(b) Under the structured approach, the contracting officer shall first measure "Contractor Effort" by the assignment of a profit percentage within the designated weight ranges to each element of contract cost recognized by the contracting officer. The amount calculated for the cost of money for facilities capital is not to be included for the computation of profit as part of the cost base.

(c) The suggested categories under "Contractor Effort" are for reference purposes only. Often individual proposals will be in a different format, but since these categories are broad and basic, they provide sufficient guidance to evaluate all other items of cost.

(d) After computing a total dollar profit for "Contractor Effort," the contracting officer shall then calculate the specific profit dollars assigned for cost risk, investment, performance, socioeconomic programs, and special situations. This is accomplished by mul

tiplying the total Government Cost Objective, exclusive of any cost of money for facilities capital, by the specific weight assigned to the elements within the "Other Factors" category. Form HHS-674, Structured Approach Profit/Fee Objective, should be used, as appropriate, to facilitate the calculation of this profit objective. Form HHS-674 is illustrated in 353.301-674.

(e) In making a judgment of the value of each factor, the contracting officer should be governed by the definition, description, and purpose of the factors together with considerations for evaluating them as set forth in 315.905-72 and 315.905-73.

(f) The structured approach was designed for arriving at profit objectives for other than nonprofit organizations. However, if appropriate adjustments are made to reflect differences between profit and nonprofit organizations, the structured approach can be used as a basis for arriving at profit objectives for nonprofit organizations. Therefore, the structured approach, as modified in paragraph (f)(2) below, shall be used to establish profit objectives for nonprofit organizations.

(1) For purposes of this section, nonprofit organizations are defined as those business entities organized and operated exclusively for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and which are exempt from Federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code.

(2) For contracts with nonprofit organizations where profit is involved, an adjustment of up to 3 percentage points will be subtracted from the total profit objective percentage. In developing this adjustment, it will be necessary to consider the following factors:

(i) Tax position benefits;

(ii) Granting of financing through advance payments; and

(iii) Other pertinent factors which may work to either the advantage or disadvantage of the contractor in its position as a nonprofit organization.

[49 FR 13979, Apr. 9, 1984, as amended at 53 FR 15563, May 2, 1988]

315.905-72 Contractor effort.

(a) General. Contractor effort is a measure of how much the contractor is expected to contribute to the overall effort necessary to meet the contract performance requirement in an efficient manner. This factor, which is apart from the contractor's responsibility for contract performance, takes into account what resources are necessary and what the contractor must do to accomplish a conversion of ideas and material into the final service or product called for in the contract. This is a recognition that within a given performance output, or within a given sales dollar figure, necessary efforts on the part of individual contractors can vary widely in both value and quantity, and that the profit objective should reflect the extent and nature of the contractor's contribution to total performance. A major consideration, particularly in connection with experimental, developmental, or research work, is the difficulty or complexity of the work to be performed, and the unusual demands of the contract, such as whether the project involves a new approach unrelated to existing technology and/or equipment or only refinements to these items. The evaluation of this factor requires an anaylsis of the cost content of the proposed contract as follows:

(1) Material acquisition. (Subcontracted items, purchased parts, and other material.) Analysis of these cost items shall include an evaluation of the managerial and technical effort necessary to obtain the required subcontracted items, purchased parts, material or services. The contracting officer shall determine whether the contractor will obtain the items or services by routine order from readily available sources or by detailed subcontracts for which the prime contractor will be required to develop complex specifications. Consideration shall also be given to the managerial and technical efforts necessary for the prime contractor to select subcontractors and to perform subcontract administration functions. In application of this criterion, it should be recognized that the contribution of the prime contractor to its purchasing program may be substantial. Normally,

the lowest unadjusted weight for direct material is 2 percent. A weighting of less than 2 percent would be appropriate only in unusual circumstances when there is a minimal contribution by the contractor.

(2) Direct Labor (Professional, service, manufacturing and other labor). Analysis of the various labor categories of the cost content of the contract should include evaluation of the comparative quality and quantity of professional and semiprofessional talents, manufacturing and service skills, and experience to be employed. In evaluating professional and semiprofessional labor for the purpose of assigning profit dollars, consideration should be given to the amount of notable scientific talent or unusual or scarce talent needed in contrast to nonprofessional effort. The assessment should consider the contribution this talent will provide toward the achievement of contract objectives. Since nonprofessional labor is relatively plentiful and rather easily obtained by the contractor and is less critical to the successful performance of contract objectives, it cannot be weighted nearly as high as professional or semiprofessional labor. Service contract labor should be evaluated in a like manner by assigning higher weights to engineering or professional type skills and lower weights to semiprofessional or other type skills required for contract performance. Similarly, the variety of manufacturing and other categories of labor skills required and the contractor's manpower resources for meeting these requirements should be considered. For purposes of evaluation, categories of labor (i.e., quality control, receiving and inspection, etc.) which do not fall within the definition for professional, service or manufacturing labor may be categorized as appropriate. However, the same evaluation considerations as outlined above will be applied.

(3) Overhead and general management (G&A). (i) Analysis of these overhead items of cost should include the evaluation of the makeup of these expenses and how much they contribute to contract performance. To the extent practicable, analysis should inIclude a determination of the amount of labor within these overhead pools

and how this labor would be treated if it were considered as direct labor under the contract. The allocable labor elements should be given the same profit considerations that they would receive if they were treated as direct labor. The other elements of these overhead pools should be evaluated to determine whether they are routine expenses, such as utilities and maintenance, and hence given lesser profit consideration, or whether they are significant contributing elements. The composite of the individual determinations in relation to the elements of the overhead pools will be the profit consideration given the pools as a whole. The procedure for assigning relative values to these overhead expenses differs from the method used in assigning values of the direct labor. The upper and lower limits assignable to the direct labor are absolute. In the case of overhead expenses, individual expenses may be assigned values outside the range as long as the composite ratio is within the range.

(ii) It is not necessary that the contractor's accounting system break down overhead expenses within the classifications of research overhead, other overhead pools, and general administrative expenses, unless dictated otherwise by Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). The contractor whose accounting system reflects only one overhead rate on all direct labor need not change its system (if CAS exempt) to correspond with the above classifications. The contracting officer, in an evaluation of such a contractor's overhead rate, could break out the applicable sections of the composite rate which could be classified as research overhead, other overhead pools, and general and administrative expenses, and follow the appropriate evaluation technique.

(iii) Management problems surface in various degrees and the management expertise exercised to solve them should be considered as an element of profit. For example, a contract for a new program for research or an item which is on the cutting edge of the state of the art will cause more problems and require more managerial time and abilities of a higher order than a follow-on contract. If new con

tracts create more problems and require a higher profit weight, followons should be adjusted downward because many of the problems should have been solved. In any event, an evaluation should be made of the underlying managerial effort involved on a case-by-case basis.

(iv) It may not be necessary for the contracting officer to make a separate profit evaluation of overhead expenses in connection with each acquisition action for substantially the same project with the same contractor. Where an analysis of the profit weight to be assigned to the overhead pool has been made, that weight assigned may be used for future acquisitions with the same contractor until there is a change in the cost composition of the overhead pool or the contract circumstances, or the factors discussed in (iii) above are involved.

(b) Other costs. Analysis of this factor should include all other direct costs associated with contractor performance (e.g., travel and relocation, direct support, and consultants). Analysis of these items of cost should include:

(1) The significance of the cost of contract performance;

(2) Nature of the cost; and (3) How much they contribute to contract performance. Normally, travel costs require minimal administrative effort by the contractor and, therefore, usually receive a weight no greater than 1 percent. Also, the contractor may designate individuals as "consultants" but in reality these individuals may be obtained by the contractor to supplement its workforce in the performance of routine duties required by contract. These costs would normally receive a minimum weight. However, there will be instances when the contractor may be required to locate and obtain the services of consultants having expertise in such fields as medicine or human services. In these instances, the contractor will be required to expend greater managerial and technical effort to obtain such services and, consequently, such costs should receive a much greater weight.

315.905-73 Other factors.

(a) Contract cost risk. The contract type employed basically determines the degree of cost risk assumed by the contractor. For example, where a portion of the risk has been shifted to the Government through cost-reimbursement provisions, unusual contingency provisions, or other risk-reducing measures, the amount of profit should be less than where the contractor assumes all the risk. In developing the prenegotiation profit objective, the contracting officer will need to consider the type of contract anticipated to be negotiated and the contractor risk associated therewith when selecting the position in the weight range for profit that is appropriate for the risk to be borne by the contractor. This factor should be one of the most important in arriving at prenegotiation profit objectives.

(1) Evaluation of this risk requires a determination of:

(i) The degree of cost responsibility the contractor assumes;

(ii) The reliability of the cost estimates in relation to the task assumed; and

(iii) The complexity of the task assumed by the contractor. This factor is specifically limited to the risk of contract costs. Thus, such risks on the part of the contractor as reputation, losing a commercial market, risk of losing potential profits in other fields, or any risk which falls on the contracting office such as the risk of not acquiring a satisfactory report, are not within the scope of this factor.

(2) The first and basic determination of the degree of cost responsibility assumed by the contractor is related to the sharing of total risk of contract cost by the Government and the contractor through the selection of contract type. The extremes are a costplus-a-fixed-fee contract requiring the contractor to use its best efforts to perform a task and a firm fixed-price contract for a service or a complex item. A cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract would reflect a minimum assumption of cost responsibility, whereas a firm fixed-price contract would reflect a complete assumption of cost responsibility. Where proper contract selection has been made, the regard for risk by

contract type would usually fall into the following percentage ranges:

Percent

Cost-reimbursement type contracts-0-3
Fixed-price type contracts-2-7

(3) The second determination is that of the reliability of the cost estimates. Sound price negotiation requires welldefined contract objectives and reliable cost estimates. Prior experience assists the contractor in preparing reliable cost estimates on new acquisitions for similar related efforts. An excessive cost estimate reduces the possibility that the cost of performance will exceed the contract price, thereby reducing the contractor's assumption of contract cost risk.

(4) The third determination is that of the difficulty of the contractor's task. The contractor's task can be difficult or easy, regardless of the type of contract.

(5) Contractors are likely to assume greater cost risk only if contracting officers objectively analyze the risk incident to proposed contracts and are willing to compensate contractors for it. Generally, a cost-plus-fixed fee contract will not justify a reward for risk in excess of 0.5 percent, nor will a firm fixed-price contract justify a reward of less than the minimum in the structured approach. Where proper contract-type selection has been made, the reward for risk, by contract type, will usually fall into the following percentage ranges:

(i) Type of contract and percentage ranges for profit objectives developed by using the structured approach for research and development and manufacturing contracts:

Percent

Cost-plus-fixed fee-0 to 0.5
Cost-plus-incentive fee:

With cost incentive only-1 to 2
With multiple incentives-1.5 to 3
Fixed-price-incentive:

With cost incentive only-2 to 4
With multiple incentives-3 to 5
Prospective price redetermination-3 to 5
Firm fixed-price-5 to 7

(ii) Type of contract and percentage ranges for profit objectives developed by using the structured approach for service contracts:

Percent

Cost-plus-fixed fee-0 to 0.5
Cost-plus-incentive fee-1 to 2
Fixed-price incentive-2 to 3
Firm fixed-price-3 to 4

(6) These ranges may not be appropriate for all acquisitions. For instance, a fixed-price-incentive contract that is closely priced with a low ceiling price and high incentive share may be tantamount to a firm fixed-price contract. In this situation, the contracting officer may determine that a basis exists for high confidence in the reasonableness of the estimate and that little opportunity exists for cost reduction without extraordinary efforts. On the other hand, a contract with a high ceiling and low incentive formula can be considered to contain cost-plus-incentive-fee contract features. In this situation, the contracting officer may determine that the Government is retaining much of the contract cost responsibility and that the risk assumed by the contractor is minimal. Similarly, if a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract includes an unlimited downward (negative) fee adjustment on cost control, it could be comparable to a fixed-priceincentive contract. In such a pricing environment, the contracting officer may determine that the Government has transferred a greater amount of cost responsibility to the contractor than is typical under a normal costplus-incentive-fee contract.

(7) The contractor's subcontracting program may have a significant impact on the contractor's acceptance of risk under a contract form. It could cause risk to increase or decrease in terms of both cost and performance. This consideration should be a part of the contracting officer's overall evaluation in selecting a factor to apply for cost risk. It may be determined, for instance, that the prime contractor has effectively transferred real cost risk to a subcontractor and the contract cost risk evaluation may, as a result, be below the range which would otherwise apply for the contract type being proposed. The contract cost risk evaluation should not be lowered, however, merely on the basis that a substantial portion of the contract costs represents subcontracts without

any substantial transfer of contractor's risk.

(8) In making a contract cost risk evaluation in an acquisition action that involves definitization of a letter contract, unpriced change orders, and unpriced orders under BOA's, consideration should be given to the effect on total contract cost risk as a result of having partial performance before definitization. Under some circumstances it may be reasoned that the total amount of cost risk has been effectively reduced. Under other circumstances it may be apparent that the contractor's cost risk remained substantially unchanged. To be equitable, the determination of profit weight for application to the total of all recognized costs, both those incurred and those yet to be expended, must be made with consideration to all attendant circumstances-not just the portion of costs incurred or percentage of work completed prior to definitization.

(9) Time and material and labor hour contracts will be considered to be cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts for the purpose of establishing profit weights unless otherwise exempt under 315.905-70(b) in the evaluation of the contractor's assumption of contract cost risk.

(b) Investment. HHS encourages its contractors to perform their contracts with the minimum of financial, facilities, or other assistance from the Government. As such, it is the purpose of this factor to encourage the contractor to acquire and use its own resources to the maximum extent possible. The evaluation of this factor should include an analysis of the following:

(1) Facilities (Including equipment). To evaluate how this factor contributes to the profit objective requires knowledge of the level of facilities utilization needed for contract performance, the source and financing of the required facilities, and the overall cost effectiveness of the facilities offered. Contractors who furnish their own facilities which significantly contribute to lower total contract costs should be provided with additional profit. On the other hand, contractors who rely on the Government to provide or finance needed facilities should receive a corresponding reduction in profit.