(39 Sup.Ct.)

It is too clear for discussion that the case | McReynolds and Mr. Justice Van Devanter constated in the bill is a suit for royalties based cur in the result, but do not assent to the on the contract, and not at all involving the grounds on which it is based. construction of any law relating to patents. It has been often decided by this court that such a suit is not one arising under the patent laws, and since less than the requisite juris

dictional amount is claimed the District Court did not err in dismissing the bill. Wilson V. Sandford, 10 How. 99, 13 L. Ed. 344; Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U. S. 46, 8 Sup. Ct. 756, 31 L. Ed. 683; Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 613, 1 Sup. Ct. 550, 27 L. Ed. 295; Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U. S. 282, 22 Sup. Ct. 681, 46 L. Ed. 910; Briggs v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 239 U. S. 48, 36 Sup. Ct. 6, 60 L. Ed. 138. The decree of the District Court must be Affirmed.

(250 U. S. 478)

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Civil

Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial
District of the State of Texas.

Action by B. Leatherwood against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company and the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway of Texas. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and that court having denied rehearing and declined to certify to the Supreme Court of Texas, defendants, bring certiorari. Reversed.

*Messrs. George Thompson and J. H. Barwise, Jr., both of Ft. Worth, Tex., for peti

tioners.

Mr. D. T. Bomar, of Ft. Worth, Tex., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS announced the

TEXAS & P. RY. CO. et al. v. LEATHER- | judgment of the Court, and delivered the fol

WOOD.

(Submitted March 19, 1919. Decided June 9,

1919.) No. 249.

1. CARRIERS 219(8) — INTERSTATE TRANSPORATION-BILLS OF LADING.

Under the Carmack Amendment (Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa), a bill of lading on an interstate shipment of live stock issued by the initial carrier is binding on the shipper and all connecting carriers, just as the rate properly filed by the initial carrier is binding on them; so connecting carriers, though they insisted as a condition of carrying the shipment further that the shipper accept and sign a new bill of lading, may rely on a provision in the original bill of lading limiting the time for action, though the bills they issued contained no such limitation. (Per the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Day.)

2. CARRIERS

lowing opinion:

Leatherwood made, in 1913, a shipment of horses from Watrous, N. M., to Waco, Tex., over four connecting railroads. The initial carrier gave him a through bill of lading which contained a provision barring any action for damages unless suit was brought within six months after the loss occurred. When the horses reached the lines of the Texas & Pacific Railway and of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, each of these companies insisted, as a condition of carrying them further, that Leatherwood accept and sign a new bill of lading covering the shipment over its line, and he did so.

In 1915 he brought suit in a state court of Texas for injury to the horses while in transit on the lines of those two companies. The bills of lading issued by them did *not contain the provision requiring suit to be brought within six months; but the carriers set up

218(1) CARRIAGE OF LIVE as a defense the provisions to that effect conSTOCK-TIME FOR SUIT-LIMITATION.

A provision in a through bill of lading sued for the interstate shipment of live stock, barring any action for damages unless suit should be brought within six months after loss occurred, is reasonable and should be enforc

ed.

(Per the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Homes, and Mr. Justice Day.) 3. CERTIORARI 71-COSTS-PRINTING UNNECESSARY MATTER IN RECORD.

tained in the original bill of lading, contendis-ing that under the Carmack Amendment (Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 595 [Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa]) all connecting carriers were bound by its terms and that the later ones issued by themselves were of no legal effect. The trial court denied this contention, and ruled as matter of law that the carriers could not rely upon the provision in the initial bill of lading. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff and affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. On June 2, 1917, that court denied a rehearing and declined to certify to the Supreme Court of Texas the questions involved. The case comes here on

Under rule 8, § 1 (32 Sup. Ct. vi), petitioner will be required to pay the entire expenses of printing a lengthy transcript, where most of the matter which was included in it at the instance of petitioner was clearly not required for proper presentation of the question submitted. (Per the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Day.)

Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Pitney, and Mr. Justice Clarke dissent, while Mr. Justice

1 The rights of the parties are not affected by the Act of March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196, which prohibits a common carrier from providing by contract or otherwise for a shorter period than two years for the institution of suits.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

480

$479

government.

The judgment, however, does | agent or attorney to 20 per cent. of the claim, to be the decisive one.

not refer to that money or the lien upon it; it provides only that Calhoun recover of the administrator "the sum of fifteen hundred four and 50/100 dollars, with interest from July 1, 1915, and his costs herein and may have execution," etc.

If the judgment only etablishes a claim against the administrator to be satisfied, not out of the moneys received from the United States but from other assets of the estate, a situation is presented which it was said in Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 13, 21, 26 Sup. Ct. 216, 50 L. Ed. 348, would not encounter legal objection. In other words, the limitation in the act appropriating the money to 20 per cent. as the amount to be paid to an agent or attorney would have no application or be involved.

In its discussion counsel for Calhoun have gone far afield and have invoked many propositions of broad generality-have even adduced as impliedly against the power, if we understand counsel, the constitution of the Court of Claims and its jurisdiction as weight in the same direction.

We can only instance some of the points of the argument. The Act of February 26, 1853, c. 80, 10 Stat. 161, now section 823, R. S. (Comp. St. § 1375), is cited as recognizing the right of attorneys to compensation for their services in claims against the United States and it is said that contracts for such compensation have been universally sanctioned as legal. And, further, official statements are adduced to the effect that the Court of But the judgment is construed by the Claims is so constituted "that the successful parties as having more specific operation, prosecution of a claim" in it "is something construed as subjecting the money received more than a merely perfunctory performance from the government to the payment of the on the part of counsel"; it is a matter of balance of Calhoun's fee, doubtless because great business hazard and risk to counsel the estate has no other property. On that when done upon purely contingent fees. account it is attacked by the trust company And in many cases, it is further urged, no and defendant by Calhoun. The controversy other than contingent fees are possible and thus presented is discussed by counsel in two to deny them is practically to deny the right propositions: (1) The validity of the con- to counsel. Mr. Justice Miller is quoted from, tract independently of the limitation imposed in Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U. S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. by Congress upon the appropriated money; 441, 28 L. Ed. 64, in illustration of such (2) the power of Congress to impose the result and its injury. limitation as to that money. The latter we regard as the main and determining proposition; the other may be conceded, certainly so far as fixing the amount of compensation for Calhoun's services (we say Calhoun's services, as the appearance of the firm of Calhoun & Sizer was withdrawn), and even so far as the contract provided for a lien, if the distinction made by counsel be tenablethat is, a distinction between a lien on the claim and a lien "upon any draft or evidence | of payment," to quote from the first agreement, or "on any warrant which may be issued in payment," to quote from the second agreement.

So far as the contract fixed the amount of fee it is within the rule of Nutt v. Knut, supra, and, for the sake of the argument, the lien may be conceded to be valid against section 3477, R. S., to the contrary, if it be regarded as having been given, not upon the claim, but upon its evidence, as counsel contend. It may, therefore, not only escape the defect that was held fatal to the lien asserted in Nutt v. Knut, but may claim the support of McGowan v. Parish, 237 U. S. 285, 35 Sup. Ct. 543, 59 L. Ed. 955.

The right to counsel being thus recognized, and recognized antecedently to the contract now involved, it became, counsel contend, a "pre-existing valid right," and to take it away is to divest the right-to take it away is to deprive of property of value assured of protection by the Constitution of To sustain the contenthe United States. tions a number of state cases are cited. Among them is Black v. O'Hara, Adm'r, 175 Ky. 623, 194 S. W. 811, the case which the Court of Appeals regarded as authority for its ruling in the present case.

In a general sense there is force and much appeal in the contentions, but we think they carry us into considerations beyond our cognizance. Liberty in any of its exertions and its protection by the Constitution are of concern. The right to bind by contract and require performance of the contract are examples of that liberty and that protection and they might have resistless force against any interfering or impairing legislation if the contest in the case was simply one between Calhoun and the Arnold estate. But there are other elements to be considered-there is the element of the condition Congress imWe, however, need not dwell upon the posed on the subject-matter of the condistinctions (their soundness may be disput-troversy regarded as a condition of its grant. ed) nor upon the contentions based upon Relief could only be had through legislation. them, because, as we have said, we consider the other proposition, that is, the power of Congress over the appropriated money and the limitation of payment out of it to an

This was petitioned and the Senate of the United States was prompted to refer the claim to the Court of Claims. A defect of remedy remained even after the court had

#218

$219

(39 Sup.Ct.)

been thus invoked and had reported the positions were matters of reflection and, it amount and facts of the claim. Further may be, experience-imposition was to be legislation was necessary, but it could not protected against as well as just claims prohave been compelled; it was optional, not vided for, and, considering claimants and compulsory; and it would seem to require their attorneys in the circumstances, it may no argument to convince that the terms of have seemed to Congress that the limitation its enactment must be taken as expressed imposed was fully justified, that 20 per cent. and the relief it granted accepted with the of the amounts appropriated would be a condition imposed upon it. Indeed, the proper adjustment between them. We are proposition is confused by its discussion. not concerned, however, to accuse or defend. And it is certainly difficult to deal with the Whatever might have been *the moving condistinction that counsel makes between pre siderations, the power exercised must be existing and prospective transactions. The sustained. Frisbie v. United States, 157 right is absolute and universal and neces- U. S. 160, 15 Sup. Ct. 586, 39 L. Ed. 657; sarily must be to have any strength at all. Ball v. Halsell, 161 U. S. 72, 16 Sup. Ct. 554, It is only arbitrary in the sense that many 40 L. Ed. 622. of the contract between Arnold and Calhoun, have seen there was exertion of one of its powers in the present case-not, however, to interfere with or lessen the asserted obligation of the contract between Arnold and Calhoun, but to limit only the application of the money gratuitously appropriated in the payment of attorney's fees. The contention is that this cannot be done, or, to put it another way, that the appropriation, though it could not be compelled, was yet subservient to the contract of Calhoun (and, we may interject, if for 50 per cent. for any per cent. or terms) and that he was entitled to all the contract provided, denuded of the condition imposed upon the appropriation.

The first case dealt with conditions upon pension legislation; the second concerned a claim against the United States on account of Indian depredations. It is, therefore, contended that they are unlike Calhoun's contract with Arnold and that their principle is not applicable. We think otherwise. The legislation passed on was sustained as within the power of government.

We conclude, therefore, that Calhoun's claim for a balance due as fees cannot be paid out of the moneys appropriated by Congress and now in the hands of the administrator de bonis non, or recognized as having any validity as against that fund. Beyond this we need not go.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The contention has no legal basis, and it may be said it has no equitable one. Neither the justice nor the policy of what sovereignty may do or omit to do can be judged from partial views or particular instances. It is easy to conceive what difficulties beset and what circumstances had to be considered in legislating upon such claims. Definite dis- in the decision.

Mr. Justice HOLMES concurs in the result.

Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS took no part

(39 Sup.Ct.)

Harry H. Schutte, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for peti-
tioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit denied.

No. 996. SILVERTHORNE LUMBER COMPANY, Inc., et al., plaintiffs in error, v. The UNITED STATES of America. May 19, 1919. See, also, 250 U. S. 39 Sup. Ct. Motion that Frederick W. Silverthorne, one of the plaintiffs in error, be admitted to bail pending the hearing of this case, denied.

493, 63 L. Ed. —

(250 U. S. 635)

No.

the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by Act Sept. 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726.

(250 U. . 634)

No. 349. Daniel DONAHOE, plaintiff in error, v. The PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS. June 2, 1919. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. For opinion below, see 279 Ill. 411, 117 N. E. 105. See, also, 39 Sup. Ct. 492, 63 L. Ed. - Mr. Daniel Donahoe, of Chicago, Ill., in pro. per. Messrs. Edward J. Brundage and John W. Beckwith, both of Chicago, Ill., for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U. S. 168, 181, 19 Sup. Ct. 644, 43 L. Ed. 936; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 178 U. S. 239, 243, 20 Sup. Ct. 867, 44 L. Ed. 1052; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712, 720, 34 Sup. Ct. 892, 58 L. Ed. 1557; Norton v. Whiteside, 239 U. S. 144, 147, 36 Sup. Ct. 97, 60 L. Ed. 186. Petition for certiorari denied.

(250 U. S. 648)

No. 439. William P. RICHARDSON, plaintiff in error, v. LIBERTY OIL COMPANY et al. June 2, 1919. For opinion below, see 143 La. 130, 78 South. 326. Mr. E. J. Jacquet, of New Orleans, La., for plaintiff in error. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Dismissed per stipulation.

No. 565. Wilson Scott NORRIS, appellant, June 2, 1919. Original. Ex parte In the matter. The UNITED STATES. of W. Gordon MCCABE, Jr., and William F. For opinion below, see 53 Ct. Cl. 638. Messrs. Gray, Petitioners. L. T. Michener, of Washington, D. C., and June 2, 1919. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus William E. Russell, of New York City, for appellant. The Attorney General, for the United States. Motion to remand this case for further findings granted.

denied.

(250 U. S. 635)

No. — Elbert R. ROBINSON v. CHICAGO CITY RAILROAD COMPANY. June 2, 1919. Motion submitted herein denied.

(250 U. S. 648)

No. 578. WESTERN CASUALTY & GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. CAPITOL STATE BANK No. 33, Original. The COMMONWEALTH OF OKLAHOMA CITY. June 2, 1919. In OF PENNSYLVANIA, Complainant, v. The Error to the Supreme Court of the State of STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; and Oklahoma. For opinion below, see 172 Pac. No. 34, Original. The STATE OF OHIO, | 954. Mr. H. L. Stuart, of Oklahoma City, Complainant, v. The STATE OF WEST VIR- | Okl., for plaintiff in error. Dismissed per stipGINIA. June 2, 1919. Motions for prelim-ulation. inary injunctions in these cases to restrain the enforcement of the statute of the State of West Virginia in controversy severally granted, and the injunctions will issue accordingly.

(250 U. S. 634)

No. 240. John D. FAXON, plaintiff in error, v. CIVIL TOWNSHIP OF LALLIE, BENSON COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA. June 2, 1919. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota. For opinion below, see 36 N. D. 634, 163 N. W. 531. Mr. S. E. Ellsworth, of Jamestown, N. D., for plaintiff in error. Mr. C. L. Young, of Bismarck, N. D., for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of juradiction upon the authority of section 237 of

(250 U. S. 648)

No. 740. H. C. FERRIS and Alexander New, Receivers, etc., plaintiffs in error, v. B. F. SHANDY. June 2, 1919. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for plaintiffs in error.

(250 U. B. 649)

No. 761. ΟΗΙΟ VALLEY ELECTRIO RAILWAY COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. J. B. HALL, as Administrator, etc. June 2, 1919. In Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky. For opinion below, see 180 Ky. 743, 203 S. W. 541. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for the plaintiff in error.