captured property in any state or territory in insurrection, with an exception not material. Section 2 provides that the property so received or collected may be put to public use or sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof put into the Treasury of the United States. By section 3 a bond may be required of the agent or agents, who may be required to keep a book or books of accounts showing those from whom the property was received, the cost of transportation and proceeds of sale. It is further provided that the owner of the property may at any time within two 1865, removed all restrictions as well from products of territory west of the Mississippi river. To this it was replied that upon the arrival of the cotton in New Orleans the rights of the government to it became fixed and that at such time "one-fourth its value was as much the property of the government as the other three-fourths were the property of the defendants in error [the Kounses]. No proclamation of the President could transfer the property of the government to them." It was hence decided that Cutler "had authority under the law and regulations of the Treasury Department to exact the money" | years prefer a claim for the proceeds therewhich the suit was brought to recover. The defense of the statute of limitations was also sustained. of and upon proof of loyalty receive the residue of the proceeds. It will be observed that the act had a speIt is now asserted that notwithstanding cial purpose and was directed to the receipt such decision a claim has accrued to appel- and collection of property *in a particular lants by virtue of section 162 of the Judicial condition, either abandoned or captured, Code upon which they are entitled to recover. | recognizing however, that there might be a It will be observed by reference to that sec- just claim to it, but limiting the assertion of tion that the Court of Claims is given juris- the claim to two years after the suppression diction of claims of those whose property of the rebellion. was taken subsequent to June 1, 1865, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1863, "and acts amendatory thereof," where the property was sold and its net proceeds were placed in the Treasury of the United States, and they are directed to be returned upon judgment rendered for the claimant. Appellants invoke the relief of these provisions by the contention that the cotton was taken under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1863, because the act of July 2, 1864, was an amendment to it, and that therefore the provision of section 162 of the Judicial Code is completely satisfied; in other words, that the money exacted was taken under the *act of March 3, 1863 "and acts amendatory thereof." It is further contended that the conditions of section 162 being thus satisfied it is no answer to say that the seizure of the cotton was legal, it being the intention of Congress to declare that even in such case "the proceeds should be returned to the owners." And this contention counsel offers as an answer to Cutler v. Kouns, supra, and that Congress having by section 162 opened the doors of the Court of Claims "to claimants whose property was seized after June 1, 1865, they can no longer be met with the defense that because the seizure was lawful when made, there can be no recovery on account of it. To sustain such a defense would be 'to keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the hope.' The government opposes the contentions. The act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 820), is entitled "An act to provide for the collection of abandoned property and for the prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts within the United States." Its first section empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint a special agent or special agents to collect and receive all abandoned or The act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat. 375), describes itself to be “An act in addition to the several acts concerning commercial intercourse between loyal and insurrectionary states, and to provide for the collection of captured and abandoned property, and the prevention of frauds in states declared in insurrection." The act, therefore, is declared to be an "addition" to preceding legislation, not an amendment to it. Is an addition the same as an amendment? We are informed by the dictionaries that in addition the added parts remain independent and by amendment there is change and, it may be improvement. The words and the processes they respectively describe may, however, be regarded as roughly or even accurately interchangeable and in investigating the meaning of legislation we must regard that possibility and resolve a doubt in the words by the purpose of the legislation. In other words, whatever the relation of the statutes, their purpose must be looked to to determine the application to them of section 162. So looked to, we agree with the government that the purpose of the act of July 2, 1864, demonstrates the contrary of the contention of appellants, and that the act was strictly in addition to prior acts and not an amendment of the act of March 3, 1863 in the sense asserted. The latter act applied to a different situation. The cotton collected under it and to which its provisions applied might be the property of those innocent of disloyalty, but victims of the disorder and violence of the times, and the government constituted itself a trustee for them and gave them the opportunity, at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, to establish their right to the proceeds, requiring of them nothing but proof of loyalty and ownership. United States *v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 65, 19 L. Ed. $330 *331 615; United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531, 19 L. Ed. 788; United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 20 L. Ed. 519. The cotton in the present case, unlike that to which the act of March 3 applied, was The subject of a business enterprise and taken to a market opened by the United States forces upon the conditions expressed in the act of July 2, 1864—that is, that its owners should turn over to the government onefourth of the cotton, or its money equivalent, which would immediately become the property of the United States. Cutler v. Kouns, supra. The conditions in the two situations, therefore, are in broad contrast and it could not have been the intention of section 162 to confound the conditions. The section did no more than remove the bar of limitation of time to sue that was given by the act of March 3, 1863. It did not intend to transfer property that had become that of the United States. Judgment affirmed. (249 U. S. 337) UNION OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA v. 4. MINES AND MINERALS 36-OIL LANDSASSESSMENT LABOR-STATUTE. The proviso of Act Feb. 12, 1903 (Comp. St. § 4636), that anunal assessment labor for a group of contiguous claims done on one of them must tend to the development or determination of the oil-bearing character of the several claims, does not enlarge the effect of the statute, so as to permit, before discovery, a location which can be maintained by performing work on the contiguous claim. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. Oil Company of California to determine adAction by S. R. Smith against the Union verse claims to an oil claim. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Supreme Court of California (166 Cal. 217, 135 Pac. 966), and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Messrs. Lewis W. Andrews and Thomas O. Toland, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents, for the first time in this court, the question of the meaning and effect of an act of Congress approved February 12, 1903 (32 Stat. 825, c. 548 [Comp. St. (Submitted Nov. 13, 1918. Decided March 31, § 4636]), which reads as follows: 1919.) No. 8. 1. MINES AND MINERALS 29(6) — PUBLIC MINERAL LANDS-RIGHTS BEFORE DISCOV ERY. "An act defining what shall constitute and providing for assessments on oil mining claims. "Be it enacted, etc., that where oil lands are located under the provisions of title thirty-two, chapter six, Revised Statutes of the United States, as placer mining claims, the annual asOne exploring public lands for minerals unsessment labor upon such claims may be done der the permission given by Rev. St. § 2319 upon any one of a group of claims lying con(Comp. St. § 4614), but before making the dis- tiguous and owned by the same person or corcovery necessary to locate a claim under sec-poration, not exceeding five claims in all: Protion 2320 (section 4615) has a right of possession good against forcible, fraudulent, or clandestine intrusions, but which continues only during actual occupation and persistent and diligent prospecting. - RIGHTS AC vided, that said labor will tend to the development or to determine the oil bearing character of such contiguous claims." Smith, now defendant in error, being in possession of a placer mining claim known as 2. MINES AND MINERALS 29(3) — PUBLIC the "Schley claim," comprising a tract of 160 MINERAT L..NDS- - LOCATION QUIRED. One who, er discovery of mineral on a claim as requi by Rev. St. § 2320 (Comp. St. § 4615), loc s the claim in accordance with section 2324 (scion 4620), has, under section 2322 (section 4618), a possessory right, capable of transfer and independent of continuous possession, which can be forfeited only by failure to do the annual work required by section 2324. 3. MINES AND MINERALS 36—OIL LANDS "ASSESSMENT LABOR." The term "assessment labor," in Act Feb. 12, 1903 (Comp. St. § 4636), providing that such labor on oil claims may be done on one of a group of contiguous claims refers to the annual labor required of the locator of a mineral claim after discovery by Rev. St. § 2324 (Comp. St. § 4620), and not to work before discovery. acres of land in the state of California, part of the public domain of the United States, under a location notice posted and recorded by himself and seven other qualified persons who afterwards conveyed their interests to him, and being engaged in the diligent prosecution of work for the purpose of finding oil upon the claim, brought an action in a California state court to determine adverse claims, making the Union Oil Company of California defendant. Defendant asserted a superior right of possession under a mineral land location of the same ground under the name of the "Rawley claim," made by eight qualified associates in the year 1883, many years before plaintiff's location. No discovery of oil or other minerals had ever been made upon the ground For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes +342 by either of the claimants or by any other person. But at the time plaintiff and his associates located it defendant, although not then actually occupying this ground, was in actual occupation of a contiguous claim of 160 acres known as the "Sampson claim," upon which it then was drilling and afterwards continued to drill a well for the discovery of oil, the well being 1,000 feet dis tant from the boundary line of the disputed claim. Defendant claimed the right of possession of five contiguous claims, including the "Rawley-Schley" and the "Sampson," under locations regularly made in all respects save discovery. Defendant pleaded and proved these facts, and also introduced evidence warranting a finding that its boring work on the "Sampson claim" tended to de termine the oil-bearing character of the "Rawley-Schley claim." It was and is defendant's contention that by virtue of the act of 1903 one who has ac quired the possessory rights of locators before discovery in five contiguous claims taken up as oil-bearing lands may preserve and maintain an inchoate right to all of them by means of a continuous actual occupation of one, coupled with diligent prosecution in good faith of a sufficient amount of discovery work thereon, provided such work tends also to determine the oil-bearing character of the other claims. The superior court of the county, and, on appeal, the Supreme Court of the state, overruled this contention and gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff (Smith v. Union Oil Co., 166 Cal. 217, 135 Pac. 966), and the case was brought here by writ of error under section 237, Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), prior to the amendment of September 6, 1916 (39 Stat. 726, c. 448 [Comp. St. § 1214]). It will be observed that both parties are in the position of prospectors or explorers upon the public domain-locators without discovery; and, in order to appreciate correctly what effect, if any, the act of 1903 has upon their rights, it is important to have in mind what is meant by "annual assessment labor," and the part it plays in the operations of miners under the mining laws of the United States. * By section 2319, Rev. Stat. U. S. (Comp. St. § 4614), all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States are declared to be "free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become such, under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States." By section 2320 (section 4615 it is declared: "No location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located." By section 2322 (sec. 4618) locators of mining locations on the public domain"so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with state, territorial, and local regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins," etc. By section 2324 (section 4620): "The miners of each mining district may make regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States, or with the laws of the state or territory in which the district is situated, gov manner On all erning the location, Section 2325 (section 4622) and sections fol lowing permit a patent to be obtained for a mineral claim, and regulate the procedure By section 2325 the applicant for patent is re quired (among other things) to file "a cer tificate of the United States surveyor gen eral that five hundred dollars' worth of labor has been expended or improvements made up on the claim by himself or grantors," and, upon his compliance with this and other re quirements, if after publication of notice for 60 days no adverse claim is filed, or (section 2326 [section 4623]) such claim, having been filed, has proceeded to adjudication in a court of competent jurisdiction with result favorable to the applicant, upon a payment of $5 per acre and proper fees a patent is issued for the claim or such portion thereof as has been decided to be in the rightful possession of the applicant. By section 2329 (section 4628) placer claims are made subject to entry and patent under like circumstances and con *347 #346 ditions and upon similar proceedings as are provided for vein or lode claims; the purchase price of placer claims being fixed by section 2333 (section 4632) at $2.50 per acre. Under this legislation petroleum for many years was regarded as a mineral, although not specially mentioned as such, and claims to oil lands were disposed of by the Land Department under the provisions of law relating to placer claims, with a single exception afterwards overruled. Union Oil Co., 23 L D. 222, decided August 27, *1896; Union Oil Co. (on review) 25 L. D. 351, decided November 6, 1897. It was in order to obviate the effect of the former of these two decisions that Congress passed the act of February 11, 1897 (29 Stat. 526, c. 216 [Comp. St. 4635]), which declared: "That any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the United States may enter and obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils, and chiefly valuable therefor, under the provisions of the laws relating to placer mineral claims" -with a proviso saving petroleum land there tofore filed upon, claimed or improved as mineral but not yet patented. See House Rep. No. 2655, 54th Cong. 2d Sess.; 29 Cong. Rec. pt. 2, p. 1409; Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 678, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527. 901, 88 C. C. A. 83; Hanson v. Craig, 161 Fed. 861, 863, 89 C. C. A. 55; s. c., 170 Fed. 62, 65, 95 C. C. A. 338; Gemmell v. Swain, 28 Mont. 331, 335, 72 Pac. 662, 98 Am. St. Rep. 570; New England, etc., Oil Co. v. Congdon, 152 Cal. 211, 92 Pac. 180; Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 19, 23, 95 Pac. 849, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1093; Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 38, 95 Pac. 856.1 And it has come to be generally recognized that while discovery is the indispensable fact and the marking and recording of the claim dependent upon it, yet the order of time in which these acts occur is not essential to the acquisition from the United States of the exclusive right of possession of the discovered minerals or the obtaining of a patent therefor, but that discovery may follow after locatime of discovery, provided no rights of third tion and give validity to the claim as of the parties have intervened. Mining Co. v. Tunnel Co., 196 U. S. 337, 345, 348–352, 25 Sup. Ct. 266, 49 L. Ed. 501; Weed v. Snook, 144 Cal. 439, 443, 77 Pac. 1023. In the California courts the right of a locator before discovery while in possession of his claim and prosecuting exploration work is recognized as a substantial interest, extending not only as far as the pedis possessio but to the limits of the claim as located; so that if a duly qualified person peaceably and in good faith enters upon vacant lands of the United States prior to discovery but for the purpose of discovering oil or other valuable mineral deposits, there being no valid mineral location upon it, such person has the right to maintain possession as against *violent, fraudulent, and surreptitious intrusions so long as he continues to occupy the land to the exclusion of others and diligently and in good faith prosecutes the work of endeavorMiller v. ing to discover mineral thereon. Chrisman, 140 Cal. 440, 447, 73 Pac. 1083, 74 Pac. 444, 98 Am. St. Rep. 63 (case affirmed 197 U. S. 313, 25 Sup. Ct. 468, 49 L. Ed. 770; Weed v. Snook, ubi supra; Merced Oil Mining Co. v. Patterson, 153 Cal. 624, 625, 96 Pac. 90; s. c., 162 Cal. 358, 361, 122 Pac. 950; McLemore v. Express Oil Co., 158 Cal. 559, 562, 112 Pac. 59, 139 Am. St. Rep. 147. [1] Aside from the suggested effect of the act of 1903, it is clear that in order to create valid rights or initiate a title as against the United States a discovery of mineral is essential. Section 2320, Rev. Stat.; Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U. S. 85, 90, 32 Sup. Ct. 187, 56 L. Ed. 359. Nevertheless, section 2319 extends an express invitation to all qualified persons to explore the lands of the United States for valuable mineral deposits, and this and the following sections hold out to one who succeeds in making discovery the promise of a full reward. Those who, being qualified, proceed in good faith to make such explorations and enter peaceably upon vacant lands of the United States for that purpose are not treated as mere trespassers, but as licensees or tenants at will. For since, as a practical matter, exploration must precede the discovery of minerals, and some occupation of the land ordinarily is necessary for adequate and systematic exploration, legal recognition of the pedis possessio of a bona fide and qualified prospector is universally regarded as a necessity. It is held that upon the public domain a miner may hold the place in which he may be working against all others having no better right, and while he remains in possession, diligently working towards discovery, is entitled-at least for a reasonable time-to be protected against forcible, fraudulent, and clandestine intrusions upon his possession. Zollars v. Evans (C. C.) 2, 1911 (36 Stat. 1015, c. 201 [Comp. St. §§ 4637, 4637a]). 5 Fed. 172, 173; Crossman v. Pendery (C. C.) See Consolidated Mutual Oil Co. v. United States, 8 Fed. 693, 694; Johanson v. White, 160 Fed. | 245 Fed. 521, 524, 527, 529, 157 C. C. A. 623. To what extent the possessory right of an explorer before discovery is to be deduced from the invitation extended in section 2319, to what extent it is to be regarded as a local regulation of the kind recognized by that section and the following ones, and to what extent it derives force from the authority of the mining states to regulate the possession of the public lands in the interest of peace 1 Two recent acts of Congress contain recognition of the status of a bona fide occupant of oilbearing lands in the public domain prior to disAct June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847, c. 421, covery. Act March § 2 [Comp. St. § 4524], first proviso); rell v. Lockhart, 210 U. S. 142, 147, 28 Sup. [3] After this brief review of the mining and good order, are questions with which we are not now concerned. Nor need we stop to inquire whether the right is limited to the ground actually occupied in the process of exploration, or extends to the limits of the claim. These questions and others that sug-laws there is little danger of mistaking the gest themselves are not raised by the present record, which concerns itself solely with the rights asserted by the defendant under the act of 1903. Whatever the nature and extent of a possessory right before discovery, all authorities agree that such possession may be maintained only by continued actual occupancy by a qualified locator or his representatives engaged in persistent and diligent prosecution of work looking to the discovery of mineral. true intent and meaning of the act of Congress of February 12, 1903. Title 32, chapter 6, Revised Statutes, therein referred to, embraces the sections we have cited. And it is not to be doubted that the terms "assessments" and "annual assessment labor" refer to the annual labor required by section 2324, that being commonly called by miners the "annual assessment" or the "assessment work," and so described in many judicial opinions and in at least two acts of Congress, passed respectively November 3, 1893 (28 Stat. 6, c. 12), and July 2, 1898 (30 Stat. 651, c. 563). See El Paso Brick Co. v. McKnight, 233 U. S. 250, 255, 256, 258, 34 Sup. Ct. 498, 58 L. Ed. 943, L. R. A. 1915A, 1113. [2] But, by the provisions of the Revised Statutes above cited, a discovery of mineral by a qualified locator upon unappropriated public land initiates rights much more substantial as against the United States and all the world. If he locates, marks, and records And it is important to observe that in his claim in accordance with section 2324 and these acts of Congress, as in the practice of the pertinent local laws and regulations, he miners, "assessment work" had nothing to has, by the terms of section 2322, an exclu- do with locating or holding a claim before sive right of possession to the extent of his discovery. On the contrary it was the conclaim as located, with the right to extract dition subsequent prescribed by Congress to the minerals, even to exhaustion, without be performed in order to preserve the expaying any royalty to the United States as clusive right to the possession of a valid minowner, and without ever applying for a pateral land location upon which discovery had ent or seeking to obtain title to the fee; sub- been made. McLemore v. Express Oil Co., ject, however, to the performance of the an- 158 Cal. 559, 563, 112 Pac. 59, 139 Am. St. nual labor specified in section 2324, for upon Rep. 147. Hence the declaration in the act his failure to do this the claim is open to re of 1903 that where oil lands are located as location by others at any time before replacer mining claims "the annual assessment sumption of work upon it by the original lo- labor upon such claims may be done upon cator. any one of a group of claims lying contiguIf not content to rest upon the right confer-ous and owned by the same person," indired by section 2322, the qualified locator may obtain a patent for his claim by complying with the conditions prescribed by sections 2325 and 2326. cates simply the legislative purpose that the necessary assessment work if done upon one of the group should have the same effect as if properly distributed among the several claims; that is to say, the effect of preserving the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment conferred by section 2322 with respect to unpatented claims based upon a previous discovery of oil. But, even without patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the full sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the United States (Rev. Stat. § 910 [Comp. "Group assessment work" did not originate St. § 1533]), and it is capable of transfer by with the act of 1903. From an early periconveyance, inheritance, or devise (Forbes v. od the economy of operating contiguous Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 763, 767, 24 L. Ed. 313; mines or claims by a single system was recogBelk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 283, 285, 26 nized. In section 5 of the act of May 10, 1872, L. Ed. 735; Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last (17 Stat. 92, c. 152), now section 2324, Rev. Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S. 55, 78, 18 Sup. Stat., it was provided with respect to the Ct. 895, 43 L. Ed. 72; Elder v. Wood, 208 annual labor that "where such claims ..re U. S. 226, 232, 28 Sup. Ct. 263, 52 L. Ed. 464). held in common, such expenditure may be Actual and continuous occupation of a val- made upon any one claim." Questions as to id mining location based upon discovery is the precise meaning of *this naturally arose, not essential to the preservation of the pos- and it was determined that it applied only sessory right. The right is lost only by to contiguous claims, and that the work abandonment, as by nonperformance of the must be done for the common benefit or for annual labor required by section 2324. Belk the purpose of developing all the claims. v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 283, 284, 26 L. Ed. Sme.ting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 655. 28 735; Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 163 U. S. L. Ed. 875; Jackson v. Roby, 109 U. S. 4~0. 445, 450, 16 Sup. Ct. 1101, 41 L. Ed. 221; Far- | 444, 3 Sup. Ct. 301, 27 L. Ed. 990; Chambers, #351 |