Very briefly on another matter, ValuJet had no authorization to carry hazardous material, is that correct? ValuJet was the generator of hazardous material in the form of those oxygen canisters?

Mr. BRODERICK. No, I wouldn't say ValuJet generated them. The aircraft that ValuJet operated had those canisters on it. And I suppose the generator was the person who took them off the airplane in the course of maintenance.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The carrier, the aircraft owns the parts and owns the oxygen generators, and they are the responsibility of the carrier, and the oxygen generator, as a disposed item, is hazardous material. Management has to be held accountable as a generator. But the disposal of it was provided for in the work card that accompanied that part of the work to be done on ValuJet by the contractor. My understanding is, when the passenger service unit was removed and the heat shield with it, the work card directed that the caps were to be put on the time expired generators a subcontractor to the contractor did that work, and that was not accomplished, and the packaging was not carried out in accordance with HAZMÁT rules, which are not your responsibility, but the responsibility of RSPA and the Department of Transportation.

Do you find a disconnect there?

Mr. BRODERICK. It's certainly something that we and RSPA are looking into, and having discussions about literally daily.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You need to address that matter decisively and quickly.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar.

I'm going to ask that all other members submit any additional questions or statements for the record, with two very, very brief exceptions.

Mr. Bachus has one very brief statement, and Mr. DeFazio has one question.

Mr. Bachus.

Mr. BACHUS. We haven't gone into hazardous materials, but I think that's been touched on. But I'm not going to get into that. But I would like to talk to you, ask something about repair shops. We know the airlines can't operate without them. We know from former testimony that the FAA regulations are good. But Mr. Hinson, are they being enforced?

Mr. HINSON. Well, I think for the most part they are. Let me just make the point that we don't have any evidence, although the board hasn't ruled yet that there's absolutely any relationship between the accident and repair stations. I mean, in terms of the way they're regulated or anything.

Mr. BACHUS. Well, we've had other incidents, even on ValuJet, where a plane burned that was

Mr. HINSON. Well, that has to do with the failure of an engine, internal engine turbine disk.

Mr. BACHUS. We had another one where landing gear collapsed after it had been

Mr. HINSON. Yes.

Mr. BACHUS. So we have had instances where repair shops were not even certified by the FAA, is that right? You know, when you look

Mr. HINSON. I'm not aware of any work being done on ValuJet by non-certified maintenance.

Mr. BACHUS. Is that right?

Mr. HINSON. No, sir.

Mr. BACHUS. How about the Turkish shop?

Mr. HINSON. Except the x-rays we just talked about. Excuse me? Mr. BACHUS. Was that the Turkish repair shop?

Mr. HINSON. No. Not that I'm aware.

Mr. BACHUS. Let me ask you this. Are we enforcing those rules? Are you inspecting the repair shops?

Mr. HINSON. We do that. We have a regular basis for doing that. I'll ask Mr. Broderick to explain that.

Mr. BRODERICK. Yes, we do. We think we need to coordinate better the repair stations with the airlines. But yes, the repair stations are inspected independently by maintenance specialists in the FAA, as are the airlines.

Mr. BACHUS. OK, let me ask a final question. If ValuJet had a policy that they denied pay to pilots who did not complete their scheduled trips, is that a, does that reflect to you a lack of concern for safety?

Mr. BRODERICK. I think the points that were raised in the February 29 letter which you may be referring to were satisfactorily answered by ValuJet later, to the satisfaction of the people in Atlanta with regard to that. I'm not a specialist in ValuJet's pay structure, but I think they will be testifying in the next panel, and you might ask them.

Mr. BACHUS. Do you have an opinion on whether or not they should do that, whether that lessens safety?

Mr. BRODERICK. Well, I mean, I don't think that ValuJet, from what the inspectors that know the program best tell me now, I don't think that ValuJet had in place a pay program that endangered safety. I think they did not, when they initially raised it, understand it fully. And when it was explained to them, they found it acceptable, to my understanding.

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you very much, Mr. Bachus.

Mr. DeFazio.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the time. To piggyback onto Mr. Oberstar's concerns about aging aircraft, do you have now in place or are you contemplating putting in place a special inspection program for planes that have been in foreign ownership and maintained overseas? The previous gentleman referred to the engine fire. It was a Turkish repair station that didn't meet FAA standards which had overhauled that engine.

These are planes built in the United States of America, great planes, flown in this country until they were obsolete, sold to a Third World airline, maintained by a Third World airline in Third World conditions, and then purchased and brought back to the United States. What extraordinary scrutiny do we apply to those planes at that point in time? Is there any special program, or will you recommend one?

Mr. HINSON. Mr. DeFazio, any airplane that's been operated outside of the continental United States by another sovereign, in another sovereign state by another air carrier, non-U.S. air carrier, when that airplane comes back into U.S. inventory, it must meet

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all of the current airworthiness standards of an airplane that is already within the United States inventory.

And that creates in many cases big problems. Because we can't find the paperwork, the airline can't prove they did certain work. And in fact, often, they have to go in and overhaul an engine when there may not be any need to, because they don't have the paperwork to prove they did it the first time.

So when an airplane comes back into our inventory, it must be proven to the FAA that it meets our standards. There are no exceptions.

Mr. DEFAZIO. And so when we're dealing with bogus parts, as raised by Ms. Schiavo and others, we basically, if they can't document anything on that plane, any critical component of that plane, they will have to replace that component before it's placed into passenger service?

Mr. HINSON. That is correct.

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right, thank you.

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you very much. And thank you for bearing with us. Thank you very much.

And we will now call up the next panel. We have Mr. Lewis Jordan, who is the President of ValuJet Airlines; Mr. Steven D. Townes, who is President of SabreTech, Inc.; and Mr. Martin J. Bollinger, who is Vice President of Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.

Gentlemen, I know you just sat down, but would you stand once again and be sworn.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. DUNCAN. You may be seated.

We've had a request that Mr. Townes go first, Mr. Jordan second and Mr. Bollinger third. So that's fine with me.

Mr. Townes, you may begin your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF STEVEN D. TOWNES, PRESIDENT, SABRETECH, INC.; LEWIS JORDAN, PRESIDENT, VALUJET AIRLINES, INC.; AND MARTIN J. BOLLINGER, VICE PRESIDENT, BOOZ-ALLEN AND HAMILTON, INC

Mr. TOWNES. Good afternoon, sir.

I've submitted a detailed written statement for the committee and ask that it be included for the record.

Mr. DUNCAN. Your full statement will be included in the record, and that applies to all of you.

Mr. TOWNES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would have hoped to appear before you for the first time under different circumstances. But I'd like you to know that we very much respect and appreciate the leadership and critical roles of everyone on this committee, Chairman Shuster, Mr. Oberstar, who's not here right now but certainly integral, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Mr. Lipinski and others.

As you had asked, I'll try to address issues today. We welcome the oversight and fully understand your need for constructive answers to tough questions. You have an abundance of facts in my written testimony with no mincing of words. So briefly, let me explain this.

A little over 6 months ago, I became the President of Phoenixbased SabreTech, one of the top 10 commercial aircraft mainte

nance and modification companies in the U.S. I lead 1,500 aviation professionals. We perform nearly 2 million manhours per year of technical services.

Last June 30, SabreLiner purchased from DynCorp its DynAir Tech maintenance operations in Texas, Arizona and Florida. What is now SabreTech has been in the aircraft maintenance business for 43 years under various names. This past January, we undertook substantial management change, focused on continuous improvement of the newly acquired company.

Mr. Chairman, we are painfully aware of the tremendous losses and hardships that have accompanied this tragedy, from the victims' families to the many dedicated and professional employees of ValuJet, SabreTech, the FAA, NTSB and many others. In particular, I know that this has been an extraordinarily difficult and tragic experience for the families and for ValuJet. I wish for ValuJet the very best as they renew their operations, which I know they will.

We are all taking very difficult and painful lessons from this accident. This is an experience that must never, ever be repeated. We must examine every aspect of the accident and move swiftly to prevent a recurrence of this tragic thin line of human errors.

Examining that thin line gives rise to what might very well be national imperatives. I've thoughtfully considered these issues and I have five recommendations today for your consideration.

First, without question, we must focus far more attention on the proper identification and handling of hazardous materials. The HAZMAT issue has not been given the attention it deserves. To its credit, the NTSB has issued the warning signs and the recommendations, but now we need a more failsafe system.

We urge a joint FAA symposium and action oriented task force on hazardous materials in air transport, much like the approach that was used successfully to address the aging aircraft issue after the Aloha accident. I think this should be done very soon.

Second, we believe the Government ought to consider recurrent training requirements to maintain the licenses of air frame and power plant mechanics, or A&Ps, as they're known. There should be a strong HAZMAT content added to their recurrent training. No recurrent certification rules exist for mechanics today like there are for pilots, for example.

Given today's complex environment in the maintenance shop, it's time for the Government, I think, to consider mandating, and for myself and others in the industry to welcome, recurrent training and relicensing exams for the A&Ps. In fact, I'd take it a step further and have it apply to HAZMAT course syllabuses right in our vocational and technical colleges where they get their initial licensing. So all the thousands of young mechanics coming into the industry for the first time have that as their basic, licensed knowledge.

Third, we welcome additional tough auditing from the FAA and from our airline customers. We agree wholeheartedly with the FAA's recent actions to require greater oversight and auditing for third party maintenance. Regular audits can only help to improve quality, and I urge more funding for the FAA's NASIP auditing

program. I've undergone it. It's a constructive process. And as Ms. Schiavo said, it works very well.

We would, however, respectfully disagree with those who would use this tragic but isolated incident to condemn out-sourcing. Outsourcing is a proven process, a safe process, and certainly not a new trend. Third party aircraft maintenance and modification industry represents $7 billion in annual revenue, 85,000 jobs and about 150 million manhours per year of technical services for airline and cargo operators.

Whether independent or in-house, mechanics licensing is the same. Inspection requirements are the same. Repair stations are certificated the same by the FAA. The FAA assigns its own inspectors to every maintenance facility. And we're under the oversight of customers inspectors as well. The key is effective communication in the project management process between the airline and its contractor.

Fourth and without question, we need to guarantee the safe air transport of oxygen generators and any other high strength oxidizer. We endorse the NTSB recommendation to permanently ban oxygen generators as cargo on passenger aircraft, unless effective fire detection and suppression systems are in those cargo holds.

But more can be done. Today's system of sealing certain types of cargo holds to control fire simply is inadequate. Until safety can be assured, all high strength solid oxidizers should be banned from any cargo hold on a passenger aircraft.

In addition, we urge that the DOT consider regulating these generators and any similar product as forbidden materials. This approach is presently employed by the DOT for a variety of products, including such things as cigarette lighters, whenever there's ignition capability.

Let me explain why. We've shared evidence with the NTSB and with the FAA and we'll be happy to share it with this committee that these generators can be accidentally discharged, even when secured by a shipping cap. That should worry everyone. It doesn't excuse or mitigate the thin line of errors that I described earlier, but it should worry us. The design of this or similar devices and their inner packaging should be examined by the DOT Bureau of Explosives and be specifically approved by RSPA.

Fifth and finally, sir, from a human factors standpoint, we should consider much clearer labeling on all aircraft parts that may constitute hazardous materials at every stage in their life cycle: installation, use, and upon removal. Adoption of a HAZMAT labeling system for aircraft parts is going to definitely raise issues in my industry.

But we believe a labeling requirement merits very serious consideration. In this case, the manufacturer of the oxygen generators that SabreTech handled for ValuJet began to place some warning labels on them in the mid-1980's after the DC-10 oxygen generator fire at O'Hare. The generators we removed from the ValuJet aircraft, however, were manufactured in the late 1970's and early 1980's, and to my knowledge, did not have any of the typical, large warning labels of the later models. Later models did say that they get hot, but there was no HAZMAT label as we know it.