a military career.

It does not appear logical that 2 years of sacrifice in remuneration can influence him favorably to seek further military service.

This is not to say, however, that a lesser problem exists with regard to engineering officers at higher grade levels; for in fact, quite the reverse is true.

Because of the highly technical mission of many engineering organizations of the armed services, a need exists for a greater proportion of higher grade, more experienced, officers than in conventional military line organizations. For the uniformed services, as a whole, officer personnel requirements decrease rapidly as rank increases.

Military engineering organizations, however, frequently have large technical staffs composed primarily of officers in the O-3 to 0-6 range. In addition, there are requirements for top-quality, experienced engineering personnel in staff positions in organizations other than those ordinarily thought of as engineering units. Because of this, the personnel requirement curve for engineering officers does not descend

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