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ment. Amongst those who recommended against this course, were many who but a short time ago had testified in its favor.

Our committee made no recommendation of this sort. I find none among the recommendations of the Hoover Commission itself. The "Summary of desirable changes" appearing on page 2, and following, of the first report of the Secretary of Defense issued in January 1949 does not include any such recommendation. I am thus at a loss to know its origin and purpose. I doubt that its full effect and possible repercussions are clearly foreseeable at this moment.

Accordingly, I suggest that the need for, and the consequences of, this amendment be studied carefully to determine whether developments to date indicate that it is either necessary or desirable.

If its intent is to clarify and strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense, this can be done directly in clear and unmistakable language aimed squarely at this objective. I doubt the wisdom of trying to accomplish this result indirectly and as a byproduct of some other far broader measure whose purpose, scope, and consequences are not apparent.

(2) I recommend, therefore, that section 3 of the bill be eliminated and that the desirable objective of clarifying and strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense be dealt with under the provisions of section 4 of the bill.

Comments on section 4: Some of my remarks on section 3 of the bill also apply to that part of section 4 of the bill concerned with clarifying and strengthening the powers of the Secretary. Our committee suggested a means of dealing with this problem involving closed adherence to the language of the present statute and less disturbance to the military departments.

An example of the type of problem that might arise under section 3 and section 4 of the bill as now drawn, is found in the limitation (p. 4, lines 23 to 25) on the right of the Secretary to effect transfers of personnel, et cetera. The bill provides that this power "shall not be construed to authorize the Secretary of Defense to reassign the combatant functions et cetera." With the right to transfer personnel proposed to be conferred upon the Secretary in subparagraph (3) (p. 4, lines 15 to 19), he might not need to be concerned about the right to transfer "functions." He might move personnel of the strategic Air Force into the Naval Air Arm without touching the present distribution of "functions." Similarly, he might move personnel of the Marine Corps into the Army leaving "the functions" where they are. In other words, he might be able to shift personnel around in a manner which, while not formally a shift in "function," would be tantamount to just that. This is but one example of the type of questions that could arise and that should be carefully explored before being acted on.

By eliminating a few words from section 202 (a) of the present statute and adding a few, you accomplish clearly, definitely and effectively the objective of clarifying and strengthening the Secretary's authority without the danger of producing results that you do not desire or foresee. On page 12, volume I of our committee's report, we suggest a specific amendment to the present section 202 (a) aimed at accomplishing this purpose.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question? I do not want to, if you say not.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Eberstadt, you suggest the elimination of section 3 of the act.

My question is this: May not one purpose of that section be to bring the Secretary of Defense within the provisions of the Budget Act in order that he can submit one budget for all three separate departments? I don't know enough to know whether that is true or not, but if you eliminate that, and have three departments as at present, are you complying with the Budgetary Act?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Senator, my answer is-I don't know. There are a multitude of questions raised by that section 3, of which this is one. I have never seen the section or heard it suggested until I saw it in the bill, so that I have not had a chance to study it or gauge its effect or repercussions.

It was not recommended before, so far as I know.

That may well be one of its purposes. I am just not familiar with what its purposes and its objectives and repercussions are, or may be; and I think it seems to cut deeply into the structure and should be looked at with great care.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In your discussion of the section, you make no reference to the budget at all. I have read your report, but I am sorry to say that I have forgotten that section.

Do you recommend that the Secretary of Defense submit one budget for all three departments?

Mr. EBERSTADT. I don't think it is recommended in those terms. We recommended that he submit a combined budget and that he be given very clear and definite authority over the budget and all its classifications, terminology, and so forth. I am coming to that later. Senator SALTONSTALL. It is not in here?

Mr. EBERSTADT. I take it up in the end.
Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Does that answer your question?
Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. EBERSTADT. (3) I recommend that you consider the amendment proposed by our committee for the purpose of clarifying and strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Comments on section 5: With the provisions of section 5 of the bill appointing an Under Secretary, the views of our committee are in full accord. It is amply clear that the Secretary of Defense needs such assistance. His present burdens are heavier than even the strongest and ablest man can carry.

(4) I recommend that you pass this portion of section 5 as it is. Our committee gave very careful thought to whether we should recommend Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and finally determined not to. One reason why we did not recommend this step was our concern about the rapidly increasing size of the Secretary's office. It should not be permitted to become top-heavy. Assistant Secretaryships would, in our opinion, stimulate and accelerate this trend. Furthermore, both in form and in substance, they might cause confusion in relationships with the departmental Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries.

The CHAIRMAN. Agreeing with your point of view for the purpose of developing your thought, that the Assistant Secretaries are unde

sirable, and agreeing with your point of view that an Under Secretary is desirable, have you thought whether or not assisting the Under Secretaries there should be any increase in personnel, or do you consider that the one Under Secretary would be enough to carry on the functions of the office?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Senator, my feeling is that the Under Secretary, without the assistance of this committee, would find it possible to rally to his support adequate aid.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. EBERSTADT. I don't think it would be necessary to establish a further formal office.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Instead of a lone star, you would have a whole constellation forming around it.

The CHAIRMAN. That answers my question. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Are the three Assistant Secretaries of Defense senior to the three military Secretaries and their civilian assistants? If not, exactly what is their relationship? And what to the military heads of the three Departments? What to the chairmen of the Research and Development Board, and of the Munitions Board? You have provided the order of succession from the Secretary to the new Under Secretary of Defense, but the order of rank and succession from that point on is not indicated. It probably should be, whether or not you decide to have Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The present three civilian Special Assistants to the Secretary perform functions which, generally speaking, would fall to the lot of such Assistant Secretaries of Defense. They have performed them with impressive competence and distinction. It is difficult to see how further titular adornment could have improved their performance. This sems a clear case where "well enough" should be "let alone." If the purpose of the amendment were to confer a reward on these three individuals, there are none that deserve it more. Whether that is an adequate ground for so important an organizational change is open to question. They deserve to be raised in the pay scale and that I understand is being done. Our committee saw no urgent need for these new offices and felt that the disadvantages inherent in their creation outweighed any advantages.

(5) Accordingly, I recommend against creating these three Assistant Secretaryships of Defense.

Comments on section 6: With respect to section 6 relating to the War Council, it would seem appropriate to take this occasion to change the name of the War Council to the Armed Forces Policy Council. This would more clearly indicate its purpose and duties.

The Secretary might also be given the right to add other members to the War Council, such as the new Under Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Munitions Board and of the Research and Development Board. Possibly he might also want the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board to sit in on appropriate occasions. As time goes on, this very important and useful body can and should be used to a greater extent than heretofore.

Insofar as the proposed amendment to section 212 of the present act contemplates creating the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I think it is sound. To confer upon this officer the highest military rank in the armed forces and to make him "the principal

military adviser to the President and to the Secretary of Defense” I think is dangerously unsound. It raises some serious questions which go to the very heart of our military policy, our strategic plans and our national security.

The considerations involved in this proposed amendment are not new to your committee. Our group gave the matter a great deal of thought. A few of the witnesses before our committee recommended the Prussian type of military organization with the conventional Chief of Staff supported by a General Staff. A large majority of our witnesses, however, were against this type of organization, including many distinguished witnesses who had recommended in its favor a few years ago.

There was very general agreement that the Secretary urgently needs assistance on the military side and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff need a chairman who will spark-plug the organization and see to it, on behalf of the Secretary, that their business is kept current, and that they come to conclusions.

We did not ourselves reach a unanimous conclusion as to how these needs should be filled. A majority of the committee recommended the appointment of a principal military assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the selection of a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from among its members. Page 13 of our committee's report sets forth our recommendations on these matters. The subject is discussed at some length beginning on page 52.

If the office of the Chief of Staff to the President is to be abolishedand there seems to be no reason why it should not-there are advantages in the language of the bill which contemplates that the chairman shall be someone other than one of the three senior commanders of the military services. But the chairman we had in mind was conceived of as an executive chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not as their senior member, and particularly not as a single top-ranking military officer to supplant the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military adviser to the President and to the Secretary of Defense.

I need not discuss the significance of the highest seniority in the Military Establishment. We all know what that means and what overwhelming influence it carries with it. The relationship of "principal military adviser" to our civilian Commander in Chief and to his principal civilian deputy in national security matters, the Secretary of Defense, is a further tremendous power. I venture the opinion that the President and the Secretary would be very hesitant about overruling this man's advice in military matters. Each time they did so they would not only be taking huge responsibility in a field in which they were not expert, but they would impair his position and prestige. This would not be the case if the President's or the Secretary's decisions were fortified by the advice of some or all of the heads of the three military services who, in turn, would be responsible to carry out their advice.

As contemplated in the amendment, the "principal military adviser" would bear no responsibility for carrying out his own advice. If his advice proves wrong and results in disaster, he can point the finger of responsibility at the three services and charge them with deficiencies of execution. They, in turn, in case of failure, can lay the blame on the chairman's advice. Military history is full of disasters resulting from such division of responsibility.

I yield to no one in my admiration for the officers and men in our armed services. Among the greatest men of our time or of any time are those who have risen to the top of these great establishments. But military men enjoy no exemption from the frailties of human nature. They, too, have personal ambitions, prejudices, predilections toward friends, convictions right and wrong. They, too, make mistakes. In the average these weaknesses tend to offset each other. I would prefer a broader base of advice on these vital matters.

The arrangement suggested might, it is true, result in an apparently more harmonious Military Establishment, but it would also result in a weaker one. Wherever there are strong differences of opinion on difficult problems there is a human tendency to seek the one-man solution. Our generation has had painful opportunities to observe the dangers of this course.

The differences which divide the services are to some extent petty. These are not serious. A strong Secretary of Defense, armed with ample powers, should have no difficulty in dealing with them. But there is another type of difference which goes to the essence of military strategy, and perhaps of national security. This type of problem is not to be settled by a single military chief or even by the Secretary of Defense. It concerns the President, the Congress, and probably the people themselves. Debate on such matters does not lose lives, it saves them. The 70-group Air Force is a case in point. Regardless of the merits or demerits of that matter, it was thoroughly sound that it should have been brought to the attention of Congress and settled by Congress. The Billy Mitchell episode indicates what is likely to happen where, as was the case in the Army, a single military Chief of Staff ruled the roost.

Removing the joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military advisers to the President and to the Secretary of Defense and concentrating this function in the hands of one military man, would be an extremely dangerous thing to do in any circumstances. It is particularly dangerous at the present moment and in the light of the tremendous technological advances that are taking place.

The advances in the field of submarine warfare, though less spectacular, rival those in the air. Guided missiles may completely revolutionize the techniqes of offensive and defensive warfare on land, at sea and in the air. In the background of all loom the vast and unknown potentials of the atom. In these circumstances, for the President and the Secretary of Defense and possibly Congress, to rely on a single military officer for advice on military policy, strategy, and technology, seems hazardous in the extreme. A wrong decision may be a fatal one. There is greater safety in broader counsels, even if it involves some wrangling.

Although the officer in question is designated as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in possessing the highest rank in the Military Establishment, as well as the position of "principal military adviser to the President and to the Secretary of Defense," he combines in his person the two most important and powerful attributes of a conventional Chief of Staff. As the amendment is now drawn, he is very much like a Chief of Staff in all but name.

The majority of our committee was opposed to the Chief of Staff concept for three main reasons: (1) Because it would attenuate, not strengthen, civilian control of the Military Establishment; (2) because

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