PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA: IS THE MESSAGE GETTING THROUGH?

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Good morning. The Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia will come to order.

At the end of the Cold War, there was a great desire to review and reorganize the foreign policy structures of the United States in order to better address the challenges of a world where communism had been defeated. One of the casualties of this reorganization was the United States Information Agency, which, up until 1999, was focused on promoting America's interests, culture, and policies in a variety of ways to diverse global audiences.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, public diplomacy was regarded as less important. After all, the communists were gone, so why did we need to explain ourselves?

The September 11th attacks made it painfully clear who we should be explaining ourselves to and made it equally clear that public diplomacy should always have been a priority of U.S. foreign policy.

Since USIA was abolished, there have been more than 30 separate reports and articles concerning public diplomacy, from which the Department of State has claimed it drew valuable suggestions. The 9/11 Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, The Rand Corporation, the United States Institute for Peace, the Public Diplomacy Council, the Government Accountability Office, and even the State and Defense Departments, have all issued reports and calls for action regarding the urgency of effective public diplomacy. Many of these reports called for identifying what America stands for and communicating that clearly. Ten of the reports called for defining an overall strategy. Others called for reorganizing the public diplomacy function again.

What is most distressing is that 8 years after the USIA was abolished and 52 years after the September 11th attacks, GAO testified last month that "the government lacked an interagency com

munication strategy." Like so many other foreign policy endeavors with the administration, there is no plan.

Last year, the President established a new Policy Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. Among the things this new committee is doing is developing a pilot program in 18 countries where our overseas posts will be examined. We will examine the local media and environment and identify target audiences to help develop a strategy to counter extremism.

Sounds good, but USIA used to do precisely this and more. The USIA developed a comprehensive communication strategy in each country around the world. So in not having a strategy, the administration has decided to reinvent the wheel before coming up with one. This would be funny if the mission were not so important.

No discussion of public diplomacy would be complete without some mention of broadcasting. To be sure, Radio Sawa, Alhurra, Radio Farda, and VOA's Persian and Urdu language television play crucial roles in providing news and information to audiences in ways they would not otherwise see or hear it. While I do not doubt that broadcasting adds value, I, like others, have a hard time in quantifying that value.

Simply measuring audience size is great, but it does not tell us how much or whether our broadcasting influences those who receive it. I have heard, anecdotally, that Radio Sawa is very popular among its target audience in the Arab world, but I have also heard that those who listen to it turn it off when the news comes on because they know it is an American broadcast. If that is true, how does that help us?

There are questions of audience sampling that, with the right measurements, are ultimately knowable. More troubling is the actual content of some recent broadcasting on Alhurra. Press reports have detailed instances where Hassan Nasrallah was broadcast live, giving a speech inciting a crowd to violence and death against Israel and Israelis, in clear violation of the network's guidelines prohibiting terrorists from using their programs as a platform.

Similarly, Alhurra broadcast Palestinian Authority Prime Minister, Hamas Leader Ismael Haniyeh discussing the Mecca Accord and, most distressingly, carried sympathetic coverage of the Holocaust Deniers Conference in Tehran. The last incident is particularly offensive. There is absolutely no doubt that the Holocaust occurred, none, and to provide news coverage in such a way as to legitimize those who suggest that it simply did not happen is outrageous.

Why are American taxpayer dollars used to spread hate, the lies and propaganda of these nuts, when our goal was to counter them? The Broadcasting Board of Governors has provided explanations for both Nasrallah's speech and the Haniyeh coverage. The coverage of Haniyeh, one of the parties to the Mecca Accord, I understand. I do not like it, but I understand it. The explanation for the Nasrallah speech, however, just does not stand up. Was it really a miscommunication? He spoke for more than 30 minutes live on our network, inciting violence against Israel. Doesn't anybody watch the broadcasts are they are occurring to ensure that what is supposed to be broadcast actually is?

Notwithstanding the BBG's explanation, I can only conclude, based on the trend of the last few months, that Alhurra's new executives have decided that pandering is a way to greater audience share. I am sure many members agree with me that if this is the new direction of Alhurra, it is the wrong direction, and the American taxpayers certainly should not be made to pay for it if it continues.

I would now like to recognize members of the committee who might have opening statements and, first, Mr. Berman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

The subcommittee will come to order. At the end of the Cold War there was a great desire to review and re-organize the foreign policy structures of the Untied States to better address the challenges of a world where communism had been defeated. One of the casualties of this reorganization was the United States Information Agency, which up until 1999, was focused on promoting America's interests, culture and policies in a variety of ways to diverse global audiences. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, public diplomacy was regarded as less important, after all the communists were gone, so why did we need to explain ourselves? The September 11 attacks made it painfully clear who we should be explaining ourselves to and made it equally clear that public diplomacy should always have been a priority of U.S. foreign policy.

Since USIA was abolished, there have been more than 30 separate reports and articles concerning public diplomacy from which the Department of State has claimed it drew valuable suggestions. The 9/11 Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Rand Corporation, the United States Institute for Peace, the Public Diplomacy Council, the Government Accountability Office even the State and Defense Departments have all issued reports and calls for action regarding the urgency of effective public diplomacy. Many of these reports called for identifying what America stands for and communicating that clearly. 10 of the reports recommended defining an overall strategy. Others called for reorganizing the public diplomacy function, again. But what is most distressing is that 8 years after USIA was abolished and 5 and 1/2 years after the September 11 attacks, GAO testified last month that "the government lacked an interagency communications strategy." Like so many other foreign policy endeavors of this Administration, there is no plan.

Last year, the President established a new Policy Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. Among the things this new committee is doing is developing a pilot program in 18 countries where our overseas posts will examine the local media environment and identify target audiences to help develop a strategy to counter extremism. Sounds good, but USIA used to do precisely this and more. USIA developed a comprehensive communications strategy in each country around the world. So in addition to not having a strategy, the Administration has decided to re-invent the wheel before coming up with one. This would be funny, if the mission weren't so important.

No discussion of public diplomacy would be complete without some mention of broadcasting. To be sure, Radio Sawa, al-Hurra, Radio Farda and VOA's Persian and Urdu language television play crucial roles in providing news and information to audiences in ways they would not otherwise see or hear it. While I don't doubt that broadcasting adds value, I like others, have a hard time quantifying that value. Simply measuring audience size is great but it doesn't tell us much about how or whether our broadcasting influences those who receive it. I have heard, anecdotally, that Radio Sawa is very popular among its target audience in the Arab world, but I've also heard that those who listen turn it off when the news comes on because they know its an American broadcast. If that's true, how does it help us?

These are questions of audience sampling and with the right measurements are ultimately knowable. More troubling is the actual content of some recent broadcasting on al-Hurra. Press reports have detailed instances where Hasan Nasrallah was broadcast live giving a speech inciting a crowd to violence against Israel, in clear violation of the network's guidelines prohibiting_terrorists from using their programs as a platform. Similarly, al-Hurra broadcast Palestinian Authority Prime Minister and Hamas leader Ismail Haniya discussing the Mecca Accord and most

distressingly carried sympathetic coverage of the Holocaust denier's conference in Tehran.

The last incident is particularly offensive. There is absolutely no doubt that the Holocaust occurred. None. And to provide news coverage in such a way as to legitimize those who suggest that it didn't is simply outrageous. Why are American taxpayer dollars used to spread the hate, lies and propaganda of these nuts, when our goal was to counter them?

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has provided explanations for both the Nasrallah speech and the Haniya coverage. The coverage of Haniya, one of the parties to the Mecca Accord I understand, I don't like it, but I understand it. The explanation for the Nasrallah speech however just doesn't stand up. Was it really a miscommunication? He spoke for more than 30 minutes, live, on our network, inciting violence against Israel. Doesn't anybody watch the broadcasts as they're occurring to ensure that what's supposed to be broadcast, actually is? Notwithstanding the BBG's explanations, I can only conclude based on the trend of the last few months that al-Hurra's news executives have decided that pandering is the way to greater audience share. I'm sure many members agree with me that if this is the new direction of al-Hurra, it's the wrong direction and the American taxpayers certainly shouldn't be made to pay for it if it continues.

I would now like to recognize my distinguished friend from Indiana, the Ranking Member, Mr. Pence.

Mr. BERMAN. I think, when we come to the second panel, Mr. Chairman, I will, in the context of my questions, make my statements. Many of the things you have said concern me as well, and I think I will refrain from expanding until we get to the questions of the second panel.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this hearing, and certainly welcome to this very distinguished panel. This is, indeed, a very important subject. It is one that is probably at the heart of our foreign policy.

Specifically, the question, is how do we win the hearts and minds of foreign peoples so that we may foster productive relationships with them and their governments to mutual benefit?

Chairman Ackerman asked the question in the title of this hearing, is the message getting through? That is certainly the key question in our foreign policy today. My answer to that question would be, seemingly not. Terrorism attacks are up worldwide, domestic and international public opinion of the United States is down significantly and, in many parts of the world, at an all-time low.

It seems that even in countries who recently have been supportive of American foreign policy, some of our natural allies, public opinion of our efforts has shifted to the negative, particularly, for example, in areas and nations where we have had very productive relationships: Germany, for example; France; even, to a measure, in Great Britain, our most staunch ally.

So it begs the question, then, in spite of all of the myriad programs that the State Department has initiated to win over foreign peoples, why does the world, the Muslim world, in particular, continue to hate us so? That is a very frank question, but it is one that goes to the heart of our foreign policy and should be the overwhelming objective as we move forward. As one who has had an opportunity to travel the various parts of the world, especially the central thrust of our Foreign Affairs Committee, improving the image of the United States abroad has to be our number one priority.

I think the answer to the question is that our broader foreign policy and, quite honestly, this administration's hawkishness has

probably influenced our efforts. In essence, the State Department is working at cross purposes. We have people like you, our panelists, who are working very hard.

I have looked at each of your backgrounds, and you are working hard as grassroots levels in many Middle Eastern nations to create a very favorable view of the United States, and I commend you for that effort, and yet we have the upper echelons of the Departments and this administration seeking to spread this democracy by force, an arrogant foreign policy that has yielded negative results and, in many aspects, the rejection of what is known as a "go-it-alone attitude" of this administration.

I think that all of this must be examined, and we must pull the covers off if we are to deal with the fundamental issue, and that is the United States of America is better than what people out there are thinking and saying we are. We owe it to ourselves and our future generations to approach this issue of how to get our image back where it needs to be, as that great nation, like a shining light on the hill, providing the future light for our generation. It is my hope that our panel will speak candidly today about whether or not you feel that you are being hindered in your efforts by our present foreign policy design and then, quite frankly, to tell us what it is, in your opinion, that we need to be doing better.

I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Mr. Fortenberry? Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the offer. I would prefer just to proceed straight to the testimony.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. We are awaiting the arrival of our distinguished ranking member, but, in the meantime, there is no meantime. Timing is everything. Mr. Pence.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman. I would like to express my welcome to our distinguished witnesses as well. I look forward to your testimony.

We have a good story to tell of our country's efforts in the Middle East and across the world, and yet we seem to struggle in advocacy of our position. On this subject, our distinguished former chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Henry Hyde, asked several years ago, and I quote: "How is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has such trouble promoting a positive image of itself overseas?" How, indeed.

One witness before this subcommittee last week argued that "it is the policy, stupid."

Mr. Chairman, I am not one who believes we should significantly reorder our policy toward the Middle East. I am proud of America's role in the world and our values. I second Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes' advocacy of a diplomacy of deeds. We have many deeds we can highlight, but we must assuredly do a better job of making our own case.

Mr. Chairman, sometimes we do ourselves no favors. We correctly criticize Aljazeera for unfiltered terrorist propaganda, and then we allow what seems to be unfiltered terrorist propaganda in our own product. I join the chairman and all good Americans' outrage in the cases where it occurred at Alhurra. I applaud our witness, Mr. Blaya, for acknowledging these as "significant and unprofessional breaches."