1.03 OPERATIONS TRAINING

FINDINGS: 1.03.00: DESCRIPTION & INSPECTION DATA: DESCRIPTION -ValuJet Airlines, Inc. employs approximately 312 pilots, of which nine (9) are proficiency check pilots and nine (9) are line check

Flight Safety, Inc. provides five (5) simulator instructors and five (5) simulator proficiency check pilots. Training and checking is conducted a Flight Safety in Miami and Atlanta. Flight Safety !nstructors are trained in ValuJet procedures and approved by the POI to conduct ValuJet training.

There are eleven (11) certified dispatchers and three (3) flight followers. There is one (1) Director of Systems Operations Control.

All pilot training records are maintained in a manual folder system and kept in the Chief Pilot's office, at the Atlanta Airport. There is a computer data base being used as a back-up, and this system will be approved for use shortly. Flight Safety, Inc. also keeps a copy of training records in Miami, Florida. Dispatcher training is conducted by Transcon, Inc. and the records are maintained by the Director of Systems Operations Control at beadquarters.

The ValuJet Inflight Training Department is responsible for providing all categories of Flight Attendant
Training. This training includes Initial New Hire and Recurrent Training.

tht Attendant training is conducted in Atlanta for all domiciles. ValuJet currently employs approximately J flight attendants and maintains their qualification on DC-9 type aircraft. ValuJet utilizes the aircraft and cabin mockups to instruct fligh: anendants on exit operation in the normal and emergency modes.

INSPECTION DATA: The Flight Operations Training Manual, which contains the Flight Attendant Training Program, was reviewed to determine compliance with applicable Federal Aviation Regulations. Classroom raining was not conducted during the time of inspection. A representative sampling of Pilot Training records were reviewed for compliance with FAR 121.683 and subparts N and D. All dispatcher training records were reviewed. The following qualification events were observered during the Inspection:

Initial New Hire Ground Training.
Initial New Hire Simulator Training

FINDING: 1.03.01: Crew crossed the runway threshold at VREF+10 knots which resulted in a landing 1000 feet beyond the touchdown zone. Pilot was visual from 5 miles out and he did not line up with the runway until 800 feet.

FINDING: 1.03.02: Crew crossed threshold at 100 feet radar altitude height, VREF+10 knots which resulted in a landing 1000 feet beyond touchdown. Pilot left some power on during roundout which cause the aircraft to float substantially.

PANDING: 1.03.03: IOE Captain failed to check MEL and operations procedures for manual pressurization prior to departure.

FINDING: 1.03.04: 1OE Captain failed to check MEL and operations procedures for manual pressurization

prior to departure.

FINDING: 1.03.05: 1OE Captain failed to check MEL and operations procedures for manual pressurization prior to departure.

FINDING: 1.03.06: 1OE Captain positioned his airspeed bugs improperly.

FINDING: 1.03.07: Captain set airspeed bug improperly for akeoff and landing.

FINDING: 1.03.08: First Officer was not familiar with cockpit flow or checklist procedures.

FINDING: 1.03.09: First Officer Willard Dale Cragg, ATP#253964653, had completed IOE but he weak on procedures.

FINDING: 1.03.10: First Officer Wayne Karnath ATP #2210587 was weak on procedures.

FINDING: 1.03.11: No passenger manifest on flt 206 on 2-20-96.

FINDING: 1.03.12: Cockpit door was not checked. Item read & answered “locked" by F/O but was not checked.

FINDING: 1.03.13: Altitude clearance obtained by F/O-no confirmation that Captain heard the clearance.

ADING: 1.03.14: F/O accepted new altemate from dispatch. Wrote down CMH(Columbus, OH) instead of CSG(Columbus, GA).

FINDING: 1.03.15: There was too much flight instruction being conducted below 10,000'.

FINDING: 1.03.16: On a filt from SNN to KEF, Aircraft 939, a write-up was placed in the a/c log that the amber gear door light was on w/gear down for ldg at KEF. Corrective action was accomplished at KEF but the repairman could not sign the release off. Capt. Jim Bauch. signed the airworthiness release for the aircraft on 2/12/96.

FINDING: 1.03.17: Airspeed on final varied between VREF+10 to VREF+20 landing runway 26R at ATL. Wind was 240/9. Touchdown occurred at VREF, on the touchdown zone aimpoint markings.

was

FINDING: 1.03.18: ATC kept the aircraft high before clearing it for the visual approach to SDF rwy 19. It took approx. 2000-2500 fʊmin rate of descent with gear down and flaps 50 to reach the proper glide path as indicated by the PAPI at approx. 800 ft above touchdown. Power then added and the airspeed remained at VREF+20. The aircraft was then allowed to descend below the PAPI glide path until approx. 1000 fi prior to the runway end. At that point the PAPI showed four red lights and the airspeed was VREF+20. The descent was slowed and the airspeed kept at VREF+20 till just prior to touchdown. Touchdown occurred at VREF+10.

1.04 CREW QUALIFICATIONS

FINDING: 1.04.00: DESCRIPTION: ValuJet Airlines, Inc. qualifies flight crew members utilizing instructors and designated check airmen of Flight Safety International in Miami, Fl. and Atlanta, GA. (See Operations Training section of this report for further details). Records of training and qualification are maintained for pilots in the Chief Pilot's office located in Concourse C at Atlanta Airport.

Flight Attendant traini..g and qualification records are maintained at company headquarters at 1800 Phoenix Blvd. Suite 126, Atlanta, GA.

ValuJet Airlines, Inc. maintains qualifications of the Flight Attendants in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Aviation Regulations. Flight Attendant Training Records are maintained using a manual written system at ValuJet Headquarters.

INSPECTION DATA: A representative sampling of pilot and flight attendant records were reviewed to mine compliance with the FARs and other written guidance regarding crew qualifications

A total of 62 Pilot records were inspected.

Inspection of 31 Flight Attendant Training records was accomplished by a random sampling of the folders.

NDING: 1.04.01: Captain failed to obtain cabin ready for push from the Flight Attendant.

FINDING: 1.04.02: During SIC's walkaround, he missed open latches on aft external air door and fwd lavatory service door.

FINDING: 1.04.03: Captain powering back when the forward ground personnel did not have goggles on.. FINDING: 1.04.04: SIC landed aircraft a: ATL on runway 27R, veered off centerline toward side during deceleration, PIC took control of aircraft and completed roll-out. SIC stated that his lef foot slipped off the rudder causing the aircraft to veer off to the right.

FINDING: 1.04.05: Log book page 49906-46 3/21/96 ATL-SDF filt 338. Discrepancy logged

on preflight "noticed tail skid had been struck on landing." Capt Edenfield(50675) corrective action “inspected tail skid per m/m 32-70 no defects noted." Previous page 49906-45 ft 512 ATL-MEM, în 105 MEM-ATL, Capt Janke(50068).

FINDING: 1.04.06: Aircraft landed long and fast on runway 36 in SAV. Capt. was given option of 36 or 27, with wind of 260/8. Aircraft proceeded beyond end of runway and wound up approx 150-200 ft into the overrun. Minor damage and no injuries. Captain declined emergency equipment. No log book entry had been made previously, nor did this crew make one. There was no entry in the log book concerning the incident.

FINDING: 1.04.07: There seemed to be some confusion about who was to push what button during descent and approach. This confusion resulted in having to disconnect the autopilot during the approach because of improper selections. It does not appear that the company has ar.

adequate standardization of the MD-80 descent and approach procedures concerning the duties of the flying pilot and the non-flying pilot.

FINDING: 1.04.08: The right a/c pack was MEL'd as inop. The MEL requires that Flt. Ops be conducted at

or below FL250. The crew was aware of this requirement. The dispatch release stated
that the fit was to be operated at FL330. I had ask the crew if the fuel burn in the dispatch
flight release took operation at FL250 into consideration. The crew had to delay
pushback until they had queried dispatch about this situation. As it turned out, dispatch
bad figured fuel burn at FL250, bet nowhere on the dispatch release was it stated or
apparent that this was so. The Captain was David M. Gibbs.

FINDING: 1.04.09: During the boarding process, 2 of the 3 Flight Attendants got off the aircraft and went onto the jetway to get supplies. Reviewed the company policy in their manuals that states all 3 Flight Attendents must be on board the aircraft for boarding of passengers. Told them to make sure that they comply with this policy

FINDING: 1.04.10: Mr. Sodeman failed the oral portion of the SIC check for the following reasons: He did show adequate knowledge of the DC-9 electrical syetem or the hydraulic system.

1.05 OPERATIONS MANUALS AND PROCEDURES

FINDING: 1.05.00: DESCRIPTION: The ValuJet Flight Attendant Manual provides all flight attendants with the ValuJet company policies, flight attendant duties and responsibilities, emergency procedures and references to the Federal Aviation Regulations. A newly published Flight Attendant Manual was issued to all Flight Attendants effective September 19, 1995. A standard manual revision/bulletin distribution process assures that all additions and changes are issued to all flight attendants in a timely manner.

Flight crewmembers are provided a Company Operations Manual (COM) and Minimum Equipment List (MEL) which contain company policies, procedures, and crew duties and responsibilities.

INSPECTION DATA: The ValuJet Flight attendant Manual was evaluated for compliance with the Federal Regulations and appropriate FAA guidance. The COM, MEL and Flight Operations Training Manual were eviewed for compliance with applicable FARs.

FINDING: 1.05.01: Airport analysis for -9 showed revision 19 on lep-1. Two revisions behind, pages faxed prior to flight (N939VV)

FINDING: 1.05.02: Airport analysis (-9 power) manual in cockpit was at rev. 18, should be rev. 21. (N904VJ)

DING: 1.05.03: Did not have the latest MEL revision. Airpon analysis manual had no revision status page. N911VV)

INDING: 1.05.04: The performance and planning manual does not contain a holding speed chart. INDING: 1.05.05: There is no mention of the use of the engine sync in the checklist. There is no check on the descent or arrival check to insure that it is turned of

INDING: 1.05.06: Company Ops manual missing ops bulletins. (PHL)

INDING: 1.05.07: MEL allows that the forward jumpseat be inoperative. MEL states that an alternate procedure must be used. There is no alternate procedure in the MEL nor the F/A's manual.

INGING; 1.05.08: The inbound crew wrote up the GPW'S and TCAS as inop. Maintenance deferred bott per the MEL. MEL procedures on page 34-3, procedure 34-43, states to pull and coliz circuit breaker B10 for the TCAS computer. On this aircraft, B10 was the circuit breaker for the left hydraulic system pressure. The actual position for the TCAS C/B was E21. Therefore, the MEL procedures contain wrong information, at least for this aircraft, and maybe for the whole fleet.

DING: 1.05.09: The ValuJet's aircraft manual (abnormal) reflects that the stall warning circuit breakers are outlined in red tape. This does not appear to be correct depiction on the circuit breaker panel.