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Safety Accidents Caused by the Air Transport of Hazardous Materials

November 3, 1973

Pan American World Airways, Inc. Boeing 707-321C, Boston, MA Three crew members were killed in a crash after nitric acid improperly packaged and stored on board ignited a fire which impaired the flight crew's vision and hindered their performance.

August 10, 1986

McDonnell Douglas DC-10-40, Chicago, IL

The impropeï handling unti Livings of a chomden! ovunen generator caused a fire which destroyed the airplane.

February 3, 1988

American Airlines DC-9-83, Nashville, TN

A shipment of hydrogen peroxide solution and a sodium orthosilicate-based mixture were improperly packaged and not properly identified as hazardous materials. The chemicals leaked and ignited a fire in the cargo compartment. Upon landing, 120 passengers and six crew members commenced an emergency evacuation of the aircraft.

November 6, 1992

Air Cargo Package Fire, Los Angeles, CA

A chemical oxygen generator was not properly labeled as hazardous waste, prior to transport on a Quantas Airways flight, the package ignited as it was loaded on to a LD-3 unit load device (ULD). Flames from the fire reached a height of four feet.

September 23, 1993

Air Cargo Package Fire, Oakland CA

A ULD that had just been unloaded from a Federal Express Boeing 727 caught fire. It was later learned that a package inside the ULD contained a chemical oxygen generator.

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May 31, 1996

Honorable William J. Clinton

President

The White House

Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned organizations are very concerned about recent public statements by the
Inspector General of the Department of Transportation. Ms. Mary Schiavo holds a critical
position that requires the highest level of careful research into important issues of public
trust and Department of Transportation operations. As industry groups involved in com-
mercial aviation and subject to the department's oversight, we expect documented, well-
founded background for any public allegations about companies, organizations or whole
industry segments. Extraordinary care and judgment are clearly expected when offering
"official advice" to the public to avoid using entire sectors of transportation or groups of
companies. Broad generalizations that include sensationalism and guilt-by-association are
not expected.

By writing a column for Newsweek including statements such as, “I go out of my way to stay off commuter planes. I have skipped conferences because I would not fly on marginal airlines...", Ms. Schiavo may be perceived as an authority providing advice to the traveling public. Many people may also interpret her advice as government policy. We understand the charter of the DOT Inspector General as one of oversight, not establishing and declaring aviation policy. Some Americans may read Ms. Schiavo's remarks, or watch as she repeats them on television, and make travel decisions based upon her personal views. If the decision is to avoid commercial aviation and travel by automobile, it is a much more dangerous choice. More people are killed every four months on our nation's highways than have been killed since 1914 in the 82-year history of commercial aviation.

Travel by commercial airlines is very safe. Every day our system averages 30,000 takeoffs and landings by U.S. airlines with 1.5 million passengers arriving at their destinations safely. In fact, commercial aviation's safety record far exceeds every other form of transportation in history. Notwithstanding this record, there is no acceptable rate of airline accidents. Therefore, a balanced perspective by government officials is essential. We should seek the goal of a perfect airline safety record, without obscuring the outstanding safety record already achieved. Accidents involving passenger fatalities are extremely rare and the empirical evidence on safety does not merit advice to avoid any segment of commercial aviation. The recent airline tragedy is the first passenger fatality involving a startup carrier since the economic deregulation of the airlines in 1978. Ms. Schiavo's broad based reference to commuter airlines is particularly disturbing. Regional and commuter airlines, many of which have been providing scheduled service for 20 years, have an

exceptional safety record. They provide safe, reliable and efficient transportation from small communities to larger cities and connecting hubs. Over three out of every five commercially served airports in the United States are served solely by regional and commuter airlines. If Ms. Schiavo's advice were accepted by the traveling public, these communities would lose their links to the air transportation system and transportation fatalities would increase as a result of the shift to other, less safe modes.

We believe the federal government and your administration play a critical role in maintaining the safety of our air transportation system and the public's confidence in that system. A publicity campaign by the DOT Inspector General, making broad claims that conflict with the policies and statements of other DOT offices and FAA, creates public confusion. The American public deserves clear, accurate, informed messages from the government about aviation system safety.

We ask that you make clear to the American public that the DOT Inspector General does not speak for the administration on aviation safety policy.

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June 3, 1996

Chairman,

Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Public works and Transportation

Dear Sir:

It is my understanding that you will be holding hearings on the recent Valujet crash. It is becoming very likely that dangerous goods (Hazardous Materials) played a major role in the cause of this crash. As you are no doubt aware, the Office of Civil Aviation Security, Federal Aviation Administration has regulatory responsibility for dangerous goods that are carried on commercial aviation.

I think you will come to the conclusion that for years FAA Security has basically ignored its responsibilities in this field. In order to demonstrate this, attached is the current SES Performance Plan of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Cathal L. Flynn. As you can clearly see the most important duty is to fill a diversity quota (there is no requirement that they be qualified). Dangerous goods are not even among the top 5.

This has also been demonstrated by the staffing of the dangerous goods section in headquarters. I hope you will look into the backgrounds of the three persons on the staff at the time of the crash.

I do not like to send an anonymous letter, but I am aware that attempts are underway to determine the identifies of those persons who recently testified before your committee (reviewing time and attendance records).

Sincerely,

A concerned FAA employee.

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