Statement of the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation Another problem is the lack of knowledge by some FAA inspectors. During our audit of DMEs, we wanted to know if the FAA inspectors were knowledgeable of the basic test requirements. Accordingly, we randomly asked 20 FAA inspectors two basic questions related to requirements of the oral portion of the examination. We asked: What was the minimum number of questions required for each subject, and What was the minimum passing grade for each subject? We found that 17 of the 20 FAA inspectors did not know the correct answers to at least one of the questions. Based on the results of our audit, it was obvious that FAA's surveillance of the DME Program was insufficient to provide assurances that DME certified mechanics, as officially endorsed by FAA, actually possessed adequate skills and knowledge. Performing Required Oversight FAA safety oversight of parts used throughout the industry is also seriously deficient. FAA has failed to ensure that manufacturers producing and selling parts have the requisite approvals and authority. FAA has knowingly failed to oversee and enforce implementation of its regulatory requirements for many years. While FAA inspections of repair stations, over the years, have shown that parts produced by manufacturers without requisite authority, were being used, FAA has done little to enforce its requirements. FAA's inaction contributed to the substantial inventory of unapproved aircraft parts in existence today. FAA has not provided oversight of foreign manufactured parts. Although such oversight is required by FAA Order 8120.2A, at the time of our audit in 1992, FAA inspectors had not identified foreign manufactured parts that were critical to safety, and did not plan to perform any surveillance over foreign suppliers of these parts through May 1996. FAA's response to our report addressing foreign manufactured parts included a discussion of insufficient resources to accomplish those required inspection. However, as I have previously stated, FAA used its inspection resources to conduct 13,000 inspections of a single carrier. This is another example of failure to prioritize and target inspection resources. Since our audits, FAA has initiated corrective actions on both of these problems. June 25, 1996 Page 7 Statement of the Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation Recording and Tracking Corrective Actions Many FAA inspectors do not properly report, or followup on, deficiencies identified during inspections. In 1991, we observed 60 ramp inspections during which 92 deficiencies were identified that required airlines to make corrective repairs. Inspectors did not record 71 of 92 deficiencies in FAA's data base so that corrective action could be tracked. Furthermore, inspectors did not report all violations for appropriate enforcement action. During FY 1990, 6 of 79 FSDOS accounted for 56 percent of enforcement actions, while 49 FSDOs recorded no enforcement actions. More recently, FAA's FY 1994 PTRS results indicate that 6 of 96 FSDOs accounted for 54 percent of the enforcement actions, while 52 FSDOs recorded no enforcement actions. As part of our current audit, we will determine the reason for these differences. After the tragic accident involving ValuJet Flight 592 occurred, FAA announced it was increasing its oversight of ValuJet. On June 17, 1996, the FAA Administrator announced the voluntary cessation of ValuJet's operations. He said that the inspections of ValuJet performed after the May 11 accident identified reasons to question ValuJet's ability to meet FAA's safety - requirements. The FAA actions clearly demonstrate the need for FAA to target high-risk carriers and improve its inspection process as we have recommended. During the past 4 years, the OIG has made 70 recommendations to improve FAA's safety oversight mission. There has been some improvement, but much more needs to be done. Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. June 25, 1996 Page 8 STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN RANDY TATE June 25, 1996 I want to first thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on the issue of aviation safety as a result of the recent crash of ValuJet Flight 592. Clearly, Congress has the responsibility to examine the FAA and to analyze its oversight of ValuJet. The death of the flight's passengers and crew, the hurt caused their families and the shaken confidence of the nation's flying public demands no less. Make no mistake about it -- airline travel in this country is still the safest in the world. But, this hearing will bring into focus new ideas and suggestions as to how we can improve upon that laudable record. As we all know, the tragic crash of Flight 592 has raised several disturbing questions regarding the FAA's oversight of ValuJet operations. ValuJet was cutting costs by purchasing older planes and then contracting out the maintenance work on those planes. As we all know, older planes require more maintenance than new planes. So, did the FAA have the appropriate level of oversight of ValuJet maintenance work based on these unique circumstances? Between October 1994 and May 1996, the FAA had access to several reports that indicated significant safety problems with ValuJet. In addition, ValuJet experienced safety-related incidents during this same time frame. In fact, the findings of the FAA's Special Emphasis Review in March 1996 raises a strong possibility that significant safety violations were being ignored by the FAA. The most important question we will ask is whether the FAA failed to properly supervise and inspect ValuJet and to take appropriate action in a timely manner once violations were revealed and action was warranted. Congress has an obligation to ensure that the FAA's function of keeping our skies safe is executed properly, professionally and every day. Hopefully, this hearing will produce new or improved procedures so that the FAA can tighten and strengthen its oversight responsibility, so that we will restore the public's confidence in the safety of our skies. TESTIMONY OF STEVEN D. TOWNES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION Aviation Safety: Issues Raised by the June 25, 1996 Steven D. Townes SabreTech, Inc. Sky Harbor International Airport Phoenix, AZ 85034 Tel: (602) 267-0660 Fax: (602) 273-8249 |