than have a blunderbuss-and-shotgun approach to vast changes, the thing to do is to shoot for an Under Secretary, shoot for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shoot for your budgetary improvements, take your rifle and go at these things one by one. Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask just one more question? You brought out that the Munitions Board, and I assume also the Board of Research in the same way-that that section of the law dealing with them should be amended by a few words and not gone into at full length as it is gone into here. Mr. Forrestal said, the other day, if my memory is right, that the purpose of those changes was to change those Boards from purely advisory boards into boards where the chairman had the right to assist the Secretary of Defense. Now, if you are going to have him assist, do you not have to pretty well define the functions and area or field of operations in which he is going to assist, and therefore is not that specific language somewhat necessary? Mr. EBERSTADT. Senator, I think the objective which you mention and which Secretary Forrestal mentions is entirely desirable and of course I may be wrong about it, but I think the language in the bill moves in the other direction. Senator SALTONSTALL. I don't understand. Mr. EBERSTADT. I think the language of this bill turns these into advisory boards to the Secretary, whereas my recommendation is in favor of the power in the Secretary, but a delegation by the Secretary to the Chairman, and the authority in the Chairman of the Board. Under the statute as now drawn, the power resides in the Secretary, to be sure; but, in the second instance, it resides in the Board. I don't think that is sound. I think it ought to reside in the Secretary and be delegated by the Secretary to the Chairman of the Board, so that the Board turns into a Senator SALTONSTALL. An assistant? Mr. EBERSTADT. Into an advisory board to its Chairman, more or less. The patterns have been very different and they have resulted from personal equations. In the Research and Development Board, under Dr. Vannevar Bush, a very clear and effective pattern of operations, as one would expect, was worked out and decisions were arrived at promptly. The Munitions Board suffered from the fact that the former Chairman was available only a few days every 2 weeks and what one would expect happened there; but I think you can accomplish every purpose which the bill aims at, by changing a limited number of words. Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, put those two boards really right under the Secretary's advisory boards and give him the power to use them in any way he sees fit, rather than try to delegate in the various fields? Mr. EBERSTADT. I would rather indicate their fields. I think, in other words, when I said I think these boards need more stability, I don't think you can necessarily leave it to the taste or whim of this official or that official. The Munitions Board has years of tradition and years of experience so I wouldn't make that too loose, but I would make arrangements that the Secretary might delegate the authority to decide to the Chairman. 8946949-5 There again I think that had that course been adopted, as indeed it was in certain cases, it could have been adopted under the present act, but the present act isn't quite clear enough. Let us say it needs clarification, but I would remember, in reference to changing that whole system, that Research and Development Board has made the greater progress and if a statute comes out under which the Secretary can shift that all around, things are disturbing although I don't think there is any intention to do it. Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask just one more question, and perhaps you have already answered that. Would you be willing to elaborate in a very few words on your ideas as to the powers of the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to the other three Secretaries-the Secretary of War, and Air Force and the Navy-on budgetary matters? In other words, would you, in your opinion, say that the secretaries of the various groups could go over the head of the Secretary of Defense to the President, or go over the head of the Secretary of Defense, we will say, to the Congress, or would you eliminate that? Mr. EBERSTADT. I would not give them a legal invitation to do so, and I would not pave the road with a statute. There are, of course, informal ways in Washington that are better known to you gentlemen than to me, whereby a Secretary of any of these establishments-and properly-should bring his objections before you. That is entirely desirable. There are circumstances when a Secretary might well find his views in conflict with the policy of the Department. What action_is_to be taken in those circumstances is a matter for him to decide vis-à-vis of his conscience, but I wouldn't put it in the statute. I would not put in a statute what is certainly an inconsistency with our normal organizational and operational practice, a straight and easy invitation to appeal. Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. It prevents subordination. When you do that. you sort of make a man an assistant to somebody else and then tell him: "You don't have to follow the orders of your boss if you don't want to." Mr. EBERSTADT. I mentioned the fact that there have been personnel problems, and we had difficulty in ascribing what was due to personnel. and what was due to organization, and what was due to policy. I did not mean to reflect on anybody. I meant that there are two categories of boards, or bodies. Take, for example, the National Security Council-they have their personnel in pretty good shape, they are experienced people and are buckling down and have their nose to the grindstone and are working right along. On the score of the National Security Resources Board, its accomplishments are more modest. The position of the Secretary and his relation to the three Secretaries is, of course, a very difficult thing, and it is not a thing that you can control by statute. There are Presidential and other prerogatives involved. This committee has a considerable influence in the matter of confirmation in these high offices, and I hope you do not think that it is an impertinence if I suggest that among the qualifications of civilian Secretaries in the departments, and Under Secretaries, is their devotion to the principles of the law under which they are to serve. I would think that that is a very pertinent qualification. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall, have you anything further! Senator SALTONSTALL. That is all, thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kefauver? Senator KEFAUVER. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baldwin? Senator BALDWIN. I have just one question, Mr. Chairman. I notice that Mr. Eberstadt recommended complete elimination of section 3 of the bill, and the placing of additional powers, or clarification of the powers of the Secretary of Defense in section 4. Is your thought, or one of your thoughts, behind this, Mr. Eberstadt, that if we were to go ahead under section 3 of the bill, we would superimpose upon the present organizational arrangements another entire organization which might very well be a duplication? For example, if you have a Secretary of Defense and an Under Secretary of Defense, and there is an Assistant Secretary of Defense, you will gradually draw into that secretarial organization all of the duties and powers and authorities that now reside in the three separate branches of the service. Isn't that what would be pretty apt to happen? Mr. EBERSTADT. Senator, if you did what you said in the last sentence, that might not be so bad-if you really drew them in therewhat may result is to establish their duplicates at the top, and you wouldn't draw them out underneath. For example, if you are going to adopt the suggestion that you have three Assistant Secretaries of Defense, that might be expected to be accompanied by the suggestion that you knock three out somewhere else, but I don't see that. The tendency of the superstructures is to develop and to grow. I think you gentlemen probably know better than I do, you have to watch them very carefully, and I am afraid of the section you mention, because I really don't know exactly what it means and exactly what its purposes are and exactly what its consequences are. I think that the power of the Secretary of Defense needs clarification, and needs strengthening. The CHAIRMAN. He replied to me a while ago that if the Under Secretary or the Secretary needed additional help, they can always get them; that we don't have to put supermen over supermen. We can get the same results without having a conflict in title and authority and scope, and so on. Isn't that your point? Mr. EBERSTADT. I am sure of it. Senator BALDWIN. I think the original conception of the committee was that the Secretary of Defense was to be a coordinating agency of the three existing services. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator BALDWIN. I think there is much to the point made by Mr. Eberstadt that if you build up another organization on the Secretary of Defense level, you will have Assistant Secretaries of Defense for War, and Army and Navy, and for the Air Corps, and gradually duplicate on a higher level what we have now, and I think that is what we want to avoid. Mr. EBERSTADT. With all these lesser elements in the constellation, what might be called the secretarial adjuncts and appointments, we don't always realize that they are there. Senator BALDWIN. On this Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. his being a principal adviser to the President, or military adviser to the President, is it not your fear that that particular official would become the man who made the decisions which, under the Constitu tion, must reside in the President and in the Congress ultimately? Mr. EBERSTADT. There is a tendency in that direction, Senator; and I think it should be avoided. I would not speak with assurance, for that would depend to a great extent on the character of the President, and the character of the man; but I think that when you make a man the highest ranking official in the Military Establishment, which is a new and unique position, and when you give him or make him the principal military adviser, you are giving him a power and influence to a military man-that you would want to think over pretty carefully. There is the question of wrangles and disputes and competition, and so forth. Gentlemen, I see a good side to that. I have seen these harmonious military establishments go down to defeat. I do not think our objective should be to develop a group of, let's say, Little Lord Fauntleroys. I think that is not a desirable objective. These are fighting men. These are real tough, serious fighting men, and it is to our interest that they should remain so, and I would hate to see any arrangement which would put that outfit into a strait-jacket in the name of harmony, which would be a very dangerous thing to do. I would rather see you and the Secretary of Defense and the Presi dent get the conflicting views of the experts on air, the experts on naval matters, and of the Army expert than to try to tie things up into some neat package, which may be a harmonious package, but which might lead us into trouble. Senator BALDWIN. Hasn't the President of the United States always had under law the authority that is needed to resolve any difficulties that may arise in any one of these agencies where there is difference of opinion? Isn't that one of his functions? Mr. EBERSTADT. I would think the President had it in the fullest measure; and I would think that in the amendment I have suggested. if that were passed here, the Secretary has it to the fullest measure that he ought to have it. I would not want to see the Secretary reach a final decision on such things as a 70-group Air Force. Those are responsibilities from which you cannot escape, and if you set up machinery whereby the determination of those tremendously important questions are delegated to either a civilian or military man, it seems to me you are taking great risks. Senator BALDWIN. In the last war, for example, where the question of when and where we were going to make an invasion of western Europe came up, a thing concerning which we were under great pressure from the Russians for a long period of time, you wouldn't think it desirable, would you, that the chief military adviser to the President would make that decision? Mr. EBERSTADT. No; most certainly not. Senator BALDWIN. The President ought to make that. Mr. EBERSTADT. Most certainly. That is a decision of grand strategy of the highest military and political level, and I would want the President's decision on that, and not the decision of the military man mentioned here. Senator BALDWIN. But you think if you had a chief military adviser, he might be the fellow who, in the last analysis, made the decision and the President would say, "That is the advice of my chief military adviser"? Mr. EBERSTADT. That is what I am afraid of, and-he advises without responsibility, Senator. That is the point. Senator BALDWIN. If it goes wrong, the execution wasn't effective. Mr. EBERSTADT. If it goes wrong-these fellows in the field, they didn't do right; whereas the present set-up has a curb. These men, when they advise, that advice carries responsibility. If their advice is accepted, there is no room for alibis. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hunt, do you have some questions? Mr. Eberstadt, did Secretary Forrestal appear before your task force in a committee hearing? Mr. EBERSTADT. In a number of them, Senator. Senator HUNT. Have you discussed with the Secretary or had the opportunity to discuss S. 1269, that you just treated in your state ment? Mr. EBERSTADT. I have not discussed this particular bill, Senator. I have discussed these matters, you might say, almost constantly with Mr. Forrestal for 5 years, off and on; but, I have not discussed this particular bill with him, or its provisions. Senator HUNT. What this committee must give a lot of weight to, of course, is the fact that you present to us a very feasible and splendid statement. Secretary Forrestal does likewise, but you are not in harmony, so it puts us in a position of attempting to evaluate the positions of both of you, and naturally make the best selection possible for us to make, from you two men who have spent so much time and know the subject so well. We have the promise of Secretary Forrestal that he will assist and advise us in the future whenever we ask. Could we get the two of you to come in with a joint recommendation for the final bill? Mr. EBERSTADT. Senator, it is my business to answer questions, not to ask, but may I ask-in what particular respect do you think we are not in harmony? I am not saying about an endorsement of the bill, and so forth, but this Chief of Staff to which I object, where I suggest a Chairman with different specifications, I took the liberty of measuring the Chairman that I suggest here against the testimony that Mr. Forrestal gave you gentlemen, and may I read it to you? Secretary Forrestal said, speaking of this man's specifications: The common effort of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on problems common to all the services, must be organized, be directed and the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs must be focused by somebody who has a full-time preoccupation with that duty. There is no difference there. Then again: I look upon him as a man carrying out the functions of a chairman who undertakes to, let us say, provide the agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs, see that their business is vigorously prosecuted, to resolve or identify those issues upon which agreement is not reached and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense upon those unsolved questions. Again: I visualize his functions as collating and bringing together the opinions and views of his three other colleagues and bringing those views to the attention |