Page images
PDF
EPUB
[ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

(914) 945-0346

Fax: (914) 945-0332

Craig A. Usas, MD
Director

Accredited By the
American College of
Radiation Oncology

Dear Congressman Shuster:

Today's Wall Street Journal indicates you have promised hearings
next week into the FAA and "how it does its job".

Should that be the case, I would offer to you the following as issues clearly meriting the attention of your committee:

1. Why the FAA appears so incapable of rapidly and efficiently
introducing changes suggested by appropriate organizations
(e.g., NTSB).

2. Why the IG of the Dept. of Transportation (Mrs. Schiavo) has
become a household name and face in a field where one might expect
invisibility. I can clearly recall public hearings regarding
fradulant aircraft parts in which she was open and candid (to the
extent of putting such parts on public display) while the FAA was
publicly suggesting that there was no "fradulant parts problem".
3. Why the FAA is incapable/unwilling to dip into the Airways Trust
Fund for long-recognized and much-needed improvements to US

air traffic control and management (e.g., doppler radar; wind shear
detection technology; MLS (microwave landing system) technology;
improvement in flammability reduction in materials used in aircraft
interiors; etc, etc, etc.

In general, the argument could be advanced that the FAA (in the eyes
of the travelling public) has become an impotent agency which sees itself
as responsible for fostering airtravel AT THE EXPENSE OF safety issues.

The debacle of the "upgrade" in the computerization of air traffic control is one which, in my opinion, should result in the firing of both Hinson and Broderick - as well as any other senior administrators involved. That ATC (with which I have no connection whatsoever) must function in a technologic cage thirty or more years out of date is ABSOLUTELY AND TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

Finally, I strongly support Hinson's suggestion that the FAA's SOLE CHARGE AND RESPONSIBILITY be safety. Let the airlines proselytize for themselves. Keep ValuJet grounded in perpetuity, as its egregious violations of safety (commen sense or regulatory) is inexcusable.

[blocks in formation]

449 North State Road Briarcliff Manor

New York 101510

Hon. Bud Shuster
-Page Two-

June 20, 1996

Finally, please PUBLICLY investigate why Sec. Pena is given to public pronouncements ("ValuJet is a perfectly safe airline") when he SHOULD HAVE KNOWN -IF HE WAS DOING ANY PORTION OF HIS JOB CORRECTLY- that this airline was egregiously violative of safety.

Thanks for your time and attention.

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small]
[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

Since the sacking of Mr. Tony Broderick at the FAA, I believe I should give your committee some idea of
what it is really going on at the FAA, especially in the Flight Standards Service. First, Mr. Broderick has
been totally honest and has always tried to do what was best for aviation, the FAA, and its people. He is
the only person who could accept comments and criticism without one worrying about retribution.. The
real problems within the AVR complex are with the leadership of Flight Standards. I say this for several
reasons. We in the inspector force see the director of Fight Standards (FS), Mr. Accardi and Mr. White
the real problem with the Service accomplishing it goal of ensuring compliance with the Federal Aviation
Regulations. These two leaders command no respect from the inspector force. They don't lead. They are
only interested in their own self promotion. They don't want to hear about anything that doesn't make
them look good. Their is real fear of retribution here and that is why I am not able to sign this letter. The
general consensus here is that Mr. Accardi and Mr. White have almost a total disregard for the good of
the Service, its objectives and finally its employees. The following might be some questions you might
ask Mr. Accardi.

VALUJET

Did you receive a memo, written by a Headquarters inspector prior to ValuJet's crash, stating that
ValuJet was in noncompliance with several maintenance regulations and that it should be shutdown until
it was in compliance?

Did you inform Mr. Broderick of this Memo?

Have

you removed
a box of documents)

any documents about VALUJET from the FAA Headquarters? (He was seen removing

MANAGEMENT OF FS

If your responsibility is to provide highly motivated and trained inspector force to ensure airlines operate
safely and comply with all the applicable FAR, why have you----

Increased your administrative staff from approximately 7 personnel to over 70 in the last 5 years when you
should, in fact, been down sizing admin. staff and increasing the number of inspectors.

Why have you not ensured inspectors are trained and qualified for their surveillance activities? If
resources have been a problem, why have you spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on Washington
management conferences? How much money have you spent producing glossy pamphlets that talk about
FS strategic goals?

Why have you refused to allow FS inspectors assigned to Headquarters to receive any flight training,,
while other non FS personnel assigned to Headquarters are provided this training? Yet you require these
inspectors to perform enroute safety inspections.

Why have you proposed to lower the basic qualifications for inspectors from GS-9 to GS-5 dropping most
of the basic experience requirements when qualified white males are on the qualified register waiting to
be hired? Did you do this to hire more affirmative action candidates so your performance appraisal would
look better. Do you think these actions increase inspector moral. How much more time and money does
it cost to qualify a new GS-5 vs. a GS-9 ?

I feel very uncomfortable writing this, but I must at least try to do the right thing. I would strongly
recommend an GAO or IG investigation into Mr. Accardi's unbelievable expansion of his admin. staff
and his failure provide minimal training to Headquarters inspectors as well as him removing documents
from the FAA Headquarters.

'ང

[ocr errors]
[blocks in formation]

It is indeed heartening to see that your committee is delving into the mismanagement of the Federal Aviation Administration. I do believe that you should expand your investigation to include other areas such as the Pilot Certification and the Federal Aviation Regulations.

I have been associated with aviation since 1942. First as a pilot instructor and combat pilot and later in staff positions where I had close association with the FAA and the International Civil Aviation Organization. I retired from the Air Force in 1975 and was employed in 1976 to manage an international pilot ground school, and have, this year, finally retired from that position. Since 1976, I have regularly taught Instrument Flying to student pilots all the way up to Airline pilots. I have taught other classes for those studying to become Private, Commercial and Instructor pilots. I have supervised those classes for Airline Transport pilots. I received my Commercial Pilot

certification with an Instrument Rating in 1946.

Until the mid and late 1970s, I continued to learn from the experts in FAA who had grown up with the developing system. As these people retired, there was a noticeable change in the knowledge and the attitude of people within FAA. The pilots being hired were, and are, primarily military pilots with little or no time in the civilian aviation environment. Unfortunately, low time pilots believe that they know all there is to know about flying, when in actuality, they have a lot to learn. I, and other instructors can attest to the ignorance of military pilots coming through our school for their civilian ratings, as to rules, regulations and procedures in civilian aviation.

The FAA used to let FAA ground schools make up their own written tests to give pilots aspiring for various ratings. These tests were sent to FAA for their approval before they could be used to determine if the applicant met the minimum FAA standard, which was, and is, 70%. Hardly reassuring for some paying passengers. I actually spent more time on the telephone and writing correspondence explaining the questions and proper answers to the reviewing official at FAA, in Oklahoma City, than I did in composing the tests. I can recall one incident where the reviewing FAA official did not know how to correctly read an altimeter.

After the Freedom of Information Act became law, FAA was forced to make the questions on written pilot tests available

faa

1

to anyone, including prospective pilots. FAA published question books for the various FAA ratings which contained up to approximately 800 questions, from which the approved ground schools would randomly select between 60 to 100 questions, dependent upon the rating. Ten test selections would be sent to FAA in Oklahome City for their approval as being representative questions.

was

When these questions books first cane out it appalling how many errors there were, indicating the lack of knowledge on the part of FAA as to their Own rules and regulations and plain ignorance as to flying in general and procedures in particular. I understand that the question book for Air Transport Pilots was published, distributed, and then recalled due to enumerable errors. This was obviously at great expense to the government.

Instrument

Flying

When the question book was distributed, it contained over 80 errors of inaccurate questions or no correct answers, which indicated a complete lack of knowledge on the part of the FAA people who composed the question book. Some questions conveyed misinformation which definitely could contribute to aircraft accidents. Even after the tragic accident at Dulles, the FAA published a question, whose answer would be the same procedure as caused the accident at Dulles, even though FAA had published changes that would prohibit the same fatal action as was taken by the pilots in the Dulles accident.

All of these gross errors in the question books were called to the attention of the responsible people at FAA in Oklahoma City, first by telephone and then by letter, with supporting documents, when I ran into a stone wall from FAA. Subsequent question books, updated every two years, continued to have many of the same mistakes. I personally talked to the FAA author of the Instrument Flying question book and was absolutely stunned by his ignorance and suggested to the FAA, in writing, that if this FAA individual held an Instrument Rating, it should be revoked, as he was dangerous. In one set of 9 instrument questions, regarding a Horizontal Situation Indicator instrument, five of the questions had the instrument set backwards. My telephone conversation with the FAA author of the book, showed that he did not have the foggiest idea how the instrument worked. The supervisor of the individual agreed with me but they failed to correct the error, even in the next publication. FAA did, in later books, change some answers around on those five questions, which still were wrong, even with the instrument set bacwards and this showed the continuing ignorance. Those 5 questions were still wrong after 6 or 8 years. At one point the FAA said that they set those five questions backwards in case the pilot set his instrument backwards. Those errors still existed when I retired from running the ground school

Another instance of FAA inaction involved an article

faa

2

« PreviousContinue »