it would not foster economy. A single military Chief of Staff would more likely contend for increased than reduced military appropriations; and (3) it would weaken and not strengthen our military power. It is no accident that in modern warfare the military organizations headed by a single military Chief of Staff have, so far as I know. invariably been on the losing side. This type of organization is conducive to static military thinking and to a "military line"-to Maginot Line psychology. It discourages debate and tends to foster an unjustified sense of security in one weapon, one arm, or one service. Debate and wrangles are trying, but military defeat is far worse. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff in the last war may not have been perfectthe system had some deficiencies-but it was just about as perfect as any institution in human affairs is likely to be. We should, therefore, think very carefully before we take any action which would impair the demonstrated strength of this magnificent military machine, bearing in mind the sage words of the Bard of Avon that in "striving to better, oft we mar what is well." I believe the office of chairman, as contemplated in the present bill, would greatly weaken the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We need to strengthen, not weaken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (6) Accordingly, I recommend that the bill provide for the appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the regular officers of the armed services, of a principal military assistant to the Secretary of Defense who, in addition to such other responsibilities as may be assigned to him by the Secretary of Defense, shall be a member of and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, on behalf of the Secretary, be responsible for expediting their business and for keeping their docket current in accordance with regulations and procedures approved by the Secretary. He should be responsible, in the Secretary's absence, for presenting and interpreting the Secretary's point of view and for bringing split decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the attention of the Secretary of Defense for resolution. He should not be empowered to exercise command or military authority over the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make military decisions on his own responsibility, or to set up a military staff of his own. His rank should not be higher than that of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his term of service should not exceed a fixed number of years. It should be his last active regular tour of duty. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he would be one of the President's and the Secretary's military advisers, but not the sole or principal one. His relations to the Secretary would furnish assurance that in resolv ing conflicts, his views would receive adequate consideration. With respect to the proposed amendment of section 212 of the National Security Act, the present burden on the Joint Staff, limited by statute to 100 officers, is excessive. Our committee suggested that the number be doubled. To all appearances this would fully meet the needs of the moment without involving the danger of having the Joint Staff mushroom into a huge organization as might well happen if no limit were placed upon it. The CHAIRMAN. For the record, I suppose that the recommendation to double the Joint Staff was predicated on testimony of those who were serving on it, and who said there was need for an increase? Mr. EBERSTADT. Principally on it, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. Those now serving on the Joint Staff, did they say they required more people to handle the work? Mr. EBERSTADT. Well, they said they required more officers and more civilians. The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. Mr. EBERSTADT. Our committee was quite satisfied that the burden. was too heavy for the present establishment, but we felt that doubling the establishment was an adequate step forward at this moment. The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead. Mr. EBERSTADT. The position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as proposed in the bill, accompanied by removal of all limitations on the size of the Joint Staff, is an invitation to the creation of the Chief of Staff and General Staff type of organization. Should 200 officers not prove adequate, Congress could give the matter further consideration on its merits. (7) Accordingly, I recommend that you put a limit of 200 officers on the Joint Staff. Comments on section 7: I am in full accord with the objectives of section 7. It seems to me, however, that this also can be accomplished in a simpler and less disturbing manner. These boards have made progress and have been doing useful work. What they need is stronger direction from the top and greater, not less, stability. An amendment of a few words to the present act would accomplish these purposes. Before closing, just a word about economy. This subject merits your attention although I do not know whether you wish to deal with it in this bill. Undoubtedly every provision in the bill will be supported by strong allegations that its passage will guarantee increased economy. As to this I have considerable doubt, for organizational changes alone will not effect economies and the attitude of the services is far from Spartan. Our committee made certain recommendations relating to economy and I take the liberty of commending them to your attention. There will be no substantial advances in the field of economy until military budgetary procedures and fiscal policies have been overhauled from top to bottom. Senator BYRD. Mr. Eberstadt, would it be possible for you to prepare specific amendments in accordance with the Hoover report to add to this bill, to cover what you have just discussed? Mr. EBERSTADT. With some assistance, I think that could be done. I should think one would want to discuss those things very carefully with the Bureau of the Budget people, and the people who are in the Military Establishment. Senator BYRD. I think that is very important. I think we are spending about 40 percent of our total expenditures on the Army and Navy and Air Force, and there has been practically no economy in the unification up to this time. That is admitted. Mr. EBERSTADT. I think there will be none, substantially, until the matter of expenditures is under control, and it is not under control at present. One can economize, by disposing of this duplication here and that duplication there, but that is rather like putting the cart before the horse in the approach. At least it would be, in business. Senator BYRD. It is a very important part of the bill, Mr. Chairman, and I would suggest that Mr. Eberstadt be requested to prepare an amendment or amendments and I would like the privilege of offering them to this bill, to carry out the Hoover recommendations for economy. The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have Mr. Eberstadt do that. and as a means of partial help, at least, our staff is available for any help they may give, and we will try to pave the way for the Budget Bureau to give you such help as you may need. We know you are busy, and we will do all within our power to cooperate. Mr. EBERSTADT. I will be glad to do what I can, but I will need plenty of help. The CHAIRMAN. We will be delighted and will try to help you in any way we can. Senator BYRD. If anybody can do it, you can. Mr. EBERSTADT. Thank you. To sum up, I agree with the objectives of this bill, but I think that its language can and should be improved. I believe that the desired objectives can be attained within the philosophy and framework of the present act by a few clear and simple amendments. As now drawn, I fear that in some respects the bill not only might fail to accomplish its purposes, but might tend to rock the foundations of our Military Establishment and to jeopardize our progress. Our committee was impressed by the fine spirit with which particularly the younger officials and officers who appeared before our committee have accepted the basic principles of the National Security Act and have shown hopeful confidence in working within the framework that it sets up. This seemed to the committee a point of real importance. It confirmed the committee's conviction that our nationalsecurity system rests on solid foundations. The problem now is not how to replace them, but how to build on them firmly and intelligently. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Eberstadt. Before we go on with the interrogation, I would like to ask our staff to take Mr. Eberstadt's recommendations, and in conjunction, if need be, with the legislative counsel, to prepare amendments in concrete form to carry out what Mr. Eberstadt has recommended, so we may have the actual wording, in making a decision as to whether we want to follow it completely, or how far the recommendations go. And, before you are interrogated, Mr. Eberstadt, I know I express the thought of the entire committee in saying that we are very grateful for the painstaking and detailed way you have gone about giving us the benefit of your advice. It is very helpful to us. It is a labor of love, and I want you to know that we appreciate it. Mr. EBERSTADT. Thank you very much, Senator. I was a little bit embarrassed by the length of the statement, but what you say has comforted me. The CHAIRMAN. We will give the members of the committee an opportunity to question now. Senator Byrd, have you some questions you would like to ask? Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained at the beginning of the hearing, but I have read the first part of his statement, and I may say that I have the utmost confidence in Mr. Eberstadt. I would like to know if it would be possible for myself and other members of the committee to carefully study his statement, together with the report of the Hoover Commission and possibly-would he be able to come back at some later time? The CHAIRMAN. Could you come back again, if we need you? We will try not to impose on you. Mr. EBERSTADT. I will come back at any time you want me. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd, do you have anything else now? Senator BYRD. No; nothing. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall. Senator SALTONSTALL. I Would like to ask Mr. Eberstadt two or three questions. I do so, sir, because I think that it is awfully important to us to get all the negative points of view on this thing in order to answer any possible questions in debate. The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Eberstadt, the present power of the Secretary, and this may not be the exact wording, but he has general direction but not the power of decision. I saw that you made no comment on that provision in section 6 of the act, about giving the Secretary power of decision, and I assume you are in favor of that power. Mr. EBERSTADT. Well, I thought I had cut down the number of words by referring to the amendment that we suggested, and the amendment we suggested gives him that power very clearly. This question of the power of the Secretary, and the problems that arise in connection with it, may be somewhat exaggerated. I think it is a question of clarification rather than need for extension of power. Secretary Forrestal undoubtedly proceeded wisely in adopting an evolutionary course, but an evolutionary course does not afford very sharp tests of the extent of the power, and I fail to discern any instances where the power was flagrantly or consistently defied and really put to the test. The problem is to clarify that power. There were doubts about it, and it is vague here and there, but there was no challenge of the power. Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, this makes it more specific. Mr. EBERSTADT. Sharp, and we took out the word "general.” Those words perhaps served a purpose at the time. We suggested taking out the word "general" and taking out some other ambiguous words in the present statute, and it seemed to us that that was adequate. Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, the present bill as drafted gives the War Council the power to advise the Secretary. That is done Mr. EBERSTADT. That is page 7. Senator SALTONSTALL. That is done on page 7: The Council shall advise the Secretary on matters of broad policy. Then, on page 9, under subsection (b), under Chiefs of Staff: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military adviser. In other words, under the present draft, is it not possible that the Secretary might get one type of advice or one argument from the War Council and a divergent argument from his principal military adviser, and is that one reason why you cut him out as the chief military adviser? In other words, isn't there a conflict in the words of the statute as it is now drawn? Mr. EBERSTADT. I am not so sure about that, Senator. Of course, the Secretary of Defense, in any circumstance, is likely to be flooded with advice. There won't be any dearth of advice on this, that, and the other point. The point I am emphasizing is, the creating by statute of the office of principal military adviser puts a particular premium and lays a particular importance and influence on the advice of one man. I missed the point that you mentioned there-I missed that point. I think that there might be a certain conflict there, but I would not be inclined to emphasize the importance or dangers of that, Senator. Senator SALTONSTALL. You made no mention of the so-called Chief of Staff having a vote on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I assume from your statement that you would say that he would be merely the chairman and would bring up the conflicting points of views but would not have a vote; is that correct? Mr. ELERSTADT. I must have given the wrong impression then, Senator, in the recommendation that read: "He shall be a member of, and the Chairman"—and membership would involve Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you would interpret that as having a vote, he would then have a vote? Mr. EBERSTADT. He would have full membership and of course the body, strictly speaking, does not operate as a voting body; but he would have the full franchise of any of the other three. Senator SALTONSTALL. And that might well lead to a 2-and-2 decision? Mr. EBERSTADT. It might lead to a 2-and-2 decision. Senator SALTON STALL. As I get it, our present law was set up, to use words that we discussed before your committee this summer; it was a merger without unification. Assume we are going to give the Secretary more power and general authority, and assume that there was to be a Chief of Staff that would go the whole limit one way, what you in substance suggest is that we give the civilian general authority, but we create no all-powerful military man. That is about the size of your argument, is it not? Mr. EBERSTADT. That is correct, that you clarify the authority of the civilian, bearing in mind, gentlemen, that that question has been exaggerated. The act has not been in effect 2 years and you had a team in there of fine, loyal, intelligent, hard-working men, but all of whom had commitments to the past, of one sort or another; and, as you know, the problems were problems which engendered a good deal of strong feeling. Give the act a chance. The CHAIRMAN. You think the colts are broken now, and all you need to do is bring them along gradually, and they will make good horses? Mr. EBERSTADT. I think they are being broken now, but I urge great reserve before a revolutionary change in the situation. I saw an article in the newspaper this morning by General Eisenhower, and it contained what seems to be a very wise statement: It is easy to talk about fighting. The wonder is that there have been so few, if you stop to think about the areas in which there could be differences. It is a wonder. And he goes on. Those who report rather than propagandize, I think, would confirm to you that substantial progress is being made and that rather |