STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID R. HINSON, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATOR, BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, CONCERNING THE FAA'S SURVEILLANCE AND INSPECTION PROGRAM. JUNE 25, 1996.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss the FAA's surveillance and inspection programs, although we are deeply saddened by the tragic ValuJet accident of May 11 that has provided the impetus for this hearing. With me is Tony Broderick, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification.

As Chairman Shuster and Chairman Duncan have noted on several recent occasions, the United States air transportation safety record is second to none. We operate the busiest and safest system in the entire world, and we can all take pride in that accomplishment. But, as the recent accident so graphically demonstrates, none of us can ever afford to take that safety for granted. Because of the serious nature of our work, we in the FAA recognize as well as anyone that safety statistics offer no comfort to those who have lost loved ones in an accident. They rightfully want an explanation of what went wrong and how such a tragedy can be prevented from ever happening again. We share those objectives. Any airline accident represents a failure in the system that must be a source of concern to us all.

Our efforts at the FAA began three and half years ago with the serious challenges facing the agency at that time. Technology used by air traffic controllers was out-of-date and

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planned replacements were behind schedule and over budget. Since day one, the

Secretary and I have changed the FAA's way of doing business, in many cases working

with you in Congress to make the fundamental reforms necessary to prepare the agency for the future.

In a few moments, I will describe some of the steps we have taken to improve our surveillance and inspections programs based on lessons we have learned from our surveillance activities of ValuJet, which, as you know, led recently to the voluntary suspension of airline operations on June 17. First, though, I would like to briefly highlight the nature and extent of surveillance we performed of ValuJet. Let me stress that we have no indication or reason to believe that there is any relationship between the recent ValuJet accident and the aviation safety surveillance programs I will discuss. In fact, information developed so far would suggest otherwise.

ValuJet commenced operating as an airline in October 1993. When initially certificated by the FAA for airline operations, the airline had 2 DC-9's in its fleet. The carrier grew rapidly--in fact, more rapidly than any other passenger carrier of which I know-increasing its fleet of aircraft to 52 by late winter of this year. I would add that the fleet was comprised almost wholly of DC-9's, which, in view of their age and associated FAA regulatory requirements, typically require a greater degree of maintenance than newer aircraft. In order to perform the maintenance activities necessary, ValuJet contracted with a series of widely dispersed repair stations, which is typically referred to as

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"outsourcing" its maintenance. Over time, the airline's organizational capabilities appear to have become outstripped by the logistical difficulties of assuring the quality of maintenance work performed on its behalf at so many facilities by so many vendors, and the airline began to experience difficulties in meeting consistently or fully the many, strict regulatory requirements required by their operating certificate.

In October 1994, FAA regional inspectors conducted a Regional Aviation Safety Inspection Program (RASIP) inspection of ValuJet. There were a total of 32 findings, the majority of which focused on pilot training and manuals, with only a few findings related to maintenance. Two findings resulted in enforcement activity. One related to the lack of records on pilots who failed proficiency checks and had to be re-tested. The other

involved an improperly deferred testing procedure necessary to isolate an internal

hydraulic leak. All but one of the 32 findings was closed by January 31, 1995. The last finding was closed on February 27, 1995.

In July 1995, ValuJet bid on a government contract with DOD and underwent a DOD inspection. DOD found that they did not have all the procedures in place that the DOD required, including a fully developed Internal Audit Program. The carrier made the necessary adjustments, and, in a January 1996 inspection, was found to be satisfactory and certified as an approved carrier by DOD) in February.

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In September 1995, after the August DOD inspection, ValuJet underwent an FAA National Aviation System Inspection Program (NASIP) inspection by a team of FAA inspectors from outside the region. This inspection noted a number of operations and maintenance issues, but resulted in only one violation relating to manual errors and a Letter of Warning to the airline for not having a current copy of an employee's pilot

certificate.

After each of these inspections, the carrier took action to address the problems noted by making numerous changes to its operations or maintenance programs. Over this period of time, many necessary changes were being implemented that were designed to improve the airline's systems and means of doing business. From all indications, the carrier was demonstrating a positive disposition towards compliance with FAA safety regulations and cooperatively working towards the kinds of changes thought to reduce the types of problems being seen.

On February 16, just after DOD certified ValuJet as a DOD-approved carrier, the FAA's Southern Region initiated a 120-day special emphasis review of the airline to begin on February 22. This review was initiated to provide an in-depth look at its operations and maintenance activities. FAA's principal inspectors for ValuJet and their management had developed concern over several recent accidents and incidents, a decrease in the

experience level of new hire pilots, unfavorable surveillance reports, and the further addition of aircraft to ValuJet's fleet.

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This review process began with an initial, intensified 7-day inspection period to establish a baseline for the overall inspection. At the end of the 7-day period, on February 29, the Atlanta Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) wrote ValuJet expressing concerns about maintenance manuals and procedures, training programs, Minimum Equipment List/deferred maintenance, and the quality of inspections performed. On March 5, ValuJet responded, detailing a series of specific steps it would initiate to correct these deficiencies. The FSDO continued on with the special emphasis review to assess the airline's operations and maintenance activities and, ultimately, to determine the effectiveness of the new measures implemented by the carrier. On May 11, the tragic

accident occurred.

Two days after the accident, we initiated an intense 30-day review of the airline to determine whether the earlier corrective steps taken by the airline had proven effective at stemming the deficiencies we had informed them about. In what amounts to probably the most detailed scrutiny we have ever given an airline, approximately 60 FAA inspectors worked around the clock, examining maintenance records for each aircraft in the airline's fleet, performing en route inspections of carrier pilots, observing maintenance work performed on the aircraft, and following up on maintenance work that was to have been

performed. Our safety inspectors performed the equivalent of 4 years of inspection

activities in 4 weeks.