chandise should have been classified under paragraph 95 of the same act, and this was one claim made in the protest. The pertinent part of that paragraph is as follows:

95. Articles and wares composed wholly or in chief value of earthy or mineral substances, not specially provided for in this section, whether susceptible of decoration or not, if not decorated in any manner, thirty-five per centum ad valorem;

The Government agrees to such a classification provided this court is of opinion that these stones are not dutiable as hewn or dressed building stones under paragraph 114.

The merchandise is said to be identical with that before this court in the case of Manufacturers' Paper Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 72; T. D. 32353) and is designed for a like use. That case involved certain paragraphs of the act of 1897 and the merchandise was held dutiable as a nonenumerated manufactured article. The applicable provisions of the act of 1909 are so manifestly different from those of the act of 1897 that no further reference to that case is deemed necessary.

In the case at bar the board held these stones to be dutiable as nonenumerated manufactured articles under paragraph 480 of the act of 1909, but, as stated, neither party now claims this conclusion to be tenable.

It is material to note that paragraph 608 of the act of 1909 places “lava, unmanufactured," on the free list. If this and the duty paragraph be combined in the following manner

Freestone, granite, sandstone, limestone, and all other monumental or building stone, except marble, breccia, and onyx, not specially provided for in this section, hewn, dressed, or polished, or otherwise manufactured, fifty per centum ad valorem; unmanufactured, or not dressed, hewn, or polished, ten cents per cubic foot. Lava, unmanufactured, free.

the meaning of these paragraphs, when construed together, as they must be, becomes more readily apparent.

So written it would seem that marble, breccia, and onyx were, together with the other specifically mentioned rock or stone, understood by Congress to be building stones, while lava, the melted rock which has been discharged from a volcanic crater and afterwards hardened where deposited, is not by express declaration or inference placed in or excluded from the category of building stone. It is left in a class by itself, without any attempt to say whether it is or is not a building stone.

This view is strengthened by the fact that the cooled and hardened lava may possess various elements and qualities dependent among other things upon the substances that were melted in the crater and poured therefrom in a molten condition.

In some cases a building stone in the ordinary sense of the term could not result therefrom, while in others perhaps it might.

This lava stone comes from France, and it seems, using in substance the language of a witness, that it lacks a sufficiently close unity of its molecules to give it sufficient strength to resist the crushing force which operates upon stone when put to building uses.

It is at once apparent that this resisting quality may be required in a greater or lesser degree, according to the particular use to which a building stone may be put; but whatever the standard, if any, may be, it seems that Congress understood that certain stone possessed it, but did not attempt to say whether lava stone did or did not. While granite or limestone, for instance, may differ in their ability to withstand a crushing force, or while the products of different quarries of either may vary somewhat in that respect, it must be accepted that Congress understood that as a class either possessed such ability in the requisite degree and so declared they might be classified as building stone.

The record here tends to show that the lava stone from which these pieces are cut has peculiar acid-resisting qualities which make it specially desirable in the construction of apparatus used in connection with chemical manufacturing and that it is not generally used or adapted for monumental or building purposes.

These stones do not as a matter of course fall within the provisions of paragraph 114, because lava stone per se is not in all cases a monumental or building stone, and it appears that in their condition as imported they are not fit for or designed to be devoted to such uses. They are not free, as lava unmanufactured, and therefore appropriately fall within the provisions of paragraph 95 as articles composed wholly or in chief value of earthy or mineral substances not specially provided for, as claimed in the protest. United States v. Tamm & Co. (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 425; T. D. 32173); United States v. Stouffer (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 67; T. D. 32351); Waddell & Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 406; T. D. 32989).

It is urged that such a conclusion is not in harmony with United States v. Grasselli Chemical Co. (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 486; T. D. 33123). That case involved pieces of hewn lava stone, shown by the record to be some 4 feet long, 3 feet wide, by 12 inches thick, specially shaped to build the inside of a tower or chimney some 35 feet high and 12 feet in diameter, the outer portion of which was of lead, and was used in the manufacture of sulphuric acid. One purpose of so using those lava stones was to protect the outer portion of the chimney from the action of the acid fumes, but the stone also served to give form and stability to the chimney or tower.

It was held in that case that this was an adaptation and appropriation of the stone to a building use, which made it classifiable under paragraph 114 as a building stone. No such state of facts appears in this case, and in holding, as we do, that the lava stone

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here is not a building stone, but is dutiable under paragraph 95, we see no lack of harmony between the conclusion reached in the Grasselli case and in this.

As already stated, lava rock may or may not be a building stone, depending among other things upon its molecular formation, but when it is found to be prepared and appropriated for a building-stone use it may be held dutiable as such, as in the Grasselli case.

The judgment of the Board of General Appraisers is reversed and reliquidation ordered pursuant to the views herein expressed.

(T. D. 33391.)

Hydron blue.

CASSELLA COLOR Co. v. UNITED STATES (No. 948).

DYES PRODUCED FROM CARBAZOL.

Carbazol is a chemical compound distinct from anthracin, having a different chemical formula, and it is used to produce different dyes from those derived from anthracin. The fact that carbazol is found in association with anthracin does not leave it open to say that a product derived solely from carbazol, not including anthracin, is derived from anthracin. The dyes here are a product of coal tar, some elements being eliminated, but none added, to produce carbazol. They were dutiable at 30 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 15, tariff act of 1909.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, April 29, 1913.

APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7369 (T. D. 32559). [Affirmed.]

Curie, Smith & Maxwell (Thomas M. Lane of counsel) for appellants.

William L. Wemple, Assistant Attorney General (Charles E. McNabb, assistant attorney, on the brief), for the United States.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, DE VRIES, and MARTIN, Judges. MONTGOMERY, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The merchandise in question in this case, known as hydron blue G and hydron blue R, consists of dyes, one being a blue with a greenish tinge and the other a blue with a reddish tinge. Duty was assessed at 30 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 15 of the tariff act of 1909 as "coal-tar dyes or colors not specially provided for in this section." They are claimed to be free of duty under paragraph 487 as dyes derived from anthracin.

The comprehensive finding of facts by the board, which is fully supported by the evidence, we state in the language employed by the board as follows:

(1) The manufacturers purchase in Germany a substance which they call crude anthracin.

(2) This substance is an intermediate product obtained in the distillation of coal tar and contains anthracin, carbazol, and other ingredients mechanically combined.

(3) The manufacturers subject this so-called crude anthracin to a process for the purpose of separating the carbazol from the anthracin and other constituents.

(4) By further processes applied only to the carbazol they produce the dyes here in question.

These processes may be better understood from the following diagram:

CRUDE ANTHRACIN MASS.

This mass contains carbazol, phenanthren, and other associated bodies. When treated with caustic potash, a suitable solvent and heat yields

(5) Carbazol is a chemical compound distinct from anthracin, having a different chemical formula and used for producing different dyes from those derived from anthracin.

The board held that, within the meaning of paragraph 487, these dyes were not derived from anthracin. It is contended by the importers that as in the crude mass, sometimes called crude anthracin by authorities on chemistry and sometimes referred to in such works as commercial anthracin,, the substance of carbazol is found in association with anthracin, carbazol should be construed as derived from anthracin.

Authorities are cited to the point that tariff terms are usually understood to have been employed in their commercial sense. This proposition is too well accepted to require elaboration or discussion. But this is not such a case. Anthracin is not named, eo nomine, as the ingredient entitled to free entry. It is a derivative from that substance. The question is whether in the use of the term "derived from anthracin" a derivative from the substance of anthracin as such was intended or whether a product which entirely excludes anthracin may be treated as within the terms of the paragraph.

We do not think this latter construction permissible. It happens that carbazol and anthracin at one stage of the processes reducing coal-tar preparations are in association. But they are entirely distinct substances, and it is a stretch to say that a dye derived

from carbazol is derived from anthracin. Had there been an express provision in the tariff act for dyes derived from carbazol, there would be no room for discussion. There is no such express provision, but there is a general provision for coal-tar dyes, which comprehends and includes dyes derived from carbazol. Carbazol and anthracin are two distinct chemical compounds, having different chemical formulas. If the contention of the importers be allowed, the phrase "derived from anthracin" would, as pointed out by the board, be given a meaning that would include substances derived from compounds entirely foreign to anthracin and which, in any known chemical test, would not show the presence of anthracin or any characteristic due to the use of anthracin. As anthracin and carbazol boil off at the same degree of temperature, it would be certainly as appropriate to say that this is a product of carbazol as to say that it is a product of anthracin.

We think the illustration given in the brief of Government's counsel is apt. Lead, zinc, gold, and silver often appear in lead ore. A product of gold and silver extracted from such ore would not in any proper sense be held to be derived from lead. Nitrate of silver, made from silver, would not be held to be derived from lead rather than from silver because the silver was obtained from lead ore.

So

in this case the fact that carbazol is found in association with anthracin does not leave it open to say that a product derived solely from carbazol and not including anthracin is derived from the latter substance.

The cases cited by the appellant do not, we think, sustain the contention made. In re Pickhardt (T. D. 20728) it was held that the ordinary and commonly accepted meaning of the words "derived from" is "made or prepared from," "produced from," or "obtained from." The words "dyes derived from anthracin" mean dyes of which anthracin is the source or base. They do not mean anthracin itself, nor dyes made wholly of anthracin, but dyes produced or obtained from anthracin by the extraction of some of its elements and their utilization by actual substitution with other substances. If the manufacturer starts with anthracin, and, by partial replacement or any other process, produces a dye, that dye is derived from anthracin, but not otherwise.

This is far from saying that a dye may be said to be derived from anthracin when anthracin is wholly displaced by other substances, whether by substances found in association or substances applied from other sources. See also Farbenfabriken Co. v. United States (102 Fed., 602).

Counsel for the importers cites the case of In re W. J. Matheson & Co. (Ltd.) (49 Fed., 272) in support of his contention. That case related to "toluidine base" made from a substance called "toluole." The commercial source of "toluole" was shown to be coal tar, from which it was isolated by a process of distillation, and the question