Marriage of Diseased Persons.

Certificate of health required before marriage.-The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that the so-called "Wisconsin eugenics law" was valid. This law requires all male applicants for a marriage license to file a physician's certificate showing that they are free from venereal diseases "so nearly as can be determined by physical examination and by the application of recognized clinical and laboratory tests." In the opinion Chief Justice Winslow stated the following legal principles: "The power of the State to control and regulate by reasonable laws the marriage relation, and to prevent the contracting of marriage by persons afflicted with loathsome or hereditary diseases, which are liable either to be transmitted to the spouse or inherited by the offspring, or both, must on principle be regarded as undeniable. * * * When the legislature passes a constitutional law, that law establishes public policy upon the subjects covered by it, and that policy is not open to question by the courts." The court also decided that the fact that the law required a certificate from males and made no such requirement as to females did not make it unreasonably discriminatory or unconstitutional; and that it was not necessary for physicians to make the Wassermann test before issuing the required certificate. (Peterson v. Widule, p. 57.)

Venereal disease as ground for annulment of marriage.-The Wisconsin Supreme Court also held that gonorrheal infection of one party at the time of the marriage justified the court in annulling the marriage. (C. v. C., p. 69.)

Tuberculosis as ground for annulment of marriage.—The Supreme Court of New York annulled a marriage because one party concealed from the other the fact that he was suffering from tuberculosis at the time of the marriage. The court said: "There can be no doubt that tuberculosis is a disease of an infectious character, and that close association with a person afflicted with that disease, unless attended by great care, occasions danger of infection to those coming into close contact with such person. While it may be that such care is possible in the marital relation, nevertheless I do not think it should be the policy of the courts to sustain the obligations of a union which would entail the burden and danger that would follow under the circumstances." (Sobol v. Sobol, p. 70.)

· Occupational Diseases and Workmen's Compensation Laws.

The Massachusetts law.-Under the Massachusetts workmen's compensation law, employees coming within the terms of the law are entitled to compensation for any disease or injury which arises out of and in the course of the employment which causes incapacity for work and thereby impairs the ability of the employee for earning wages. (In re Johnson, p. 73.)

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has decided that the following causes of disability were included within the term "personal injury" as used in the Massachusetts law: Lead poisoning (In re Johnson, p. 73); blindness resulting from an acute attack of optic neuritis induced by poisonous gases (In re Hurle, p. 74); heavy lifting by an employee whose heart was weak (In re Fisher, p. 77); suicide resulting from insanity caused by injury (In re Sponatski, p. 78); heart disease, which was aggravated by excitement and exertions in an emergency (In re Brightman, p. 81.)

The Michigan law. The Supreme Court of Michigan decided that it was not the intention of the Michigan Legislature in passing the Michigan workmen's compensation law to provide compensation for industrial or occupational diseases, but for injuries arising from accidents alone. Injury from lead poisoning was held not to be included within the terms of the law. (Adams v. Acme Co., p. 82.)

Milk.

Right to regulate sale of.-Milk is so generally used and the effect of its impurity or unwholesomeness is so serious that the regulation of its sale is an imperative duty which has been universally recognized. This regulation in minute detail is essential, and extends from the health and keeping of the cows which produce the milk through all the processes of transportation, preservation, and delivery to the consumer. (Koy v. Chicago [Пll.], p. 96.)

Pasteurization-Recording apparatus required on pasteurizer.-An ordinance of the city of Chicago required that a recording apparatus be used on pasteurizers which would show the temperature and the time of exposure to that temperature. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the ordinance was valid. (Koy v. Chicago, p. 96.)

Tuberculin test required.—The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a regulation of the State board of health which required that all cows used by dairymen selling milk should be tuberculin tested semiannually by a competent veterinarian. The court said that the purpose of the regulation was to prevent disease among human beings, and that therefore the regulation was properly made and enforced by the State board of health rather than by the State live stock commission. (Hawkins v. Hoye, p. 100.)

Tuberculin test required.-The Supreme Court of the United States upheld an ordinance of the city of Milwaukee, Wis., relative to milk produced outside the city for sale within the city. The ordinance required that each person bringing or shipping milk into the city for sale should file with the city health department a certificate showing that the milk was drawn from tuberculin-tested cows. It also provided that if the provisions of the ordinance were not complied with the milk should be confiscated and destroyed. (Adams v. Milwaukee,

Sale in glass bottles required.-The board of health of the city of Covington, Ky., adopted a regulation requiring that milk sold in quantities less than 1 gallon must be delivered in transparent glass bottles. The Kentucky Court of Appeals decided that this regulation was valid. (Covington Board of Health v. Kollman, p. 90.)

Federal pure-food law applies to milk.-Milk which was filthy and decomposed, containing colon bacilli and streptococci in large numbers, was held by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to be adulterated within the meaning of that term as used in the Federal pure food and drugs law. (Dade v. U. S., p. 93.)

Standards for milk prescribed by State board of health.-The regulations of the Kansas State Board of Health prescribing standards for milk were upheld by the State Supreme Court. (State v. Meyer, p. 110.)

Adulteration.-The Supreme Court of New York and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rendered decisions construing the State statutes prohibiting the adulteration of milk. (People v. Martin [N. Y.], p. 108; Commonwealth v. Elm Farm Milk Co. [Mass.], p. 109.)

Foodstuffs.

Federal pure food and drugs law.-The Supreme Court of the United States decided that Congress in adopting the fifth paragraph of section 7 of the United States pure food and drugs law intended to prevent injury to the public health by the sale and transportation in interstate commerce of foodstuffs containing deleterious substances, and that it was necessary to prove, in order to secure a verdict of condemnation under this part of the statute, that the added poisonous or deleterious substances are such as may render the foodstuff injurious to health. (U. S. v. Lexington Co., p. 113. See also Dade v. U. S. [D. C.], p. 93.)

Poisonous foreign substance in foodstuff — Manufacturer liable.—The Supreme Court of Tennessee decided that a manufacturer of foodstuffs which are placed on sale in sealed packages must exercise care to see that nothing unwholesome or injurious is contained in the packages, and he is liable to the consumer for injury resulting from negligence in filling a package even when the consumer purchases the package from a dealer and not directly from the manufacturer. (Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, p. 117.)

Cold storage of food.—The New York law limiting the time during which foodstuffs can be retained in cold storage was held to be valid. (People v. Finkelstein, p. 119.)

Inspection of meat.—The courts of New Jersey and Maine rendered decisions upholding the right of a city to require that meat sold in the city should be inspected at the place where the slaughtering is

done even if this place is outside of the city. (Feld v. Passaic [N. J.], p. 124; State v. Starkey [Me]., p. 122.)

The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed a conviction under a State law for manufacturing foodstuffs from unwholesome meat.

v. State, p. 125.)

Habit-Forming Drugs.

(Gardner

Power of the legislature. In the exercise of the police power it is competent for the legislature to strictly regulate the sale and distribution of any drug of a poisonous nature the use of which tends to debauch the public in the formation of a habit which undermines the physical, mental, and moral constitution of its users. (Hyde v. State [Tenn.], p. 127.)

The Supreme Court of Tennessee decided that the antinarcotic law of that State was constitutional. The law prohibited the sale of certain poisons except on the prescription of a practicing physician and required that a physician who prescribes habit-forming drugs must be in personal attendance upon the patient for whom they are intended. (Ibid.)

Securing of evidence-Detectives.-The same court decided that the fact that a prescription was secured by a detective for the purpose of securing evidence did not constitute a valid defense. (Ibid.)

Kentucky law.—The Kentucky Court of Appeals decided that the Kentucky law of 1912 was valid. The law prohibited the sale of opium or its alkaloidal salts or their derivatives for any purpose other than for "legitimate use." (Commonwealth v. Gabhart,

p. 131.)

New Jersey law. The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that the antinarcotic law of that State was penal in its consequences and could not be enlarged in its scope by judicial construction; and it was held that the statute did not include heroin among the drugs the sale of which was regulated. (State v. Norwood, p. 133.)

Evidence to prove nature of drug.-In Georgia it was decided that a chemical analysis was not necessary to prove that a drug which was sold was cocaine, but that this might be proved by the testimony of addicts who were familiar with the drug and its effects. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed a conviction for selling cocaine on the ground that the testimony in the case was not sufficient to show the nature of the drug. (Butler v. State [Ga.], p. 134; Stadler v. People [Colo.], p. 136.)

Federal opium laws.—A person who receives smoking opium in the United States must bear in mind the statutes regulating its importation and possession, must ascertain its history, and be prepared to show if necessary that it was not unlawfully imported. (U. S. v. Yee Fing, p. 138.)

In a prosecution for unlawfully manufacturing smoking opium, it is proper to introduce evidence showing that the defendant is an opium smoker in order to show that he is under a temptation to supply himself with smoking opium. (Tam Shi Yan v. U. S., p. 140.)

THE FEDERAL ANTINARCOTIC LAW.

Meaning of section 8.-Section 8 of the Harrison antinarcotic law provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person not registered under the provisions of this act, and who has not paid the special tax provided for by this act, to have in his possession or under his control any of the aforesaid drugs; and such possession or control shall be presumptive evidence of a violation of this section and also of a violation of the provisions of section 1 of this act." (38 Stat. L., 785; P. H. R., Feb. 19, 1915, p. 573.)

Judge Neterer, of the United States Court for the Western District of Washington, said that the purpose of Congress in enacting the law was to "prohibit the importation, manufacture, or sale of the drugs described; and by this act the drug became an 'outlaw' in the country; its presence Congress has the right to trace, and has the power to punish any person in whose possession this 'outlawed' article may be found." 1 (U. S. v. Brown, p. 141.)

On the other hand, Judge Bourquin, of the United States District Court for Montana, decided that section 8 does not purport to do more than "make unlawful mere possession of the drugs by any person of the classes by section 1 required to register and pay and who have not, and to create a statutory rule of evidence." (U. S. v. Woods, p. 142.)

Judge Neterer held that an indictment which charged that the defendant had in his possession and under his control a preparation of opium and that he had not registered and paid the special tax stated facts sufficient to constitute an offense under the statute; but Judge Bourquin decided that a similar indictment was insufficient, in that it did not allege that the defendant belonged to any of the classes of persons required to register and pay the special tax.2

Physicians' prescriptions—Amount of drug prescribed.―The United States Court for the Western District of Tennessee decided that the law does not limit the amount of habit-forming drugs that a physician may prescribe. (U. S. v. Friedman, p. 144.)

The United States Supreme Court decided that the law in question is primarily a revenue measure, and practically overruled the decision of Judge Neterer. (See Public Health Reports, June 16, 1916, p. 1561, United States v. Jin Fuey Moy.)

2 Later cases discussing this question appear in the Public Health Reports, Jan. 21, 1916, pp. 141 and 143. The United States Supreme Court, on June 5, 1916, decided that such an indictment was not sufficient. (U. S. v. Jin Fuey Moy, P. H. R., June 16, 1916, p. 1561.)