jobs, that they might lose them if they come forward and report some of the deficiencies.

We interviewed over 40 FAA inspectors. They all said virtually the same thing, but only one was willing to come forward and testify, provided his identity was protected, and we did that. We precluded the press from photographing that individual, we scrambled his voice electronically.

Since that testimony, however, we have been told by several FAA employees that the FAA has undertaken an investigation to try and track down that individual by calling for the records of all of those who were not on duty that day, who may have been taking flights to Washington that day, and also trying to utilize a computerized system to de-scramble the voice.

Let me suggest to this committee and to my colleagues in the Senate, this is not action worthy of any Federal agency. This is a gestapo-type activity. If there is any truth to this, those individuals ought to be prosecuted.

It's for that reason that I referred the matter to the Justice Department and the FBI to conduct an investigation to see if the allegations are true.

Mr. Chairman, we also have conducted investigations into what are called “unapproved parts." My prepared statement covers that in some detail. I only mention it in this context: one of the problems we have had in dealing with the FAA is it seems to have a culture that denies a problem exists, that defends the status quo, and then seeks to deflect public criticism.

When we had a hearing last year about suspected unapproved parts, or bogus parts, making their way into the commercial aviation sector, the FAA testified in a public hearing that it wasn't a serious problem. But, in fact, there is an internal FAA document that I have that indicates it is a more serious problem than the FAA is willing to admit.

I think that typifies some of the problems that we're trying to deal with here. On the one hand, we don't want to undermine the public's confidence in our agencies, but we shouldn't tolerate the failure to fully disclose information that allows lawmakers and regulators and executives to formulate policies to correct the problems. Let me suggest a couple of recommendations that I have.

First of all, it has been suggested here and I agree that we should eliminate the FAA's dual mission of promoting air commerce and assuring aviation safety. The dual mission poses an inevitable conflict of interest and, frankly, I don't know why the aviation industry doesn't engage in its own promotion, as opposed to the Government undertaking that function.

I hope that the FAA would embrace constructive criticism and address the managerial and oversight deficiencies, rather than attempting to deflect criticism.

I would hope that the FAA would discontinue concealing unfavorable or critical internal analyses and make full disclosure so the public can make informed decisions about air travel.

Chairman Duncan, you indicated that FAA should stop making cosmetic changes that simply mask the underlying deficiencies, and I completely agree, and I would hope that FAĂ would start holding

managers and inspectors accountable for the quality of their inspections.

I would also recommend, Mr. Chairman, that your subcommittee closely monitor the recertification process as far as ValuJet is concerned. I make this point because just last year there was an air carrier in Florida that was grounded for very serious violations. DOT's recertification documents, I believe, contained some questionable, inaccurate, and unsupported statements that may have allowed the air carrier to begin flying again than under normal conditions.

So, in sum, I think the FAA culture has to change. It is a culture that says, "Protect your turf, avoid accountability, and resist change." Without a change in culture, I think we're not going to see these problems seriously addressed.

I know that a number of ValuJet employees, thousands of employees, are now imploring our offices. I've been watching this on television. I know they're concerned. They are concerned that Congress must take action which would jeopardize their jobs, and surely we should not take any kind of action which is imprudent or in any way complicates their livelihoods.

But I also think the Federal Government has a more compelling duty to ensure that thousands of innocent and trusting travelers do not experience the same horrible fate as those who perished in the Everglades.

A final comment. When Senator Dole retired from the Senate a couple of weeks ago he made a statement which caught the attention of all of us, democrats and republicans. He said, “Our word is our bond. It's the most important thing we have." The same applies to every single Government institution or agency, be it the White House, Congress, the FBI, the FAA. Our word has to be our bond.

If we break it, through either neglect or indifference or arrogance or venality, then we breed distrust for the Government, itself, and we give rise to a contempt and a hatred that I think reflects the darker angels of our nature.

The restoration and maintenance of confidence in Government institutions is one of the most important missions that all of us have, and it is not a mission impossible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Cohen, for a really outstanding statement. You've done an excellent job of outlining the problems with which this hearing and our subsequent hearings will deal, and you've made some very fine suggestions.

I can say, speaking for myself, that I think that when you leave the Senate at the end of this year, the Senate will be losing a very valuable Member. But it's obvious that you have a very great and sincere interest in this area, and we appreciate the work that you've done on it.

The policy of this subcommittee has always been that, because we have the opportunity to have private discussions with Members on a frequent basis, and also because we need to move on to the other witnesses and you've got other things that you need to do, that we do not ask questions of Congressional Members, and so we simply want to thank you at this time for being here and for giving such an outstanding start.

Any questions that Members may have can be submitted in writing, and I'm sure that you and your staff will be glad to respond. Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much for being with us today.

As previously announced, we've had requests that the first panel testify-that each of the three witnesses testify separately, and so we will call up the first witnesses at this time, and that is The Honorable Jim Hall, who is chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board.

Mr. Hall, if you will remain standing for a moment, as announced in my opening statement, we will swear in all the witnesses today, because this is an investigative hearing.

Would you raise your right hand, please?

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. DUNCAN. Chairman Hall, thank you very much for being here with us today. You may begin your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF JIM HALL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; MARY SCHIAVO, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY TODD J. ZINSER, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL; AND DAVID R. HINSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY ANTHONY BRODERICK, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR REGULATIONS AND CERTIFICATION

Mr. HALL. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Chairman Shuster, Congressman Lipinski, and Congressman Oberstar, and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning and congratulate you for holding these timely hearings. Accompanying me this morning are some members of the ValuJet investigative team who are also present in case there are any questions that come up that I want to refer to them.

It has been 6 weeks since ValuJet Flight 592 crashed into the Everglades following an in-flight fire, killing all 110 persons aboard. Since that time, the FAA has grounded the airline, and as this morning's hearing shows, many questions have been raised about ValuJet's operations and the FAA's oversight of those oper

ations.

While we have had differences with the FAA over the years, our relationship has always been professional and it has worked to benefit the American people.

In an industry that has seen traffic grow from 106 million passengers in 1967, the year the Safety Board opened its doors, to 545 million passengers last year, a fivefold increase, the fatal accident rate has dropped, at the same time, almost 75 percent.

Mr. Chairman, in 1995, just last year, for example, there was one fatal Part 121 scheduled airline accident fatality for every 4.1 million flights.

This remarkable safety record did not happen by chance, but by the dedicated efforts of thousands of inspectors, air traffic controllers, investigators, pilots, mechanics, manufacturing personnel, and through the oversight, policy, and budgetary support provided by you and your colleagues in Congress.

Mr. Chairman, 18 months ago, after a series of fatal accidents, Secretary Peña convened an airline safety summit here in Washington, D.C. It provided a forum for Government agencies and the airline industry to establish heightened safety goals.

Several hundred senior Government and airline officials attended that 2-day meeting. While at the time I praised the decision to hold the summit, I noted in my speech to the summit that absent from the agenda were certain issues the Safety Board had addressed over the years-issues like airline management, FAA oversight, and corporate culture. Without addressing these issues, I felt we could never approach the summit's goal of zero accidents.

Although the aviation industry has taken the necessary steps over the years to prevent most accidents through the systematic elimination of hazards and the use of technology to overcome human failures, I question how far we have come in challenging corporate cultures that do not put safety first.

Mr. Chairman, that is a question we must continue to address. How far have we come to eliminate a management mind set that allows unsafe practices to flourish at airlines or go undetected at the FAA?

This hearing has been convened to examine issues raised by the ValuJet crash. No issues more directly concern the circumstances of this accident than the carriage of hazardous materials on aircraft and fire protection on airlines.

I am sorry to say, Mr. Chairman, that, while we have not yet determined what exactly happened aboard Flight 592 that fateful day, I would not be surprised if, at the conclusion of this investigation, we find that this accident is a result of previous lessons learned and ignored or forgotten.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we recently concluded the recovery efforts in the Everglades after an unprecedented month-long search for wreckage, and on the part of the medical examiner, for the remains of victims.

While our investigation is continuing, some very important facts have emerged.

It appears that about 5 minutes after takeoff the crew of Flight 592 decided to return to Miami after hearing a noise and reporting smoke in the cabin to air traffic controllers.

Wreckage examination indicates an extremely intense fire in the aircraft-hot enough to melt seat railings and floor beams.

We know the forward cargo compartment carried oxygen generators-perhaps more than 100-packed in cardboard, and at least three airplane tires. It appears that at least some of the generators were not empty, as labeled on the shipping papers, and none were equipped with a safety cap.

What actually caused the plane to plunge into the Evergladesfor example, was the crew incapacitated, or was the aircraft rendered uncontrollable is unknown at this time, but these facts raise the very real possibility that warnings the airline industry and its regulators received through close calls in previous years, which are discussed in my submitted testimony, went tragically unheeded.

One of these close calls involved a DC-9 that landed in Nashville on February 3, 1988, with a fire in the cargo hold. The pilot had

no way to detect the fire except through reports by cabin personnel that the floor was hot and soft. They also had no way to fight the fire while in the air.

Mr. Chairman, despite Safety Board recommendations to the FAA to require fire detection systems and fire extinguishing systems and better fire-blocking materials in cargo compartments, the sad fact is that the crew of ValuJet Flight 592 had no more equipment available to warn them of a fire or to fight it than the crew of that DC-9 flight over 8 years earlier.

The Department of Transportation's program to regulate the transportation of hazardous materials by air and its regulations to protect aircraft and occupants from the effects of fire on airliners will be major focuses of our Board's ValuJet investigation.

A focus of today's hearing, Mr. Chairman, is whether there are systemic problems with the oversight of airline operations and maintenance, particularly in those segments that are outsourcing to contractors.

The Safety Board first addressed the issue of FAA oversight of contract maintenance operations 20 years ago, following an accident in Van Nuys, California. We addressed the issue of contract maintenance again in 1982 following a Boeing 737 accident here in Washington, DC

The ValuJet tragedy again has shown a spotlight on an evolution that has occurred in segments of the airline industry. The Board has expressed its concern previously about airlines carrying out their own maintenance programs properly in past accident investigations which are discussed in my full testimony.

Now we are looking at what some have dubbed a "virtual airline" one that provides transportation but conducts none of its own maintenance and training.

As part of our investigation of this tragic accident, we will analyze how carriers that outsource these services are ensuring the safety of their operations.

We will also analyze the effectiveness of the FAA and its NASIP program to ensure its compliance with safe practices.

This brings me to an observation, Mr. Chairman.

Last week the FAA announced that it would now require airlines to demonstrate the regulatory compliance of each of their major contract maintenance programs and facilities. The implication is that the airlines have not done that until today. If this is true, Mr. Chairman, then we may not just have a ValuJet problem here; we may also have an FAA problem.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the ValuJet accident has brought to the forefront the ongoing issues of the need for stronger rules to protect airline passengers from fire dangers aboard airliners, including rules governing the acceptance and carriage of hazardous materials.

The Board will also be examining the FAA's ability to provide adequate oversight to startup carriers, particularly those that undergo rapid expansion and contract and maintenance operations. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we will look closely at whether corporate culture played any role in this tragedy.

This will be an exhaustive investigation, Mr. Chairman, because these are issues that must be resolved.