Preface This paper was prepared to provide background for the deliberations of the Senate Budget Committee prior to its markup of the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1977. The report was prepared by Thomas A. Dine and Robert D. Sneed of the Senate Budget Committee staff and Robin Pirie of the Congressional Budget Office staff. EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Chairman: U.S. AND U.S.S.R. MILITARY SPENDING I. Introduction and Summary An important determinant-though not the only one-of American foreign and military policy, and therefore of the U.S. defense budget, is the Soviet Union's stance. This study is designed to examine and evaluate (1) the policy pressures which have pushed Soviet defense spending upward over the past 15 years, (2) the significance of comparing U.S. and U.S.S.R. military spending, and (3) the implications of Soviet strength for the United States in the FY 1977 through FY 1981 budgets and beyond. The study is intended to serve as a vehicle for discussion by the Senate Budget Committee of U.S. strategic and general purpose force needs during the FY 1977 debate over the defense budget. U.S.S.R. PERCEPTION OF SECURITY SITUATION Section II (pages 132-142) analyzes the Soviet Union's perception of its external and internal security situation. In the international arena, Moscow sees Peking as a "great danger," a threat about which Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev reminded the 25th Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress on February 24, 1976. Since the split between the Soviet Union and China, the U.S.S.R. has pursued a rapid buildup of its forces. One fourth or more of Soviet armed forces are deployed in Asia to counter China and the Chinese nuclear arsenal which is aimed at Moscow and other crucial targets deep inside Western Russia. The maintenance of the status quo in Eastern Europe is another primary objective of Soviet military policy; 31 Soviet Army divisions are deployed in Eastern Europe to maintain order according to Moscow's terms. ARMS COMPETITION With regard to the United States, the U.S.S.R.'s overriding objective has been to achieve strategic nuclear parity. In 1962, the United States enjoyed a five-to-one superiority in strategic missiles, a threeto-one superiority in strateric bombers, and naval superiority on and under the seas. After the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets determined never again to be caught in similar circumstances and sought genuine great power status. A rough strategic equality now exists. Both sides maintain a strong second strike capability and will likely maintain such destructive capability through vigorous research and development programs. (129) |