(f) Certain classes of employees who are not within the definitions of drivers, driver's helpers, loaders, and mechanics are mentioned in §§ 782.3782.6, inclusive. Others who do not come within these definitions include the following, whose duties are considered to affect safety of operation, if at all, only indirectly; stenographers (including those who write letters relating to safety or prepare accident reports); clerks of all classes (including rate clerks, billing clerks, clerks engaged in preparing schedules, and filing clerks in charge of filing accident reports, hours-of-service records, inspection reports, and similar documents); foremen, warehousemen, superintendents, salesmen, and employees acting in an executive capacity. (Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125; Ex parte No. MC-28, 13 M.C.C. 481. But see §§ 782.5(b) and 782.6(b) as to certain foremen and superintendents.) Such employees are not within the section 13(b)(1) exemption. (Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (rate clerk who performed incidental duties as cashier and dispatcher); Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Porter v. Poindexter, 158 F. (2d) 759 (C.A. 10) (checker of freight and bill collector); Potashnik, Local Truck System v. Archer (Ark. Sup. Ct.), 179 S.W. (2d) 696 (night manager who did clerical work on waybills, filed day's accumulation of bills and records, billed out local accumulation of shipments, checked mileage on trucks and made written reports, acted as night dispatcher, answered telephone calls, etc.).)

interstate or foreign commerce. (As to what is considered transportation in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act, see § 782.7). This definition does not require that the individual be engaged in such work at all times; it is recognized that even full-duty drivers devote some of their working time to activities other than such driving. "Drivers," as thus officially defined, include, for example, such partial-duty drivers as the following, who drive in interstate or foreign commerce as part of a job in which they are required also to engage in other types of driving or nondriving work: Individuals whose driving duties are concerned with transportation some of which is in intrastate commerce and some of which is in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act; individuals who ride on motor vehicles engaged in transportation in interstate or foreign commerce and act as assistant or relief drivers of the vehicles in addition to helping with loading, unloading, and similar work; drivers of chartered buses or of farm trucks who have many duties unrelated to driving or safety of operation of their vehicles in interstate transportation on the highways; and so-called "driver-salesmen” who devote much of their time to selling goods rather than to activities affecting such safety of operation. (Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 300 U.S. 649; Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422; Richardson v. James Gibbons Co., 132 F. (2d) 627 (C.A. 4), affirmed 319 U.S. 44; Gavril v. Kraft Cheese Co., 42 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ill.); Walling v. Craig, 53 F. Supp. 479 (D. Minn.); Vannoy v. Swift & Co. (Mo. S. Ct.), 201 S.W. (2d) 350; Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M.C.C. 665; Ex parte No. MC-3, 23 M.C.C. 1; Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125; Ex parte No. MC-4, 1 M.C.C. 1. Cf. Colbeck v. Dairyland Creamery Co. (S.D. Supp. Ct.), 17 N.W. (2d) 262, in which the court held that the exemption did not apply to a refrigeration mechanic by reason solely of the fact that he crossed State lines in a truck in which he transported himself to and from the various places at which he serviced equipment belonging to his employer.)

(b) The work of an employee who is a full-duty or partial-duty "driver," as the term "driver" is above defined, directly affects "safety of operation" within the meaning of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act whenever he drives a motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of that act. (Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, citing Richardson v. James Gibbons Co., 132 F. (2d) 627 (C.A. 4), affirmed 319 U.S. 44; Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422; Ex parte No. MC-28, 13 M.C.C. 481, 482, 488; Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 139 (Conclusion of Law No. 2). See also Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M.C.C. 665; Ex parte No. MC-3, 23 M.C.C. 1; Ex parte No. MC-4, 1 M.C.C. 1.) The Secretary has power to establish, and has established, qualifications and maximum hours of service for such drivers employed by common and contract carriers or passengers or property and by private carriers of property pursuant to section 204, of the Motor Carrier Act. (See Ex parte No. MC-4, 1 M.C.C. 1; Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M.C.C. 665; Ex parte No. MC3, 23 M.C.C. 1; Ex parte No. MC-28, 13 M.C.C. 481; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44; Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422; Safety Regulations (Carriers by Motor Vehicle), 49 CFR parts 390, 391, 395) In accordance with principles previously stated (see § 782.2), such drivers to whom this regulatory power extends are, accordingly, employees exempted from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act by section 13(b)(1). (Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Morris V. McComb, 332 U.S. 422; Rogers Cartage Co. v. Reynolds, 166 F. (2d) 317 (C.A. 6). This does not mean that an employee of a carrier who drives a motor vehicle is exempted as a "driver" by virtue of that fact alone. He is not exempt if his job never involves transportation in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act (see §§ 782.2 (d) and (e), 782.7, and 782.8, or if he is employed by a private carrier and the only such transportation called for by his job is not transportation of proper

ty. (See § 782.2. See also Ex parte No. MC-28, 13 M.C.C. 481, Cf. Colbeck v. Dairyland Creamery Co. (S. Ct. S.D.), 17 N.W. (2d) 262 (driver of truck used only to transport himself to jobsites, as an incident of his work in servicing his employer's refrigeration equipment, held non exempt).) It has been held that so-called "hostlers" who "spot" trucks and trailers at a terminal dock for loading and unloading are not exempt as drivers merely because as an incident of such duties they drive the trucks and tractors in and about the premises of the trucking terminal. (Keegan v. Ruppert (S.D. N.Y.), 7 Labor Cases, par. 61,726 6 Wage Hour Rept. 676, cf. Walling v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 846)

§ 782.4 Drivers' helpers.

(a) A Driver's "helper," as defined for Motor Carrier Act jurisdiction (Ex Parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 135, 136, 138, 139), is an employee other than a driver, who is required to ride on a motor vehicle when it is being operated in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. (The term does not include employees who ride on the vehicle and act as assistants or relief drivers. Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC3, supra. See § 782.3.) This definition has classified all such employees, including armed guards on armored trucks and conductorettes on buses, as "helpers" with respect to whom he has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service because of their engagement in some or all of the following activities which, in his opinion, directly affect the safety of operation of such motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce (Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 135-136): Assist in loading the vehicles (they may also assist in unloading (Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, supra), an activity which has been held not to affect "safety of operation," see § 782.5(c); as to what it meant by "loading" which directly affects "safety of operation," see § 782.5(a)); dismount when the vehicle approaches a railroad crossing and flag the driver across the tracks, and perform a similar duty when the vehicle is being

turned around on a busy highway or when it is entering or emerging from a driveway; in case of a breakdown: (1) Place the flags, flares, and fuses as required by the safety regulations. (2) go for assistance while the driver protects the vehicle on the highway, or vice versa, or (3) assist the driver in changing tires or making minor repairs; and assist in putting on or removing chains.

(b) An employee may be a "helper" under the official definition even though such safety-affecting activities constitute but a minor part of his job. Thus, although the primary duty of armed guards on armored trucks is to protect the valuables in the case of attempted robberies, they are classified as "helpers" where they ride on such trucks being operated in interstate or foreign commerce, because, in the case of an accident or other emergency and in other respects, they act in a capacity somewhat similar to that of the helpers described in the text. Similarly, conductorettes on buses whose primary duties are to see to the comfort of the passengers are classified as "helpers" whose such buses are being operated in interstate or foreign commerce, because in instances when accidents occur, they help the driver in obtaining aid and protect the vehicle from oncoming traffic.

en

(c) In accordance with principles previously stated (see § 782.2), the section 13(b)(1) exemption applies to employees who are, under the Secretary of Transporation's definitions, gaged in such activities as full- or partial-duty "helpers" on motor vehicles being operated in transporation in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. (Ispass v. Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 152 F. (2d) 619 (C.A. 2); Walling v. McGinley Co. (E.D. Tenn.), 12 Labor Cases, par. 63,731, 6 W.H. Cases 916. See also Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Dallum v. Farmers, Coop Trucking Assn. 46 F. Supp. 785 (D. Minn.).) The exemption has been held inapplicable to so-called helpers who ride on motor vehicles but do not engage in any of the activities of "helpers" which have been found to affect directly the

safety of operation of such vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. (Walling v. Gordon's Transports (W.D. Tenn.) 10 Labor Cases par. 62,934, 6 W.H. Cases 831, affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied, 332 U.S. 774 (helpers on city "pickup and delivery trucks" where it was not shown that the loading in any manner affected safety of operation and the helper's activities were “in no manner similar” to those of a driver's helper in overthe-road operation).) It should be noted also that an employee, to be exempted as a driver's "helper" under the Secretary's definitions, must be "required" as part of his job to ride on a motor vehicle when it is being operated in interstate or foreign commerce; an employee of a motor carrier is not exempted as a "helper" when he rides on such a vehicle, not as a matter of fixed duty, but merely as a convenient means of getting himself to, from, or between places where he performs his assigned work. (See Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, modifying, on other grounds, 152 F. (2d) 619 (C.A. 2).)

§ 782.5 Loaders.

(a) A "loader," as defined for Motor Carrier Act jurisdiction (Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 133, 134, 139), is an employee of a carrier subject to section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act (other than a driver or driver's helper as defined in §§ 782.3 and 782.4) whose duties include, among other things, the proper loading of his employer's motor vehicles so that they may be safely operated on the highways of the country. A "loader" may be called by another name, such as "dockman," "stacker," or "helper," and his duties will usually also include unloading and the transfer of freight between the vehicles and the warehouse, but he engages, as a "loader," in work directly affecting "safety of operation" so long as he has responsibility when such motor vehicles are being loaded, for exercising judgment and discretion in planning and building a balanced load or in placing, distributing, or securing the pieces of freight in such a manner that the safe operation of the vehicles

on the highways in interstate or foreign commerce will not be jeopardized. (Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 300 U.S. 649; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Walling v. Gordon's Transport (W.D. Tenn.), 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Walling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 855; Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 133, 134)

(b) The section 13(b)(1) exemption applies, in accordance with principles previously stated (see § 782.2), to an employee whose job involves activities consisting wholly or in part of doing, or immediately directing, a class of work defined: (1) As that of a loader, and (2) as directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act, since such an employee is an employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transporation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service. (Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Walling v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 846; Walling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 855; Walling v. Gordon's Transports (W.D. Tenn.); 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6) certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Tinerella v. Des Moines Transp. Co., 41 F. Supp. 798.) Where a checker, foreman, or other supervisor plans and immediately directs the proper loading of a motor vehicle as described above, he may come within the exemption as a partial-duty loader. (Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Walling v. Gordon's Transports (W.D. Tenn.), 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934; affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Walling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 885; Walling v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 846; Crean v. Moran Transporation Lines, 57 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. N.Y.). See also 9 Labor Cases, par. 62,416; Walling v. Commercial Motor Freight (S.D. Ind.), 11 Labor Cases, par. 63,451; Hogla v. Porter (E.D. Okla.), 11 Labor Cases, par. 63,389 6 W. H. Cases 608.)

(c) An employee is not exempt as a loader where his activities in connection with the loading of motor vehicles are confined to classes of work other than the kind of loading described above, which directly affects "safety of operation.” (Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649) The mere handling of freight at a terminal, before or after loading, or even the placing of certain articles of freight on a motor carrier truck may form so trivial, casual, or occasional a part of an employee's activities, or his activities may relate only to such articles or to such limited handling of them, that his activities will not come within the kind of “loading" which directly affects "safety of operation." Thus the following activities have been held to provide no basis for exemption: Unloading; placing freight in convenient places in the terminal, checking bills of lading; wheeling or calling freight being loaded or unloaded; loading vehicles for trips which will not involve transportation in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act; and activities relating to the preservation of the freight as distinguished from the safety of operation of the motor vehicles carrying such freight on the highways. (Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Porter v. Poindexter, 158 F. (2d) 759 (C.A. 10); McKeown v. Southern Calif. Freight Forwarders, 49 F. Supp. 543; Walling v. Gordon's Transports (W.D. Tenn.), 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Walling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 855; Walling v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 846; Crean v. Moran Transp. Lines, 50 F. Supp. 107, 54 F. Supp. 765 (cf. 57 F. Supp. 212); Gibson v. Glasgow (Tenn. Sup. Ct.) 157 S.W. (2d) 814. See also Keeling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 57 F. Supp. 617.) As is apparent from opinion in Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, red caps of bus companies engaged in loading baggage on buses are not loaders engaged in work directly affecting safety of operation of the vehicles. In the same

opinion, it is expressly recognized that there is a class of freight which, because it is light in weight, probably could not be loaded in a manner which would adversely affect "safety of operations." Support for this conclusion is found in Wirtz v. C&P Shoe Corp. 335 F. (2d) 21 (C.A. 5), wherein the court held the loading of boxes of shoes, patterned on the last in, first out principle clearly was not of a safety affecting character "in view of the light weight of the cargo involved." In the case of coal trucks which are loaded from stockpiles by the use of an electric bridge crane and a mechanical conveyor, it has been held that employees operating such a crane or conveyor in the loading process are not exempt as "loaders" under section 13(b)(1). (Barrick v. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. (N.D. Ill.), 8 Labor Cases, par. 62,242, affirmed 149 F. (2d) 960 (C.A. 7).) It seems apparent from the foregoing discussion that an employee who has no responsibility for the proper loading of a motor vehicle is not within the exemption as a "loader" merely because he furnishes physical assistance when necessary in loading heavy pieces of freight, or because he deposits pieces of freight in the vehicle for someone else to distribute and secure inplace, or even because he does the physical work of arranging pieces of freight in the vehicle where another employee tells him exactly what to do in each instance and he is given no share in the exercise of discretion as to the manner in which the loading is done. (See Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Yellow Transit Freight Lines Inc. v. Balven, 320 F. (2d) 495 (C.A. 8); Foremost Dairies v. Ivey, 204 F. (2d) 186 (C.A. 5); Ispass v. Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 78 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. N.Y.); Mitchell v. Meco Steel Supply Co., 183 F. Supp. 779 (S.D. Tex.); Garton v. Sanders Transfer & Storage Co., 124 F. Supp. 84 (M.D. Tenn.); McKeown v. Southern Calif. Freight Forwarders, 49 F. Supp. 543; Walling v. Gordon's Transports (W.D. Tenn.) 10 Labor Cases, par. 62,934, affirmed 162 F. (2d) 203 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 774; Crean v. Moran Transporation Lines, 50 F. Supp. 107 (see also further opinion in 54 F.

(a) A "mechanic," for purposes of safety regulations under the Motor Carrier Act is an employee who is employed by a carrier subject to the Secretary's jurisdiction under section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act and whose duty it is to keep motor vehicles operated in interstate or foreign commerce by his employer in a good and safe working condition. (Ex parte, Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M.C.C. 125, 132, 133. Ex parte No. MC-40 (Sub. No. 2), 88 M.C.C. 710 (repair of refrigeration equipment). See also Morris V.

McComb, 332 U.S. 422.) It has been determined that the safety of operation of such motor vehicles on the highways is directly affected by those activities of mechanics, such as keeping the lights and brakes in a good and safe working condition, which prevent the vehicles from becoming potential hazards to highway safety and thus aid in the prevention of accidents. The courts have held that mechanics perform work of this character where they actually do inspection, adjustment, repair or maintenance work on the motor vehicles themselves (including trucks, tractors and trailers, and buses) and are, when so engaged, directly responsible for creating or maintaining physical conditions essential to the safety of the vehicles on the highways through the correction or prevention of defects which have a direct causal connection with the safe operation of the unit as a whole. (Walling v. Silver Bros., 136 F. (2d) 168 (C.A. 1); McDuffie v. Hayes Freight Lines, 71 F. Supp. 755; Walling v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, 67 F. Supp. 846; Keeling v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 57 F. Supp. 617; Walling v.