FINDING: 1.07.26: No weather data is being maintained with any flights records. I talked with Bobby Dez who is responsible for maintaining the fit records and he stated that the weather is maintained by dispatch and not with the flt records. FINDING; 1.07.27: (N801VV) I checked the cabin interior for conformity. The left aft lav did not have a "No Smoking" placard on the inside of the lav door.(FAR 121.317(g)(h)). The two PBE's on the forward left side of the cabin were stacked so that the red nipple was difficult to determine the serviceability of the PBE. Referred to MTC prior to putting A/C N801 VV into service. FINDING: 1.07.28: Forward F/A seat was broken and would not stay stowed. Maintenance asked me for my concurrence that the securing of the seat would meet the requirements of the MEL. The seat was being held up by 2 strips of masking tape and a metal piece kept falling into the walkway. I withheld any comment or concurrence and suggested to the pilots that they ought to review the adequacy of the required mx procedure required by the MEL. Subsequently the seat was more securely taped to the stowed position. FINDING: 1.07.29: It appears that ValuJet does not carry any extra personal flotation devices aboard their aircraft. FAR 121.340(a) states that aircraft must have a personal flotation device for each occupant aboard the aircraft. Therefore, if ValuJet had a full airplane of and there were several infants also on board, the carrier would not have enough personal flotation devices aboard the aircraft for each occupant. SUBJECT IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE F/A MANUAL. passengers NDING: 1.07.30: All 3 Flight Attendants were just out of flight attendant training and were on the line for only 1 week. Each Flight Attendant aboard the aircraft had 1 weeks experience. May meet the regulations regarding training and qualifications, but it would be better to have a more experienced Flight Attendant assigned with them. FINDING: 1.07.31: The flight was full with 89 pax, 1 infant, and 1 extra Flight Attendant. The carrie: does not carry any extra floatation devices aboard their aircraft. Advised PIC and Fligh: Attendant that they needed an extra flotation device for the infant. Flight took a 5 minute delay while mx put one aboard the aircraft. Mx also signed the logbook indicating the life vest was placed on board. FAR 121.340(a) requires a flotation device for each occupant. FINDING: 1.07.32: Inexperience crewmembers flying together. PIC had 4 months with ValuJet and the SIC had 2 months. FINDING: 1.07.32: On 2-23-96, aircraft 916 had a requirement to verify oil level on #2 engine prior to departure from PHL per MEL 79-3. The flight departed PHL with this write-up open in the log book. This incident is presently under investigation by the PHL FAA office. 1.09 FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT FINDING: 1.09.00: DESCRIPTION & INSPECTION DATA: FINDING: 1.09.01: ValuJet is not using bag sizing box located at the passenger service counter. 2.03 MANUALS AND PROCEDURES ESCRIPTION OF ORGANIZATION AND INSPECTION DATA: ValuJet utilizes a standard practice manual (SP) which contains detailed instructions on performing tasks and implementing company policies. This SP is furnished to all departments to carry out company rules, and regulations to permit the accomplishment of company objectives. An overall review of ValuJet's SP has not been accomplished at this time as this special emphasis program is focused upon line maintenance activities. The SP encompasses many line maintenance work procedures and practices used to maintain ValuJet's aircraft in airworthy condition. In addition to ValuJet's SP, ValuJet furnishes DC-9 maintenance manuals, aircraft electrical wiring diagrams, and illustrated parts catalogs, in the form of microfiches to maintenance line stations for reference and accomplishment of maintenance tasks. The Atlanta line maintenance base currently utilizes .wo reader\ printers for viewing and printing maintenance manual reference data. FINDING: 2.03.01: Inadequate procedures for out-station contract maintenance. ValuJet's SP for maintenance control does not contain detailed procedures for initiating and controlling contract line maintenance. A review of maintenance control's procedures contained in ValuJet's SP is very brief in nature and does not contain detailed instructions and procedures for the varied tasks that are performed. The most prominent deficiency noted was the inability of Valulet to coordinate maintenance at out stations staffed with contractors. On specific occasions, maintenance control has failed to properly coordinate maintenance activities by allowing an aircraft to depart a location without maintenance being properly performed. This FINDING is based upon FINDINGS 2.03.02 and 2.03.03. FINDING: 2.03.02: On 02-27-96, aircraft N920VV was inspected by FAA personnel at Hartford, Conn. (BDL). Fuel was discovered seeping from several over and under wing panels. Maintenance control instructed a contract maintenance technician to tighten screws on the wing fuel panels. No reference data or torque wrench was provided to the contract mechanic nor was the contract maintenance technician asked to use either. The contract maintenance technician followed the verbal instructions provided over the telephone by ValuJet's maintenance control. (reference aircraft logsheet 49914-09,and -10, dated 0227-96). FINDING: 2.03.03: On 02-24-96, aircraft N960VV on flight 241, from Chicago's Midway Airport (MDW) to Atlanta (ATL) was inspected at (MDW) by FAA personnel. It was discovered that the aircraft's left and right main landing gear's shimmy dampers required servicing. ValuJet's maintenance control faxed the necessary instructions to contract maintenance personnel but no specialized shimmy dampener serving tooling was available. After a considerable delay, maintenance control contacted the Captain and stated the aircraft was "okay for flight." Upon the arrival of this flight into Atlanta, both shimmy dampers were serviced (reference log sheet # 40682-37). At the present time, this occurrence is under investigation by the Chicago FSDO. ANDING: 2.03.04: Failure to follow procedures contained within the ValuJet's SP manual system. On 0327-96, during a routine aircraft ramp inspection of aircraft N920VV, it was noted that the aircraft's bumper assembly had been recently scraped (logsheet # 49876 - 07, dated 03 |