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Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes. I would repeat, I put, if possible, even more emphasis upon the creation of additional facilities of help than I do upon the power-though the increased power is also essential, as I have stated earlier.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, how does the proposed legislation strengthen civilian control? Do you care to elaborate on that?

Secretary FORRESTAL. In the first place, the Under Secretary bill which Senator Byrd so skillfully handled on the floor of the Senate, and which has now passed both Houses, is one of the paramount important things in this concept that I have of this new bill. It will enable the Secretary of Defense to delegate to an Under Secretaryof Defense broad areas of responsibilities which now devolve directly upon the Secretary himself. Our second component in that increased civilian control is, I think, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The creation of that office will enable the Secretary to focus the military judgment which now has to come from a composite body, rather than a body which has a man at its head to direct its energies and bring the results to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator JOHNSON. In addition to the power, you will then have a chairman who is responsible to the Secretary of Defense, which will give a civilian line of thought to it, which you do not now have?

Secretary FORRESTAL. The civilian influence or control I think is augmented by the fact that you will have a man who can identify the questions upon which decisions have been made and questions where they have been unable to arrive at a decision, and who would produce supporting data which would enable the Secretary of Defense to come to decisions.

Senator JOHNSON. But in the last analysis, the Secretary of Defense, in addition, will have the power of decision.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes; he has the final power of decision. Senator JOHNSON. To whom is the Munitions Board responsible now?

Secretary FORRESTAL. What is that?

Senator JOHNSON. To whom is the Munitions Board directly responsible now?

Secretary FORRESTAL. That Board, which has four members, is collectively responsible to the Secretary of Defense, but three of its four members are designees of the departmental secretaries.

Senator JOHNSON. How about under the existing law?

Secretary FORRESTAL. What I have just said applies to the existing law, but the difference is that it is now a Board without having a head who could be given a power of decision.

Senator JOHNSON. Does the new bill make for more responsibility to the Secretary of Defense than the existing act?

Secretary FORRESTAL. I think it would be of assistance by virtue of the fact that it will give the Secretary of Defense the right to delegate such of his power as he wishes to the Chairman of the Munitions Board. The Munitions Board, as it is now constituted, is comprised of Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the three services. The Chairman does not have specific power of decision, and is merely named as the head.

Senator JOHNSON. As you might summarize the proposals, there are four things brought out in the present bill: It clarifies authority vested in the Secretary of Defense; it provides a staff to carry out

his authority and strengthen civilian control and it sets up a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it makes the Munitions Board more responsible to the Secretary of Defense.

On page 7 you make this statement:

I am now convinced that there are adequate checks and balances inherent in our governmental structure to prevent misuse of the broad authority which I feel must be vested in the Secretary of Defense.

Now, you state here that in the past you have felt that it might be unwise to place too great a concentration of power in one man. What are those checks and balances that are inherent in our governmental structure, which you think is sufficient?

Secretary FORRESTAL. I think the President and the Congress are the two great components in that system of checks and balances; and particularly the Congress, which will not cease to inquire into the conduct of his business, the ways in which he conducts his office.

I would say that you cannot escape the fact that what I am here recommending is a great concentration of authority, though.

Senator JOHNSON. And, there are dangers in placing too much authority in that one man, that you readily admit; but, you think the things to be gained are such that we can afford to take that risk?

Secretary FORRESTAL. I think you have to, in order to get accelerated results that you have to have in order to meet the changed conditions of the modern way of living.

Senator JOHNSON. The present Commander in Chief recommends this legislation?

Secretary FORRESTAL. This reflects his view, as embodied in his message.

Senator JOHNSON. What is the opinion of the various departments? Secretary FORRESTAL. I would have to canvass them. I might say, I am assuming that all three will support this measure.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, Mr. Secretary, under the existing set-up you now have, if there is a dispute among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each one of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force goes back to his Secretary, and then the Secretaries come up to you, you have to listen to all three sides of the situation from three different sources in order to get the over-all picture; whereas, if you had a representative, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he could come to you and tell you what all two or three sides of the controversy were about, and you could get the over-all picture from one man; is that not correct?

Secretary FORRESTAL. I think that states the picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Without that, you have to rely on interviewing the three of them and get the over-all picture in order to make a decision

in a conceivable case?

Secretary FORRESTAL. There is an inherent conflict in the relationship of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that body, and their role as heads of their respective military services, and their relationship to their civilian Secretaries. There is no criticism of any of them, but it is inherent in that relationship that they will report to their Secretaries in one role, and be members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in another.

The CHAIRMAN. So, this gives you the chance to get at first hand what all of the viewpoints happen to be, from the Chief of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, who can come to you and say, "The Navy says this, and the Army says this, and the Air Force says that."

You get it all in one picture, and the only other way you can get it under the existing set-up would be to call the three points of view in, if there were three, before you. It seems to me you would save a lot of time by having a Chief of the Chief of Staffs that you could not save now in a conceivable emergency .

Secretary FORRESTAL. I would like to point out-and as I say, this is my own conception-that this man would not be a Chief of Staff in the sense that he would exercise authority over the military commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Secretary FORRESTAL. He would be a member of that body, and he is a man who would correlate and bring together the composite views of that body, with a recommendation in those cases where they failed to come to an agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Hunt?

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Secretary: This organizational chart-I notice it is dated September the 1st 1948. Does that contain the amendments as set out in S. 1269?

Secretary FORRESTAL. This only reflects the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense.

Senator HUNT. Just that one?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any other questions. However, I would like to make this comment for the record: Not being a member of Congress when the Unification Act was passed, I can assure you that it was an act that was accepted by the people throughout the country as a very necessary step in organizing our national defense, and was very much approved throughout all of the country, at least I know, throughout my area.

Now, I have had the pleasure of being down here about 3 months, and these are my observations, Mr. Chairman: That the Secretary of Defense has exercised, I think, very fine judgment in bringing this Unification Act along rather slowly and with a great degree of skill. His theory of evolution in bringing the act into operation, rather than revolution I think is basically a very fine way to proceed.

With reference to the economies which everybody looked toward this act to accomplish, I should just like to say that certainly we would like to see economies effected, but I think everybody was considerably more interested in an effective defense and in the establishment of more striking power than we were primarily in the savings. With reference to the concentration of authority in the Secretary, it seems to me that that is needed if eventually this Unification Act is going to produce results that the people have a right to expect of it. I think in this organization, the Secretary should have exactly the same authority as a field general should have when in active operations. In other words, he must have the last word, and must have all this authority, even though there is inherent in all of us some feeling that we don't like to see too much authority vested in any one person. In this particular case, I believe the authority the Secretary has requested is quite proper, and personally I should like to thank the

Secretary for a very splendid service that he has rendered to this country during his term of office, in that capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. The only question I would like to ask the Secretary is, if he would briefly outline the difference, as he understands it, the budget procedures which will operate under the new concept of the Secretary of Defense, and those which operate under the present situation.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, I think there will be no great difference except an extension of the budgetary approach that was begun by me. The proposed legislation makes it clear that the Secretary of Defense has the right to put into effect in the three departments a common budgetary and accounting staff. I don't say that you are not able to do that now, but giving this power to the Secretary of Defense, to move with greater speed in getting the budgetary procedure accepted on a common denominator basis in the three different departments, would enable matters to be handled much more rapidly, because these practices, some of them, are effected by statute and have to be examined

Senator BALDWIN. Mr. Chairman, may I retrieve my opportunity to ask a question? To clarify my own thinking?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, Senator.

Senator BALDWIN. Am I correct in this thought that when we originally passed this act, it was our conception that the Secretary of Defense was to be the first and principal assistant of the President in dealing with all matters pertaining to the armed forces, and that he was a coordinating agent rather than a directing one?

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is correct.

Senator BALDWIN. As I read this section 201 on page 6, which section, as I look at it, seems to be the section in which the potent changes are made, the first thing you do is create the Department of Defense as an executive department of the Government, and place over it an executive officer with broad authority.

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is right, that is correct.

Senator BALDWIN. And then going down to page 6, section 202, the potent additions there are the words

he shall be responsible for exercising direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense, including the performance of the following duties: Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes.

Senator BALDWIN. That gave him much broader authority than he had before, an authority consistent with his new position as defined in this amended act, as the executive head of a new executive department of the Government.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes, but I would say, to use your phrase or words, the other potent section of that, at the bottom of the page to which you referred, and that is page 7, consists of these words:

Provided, That, subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the terms of this Act, the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force shall be administered by their respective Secretaries.

The distinction in this language under the existing bill is that it removes the illogical condition, or situation, of having one man sit and exercising general control there, and in another part of the bill, just

the reverse, it specifies that each department shall continue to be administered as a separate executive department.

Senator BALDWIN. When we were discussing the other bill, if I remember, there was a great deal of discussion over the question of whether or not the heads of the three military departments then in existence would then have the right to go to the President or to the Congress directly, over the head of the Secretary of Defense, and I see on page 7 that has been stricken out.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes.

Senator BALDWIN. That does not mean, however, that if the President or the Congress wanted to ask these men to present their own individual points of view, that they could not do it?

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is implicit, always, I think, in the power of the Congress and the President.

Senator BALDWIN. So, as a matter of fact you are not taking away anything there, that does not exist in the very nature of the whole set-up of our Government?

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is right. It removes, so to speak, an invitation for such action.

Senator BALDWIN. I notice on page 4 of the bill, the amended bill, at the bottom of the page in line 20, there is this language:

But this shall not be construed to authorize the Secretary of Defense to reass gn the combatant functions assigned to the military departments by the named sections of the bill.

As I understand, that is left in there because you would consider it would be a function of the Congress and the President and the who.e Government to determine what the different combatant functions of the different branches of the service are? In other words, the main determination of military policy is still in the Congress and in the President?

Secretary FCRRESTAL. The answer is "Yes."

Senator BALDWIN. There would be no fear, under this bill, that the Secretary of Defense could step in and realine the departments of the Military Establishment and, for example, abolish the marines or entirely change the function of the Navy, or dictate some different policy with reference to the ground forces? That still is left a matter of major policy determination by the President and the Congress itself?

Secretary FORRESTAL. That was the purpose of the specific retention of the specific language on the combatant functions.

He would have, of course, rather broad powers somewhat similar to those exercised by the President, and for an emergency could undoubtedly make some organizational changes under general legislation such as the War Powers Acts, but any changes that were of such a broad character as those you mention, I do not think he would do it even under those circumstances, though.

Senator BALDWIN. Is it fair to say that your experience with the act that we have at present, which was passed in 1947, dictates the absolute wisdom of these proposed changes?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes. I do not say that the language of S. 1269 is necessarily a perfect piece of language, since we ourselves may want to suggest some minor language changes before your hearings close, but the broad principles I am completely in support of.

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