after Mr. Hall and Ms. Schiavo testify, they will return to their seats, and we will defer questions to them until after Mr. Hinson testifies.

After Mr. Hinson testifies, I will recognize Chairman Shuster and one Democratic Member to ask questions of Mr. Hinson and Mr. Broderick only. Then we will bring Mr. Hall and Ms. Schiavo back to the table and all Members will have an opportunity to ask any questions of them. As I said, that has been worked out at the request of some of the witnesses involved and with the agreement of the chairman of the full committee and the ranking member, Mr. Oberstar.

So at this time I now would like to call on the chairman of the full committee, who has really been the leader of this entire investigation, and that is our fine chairman, Mr. Shuster.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It's very important that these hearings not obscure the very clear fact that air travel is remarkably safe. The chairman has quoted some of the statistics. Let me share one additional one with you.

The United States has 50 percent of the world's air traffic, but only 8 percent of the fatalities. Indeed, air travel in America is nearly three times as safe as it is in Europe.

So, having emphasized that, nevertheless, one accident is one too many. The recent ValuJet crash has raised very significant questions about the role of the FAA in overseeing airlines.

After the crash, Secretary Peña and Administrator Hinson insisted that ValuJet was safe. Indeed, on Tuesday, June 11, Administrator Hinson, whom I certainly respect, was in my office saying once again that ValuJet was safe.

Then, a week later, after a political meeting in the White House, ValuJet was grounded. We want to know why. A rational person could conclude that political considerations played a role, and there is no room for politics when we're talking about aviation safety.

If ValuJet wasn't safe, why wasn't it grounded 6 months ago? If we go through the list of items in the consent order grounding ValuJet, you will see that many of them occurred months and months ago. Even the more recent ones seem no worse than the problems cited months ago, and the problems seem similar to those that have been found at virtually every other airline in the past. Why was the penalty not a fine rather than a grounding?

The FAA has only recently discovered the extent of the problems at ValuJet. That being the case, then the question arises: where has the FAA been all this time? Why didn't the FAA's regular inspection program uncover these problems? Why didn't the special 120-day inspection program uncover these problems? Why did it take a crash, 110 deaths, and an intense 30-day inspection and intense media and Congressional scrutiny to uncover these problems? This certainly raises serious questions. Among those questions, we've been told that inspectors haven't been trained as they should have been for the assigned tasks. We've been told that there is an inappropriate allocation of inspectors so that the least-experienced inspectors are assigned to the least-experienced airlines. And we've been told by more than one that a culture of fear exists where inspectors are afraid to tell management of the problems that they find.

All of these allegations-and I emphasize the word "allegations"-certainly deserve our closest scrutiny.

I want to emphasize that the chairman and I, in consultation with the ranking members, are not placing a limit on these hearings. We are going to continue to pursue this until we get answers to these questions.

Now, there are two actions that could be taken immediately. The FAA could be made an independent agency to remove allegations of political interference. This committee and the House passed such legislation to reform the FAA last March, passed it overwhelmingly on a bipartisan basis, and the Administration opposes that legislation.

The second thing that could be done is to take the Trust Funds off budget to free up money for more inspectors, better equipment, and other safety improvements. Again, the House passed legislation in April, but the Administration opposes such legislation.

Secretary Peña suggested in a press conference changing the FAA's preamble to eliminate the so-called "promotion" aspect of its charter, but the Secretary has yet to send us any legislation to do this. It seems that we're getting management by press release rather than legislation with these recommendations. In fact, I believe that's a red herring.

The law which has been in effect for the past 40 years very clearly says that safety is the prime mission of the FAA. Nevertheless, all of these recommendations should, indeed, be on the table and should be considered, and we're still waiting to receive such recommendation through legislative recommendation rather than press release.

Having said all that, I look forward to these hearings. I emphasize again that we're going to get to the bottom of these issues. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing me. Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman Shuster.

We will go at this time to our very fine ranking member, Mr. Lipinski, for any opening statement that he has.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we are holding this hearing today as a result of the ValuJet plane that crashed into the Everglades on May 11 and killed 110 people.

As we examine the range of issues raised by this crash, I think it would be wrong not to stop and pay tribute to their memory.

We were all moved by the testimony at last week's hearing by Richard Kessler, whose wife, Kathleen, was a passenger on Flight 592. As we proceed with today's hearing, I know we do so in the name of the 110 victims of ValuJet Flight 592.

A tragedy has occurred, and we are here to learn whatever lessons we can to prevent another disaster.

Mr. Chairman, you will recall that only days after the ValuJet crash I came to you and suggested that we hold this hearing. I was convinced then, and I am even more convinced today, that there are important issues to be addressed by this subcommittee.

It is our responsibility to hold this hearing. We simply won't be doing our jobs if we didn't.

There were two primary reasons I requested this hearing. First, I was very concerned with the conflicting statements about ValuJet

safety made by the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA administrator on the one hand and the DOT Inspector General on the other.

At the time I found it very disconcerting that the three top officials of the United States Department of Transportation could make statements about the safety of an airliner or groups of airliners that were so diametrically opposed. With the grounding of ValuJet last week, I remain even more concerned about these statements.

The American people rely on the statements of their senior Government officials. They should not be the victims of some interagency turf battle. No public official should make statements which he or she cannot substantiate, and no public official should make headline-grabbing pronouncements questioning the safety of our transportation system without making every effort to address the problems through appropriate channels.

The American people should not be subjected to that type of manipulation. At the same time, though, the American people deserve to fly on airlines that are undeniably safe.

The second issue that I hope to raise in this hearing relates to the role of the low-cost, new entrant carriers in the U.S. aviation system.

In the weeks since the crash of Flight 592, significant attention has been given to the fact that ValuJet has grown at an unprecedented pace since it began operation in October 1993. In recent years, the number of low-cost new entrants has skyrocketed. I see it at Chicago's Midway Airport, located in the heart of my District, which is dominated by low-cost carriers, many of which are new entrants.

While I am certainly very happy with the positive economic impact of these carriers at midway and throughout the Nation, I am concerned by their rapid growth and low-cost emphasis.

I do believe that these low-cost carriers, led by Southwest, have made air travel available to a segment of Americans who would not otherwise fly, and I consider this to be a great happening. But I want to make doubly sure that these affordable carriers are safe.

The FAA's action this week curtailing service by Kiwi Airlines sends up another red flag for me, emphasizing the fact that this subject needs extensive investigation.

Today's hearing is the first step in that process, and I expect that we will have other hearings to further address the implications of the growing low-cost new entrance airline community.

Mr. Chairman, since I first suggested a hearing on these two issues in the middle of May, there have been a number of events which have slightly shifted the focus of this hearing.

ValuJet was grounded last week. The FAA has announced changes in its inspection program as in the wake of this accident. And, as we all know, although the NTSB has not yet established a cause for the accident, the oxygen containers returned from a maintenance contractor to ValuJet seemed to be at the root of the disaster.

In the course of today's hearing we will delve into many of these issues. We have a full day. I know other Members wish to speak

as soon as possible. But let me take a moment to emphasize the real importance of this hearing.

Chairman Duncan and I do not sit here to get ourselves on television or in the newspapers. Certainly I expect there to be considerable media attention in this issue, but let's not allow the cameras to drive what we are doing here. A tragedy has occurred, and we are here to learn whatever lessons we can to prevent another disas

ter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for your time.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Lipinski, for a fine statement. The Chair certainly appreciates your interest and involvement in this right from the very day that this tragedy first occurred.

The committee, and this subcommittee, in particular, is very fortunate to have as one of its most dedicated members the ranking member of the full committee and former chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Oberstar.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And especially thank you for your kind words, as well. I appreciate your comments, those of Mr. Shuster, and my good friend, Mr. Lipinski, our ranking member.

As we go throughout this hearing, we must all be very conscious of the impact of words and questions and implications, suggestions, because those will have very serious and profound impact upon the families of the victims of ValuJet, the employees of Valujet, the traveling public, who will be very tuned to the words that we use, questions we raise, and the comments that we make in the course of this hearing and the subsequent ones. And I appreciate the chairman's willingness to extend this process out over a longer period of time than just one hearing.

We by now know the story. On May 11 an aircraft operated by ValuJet_carrying 110 people disappeared into the Florida Everglades. Pilots in the area witnessed the area from a distance, and said it took them 15 minutes to locate the accident site because the aircraft and all of its contents had completely vanished.

There was virtually no sign that a large jet had just plunged into the earth, unlike other crash sites that we have witnessed in recent years.

The plane and its contents had been shattered into small pieces, immersed in mud and limestone beneath a murky swamp, filled with predatory animals and rough sawgrass, and with it, stories of 110 people. One of them was a celebrated athlete from Notre Dame, Rodney Culver, for whom ceremonies were just held recently at Notre Dame.

America watched mesmerized as Dade County officials, as the National Transportation Safety Board investigators meticulously searched through miles of swamp inch by inch to recover the least scrap of evidence that could be brought to bear on this issue to help us discern a probable cause. Covered in protective suits, investigators meticulously searched into the toxic waters as much as 20 minutes at a time, recovering about 75 percent of the aircraft, including the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorders.

There has been no official NTSB determination of probable cause yet, and we must keep that in mind throughout this process today.

But speculation certainly began immediately about the inherent safety of so-called "low-fare" or "low-cost" carriers. A country that had enthusiastically enjoyed the benefits of low fares and the competition they engendered now was wondering whether low fares could be offered, whether they might, in fact, be a partnership in the tragedy at hand.

Where did low-fare carriers cut costs? In spite of repeated assurance from the Secretary of Transportation and the administrator of FAA that low-cost carriers or low-fare carriers were safe and that the system of FAA safety would protect the public, uncertainty persisted.

Could cutting meals, cutting other amenities, alone, account for $39 and $49 fares-unheard of among the major carriers? Could it be possible that those low-fare carriers were cutting costs elsewhere with safety matters? Could their fleets, some of which were comprised of aircraft parked in the desert for many years and which were as much as 20 years old and older, could they be received inadequate maintenance in order to save the carrier money? Were these airlines safe? That is the fundamental question people were asking in the aftermath of the tragedy.

Adding to the public uncertainty were other factors. The Inspector General of the Department of Transportation, Mary Schiavo, took to the airwaves in the aftermath of the accident to proclaim a longstanding concern about the safety of ValuJet specifically, as well as other low-cost carriers, and then dragged regional carriers, commuter airlines, into the mix, as well.

She had articulated those concerns in an article written for publication in a national periodical scheduled to be published shortly before the crash, written before that crash. Those pronouncements created a media frenzy that questioned the integrity of FAA's oversight of air crash maintenance.

On June 17 the FAA announced that ValuJet had agreed to ground its fleet, pursuant to a consent order. Intense FAA oversight indicated that ValuJet did not adequately monitor the maintenance of its aircraft, and the decision to ground the carrier and the subsequent decision to take action against another new entrant low-cost carrier fueled speculation that low-cost carriers may, indeed, be inherently unsafe.

Certainly all of this has raised questions that have prompted this hearing, prompted a widespread inquiry into the matter of low-fare or low-cost new entrant carriers. That concern is not new in this subcommittee.

At the conclusion of the 103d Congress, I directed the GAO to undertake two inquiries into low-fare new entrant carriers, one to examine DOT's fitness certification process for reviewing and permitting new entrant carriers to enter the marketplace, and to review FAA's safety certification process for new entrant carriers.

The first report was completed in January of this year. The second report is due by GAO in July.

Many of those issues have already been addressed with both the Department and FAA, and many of the recommendations made by GAO to improve the safety certification have already been implemented by the FAA.