On his return to the United States he would enjoy all the rights of American citizenship, and during any stay in Prussia no attempt would be made to force his service in the Landwehr. The convention further provided that

"2. Every naturalized subject of either state who may return to the land of his birth cannot be prosecuted for any criminal offenses, unless they shall have been committed by him previously to his expatriation. 4. Every naturalized subject who, having no intention of returning to the country of his adoption, resides continuously during two years in his former country, is presumed to have renounced his naturalization.”

This convention might be regarded as the result of long negotiation between two nations desirous of enabling their citizens to expatriate themselves. He then came to the question what arrangement could be made to enable persons to repatriate themselves, if he might use an obsolete word. A congress of nations had been suggested, and he favored this suggestion because the matter did not seem to be so much a subject for treaty as for mutual understanding. He noticed also that "Historicus" recommended it, and he observed that the subject he had mooted was one which could with great propriety have been submitted to that quintennial or decennial congress of nations proposed by the Emperor of the French if that proposal had been carried out. But if with reference to this suggestion of a congress it was said that questions might arise such as extradition and criminal jurisdiction, which it would not be well to discuss in a congress partly composed, perhaps, of despotic powers, no such argument could justly be adduced in opposition to a proposal to come to an understanding on the matter with the United States, and for the purpose he suggested the appointment of a general commission of subjects of the two countries. A commission might be appointed, composed of some of the ablest and best men of both countries, who would carry with them the confidence of their own nation, and very likely also that of the other. The American law required almost as much alteration as ours. America was the only other great country besides England that denied the right of expatriation. On that matter there had been a curious conflict between American law and American diplomacy. The American government had found it necessary to protect the men who emigrated to their shores; yet their jurists had always stuck to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, which was part of the common law of England; and America has shared our difficulty in getting rid of these old principles of law. In his last general message to Congress, in December. 1857, President Johnson, alluding to the negotiation with Prussia, said:

"In connection with this subject, the attention of Congress is respectfully called to a singular and embarrassing conflict of laws. The executive department of this government has hitherto uniformly held, as it now holds, that naturalization in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States absolves the recipient from his native allegiance. The courts of Great Britain hold that allegiance to the British Crown is indefeasible, and is not absolved by our laws of naturalization. British judges cite courts and law authorities of the United States in support of that theory against the position held by the executive authority of the United States. This conflict perplexes the public mind conerning the rights of naturalized citizens, and impairs the national anthority abroad."

Mr. Johnson was perfectly justified in that statement, because the highest authority among the Americans, Chancellor Kent, said:

"From this historical review of the principal discussion in the federal courts on this interesting subject in American jurisprudence, the better opinion would seem to be that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without the permission of government, to be declared by law; and that, as there is no existing legislative regulation on the case, the rule of the English common law remains unaltered."

Their next best authority, Justice Story, gave the same opinion. Therefore a joint commission might do a useful work for both countries, and define what was a British subject and what an American citizen. The question of naturalization and that of the position of aliens would come before it. England and America seemed to be behind other civilized nations in their treatment of aliens. France, he believed, did not make it impossible for aliens to possess land; but England and America did. England allowed naturalization without any term of previous residence; while America required five years' residence. In the United States naturalized citizens might, after seven years' residence, become members of the House of Representatives, and after nine years' residence members of the Senate; whereas in England, notwithstanding the facilities afforded by an act of 1844, naturalized subjects could not sit in the legislature. But for the accident of the act of George III coming to his rescue, the honorable member from Banbury (Mr. Samuelson) could not now be a member of that house. He really did fet see why constituencies should not be at liberty in such cases to elect whom they tight fit. In considering the subject of expatriation and repatriation various legal dificulties would probably arise. One of those difficulties would relate to the position of radren; and it would be well to look at the French mode of meeting it. În France, inst ad of the child of every French subject abroad becoming necessarily a French subject also, the option was given to the child of choosing his country within one year after he became of age. That appeared to him a principle which had much justice to recom

mend it. Or, possibly, this rule might be adopted-namely, that every child of a British subject might at any time, after a certain term of residence, be entitled to claim the full rights of citizenship. But the rather absurd act passed in the reign of George III, although it had certainly been of great advantage in the honorable member for Banbury's case, could scarcely be maintained. If an Englishman went to France or America, lived there, died there, had a son who also lived and died there, and had a grandchild who happened to come to England, he did not see how he should then be deemed a British subject. In conclusion, if the mode of settling these questions which he advocated were fairly tried, and proved, as he hoped it would, successful, he believed such a result would lead to its adoption in regard to other matters of dispute between this country and America, so as almost to make the occurrence of war between the those two nations impossible. [Hear, hear.] The honorable gentleman concluded by asking the secretary of state for foreign affairs whether he did not think the time was opportune for attempting to arrive at a mutual understanding between her Majesty's government and the government of the United States respecting the rights of expatriation.

Lord STANLEY. I think the honorable member for Bradford has done good service in bringing this question forward. [Hear, hear.] And, reserving my opinion upon some points of detail which it is hardly necessary to discuss, and upon some matters as to which I do not feel that I am called upon to offer an opinion, I will at once say that I do not see any reason to dissent from the general tendency of the views expressed by the honorable member. He stated, and stated very truly, that as long as the United States law remains, as practically I believe it is, identical with ours, we have a very fair reply in any controversy which may arise. But that is no reason why we should not agree to amend anything in the laws of both countries which may be unsuited to the purposes of the time for which we live. From the moment when these questions first arose I have carefully guarded myself, when speaking in the name of her Majesty's government, against even the appearance of a wish to stand up for the maintenance of that doctrine of indestructible natural allegiance which seems to be so entirely unsuited to the case of emigrants, and still more to the descendants of emigrants. Putting aside the extreme theory on the subject, I believe some doubt exists whether the rule can legally be said to apply to the children of emigrants; but even as regards emigrants themselves it seems to be hardly defensible in theory, and it is certainly unworkable in practice. It is hardly defensible, because in any country where emigration is sanctioned and encouraged, and where that emigration notoriously takes place to a foreign country, the government, by the sanction which it gives, must be held to contemplate that those who emigrate, not to speak of their descendants, do in most cases intend to sever themselves from the country of their birth. If we attempted to make good the claim which theoretically exists in the case of all British subjects who have expatriated themselves, we should be obliged to apply that law to the many thousands who have scattered themselves all over the States of America, over whom, if we wished it, we could exercise no control whatever. I think a good deal of misunderstanding exists as to the bearing of this question upon the status of persons engaged in a conspiracy against the government of this country who may be brought to trial here. A great deal has been said about men being punished before a British court of justice for acts done in America. I apprehend that is a case which only arises once in a hundred times. [Hear, hear.] Then a great deal is heard about the claims of persons over whom we seek to exercise no national rights to be tried by a mixed jury. But it is perfectly clear that the right to be so tried is not a matter of international obligation; it is only a regulation of our own municipal law, [hear, hear,] which we should have a right to abolish to-morrow if we thought fit, without any foreign government having reason to complain. That consideration, therefore, we may put out of the question. The only other advantage that I can see which an alien tried for some Fenian offense here would have over a British subject would be the power of appealing to his own government for their interference and protection. I apprehend that that would not be of any practical importance in a civilized state of society, though it might have been of some advantage in a ruder state. If a person born in England were, on returning from America to this country, tried for a political offense, and if he claimed to be an American citizen, and declined to be regarded as a British subject, he would be in some respects in a worse position as regards his own case than before any alteration of the law. It was some advantage to a man, however misguided his conduct may have been, to say that he was endeavoring to redress the wrongs of his country; but if he severed himself altogether from his native country and settled in another, becoming a citizen of that other country, then his locus standi for interference in the affairs of his native country is absolutely gone. [Hear, hear.] He is then not a man endeavoring to redress the grievances of his own country, but he appears in the character of a foreign revolutionist. [Hear, hear.] I may perhaps say that I have directed the British minister at Washington to express to the government of the United States our willingness to take this whole question into consideration, [hear, hear,] and if they act in the same spirit with us we are willing to meet them half way. [Hear, hear.] But when we come to consider the details the matter is not quite so simple, for there are many legal difficulties connected with the

succession of property in this country or in other countries, and other points of an analogous nature, which would require a good deal of careful and minute examination before they could be satisfactorily dealt with. It is quite true that a treaty has been concluded between Prussia and the United States which deals with this question. I have seen, confidentially, a copy of that treaty, and it contains absolutely no provision for meeting those difficulties I have adverted to, and which I do not think we can ignore altogether in legislating. If it were a question of extradition only the matter would be simple; but when it is a question of what is to be done with those who emigrate to another country and desire to assume there the rights of citizenship, more complicated questions arise; for any alteration of the laws which affect British subjects affects all the inhabitants of the British colonies. Many of those colonies have independent legislatures, and we must consider them in making any alteration in our municipal law. I am in communication with the government of the United States on the subject, and though not willing to give any absolute pledge to the house, I think it likely before anything can be concluded that it will be desirable or necessary to have an inquiry by competent legal authorities. I do not think that in a matter of this kind we ought to act with too much haste. As long as there is an understanding as to the general principles on which we desire to act, questions of detail may be left for further consideration; and as to the mode of effecting the desired object, I trust the house will leave that point for the consideration of the government. [Hear, hear.] Sir R. Palmer did not rise to disturb the general concord of opinion which appeared to prevail in this debate. He quite agreed with what had fallen from the noble lord that we should review the law of the country, to see what reasonable and wise arrangement could be made, not to prevent misunderstanding, but to facilitate that interchange between country and country which was so much wanted in present times. But there was one question of principle to be decided, as to which it was desirable that the misunderstanding which did prevail should be to some extent dissipated. The principle always applied in construing general words in legislation of a particular nature, was that they were to be understood as applying solely to those persons and things which were properly and de jure the objects of that legislation. Thus, Great Britain was not supposed by these acts to be imposing burdens upon the subjects of China or of other Countries. This country might confer privileges upon the subjects of those countries, but she could not impose burdens upon them without their consent. He should have thought it impossible to read the two acts of the 4th of George II and the 13th of George III together without seeing that the legislature as good as declared that all they intended by those acts was to confer benefits, and not to impose burdens upon the foreignborn children and grandchildren of natural-born British subjects. Had the extravagant and absurd construction which some persons sought to put upon the words of the first act been correct, and all foreign-born children of British-born subjects been subject to the same burdens and privileges as natural-born subjects, it would have been unnecessary to pass the second act, as it would naturally have followed from the provisions of the first act that the foreign-born grandchildren of the British-born subjects would have been equally subject to those burdens and privileges with their foreign-born fathers. The language of the second act, however, showed clearly that such a construction of the first act was wrong, as it was merely passed to continue those privileges to the foreign-born grandchildren which were extended by the first act to the foreign-born children of British-born subjects, there being no intention to fasten upon such persons any bardens whatsoever. That was the first branch of this question, and he was glad of having had an opportunity of stating his distinct and deliberate opinion upon it. The next point to which he wished to direct the attention of the house was also one of prinple. Many persons, when speaking or writing upon this question, appear to forget that as long as a British subject, whether natural-born or not, was resident in a foreign country, he was to all intents and purposes a subject of that country and subject to its laws. Such a foreign government had a right to say to the British resident, "We have nothing to do with your former allegiance. Whatever our laws require from you, that we have a right to exact from you during your residence here." And except in cases of mere travelers the foreign government had no right to say, "We will pass a law which will extend an exceptional protection to you during your residence in a foreign country, to whose laws you shall not be subject." We had no right to say that Englishmen should be entitled to hold an exceptional position in the United States because they owed us allegiance. The United States might well reply to such a proposition, that While British subjects were in America they must be subject to the laws of that country, and that when they had taken the oath of naturalization the American government had a right to treat them upon the same footing as if they were natural-born American bjects. This construction of the law, he submitted, was quite consistent with the night of this country to impose upon such foreign residents the obligations of their alleace when they returned here. Whether we went too far in making certain acts commited abroad cognizable by the laws of this country was a question for discussion, but 4s not one which involved any fundamental principle that ought to lead to any diffialty. Speaking with due deference to the opinions of those who differed from him upon the matter, his study of the laws of foreign nations had led him to believe that

there was not such a great difference between those laws and that of England upon the question of expatriation. It was true that the laws of some foreign countries declared that the quality of citizenship should be taken away from those who did certain acts, but this he understood to mean that by doing certain acts such persons should forfeit, not the burdens, but the privileges of citizenship. For instance, should a person thus deprived of his citizenship bear arms against his original country, he would be called to account for his conduct in the event of his return, and the excuse that he had forfeited his citizenship would not protect him from the penalties attached to his offense. He did not believe that the laws of any nation affirmed that a native of a country was at liberty, at his own will and pleasure, to divest himself of the obligations of his allegiance to act as an enemy of his sovereign, and then to return home and excuse himself on the ground that he had changed his nationality. He agreed that our law went rather too far in treating British-born children of foreign parents, who might be merely passing through this country, as British-born subjects, and he thought some alteration should be made in our legislation upon that point in the case of bona fide travelers. [Hear.] It might be quite possible to introduce some alterations in our laws respecting persons who emigrate, and who intend to reside abroad permanently; but such a change should be accompanied by provisions which would render such persons subject to the burdens of their allegiance in the event of their returning to live in this country. [Hear.]

The attorney general said that the observations which had just fallen from the honorable and learned member for Richmond showed conclusively the justice of the remark made by the noble lord the secretary for foreign affairs, that this subject was not so perfectly clear as it appeared to be at first sight. The noble lord said that he viewed with no unwillingness to gratify it the desire on the part of the United States that some new arrangement should be come to with regard to persons who had naturalized themselves in that country. It was doubtless very pleasing and very easy to say that, but it was difficult to legislate in such a direction. On the one hand, we treated the subject of this country resident abroad as liable to the burdens of his original allegiance even during a temporary return to this country; while, on the other, the United States said that the British subject naturalized in that country should become a citizen of America to all intents and purposes, and should cease to hold allegiance to his native country. That was not the case here, because the statute 7th and 8th of Victoria enacted that when any person became naturalized in this country he should not be asked to abandon his native allegiance, but merely to give a temporary allegiance to this country during his residence here; and it proceeded to declare that if he was absent from this country without permission for more than six months he should lose his naturalization, while at the same time our laws declared that a natural-born subject could not cast off his allegiance by any means. It was, however, now proposed that we should pass a law by which the British-born subject naturalized in America should become to all intents and purposes an American citizen. He repeated that it was very easy to make that proposal, but before such a law could be passed it would be necessary to look carefully through the statute-book to see what consequences might flow from such legislation affecting the interests of real property in this country, and the rights of those persons and their children who went to America. Another most material question to consider was the subject of repatriation. The honorable member for Bradford had said that by a Prussian treaty it was provided that a Prussian subject who had been naturalized in America, and who then returned to Prussia or the German confederation without intending to return to America, would be deemed to have renounced his right to American citizenship. (Mr. Forster, "After residence for two years.") He did not, however, understand what were to be the rights of a man who had so returned to the country of his birth, or what was the effect of his temporary expatriation.

Mr. FORSTER. Upon his return he is treated as an American citizen until the expiration of the two years.

The attorney general understood the honorable gentleman to say that after that time he was no longer to be regarded as an American citizen or to be treated as such. But this was one of those cases in which there was a great deal of difficulty in entering into an arrangement. He could not help thinking that before any treaty or arrangement was made upon this subject, however willing we might be to enter into such an arrangement, the rights of our countrymen who went to America and were naturalized ought to be fully considered, and the effect that any proposals would have upon some of our laws-the laws of inheritance, for instance. He did not wish at the present moment to enlarge upon that subject. It should be remembered that our municipal law had been to a great extent copied in the United States, and that a child born in this country of a citizen of the United States was deemed to be a citizen of the United States. He was not going to discuss the construction which the honorable member had put upon that statute, but it was quite clear that before this matter was determined by any treaty, or any arrangement was entered into, great care should be taken to see how far the law of this country would be affected, and how far the rights of British citizens would be involved by interference with the statute law. [Hear, hear.] The subject then dropped..

No. 2144.]

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 23, 1868.

SIR: Your dispatch of the 7th of March, No. 1549, has been received, together with a copy of the debate which took place in the House of Commons on the motion of Mr. Shaw Lefevre relative to the questions between the United States and Great Britain which arose out of our recent civil war. It is pleasant to recognize the meliorated tone of parlimentary and public opinion in Great Britain on these grave subjects. We are ourselves not unmindful of the interests involved.

I have informally suggested to Mr. Thornton a course which I think would enable us to obtain an adjustment of those questions equally satisfactory and honorable to both countries. He is in telegraphic communication with her Majesty's government in the line of my suggestions. This dispatch will reach you too late to enable you to render us desired assistance. I will simply state, therefore, for your own information, the nature of the suggestions which, with the consent of the President, I have made to Mr. Thornton:

First. That we settle the naturalization question by a treaty substantially similar to the North German treaty.

Secondly. That we provide for adjusting the San Juan question by a liberal reference of it to the republic of Switzerland.

Third. The solemnization of the naturalization treaty to be followed by a sparing and prudent exercise of executive clemency in two or three cases in the spirit of the new treaty.

When all these things shall have been done, the existing irritation. will be so far relieved that I think it beyond doubt that we can provide for adjusting the Alabama and other claims in a manner practically unexceptionable in either country.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.

No. 1558.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, March 24, 1868.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the reception from the department of dispatch No. 2141 of the 7th of March.

Although it is not presumed that any action on my part on the subject matter of that dispatch was contemplated, I shall endeavor to seize an occasion to converse with Lord Stanley upon it. Possibly this may contribute to accelerate action on the other side.

I have reason to believe that the intention is entertained by the authorities here to release, without further trial, Colonel Nagle and the six other persons remaining in prison, who were connected with the expedi tion of the Jacmel.

Stephen J. Meany has likewise been discharged from the remainder of the penalty inflicted upon him by the sentence of the court which tried him, on condition of his leaving the kingdom. Under an impression that the proposal to appropriate $50,000 to defray the expenses of persons in captivity here, which was adopted by the House of Representa