all of the circumstances bearing upon the question in the light of the rule as to the burden of proof. . Appellant cites Beidler v. Branshaw, 200 Ill. 425, 65 N. E. 1086, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 262, as a case in point favorable to its contentions. This case is somewhat similar to the present case. In this case the injured man's heel was caught between the floor of the elevator and an iron lintel in the shaft. In the course of his employment during the year prior to the injury, he had worked for a considerable portion of the time loading and unloading materials near the door which opened into the elevator, and above which the lintel projected into the shaft. He had passed up and down upon the elevator repeatedly during that time. By reason of these facts it was assumed in the prevailing opinion that he was aware of the dangerous construction, and fully appreciated the consequences to himself if any part of his body should project over the north edge of the car. We cannot apply this reasoning in the present case, and say that Webb, on account of his frequent use of the elevator, knew of the slight projections which extended into the shaft, and that they were not supplied with safety devices for the protection of passengers. We cannot say that these things should have been observed, and the danger appreciated, by one following the occupation of a mail carrier and doubtless unacquainted with the construction of elevator shafts. Besides, in considering the value of Beidler v. Branshaw as an authority, it must not be overlooked that it is the rule in Illinois, in an action of this kind, that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that his intestate was not guilty of contributory negligence. Blanchard v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 126 Ill. 416, 9 Am. St. Rep. 630, 18 N. E. 799. Moreover, two of the justices dissented in that case, and declared the question presented by the evidence to be one of fact for the jury, and not of law for the court. We are in accord with this view, and for all the reasons given cannot regard the case as an authority to be followed. Quimby v. Bee Bldg. Co. 87 Neb. 193, 138 Am. St. Rep. 483, 127 N. W. 118, is cited and discussed by appellant. In this case a boy twelve years of age got his foot caught between the floor of an elevator and a floor landing that projected into the shaft, and was injured. A verdict finding the defendant guilty of negligence was affirmed on the ground that it had not properly warned and safeguarded the boy, while a passenger in its elevator, regardless of the question of whether or not there was negligence in its construction. It is argued that the language of the decision indicates that, if the boy had been a person of mature years, he would have been held guilty of contributory negligence. Be that as it may, the case does not formulate any rule favorable to appellant. It is not what is said or intimated in an opinion, but what is decided, that is of importance. We are of the opinion that the question whether the deceased exercised ordinary care was for the jury to decide, and we see no good reason to hold that the verdict is contrary to the evidence. Evidencemortality table. The appellant insists that the court erred in admitting in evidence the American Table of Mortality published in appendix B at page 2114, vol. 2, of the Revised Laws of Nevada. The table was offered to prove Webb's expectation of life. The insertion of the table in the volume containing the Revised Laws, by the compilers, is a sufficient warrant for its authenticity. The injured man's expectancy of life was material as bearing upon the amount of damages sustained, and we see no error in the admission of the table in evidence. As stated in 19 R. C. L. p. 216: "Mortality tables consist of summarized statistical information on a matter of general interest. They are, therefore, impartial and disinterested, and are so nearly in the nature of (— Nev., exact science or mathematical dem- The specific objection, however, is that the mortality table was inapplicable in this case, as the evidence showed that for several years prior to his death Webb had been afflicted with tuberculosis and arteriosclerosis. It is urged that Webb was, therefore, not an insurable risk, and that, as the American Table of Mortality is based on insurable lives of healthy persons, it could have no tendency to prove his expectancy of life, and its admission in evidence must have had some influence on the extent of the verdict. The following statement, found in 19 R. C. L. p. 217, formulates the correct rule: "While the probative effect of mortality tables may be impaired or destroyed, they are not rendered inadmissible by evidence of disease or ill health on the part of the person to whom they are applied, or that he was engaged in a hazardous employment, or that he was not an insurable risk." See also 17 C. J. 1355, 1356. In Broz v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Asso. 148 N. W. 575, L.R.A.1915D, 334, 96 Neb. 648, 7 N. C. C. A. 298, which was an action for damages for death resulting from negligence, on the question of the admissibility of mortality tables, where it was conceded that the deceased had been suffering from a mental disorder of such nature that he could never fully recover, and his chances of a partial recovery were none too good, the court said: "Proof that the person whose expectancy of life is under consideration conforms to the stand ards of health and vigor adopted in compiling mortality tables is not essential to their admissibility. Evidence of disease, or of ill health, or of hazardous employment may impair or destroy the probative effect of tables of expectancy of life, but it does not make them inadmissible." The court cites a line of cases in support of the rule announced. In Arkansas Midland R. Co. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491, 39 S. W. 550, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 105, cited on this point, the court said: "The question is whether we can still make the tables of service in making the calculation, notwithstanding it is shown that plaintiff's condition and health were below the average, and that, in fact, he was not an insurable risk. This is an element of uncertainty that must necessarily be found in the case of one of feeble health and not insurable, in all cases, whether we call to our aid the mortality tables or not. When we do so, however, when, by reason of enfeebled physical condition, the standard tables are not strictly applicable on that account, yet they are more or less efficient aids in arriving at an approximation of the truth, and that is the best that can be hoped for, after all." On the same point, the court, in Deer v. Suckow Co. 60 Ind. App. 277, 110 N. E. 700, said: "The fact that one is shown to be in poor health does not affect the admissibility of the tables, but goes merely to their force and weight." Of the same effect is Greer v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 94 Ky. 169, 42 Am. St. Rep. 345, 21 S. W. 649. In fact, the consensus of judicial opinion on the subject is that evidence of disease or ill health does not render mortality tables incompetent as evidence tending to show expectancy of life, but goes only to its weight. We are of the opinion that there was no error -injured person in the admission of suffering from the tables in evidence. It is unnecessary to discuss any of the other objections raised disease-effect. by appellant to the admission or rejection of evidence. We are satisfied that there was no error committed in these respects-at least, of a prejudicial nature. The Appellant contends that the action contemplated by the statute is one which is created for the benefit of the persons designated therein, and is not an action wherein the estate can be damaged; and that, as the only damage alleged in the complaint is damage to the estate, the demurrers and motions thereto should have been sustained. The objection is technical. The statute gives the right of action to the personal representative of the individual injured, and was therefore properly brought by the respondent as administrator of the estate of the deceased. Had the damage been alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff as administrator, instead of by the estate, the averment would not have been objectionable, and the difference does not go to the substance of the allegation. former was the form of the allegation in Peers v. Nevada Power, Light, & Water Co. (C. C.) 119 Fed. 400, a case arising in this state and prosecuted under the statute involved here. Hawley, J., who wrote the opinion, considered the objections urged against the allegation to be without merit. On this point the court said: "The objections urged against the fifteenth averment in the complaint, that plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Wells, 'hath sustained damages,' are untenable. They are purely technical, and apply only to the form, and not the substance of the averment. The death of Wells did not damage J. V. Peers individually, and there is no claim that it did. The action is not brought by him individually, but in his representative capacity as administrator of Wells's estate. Under the express provisions of the statute, the action must be brought by the representative of the deceased, and he alone is entitled to recover damages, if any, resulting from the death of Wells by the wrongful act of the defendant-not for his own individual benefit, but for the benefit of those to whom the damages recovered are to be distributed, as provided for in the second section of the act. The averment in question follows approved forms in such cases (1 Estes, Pl. § 1841), and must be construed as having precisely the same meaning as if the words 'hath sustained damages' had been left out, and in lieu thereof the words, 'brings this action to recover from defendant $40,000 damages for the death of the deceased."" A general allegation of damages is sufficient in an action of this kind. The statute under which this action was prosecuted is in derogation of the common law, at which an action for damages for the death of a person by wrongful act was not maintainable. The first statute to authorize an action of this kind was the English Act of 1841 (9 & 10 Vict. chap. 93), commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act, and, as pointed out by Hawley, J., in Peers v. Nevada Power, Light & Water Co. supra, has served as a model upon which most of the statutes of the various states of the Union have been enacted. been enacted. In the first case in England in which the point as to a proper averment of damages was raised, it was held that a special allegation of damages was unnecessary. Chapman v. Rothwell, El. Bl. & El. 168, 120 Eng. Reprint, 471, 27 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 315, 4 Jur. N. S. 1180. In respect to damages the declaration alleged: "And the plaintiff as administrator, as aforesaid, claims £200." It is interesting to note that Lord Campbell, the author of the act, was chief justice when this decision was rendered. In this country the decided weight of authority sustains the rule that a general allegation of damage is sufficient in an action of this kind. this kind. Peers v. Nevada Power, Light & Water Co. supra; Korrady v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 131 Ind. 261, 29 N. E. 1069; Haug v. Pleading (- Nev. 205 Pac. 796.) Great Northern R. Co. 8 N. D. 23, 42 L.R.A. 664, 73 Am. St. Rep. 727, 77 N. W. 97, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 467; Peters v. Southern P. Co. 160 Cal. 48-67, 116 Pac. 400; 17 C. J. 1292. The allegation in the complaint before us amounts to a general allegation of damages, and is in our opinion sufficient. The appellant was sufficiently advised damages-injury by the complaint as to what it would have to meet on the question of damages. The complaint alleged the death of respondent's intestate, occasioned by the negligence of the appellant, and that he left surviving him a widow and three children, two of which are minors, and that by reason of such negligence, resulting in the infliction of injury and death upon the intestate, his estate hath suffered damage. Appellant knew, or was presumed to know, that the measure of damages would be based upon the pecuniary loss to the kindred named in the complaint, and could not, therefore, have been misled by the allegation of damages to the estate. to estate. There is nothing in Christensen v. Floriston Pulp & Paper Co. 29 Nev. 552, 92 Pac. 210, cited and discussed by appellant, that is opposed to the views we have expressed. No question of pleading was involved in that case. The language of the court quoted by appellant dealt merely with the measure of damages. The California cases cited are not in point. The judgment is affirmed. Sanders, Ch. J., and Coleman, J., concur. Petition for rehearing denied. ANNOTATION. Contributory negligence of elevator passenger permitting part of body to project beyond car. Cases involving injuries to employees or servants of the owner of the elevator, and cases involving injuries to passengers in freight elevators, are not included in this annotation. Contributory negligence of a passenger in an elevator, in permitting part of his body to project beyond the car, is generally a question for the jury. National L. Ins. Co. v. McKenna (1915) 141 C. C. A. 163, 226 Fed. 165; Citizens' Bank v. Fairweather (1917) 127 Ark. 63, 191 S. W. 911; WilliamsEchols Dry Goods Co. v. Wallace (1920) 142 Ark. 363, 219 S. W. 732; Beidler v. Branshaw (1902) 200 Ill. 425, 65 N. E. 1086, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 262; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Woods (1900) 88 Ill. App. 375; Kentucky Hotel Co. v. Camp (1895) 97 Ky. 424, 30 S. W. 1010; SMITH V. ODD FELLOWS BLDG. Asso. (reported herewith) ante, 38. In Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co. v. Wallace (1920) 142 Ark. 363, 219 S. W. 732, the evidence was held sufficient to support a finding that the passenger was not guilty of contributory negligence, where it appeared that he was invited by a salesman of a wholesale store into the elevator, to be carried to an upper floor for the purpose of being shown the articles which he intended to purchase; that the electric lamp in the elevator was not lighted, although the day was a dark and cloudy one; that at the first floor there was a clearance of about 3 or 4 inches between the elevator floor and the wall of the shaft, but just below the door of the next floor a wooden beam extended out into the elevator shaft to such a distance that, when the elevator passed the beam in ascending, the clearance was completely taken up and the floor of the elevator came nearly into contact with the beam as it passed; that the brick wall of the elevator shaft, the beam, and the door above the beam, were painted the same color, so that in the semidarkness it was not easy to discover the beam jutting out into the elevator shaft; and that when the pas senger walked into the elevator he stepped over to the back side, turned around fronting the door through which he had entered, and took a position with his heel partly extending over the clearance space between the floor of the elevator and the brick wall at the back, and that he was not aware of the fact that his heel thus extended over the clearance, nor that the beam jutted out into the elevator shaft so as to close up the clearance space as the elevator ascended, and that as the elevator rose to the beam the passenger's heel was caught and injured. And it was held in the reported case (SMITH V. ODD FELLOWS BLDG. Asso. ante, 38) that a verdict finding a passenger to be free from contributory negligence was not contrary to the evidence, where a mail carrier permitted his foot to project slightly beyond the floor of an office-building elevator, and it was caught between the floor of the car and a doorsill which extended into the elevator shaft. But it was held in Beidler v. Branshaw (1902) 200 III. 425, 65 N. E. 1086, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 262, that an employee of a tenant of a business building, in which the landlord maintained a combination passenger and freight elevator which was without guards upon two of its sides, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, where he stood upon one of the unguarded sides so close to the edge that his heel caught, during the ascent of the elevator, between the edge thereof and an iron window lintel which projected into the elevator shaft. This case was distinguished in the reported case upon the ground that he, by reason of his employment, had become wholly aware of the dangerous condition or construction of the elevator and the shaft, and fully appreciated the consequences to himself if any part of his body should project over the edge of the car. The following cases involved injuries to children, and in such cases the age of the child-that is, whether he s of a sufficient age to understand and appreciate the danger of permitting a part of his body to project beyond the edge of the car-is an important circumstance in determining his contributory negligence. Thus, it was held in Citizens' Bank v. Fairweather (1917) 127 Ark. 63, 191 S. W. 911, that a messenger boy about fifteen years of age was not guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law, but that his negligence was a question for the jury, where he stood in the elevator of an office building with his foot projecting slightly beyond the floor of the car, and his foet was struck by a beam extending into the elevator shaft, although it was light enough for him to see, and, had he looked, he could have seen that his foot would strike the beams of the floors. The court said, in reaching the conclusion that he was not guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law, that his immature age was considered, for the situation was such that a person of mature years would have been deemed to have assumed the risk. But it was held in Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Woods (1900) 88 Ill. App. 375, in reference to a boy of the same occupation and age, that he was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law, so as to prevent a recovery for his injury, where, after a warning by a fellow passenger of the danger, he inserted his thumb through the open grille work of the elevator, and it was crushed between the elevator and the wall of the elevator shaft. A verdict for a boy of seven, injured in a hotel elevator, was upheld in Kentucky Hotel Co. v. Camp (1895) 97 Ky. 424, 30 S. W. 1010, in which the court instructed the jury that they should not find the boy guilty of contributory negligence unless they believed from the evidence that he failed to exercise that degree of care for his own safety which ordinarily careful and prudent children of his age, experience, and discretion are accustomed to observe under the same or similar circumstances, where it appeared that the boy, upon the request of the elevator boy, sat on the floor of the elevator with his back close to the door, and, upon being suddenly called by the elevator boy, turned around, and in |