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SabreTech

A Sabreliner Company

August 2, 1996

Congressman James L. Oberstar

2366 Rayburn

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Oberstar:

We at SabreTech seek to advance appropriate industry-wide action on the subject of hazardous materials aboard
aircraft, a topic that has garnered attention since the crash of ValuJet Flight 592. We had requested that Sabre Tech
be given the opportunity to testify if a ValuJet representative appeared before your July 17, 1996 Senate hearing on
aviation safety. We understand that limited time constraints prevented our being called. In my earlier testimony
(June 25, 1996) before the House Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, I highlighted some of the hazmat challenges facing the aviation industry and recommended action steps.
My testimony is enclosed.

Although the National Transportation Safety Board has not held its hearing on the ValuJet crash nor issued any
probable cause determinations, the presence aboard the aircraft of oxygen generators that were ValuJet's company
materials (COMAT) rightfully prompts deliberate action to prevent similar materials from ever finding their way
onto airliners in the future. We commend the FAA and RSPA for moving quickly to prohibit high-strength
oxidizing substances on board any passenger aircraft, to increase staffing and training of its own hazmat personnel,
and to insist on greater airline oversight of third-party maintenance. The key to effective and safe maintenance,
whether performed in-house or by a third party, is clear communication.

I respectfully request that our following brief comments be included as part of your official hearing record.

We at SabreTech believe that two specific areas would benefit from Congressional guidance:

1.

2.

Examination of the entire issue of identifying and handling hazardous materials aboard aircraft. "Hidden
hazards," as they are called in ValuJet's Hazardous Materials Training Manual, should not be hidden.
Consensus is needed on what materials might be hazardous and how they should be handled.
Clear labeling of all hazardous materials at the point of manufacture. The labels should be prominent,
instructive, and leave no room for misunderstanding about the potentially dangerous nature of what is
being handled.

We are committed to a high level of vigilance and excellence at SabreTech. I hope you find our constructive,
proactive recommendations useful in future Senate deliberations on these issues. We are prepared to answer any
questions you may have and look forward to contributing to the legislative process as you deem appropriate. To
that end, we will be contacting your staff during recess. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Steph Towne

Stephen D. Townes
President

Sky Harbor International Airport 3737 East Bonanza Way Phoenix, AZ 85034 Phone 602-267-0660 Fax 602-273-8225

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN JERRY WELLER

JUNE 25, 1996

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

I would like to thank Chairman Duncan for holding this hearing today on the very serious and tragic recent incidents including and following the May 11th crash of ValuJet flight 592 that killed 110 people in the Florida Everglades. Obviously this is a hearing that nobody wishes we had to have. However, following the crash, the airline has been shut down, and numerous problems have come to light; both at the airline and at the Federal Aviation Administration.

Today we will examine the incidents surrounding the ValuJet crash; the previous maintenance infractions that the airline experienced, and the aftermath. We will also hear from Administrator Hinson about the FAA's and DOT's role in this

whole process, and of course from the National Transportation Safety Board. I would like to welcome them here. We are also fortunate today to have with us, Tony Broderick, who will be leaving the FAA after 18 years of service; and Lewis Jordan of ValuJet. This hearing promises to be very informative, and probably somewhat disturbing. But after its over, I hope will have answers to some very tough questions about the recent tragedy -- a tragedy that we all hope

will never repeat itself.

As I think everybody here is aware, both Secretary Pena and the Administrator of the FAA declared ValuJet safe to fly immediately following the crash. Last week, after an intense review of the airline, they determined that it was not safe to fly after all, and the airline was grounded. We must ask ourselves why they were so quick to declare the airline safe if it wasn't. We must also ask why it took a crash of that magnitude to get the FAA to scrutinize the airline to the point that they did leading up to the shutdown. I understand that on at least two previous occasions, the FAA found many maintenance infractions, those that are considered "Category A", or the most serious type of violation. Why did the FAA not take any action at that time? This makes me wonder, in the days leading up to the grounding of ValuJet, what was found that had not been previously discovered, that warranted a shutdown of the carrier? I hope the Administrator will be able to discuss that in depth with us today.

Also in recent days there has been talk of Secretary Pena's proposal to change the mandate of the FAA, making safety its only mission. It was my understanding that safety was already the highest priority of the FAA. It seems to me that

having the safest aviation system in the world promotes aviation (which is the other mission of the FAA.) I don't believe it is in anyones best interest to mess up the very important government - industry cooperation that currently exists.

Many in the industry say that ValuJet's problems are common among all carriers. It seems to me that every airline would experience some violations in this heavily regulated environment. According to many aviation experts, no airline could come out of such intense scrutiny without some violations. That is not to say that our aviation system is not safe - we have the safest air travel system in the world. Many, many more people are killed each year on our nation's highway's than in the skies. Unfortunately, it took the tragic crash of May 11th to cause us to step back and look at our system. There are obviously problems. The circumstances that surrounded this crash were very unusual. Although the NTSB has not formally announced the cause of the crash, the consensus is that it was probably due to some mislabeled oxygen generators that were improperly loaded onto the plane. Who is actually responsible for this is the big question on everybody's mind. ValuJet is not authorized to carry hazardous cargo, and their workforce is supposed to be trained to recognize those materials so that they do not get on board. While the canisters were allegedly mislabeled as empty by a maintenance

contractor, the canisters are still considered to be hazmat even if empty.

Somewhere, somehow, they slipped through the cracks and it ended in disaster. We are fortunate to have representatives from all involved parties to help piece together the puzzle.

I have many questions today, regarding the FAA's inspection system, regarding ValuJet's maintenance operations, and most importantly what needs to be done to ensure that this kind of error does not occur again. I look forward to hearing our witnesses, and thank them for their time today.

At this point I will yield back the balance of my time.

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