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date of the instrument, says: "In Cassidy v. First Nat. Bank (1882) 30 Minn. 86, 14 N. W. 363, we held that a similar writing was in effect a negotiable promissory note, and that its character as such was not qualified by the provision therein, making it payable on the return of the certificate. As it is payable upon demand, it follows logically that the instrument is to be placed upon the same footing as ordinary demands and negotiable securities, and this proposition is, we think, decisive of the question here involved. It is true that the consideration for the promise is recited in and shown by the writing to be for money deposited, but we do not see that this is material. . . . Such demand certificates fall within the sixty-day limitation fixed by General Statutes 1878, chap. 23, § 11, as to presentment and dishonor, and there is no reason why any distinction should be made as to necessity of a previous demand, between them and other negotiable securities. It is better that the rule be understood to be uniform as to all such securities that when payable on demand, unless upon their face containing a stipulation showing a different intention (as in Brown v. Brown (1881) 28 Minn. 501, 11 N. W. 64), whether with or without interest, they are to be treated as due immediately, and that an action thereon against the maker is barred by the Statute of Limitations, unless brought within six years from the day of date thereof." The court in Curran v. Witter (1887) 68 Wis. 16, 60 Am. Rep. 827, 31 N. W. 706, after stating that a certificate of deposit is in effect a promissory note, discusses the cases holding to the opposite theory as set forth above, as follows: "The cases which hold that such a certificate is not due until presented for payment, and hence that the Statute of Limitations does not comInence to run against it until such presentation, seems to go upon the ground that the transaction is not a loan of money, creating a debt against the drawer of the certificate, but rather that it is in the nature of a bailment, upon which no cause of action accrues until demand; in other words,

it is said the transaction is in contemplation of law a deposit, and not a loan. With all due deference

to the very able courts which have adopted this view, we cannot give our approval to the doctrine thus enunciated by them. We think that, when a person deposits money in a bank in the usual course of business, he loans it to the bank, and the bank thereby becomes his debtor to the amount of the depositnot his bailee of the money. By the deposit the title to the money passes to the bank, and it is thereafter its money, subject to its absolute control and disposition. The depositor cannot reclaim the specific money. He cannot maintain replevin or trover for it (as he might, were the deposit a bailment), but only assumpsit for the amount deposited. In short, the transaction has no element of a bailment, but every essential of a loan of money." 11. Certificates in form payable a stated time after date.

a. Rule that statute runs from demand.

Some certificates of deposit contain a provision that the certificate is payable to the order of the depositor a stated time after date, on return of the certificate properly indorsed. It is the view of some courts that such a certificate is not due absolutely on the expiration of the time stated, but only on return of the certificate and demand for payment; consequently, that the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until such demand. Riddle v. First Nat. Bank (1886) 27 Fed. 503; Baxley Bkg. Co. v. Gaskins (1916) 145 Ga. 508, 89 S. E. 516; Bank of Commerce v. Harrison (1901) 11 N. M. 50, 66 Pac. 460; Gardner's Estate (1910) 228 Pa. 282, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 685, 77 Atl. 509.

The certificates involved in the foregoing cases have varied in form. The certificate involved in Baxley Bkg. Co. v. Gaskins (1916) 145 Ga. 508, 89 S. E. 516, supra, certified that the depositor had deposited in the bank a stated sum of money, "payable to the order of .. [the depositor] twelve months after date, on return of this certificate properly indorsed, with in

terest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. Interest will cease at maturity." The certificate involved in Gardner's Estate (Pa.) supra, recited the deposit by the depositor of the stated amount of money, and made it "payable to his order on return of this certificate, six months after date, with interest at 4 per cent per annum." The certificate involved in Riddle v. First Nat. Bank (Fed.) supra, acknowledged the deposit of money, and provided that it was "payable to her [depositor's] order on return of this certificate properly indorsed, twelve months after date, with interest at 5 per centum per annum." The form of he certificate involved in Bank of Commerce v. Harrison (1901) 11 N. M. 50, 66 Pac. 460, was as follows: "This certifies that has deposited in this bank dollars, which is payable on the return of this certificate properly indorsed, six months after date, with interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum."

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The theory upon which these courts proceed can best be understood from their own language. The court in Baxley Bkg. Co. v. Gaskins (Ga.) supra, thus argues: "Does the language of the certificate of deposit, properly construed, make it due twelve months after its date? If it does, the suit brought in 1914, nine years after its date, would be barred by the Statute of Limitations. It is plain that the money could not be withdrawn under twelve months from the date of the certificate. It is also clear that interest ceased after twelve months. When, then, is the certificate payable? It is not due before the return of the certificate properly indorsed,' at any time. It might be payable twelve months after date, on return of the certificate properly indorsed, or subsequently. The cercate was not returned properly indorsed, or subsequently. The cer

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until a demand for payment is actually made, on the return of the certificate properly indorsed, arises from the sentence, 'Interest will cease at maturity.' At maturity of what? The word 'maturity' is somewhat confusing, and at variance with the view above expressed. But the certificate must be construed as a whole, and not on one isolated sentence, and, so construing it, we think the better view is to hold, under the decisions above cited, that the certificate does not become due until it is returned to the bank properly indorsed, and a demand is actually made for payment."

In Bank of Commerce v. Harrison (1901) 11 N. M. 50, 66 Pac. 460, the court, in discussing the effect of the words, "six months after date, with interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum," says: "It is clear that an agreement had been reached between Harrison and the bank that he should have interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, so that the technical question is the consideration of the effect of the words 'six months after date,' written into the certificate. It is urged on the part of the appellant that in the case of a certificate due on demand it partakes of the characteristics of a promissory note, and no demand is necessary, but that the Statute of Limitations begins to run immediately after the certificate is issued. If this contention were true, interest would attach at once to the certificate as overdue paper, and words written into the certificate as to interest would have no application, except as to the rate of interest to be paid. In the case at bar the legal rate and the rate agreed upon are identical, so that we are led to the conclusion that the parties understood that the certificate would not draw interest from its date, or from the expiration of six months from its date, without demand, but, to entitle the

tificate was not returned properly holder to any interest, the condition as indorsed and a demand made for the money twelve months after date, and not until July 7, 1913. only difficulty we have in reaching the conclusion that the certificate of deposit in the present case is not due

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to interest must be written into the certificate. This being a deposit, and not a loan, it is clear the holder of the certificate could withdraw it from the bank at any time, except as limited by the conditions written into the cer

tificate, which, when legally construed, mean nothing more or less than this: If the depositor allowed the deposit to remain with the bank for a period of six months or more, he would be paid interest at the rate of 6 per cent for the period of time the deposit remained with the bank; if the deposit were withdrawn before the expiration of six months all interest would be forfeited. A time limit in the certificate of deposit is part of the agreement whereby the bank agrees to pay interest."

The court in Gardner's Estate (1910) 228 Pa. 282, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 685, 77 Atl. 509, says: “Although the certificate of deposit issued to Morricy by the banking firm of Gardner, Morrow, & Company was payable on its face to his order, upon its return six months after date, it was not due so as to give a right of action upon it, until payment was demanded. The rule as to a certificate of deposit issued by a banking house, and payable to the order of the depositor upon the return of the certificate, is that it is not due or suable until return of it and demand has been made for the money, from which time the Statute of Limitations begins to run.

b. Rule that it runs from expiration of time stated.

On the contrary, other cases hold that the statute runs from the expiration of the date specified. Thompson v. Farmers' State Bank (1913) 159 Iowa, 662, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550, 140 N. W. 877; Baker v. Leland (1896) 9 App. Div. 365, 41 N. Y. Supp. 399; Rodriguez v. First State Bank & T. Co. (1919) Tex. Civ. App. —, 213 S. W. 357. The certificates involved in these cases do not differ materially in form from those involved in the cases adhering to the opposite theory. Thompson v. Farmers' State Bank (1913) 159 Iowa,. 662, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550, 140 N. W. 877, the certificate,

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after reciting the deposit of a stated number of dollars in current funds, continued that it was "payable to the order of same in current funds on the return of this certificate properly indorsed six months after date, with interest at 6 per cent per annum." The provision as to the return of the certificate properly indorsed is held not to change the legal effect of the undertaking to pay six months from the date. In Baker v. Leland (1896) 9 App. Div. 365, 41 N. Y. Supp. 399, the certificate was designated as a certificate of deposit, and, after the usual line containing the number of dollars for which it was given, the place, and date, read as follows: "Mr. Luzern Eaton has deposited in this bank $200, payable to the order of himself, 3 mos. after date, in current funds, on return of this certificate, properly indorsed, and shall receive interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum if left months from date." The certificate involved in Rodriguez v. First State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.) supra, certified that the depositor had deposited with the bank a stated sum of money, "payable to the order of himself six months after date in current funds, on return of this certificate properly indorsed, with interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum."

The Statute of Limitations does not begin to run on a certificate of deposit due at one year from date upon return of the certificate properly indorsed until the expiration of the year, although in the meantime the bank issuing the certificate has made an assignment. Rentchler v. Kunkelman (1885) 17 Ill. App. 343.

The fact that the bank issuing the certificate had made an assignment and a receiver had been appointed was held not to mature such certificate in Riddle v. First Nat. Bank (1860) 27 Fed. 503, a case holding that the statute did not run from the expiration of the time stated. W. A. E.

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A statute entitling a married woman to recover her earnings for services rendered, which shall be her sole and separate property, does not give her a right of action against her husband for services rendered in his business without any agreement for compensation therefor. [See note on this question beginning on page 18.]

APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court for Guilford County (Webb, J.) sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing an action brought to recover an amount alleged to be due for services rendered by plaintiff to defendant. Affirmed.

Statement by Clark, Ch. J.:

This action was brought by the wife to recover of her husband the sum of $5,400 upon a quantum meruit for services rendered by her while they were living together as husband and wife. The complaint alleges:

(1) That the plaintiff and defendant intermarried July 21, 1917, in the county of Guilford.

(2) That at the time of their marriage the defendant was in the business, in Greensboro, of repairing bicycles, guns, keys, locks, etc., and was doing business on Davie street in the city of Greensboro, in a house which he rented for that purpose.

(3) That in November, 1917, after the plaintiff was married, she went into the said place of business of the defendant, and, besides her domestic duties, which she carried on, she rendered service to her husband by waiting on his customers, made keys, worked worked on bicycles, guns, and other instruments to be repaired, which were brought into the shop, and other kinds of this character of business; that she continued to work for defendant until about November 15, 1920.

(4) That under the laws of North Carolina she is advised that

she is entitled to pay for her services rendered the defendant as aforesaid, which were worth the sum of $150 per month for the period of three years from November, 1917, to November 15, 1920, amounting to $5,400. Wherefore, the plaintiff demands of the defendant the sum of $5,400 and the costs of this action, to be taxed by the clerk.

The defendant demurred as follows: That it appears upon face of said complaint that said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, for that:

(1) It appears that at the time when plaintiff alleges she worked for defendant she and the defendant were married, that she was the wife of defendant, and that they were at that time living together as husband and wife.

(2) That the complaint shows upon its face that plaintiff's alleged cause of action is upon a quantum meruit for alleged services to defendant, her husband, at a time. when plaintiff and defendant were living together as husband and wife.

The court sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the action. The

only exception is to the judgment assigned.

Mr. John A. Barringer for appel

lant.

Messrs. King, Sapp, & King, for appellee:

Where services are rendered by one person for another, which are knowingly and voluntarily accepted, without more, the law presumes that such services are given and received in expectation of being paid for, and will imply a promise to pay what they are reasonably worth; but this is a rebuttable presumption.

Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C. 578, 115 Am. St. Rep. 694, 54 S. E. 540; Prince v. McRae, 84 N. C. 675.

Where a person renders services as a member of the family of the person served, and receives support therein, a presumption of law arises that such services were gratuitous; and before the person rendering the services can recover, the express promise of the parties served must be shown, or such facts and circumstances as will authorize the jury to find that the services were in the expectation by one of receiving, and by the other of making, compensation therefor.

Dodson v. McAdams, 96 N. C. 149, 60 Am. Rep. 408, 2 S. E. 453; Avitt v. Smith, 120 N. C. 392, 27 S. E. 91; Stallings v. Ellis, 136 N. C. 69, 48 S. E. 518; Dunn v. Currie, 141 N. C. 123, 53 S. E. 533; Hicks v. Barnes, 132 N. C. 146, 43 S. E. 604; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206.

she had a legal right to make 'as if single,' and that when the wife had fering of the amputation of her borne the physical and mental suffoot, and a broken arm and other injuries, compensation therefor should go to her and not to her husband, who had suffered nothing. The discharge of household duties, unending and tiresome and without limitation of hours, the rearing of children, the loving companionship. and attentions of a wife, are full compensation for her right to support by the husband."

That case upheld the right of the wife to maintain an action "by virtue of any contract for personal services and any damages for personal injuries" against a third party. The right of the wife to recover her separate earnings, suing alone, was also sustained by Adams, J., Croom v. Goldsboro Lumber Co. 182 N. C. 219, 108 S. E. 735.

In Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206, the court held that the wife "might maintain an action against her husband for an assault or other personal injury, and in such case recover punitive as well as compensatory damages," saying: "Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out her eye, broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no

Clark, Ch. J., delivered the opin- longer exempt from liability to her

ion of the court:

This action is based on Consol. Stat. 2513, which is as follows: "The earnings of a married woman by virtue of any contract for her personal service, and any damage for personal injuries, or other torts sustaired by her, can be recovered by her suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and separate property as fully as if she had remained unmarried."

This statute was recently construed in Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield, 178 N. C. 353 100 S. E. 607, in which we said: "It was felt to be unjust and illogical that the husband should recover for labor which the wife had performed outside the household duties, and under a contract which

on the ground that he vowed at the altar to 'love, cherish, and protect' her. Civilization and justice have progressed thus far with us, and never again will 'the sun go back ten degrees on the dial of Ahaz.' Isaiah, 38:8." 180 N. C. 524.

Crowell v. Crowell was reaffirmed on rehearing, Stacy, J., 181 N. C. 66, 106 S. E. 149.

This case presents an entirely new feature. It is not the case of recovery of compensation on a contract against a third party, nor for personal injury against her husband, as well as others, but whether she can recover against her husband as upon contract for services rendered without any agreement for compensation.

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