fleet of aircraft is aging, they face a greater challenge than other airlines who use newer planes that require less maintenance. However, we must remember that the airlines are responsible first and foremost for the safety of their operations.

In addition to relying on airlines, we rely on the FAA's inspection system to identify problems and to certify that an airline is safe for travel. From the information that I have it appears that the FAA did indeed identify problems within ValuJet's safety operations as early as October 1994. Following the 1994 Regional Air Safety Inspection, the FAA conducted a National Air Safety Inspection, a Special Emphasis Review and a Low-Cost Carrier Safety Study. It was not until the crash of Flight 592 and FAA's intensive 30 day review that enough information came to light to ground ValuJet.

FAA has explained that only after the crash were its inspectors able to identify systemic problems with ValuJet's maintenance. After reviewing all of the previous violations and safety problems, FAA inspectors concluded that even with ValuJet's stated dedication to address all safety issues, a system to solve the problems did not exist within ValuJet's corporate structure. It has not yet been explained to me why the FAA could not identify ValuJet's systemic failure prior to the intensive 30 day review following the crash. If something else transpired between the time FAA Administrator Hinson and DOT Secretary Peña declared ValuJet safe for travel and the time the consent decree was signed grounding the airline, we need to know about it.

One of the issues that may have contributed to the problem is FAA's dual mission to promote air transportation and safety. The law may have been necessary at the time FAA was created, however, I agree with others that this dual mission is no longer appropriate. FAA's sole focus should be safety. Promotion of the airline industry should either be the Department of Transportation's responsibility or be left to the carriers themselves.

One result I hope can now occur is to make FAA an independent agency. Legislation to make the FAA an independent agency separate from DOT but still part of the executive branch was passed by this Committee and in fact, the entire House of Representatives. I strongly supported the proposal to make FAA an independent agency at that time and will continue to work for passage of this legislation. An independent agency is better able to respond to internal problems. Given FAA's unique responsibilities, this independence is appropriate.

I hope today's hearing will provide the Subcommittee with the information to determine what other changes are necessary within the FAA's inspection system. I look forward to hearing from all of the witnesses on this absolutely critical issue.

Remarks of

THE HONORABLE THOMAS W. EWING

Before the

Subcommittee on Aviation
Tuesday, June 25, 1996

Mr. Chairman:

It is truly unfortunate that the fatal crash of ValuJet flight 592 is the catalyst for today's hearing. Although commercial aviation is the safest form of transportation, tragedy is all too often the reason why the U.S. Department of Transportation, the FAA, and even Congress are forced to reexamine safety inspection, oversight, compliance, and certification procedures. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I believe H.R. 2276, adopted by this committee and the U.S. House of Representatives earlier in the year, which would separate FAA from the U.S. DOT bureaucracy goes a long way toward solving these problems, and the legislation deserves the immediate support of the Clinton administration.

The flying public has every right to expect airlines and the FAA to provide the safest and most efficient service possible. I believe, for the most part, the U.S. airline industry does an exemplary job of providing safe and reliable air service. Statistics indicate this is true for both large established airlines as well as upstart "low-cost carriers." Consequently, I am concerned by persistent media-fed reports and the administration's explanation of bureaucratic deficiencies at U.S. DOT and FAA which suggest that less expensive airlines are naturally less safe airlines. We must remember it is not in any airline's best interest to have accidents or a long record of safety mishaps!

Clearly, FAA must review and improve its safety inspection system. However, I believe Secretary Pena's proposed solution to the problem -- separating FAA from the encouragement and promotion of air commerce so that it may exclusively focus on safety -- is misguided and will only lead to the imposition of more burdensome regulations on the airline industry. Existing law already places safety above all other functions of the FAA! The problem is not FAA's charter, it is inefficient organization, and failure to act upon information coming from inspectors who are already in the field, who are doing their job, and who are frustrated by the inaction of top management in both FAA and U.S. DOT..

Mr. Chairman, I am very interested to hear the testimony from today's witnesses. I am particularly interested in the National Transportation Safety Board's testimony concerning ValuJet's alleged mishandling of the oxygen canisters and transportation of hazardous materials aboard passenger airplanes, in general. However, I believe the subcommittee should resist the urge to act legislatively until the full NTSB investigation has been completed, and we can determine where the faults in the system lie -- with the airlines, the maintenance contractors, or both?

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these very important hearings. My heart goes out to the families of the victims of ValuJet flight 592, and the families and victims of other airline disasters. I hope that some lessons can be learned from their tragic losses, and further loss of life in airplane accidents can be prevented.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Chairman Duncan and Members of the Committee. It has been just over 6 weeks since ValuJet flight 592 crashed into the Everglades following an inflight fire, killing all 110 persons aboard. Since that time, the Federal Aviation Administration has grounded the airline, and as this morning's hearing shows, many questions have been raised about ValuJet's operations and the FAA's oversight of those operations.

The enormous tragedy of the accident, the intense public and news media scrutiny of the airline and the FAA since then, and perhaps the perception of mixed signals sent by government officials since that accident, have combined to raise doubts in the minds of some Americans about the safety of their airline system.

Before addressing the issues before us today, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to put this concern in some perspective. I think that, as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, I am in a position to do so, because Congress in its wisdom established the Board 29 years ago to be an independent investigative agency, to provide impartial analysis of industry and government alike.

Congress intended the Safety Board to take the longer view, to separate the investigation from the passion of current events, and direct recommendations to those in the position to affect improvements in transportation safety, be they in government or private industry.

In our 29-year history, we have investigated more than 100,000 aviation accidents and issued over 3,600 aviation-related recommendations, most of which were directed to the FAA. To its credit, the FAA has adopted over 80 percent of those recommendations, and over 90 percent of our urgent recommendations.

Over the decades, dedicated government employees at the Safety Board and the FAA have worked closely together to define the latest technologies and the most meaningful regulations to ensure that the American people have the safest transportation system in the world.