(84 Okla. 172, 200 Pac. 544.) would be placing a too narrow and technical construction upon the provisions of the policy. The case should be dismissed only after the court determines the questions in controversy are material, and the insured then refuses to comply with the orders of the court to answer said questions. This court in the former opinion should have ordered the case reversed, with directions to require the insured to answer those questions that were material, and upon his failure to do so, then, and not until then, should the trial court dismiss the case in so far as it related to the insurance upon property covered by the mortgages; but in no event should the case have been dismissed in so far as it relates to the insurance upon the household furniture. While the general rule is that the question decided by the supreme court on the former appeal becomes the law in the case in all its stages, and will not ordinarily be reversed on second appeal where the facts are the same, this court, in the case of Oklahoma City Electric Gas & Power Co. v. Baumhoff, 21 Okla. 503, 96 Pac. 758, stated: "The courts uniformly hold that an appellate court may review and reverse its former decision in the same case where it is satisfied that gross or manifest injustice has been done by its former decision, or where the mischief to be cured far outweighs any injury that may be done in the particular case by overruling a prior decision." We think this case comes squarely within the above rule, and it was error for this court to order the case dismissed. We therefore conclude: First, as to the former opinion, the court should have construed the contract as a divisible contract; second, that after determining certain questions were material as to certain property covered by the policy, and the defendant should answer said versed the case, with instructions to questions, the court should have requestions. Under the view we take permit the defendant to answer said of the case the same was not prematurely brought, and it was error for this court to so hold. The opinion rendered July 5, 1921, entitled George v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., is adhered to, with the exception that the third syllabus should be withdrawn and not considered, as the facts stated in the third syllabus are immaterial now, in view of the conclusion we have reached that the cause of action was not prematurely brought. For the reasons stated, the second petition for rehearing is denied. Pitchford, Vice Ch. J., and Elting, Nicholson, and Kennamer, JJ., con cur. ANNOTATION. Applicability to limitation prescribed by policy of insurance or by special statutory provision in relation to insurance of provisions of Statute of Limitations extending time or fixing time when action deemed commenced. Unless the provision relied on to avoid the defense of the expiration of the limitation period is specifically or by inevitable inference shown to be a part of a general statute of limitations, the case has not been included. This results in the exclusion of some cases which might seem to belong within the annotation, e. g., those cases wherein it has been attempted by analogy to apply to the limitation period in a policy some exception to the running of the general Statute of Limitations, which has become a recognized principle of law, although not by virtue of a provision in the Statute of Limitations. II. Limitation prescribed by contract. a. General rule. In all but a few jurisdictions the rule is that the provisions of a general statute of limitations extending the time of the running thereof, or fixing the time when an action shall be deemed to be commenced, do not apply to a limitation period prescribed in a policy of insurance. United States. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (1869) 7 Wall. 386, 19 L. ed. 257 (prior action); Harrison v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (1894) 67 Fed. 298 (prior action). Arizona. Gill v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co. (1907) 11 Ariz. 232, 95 Pac. 89 (infancy). Connecticut. Chichester v. New Hampshire F. Ins. Co. (1902) 74 Conn. 510, 51 Atl. 545 (prior action). Georgia. Melson v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1895) 97 Ga. 722, 25 S. E. 189 (prior action); Williams v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (1896) 98 Ga. 532, 25 S. E. 31 (prior action); McDaniel v. German American Ins. Co. (1910) 134 Ga. 189, 67 S. E. 668 (prior action); Maxwell Bros. v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. (1913) 12 Ga. App. 127, 76 S. E. 1036 (insanity). tion); Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Capital Ins. Co. (1900) 111 Iowa, 590, 82 Am. St. Rep. 529, 82 N. W. 1023 (attempt to commence action). Kentucky. Smith v. Herd (1901) 110 Ky. 56, 60 S. W. 841, 1121 (prior action). Louisiana. See also Tracy v. Queen City F. Ins. Co. (1913) 132 La. 610, 61 So. 687, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1145 (prior action). Nebraska. Home F. Ins. Co. v. Murray (1894) 40 Neb. 597, 59 N. W. 102 (what constitutes commencement of action). New York.-Compare Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co. (1898) 156 N. Y. 327, 42 L.R.A. 485, 50 N. E. 863 (what constitutes commencement of action), and statements in Hay v. Star F. Ins. Co. (1879) 77 N. Y. 235, 33 Am. Rep. 607, affirming (1878) 13 Hun, 496. North Carolina.-Holly v. London Assur. Co. (1915) 170 N. C. 4, 86 S. E. 694 (imprisonment). West Virginia. McFarland V. Etna F. & M. Ins. Co. (1873) 6 W. Va. 437 (prior action). Wisconsin.-Fey v. I. O. O. F. Mut. L. Ins. Soc. (1904) 120 Wis. 358, 98 N. W. 206 (death of party). Possibly the best basis of this rule was set forth very tersely in the much-cited case of Riddlesbarger v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (U. S.) supra, wherein it was said: "In the second place, the rights of the parties flow from the contract. That relieves them from the general limitations of the statute, and, as a consequence, from its exceptions also." A somewhat different argument, leading, however, to the same result, may be found in Dolan v. Royal Neighbors (1907) 123 Mo. App. 147, 100 S. W. 498, a case not within the scope of this annotation, wherein the court, in discussing a contractual limitation in a policy of insurance, said: "It is determined to be a provision which not only has no reference to the Statute of Limitations, but imposes a restriction or qualification upon the rights vouchsafed in the contract, entirely independent of the limitation statutes, so that instead of operating merely as a limitation upon the right to sue, it operates in the nature of a condition precedent to forfeit the liability when suit is not instituted within the stipulated time." b. Application of rule. Prior timely action. In a number of cases wherein a plea of failure to comply with the provisions of a policy limiting the time for the bringing of an action thereon has been met with the reply that a prior action, instituted within the prescribed time, preceded the suit in question, which was menced after the abatement thereof, in conformity with a section of the Statute of Limitations providing therefor, it has been held that the time for the bringing of the action was not extended by the statutory exception. com chancery, unless such suit or action shall be commenced within the term of twelve months next after the loss or damage shall occur, and in case any suit or action shall be commenced against said company after the expiration of twelve months next after such loss or damage shall have occurred, the lapse of time shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against the validity of such claim thereby so attempted to be enforced." About two years later the action was dismissed by the plaintiff, who, within a year thereafter, instituted the suit at bar, it having been transferred from Missouri to the Federal court. The defendant pleaded the condition quoted, and the plaintiff replied setting up the commencement of the first action within the year stipulated in the condition, and the commencement of the present action within one year after the dismissal of that action. To the replication the defendant demurred. By the Statute of Limitations of Missouri it was provided that a plaintiff who had suffered a nonsuit in an action instituted within the time specified therefor might commence a new action within one year thereafter, but it was held that the rights of the parties in the case at bar were not affected thereby, one of the reasons being that the contract relieved the parties from the provisions of the Statute of Limitations and the exceptions thereto. The court said: "The action mentioned, which must be be commenced within the twelve months, is the one which is prosecuted to judgment. The failure of a previous action from any cause cannot alter the case. The contract declares that an action shall not be sustained unless such action-not some previous action-shall be commenced within the period designated. It makes no provision for any exception in the event of the failure of an action commenced, and the court cannot insert one without changing the contract." Riddlesbarger v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (1869) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 386, 19 L. ed. 257, is a much-cited case on the point in question. The plaintiff therein had brought a timely action to recover on a fire insurance policy which provided, inter alia, as follows: "No suit or action of any kind against said company for the recovery of any claim upon, under, or In Harrison v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. by virtue of the said policy, shall be (1894) 67 Fed. 298, it appeared that sustainable in any court of law or the plaintiff, subsequently to a fire which occurred on October 4, 1892, brought an action on his policy of insurance, in which a verdict was directed for the defendant by reason of the premature institution of the suit. The action before the court was begun May 29, 1894, about four months after the judgment in the former suit, and it was the plaintiff's contention that, notwithstanding the clause in the policy sued on, which specified that "no suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any claim, shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire," he was entitled to maintain his action by virtue of a statute providing as follows: "If, after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff fail therein for any cause except negligence in its prosecution, and a new suit be brought within six months thereafter, the second suit shall, for the purposes herein contemplated, be deemed a continuation of the first." In dealing with this section of the Code, which constituted an exception to the general Statute of Limitations, the court said: "Now, the very phraseology of the section apparently limits the continuation, which it establishes as a proposition of statutory law, to 'the purposes herein contemplated.' What purposes are herein contemplated? Manifestly, the intent of the legislature in enacting the section was to ingraft on the general Statute of Limitations an exception whose terms should. save from the destruction provided by the general statute a cause of action which failed from other reasons than negligence in its prosecution. Do not the words 'the purposes herein contemplated' restrict the 'continuation of the first' action to that of such continuation as regards the general Statute of Limitations, so that, if the first action was timely, this continuation shall also be timely? And is not this application of the section the only reasonable one under the circumstances?" And, following the decision in the case of Riddlesbarger v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (U. S.) supra, it was held that, since the action had not been commenced within the time specified by the policy, it could not be sustained under the contract made by the parties, to which the exceptions to the Statute of Limitations were inapplicable. So, in Chichester v. New Hampshire F. Ins. Co. (1902) 74 Conn. 510, 51 Atl. 545, an action on a policy of fire insurance which provided that no action might be maintained thereon unless instituted within twelve months next after the fire, a failure to comply with that provision was set up as a defense. The plaintiff replied that an action had been brought in accordance therewith, and had resulted in a nonsuit, the suit then before the court having been commenced directly thereafter. It was held, however, that the contractual limitation of time for the bringing of an action governed the case, and that the contract was not in any way affected by an act amending the Statute of Limitations and authorizing the bringing of suit within a year after a nonsuit in a former action. In Melson v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1895) 97 Ga. 722, 25 S. E. 189, an action on a fire insurance policy containing a provision necessitating the commencement of action within twelve months after loss, it appeared that in each instance, suit having been commenced in time, a nonsuit was granted and a new action instituted within the time specified in the Code, namely, within six months thereafter, but not within the contractual period of twelve months. The court held that the section of the Code in question, which provided an exception to the running of the Statute of Limitations, had no application to the case, and that a second action in renewal of a suit properly commenced and nonsuited, brought after the expiration of the period provided in the policy, was not saved thereby. It was said: "Where a party binds himself absolutely to sue within twelve months, or not at all, it would be a radical and material departure from the contract to allow such a variance from its plain terms as would have resulted from a proviso declaring that a suit brought within that time might be renewed within six months, in case of nonsuit." In Williams v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (1896) 98 Ga. 532, 25 S. E. 31, under similar circumstances, the court held that the case was controlled by the decision in Melson v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Ga.) supra. And see McDaniel v. German American Ins. Co. (1910) 134 Ga. 189, 67 S. E. 668. Harrison v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (1897) 102 Iowa, 112, 47 L.R.A. 709, 71 N. W. 220, was an action on a policy of fire insurance containing a provision that no suit or action should be sustainable thereon unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire. The action was instituted more than two years and nine months after the fire, and so was barred by the contractual limitation in the policy, unless the plaintiff could succeed in his contention that his right to sue was saved by that section of the Statute of Limitations (Iowa Code, § 2537) providing as follows: "If, after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff fail therein for any cause except negligence in its prosecution, and a new suit be brought within six months thereafter, the second suit shall, for the purpose herein contemplated, be a continuation of the first." The court said: "Statutes similar to this exist in many of the states, and the question has frequently arisen whether such a statute is applicable to a contract limitation such as the one in the policy in suit. The general tenor of the authorities is to the effect that it is not, for the reason that the rights of the parties arise out of contract, which relieves them from the general limitations of the statute, and, as a consequence, from its exceptions also." It was pointed out that the section in question must be considered as specifically referring to the statutory limitation, and that moreover, if the second suit was to be considered as a continuation of the first, there arose the situation of one being allowed to recover in an action which was prematurely brought. To the extent that the case of Jacobs v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. (1892) 86 Iowa, 145, 53 N. W. 101, could be considered as holding contrary to the present opinion, it was specifically overruled. And of the case of Wilhelmi v. Des Moines Ins. Co. (1896) Iowa, 68 N. W. 782, wherein it seemed to be assumed, without any decision of the question, that § 2537 applied to contract limitations, it was said by the court that it was no longer authority. On a somewhat similar state of facts in Wilhelmi v. Des Moines Ins. Co. (1897) 103 Iowa, 532, 72 N. W. 685, the court said that the questions controlling in the case had been considered and determined in Harrison v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (Iowa) supra, and that § 2537 of the Code of 1873, providing that “if, after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff fail therein for any cause except negligence in its prosecution, and a new suit be brought within six months thereafter, the second suit shall, for the purposes herein contemplated, be deemed a continuation of the first," applied to statutory limitations, but not to contractual limitations. In Smith v. Herd (1901) 110 Ky. 56, 60 S. W. 841, 1121, wherein an attempt to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance policy was defended on the ground that suit was not commenced within the contractual period of limitation, it was replied that a prior action had been pending between the parties. As to whether the action at law specified in the reply suspended the running of the period of limitation the court said: "That suit does not come within the meaning of § 2545, Kentucky Statutes, as it was not dismissed for want of jurisdiction." And quoting the much-cited Riddlesbarger Case (1869) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 386, 19 L. ed. 257, supra, it seems to have been held that a contractual limitation did not permit of the bringing of a second action barred thereby, even though it was instituted pursuant to the discontinuation or dismissal of a prior suit properly brought. In Ward v. Pennsylvania F. Ins. |