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5. Customs officers shall observe care to distinguish between the products covered by the foregoing provision of law, which are for the treatment of domestic animals, and those products covered by the act of July 1, 1902 (T. D. 33079), which are for the treatment of man. 6. These regulations shall take effect July 1, 1913.

(51022.)

JAMES F. CURTIS, Assistant Secretary.

(T. D. 33576-G. A. 7471.)

Cotton cloth with silk figures.

Cloth composed in chief value of cotton, but in part of silk, is dutiable at 8 cents per square yard and 30 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 321, tariff act of 1909, although the amount of silk in the fabric is insignificant.

United States General Appraisers, New York, June 19, 1913.

In the matter of protest 577859 of F. B. Vandegrift & Co. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.

Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and COOPER, General Appraisers).

COOPER, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question consists of cotton cloth through which threads of silk are woven at intervals. These silk threads run clear across the fabric, some parallel with the warp and some parallel with the filling. They are so placed as to form a large design in the form of double squares, and an average count of the cloth shows about two silk threads to the square inch. Duty was collected thereon under the provisions of paragraph 321, act of 1909, the pertinent part of which is as follows:

321. Cloth, composed of cotton or other vegetable fiber and silk, whether known as silk-striped sleeve linings, silk stripes, or otherwise, of which cotton or other vegetable fiber is the component material of chief value, eight cents per square yard and thirty per centum ad valorem: Provided, That no such cloth shall pay a less rate of duty than fifty per centum ad valorem.

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Protestants claim the goods to be dutiable as "cotton cloth" under the countable cotton paragraphs (315 to 320), but counsel for the importers in his brief admits that the goods are not dutiable thereunder, as the countable provisions are limited to what is absolutely and wholly cotton. There are also several other claims made. in the protest, but the only one relied upon by counsel for the importers in his brief is that of 45 per cent ad valorem as "manufactures of cotton or of which cotton is the component material of chief value" under paragraph 332, or at the same rate as "all woven articles *** of vegetable fiber" under paragraph 358 of said

act.

The importers claim that the goods were improperly assessed on the ground that the silk is so insignificant in comparison with the

cotton that it is a negligible quantity. Counsel further argues, in his brief, that Congress indicated, in prescribing a minimum duty of 50 per cent ad valorem in this paragraph, that it did not have in mind goods so cheap in price and containing so little silk that the duty of 8 cents per square yard and 30 per cent ad valorem would amount to the prohibitive ad valorem rate of 87.8 per cent, which is the rate he figures duty was collected. As supporting the claim as to prohibitive rates he cites the case of United States v. Vietor (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 297; T. D. 31355); but in that case the court. was considering two paragraphs, under either of which the goods there under consideration were aptly described, while in the case at bar the paragraph which levies the so-called prohibitive rate of duty is specific in its terms, while the other paragraphs in question are general paragraphs designed to catch all merchandise of this character which is not specifically provided for elsewhere. It would seem, however, that it is immaterial in making a decision in this case whether the rate levied is prohibitive or not. It is the duty of the board to determine under which paragraph of the law Congress has more specifically described these goods, irrespective of the rates of duty attaching to the paragraph.

As to the claim that the amount of silk in this merchandise is insignificant, the testimony shows that the same class of goods with mercerized cotton threads in place of the silk can be bought for the same price as the goods here in question. However, although the value of the goods may not be enhanced by the silk, the attractiveness of the cloth is greatly increased thereby. A similar question was raised under the act of 1894 in the case of In re Doull Miller & Co. (G. A. 3891; T. D. 18089). There, as here, the value of the silk was insignificant, but the board held that the goods were dutiable under the provision for "sleeve linings or other cloths, composed of cotton and silk, whether known as silk stripe sleeve lining, silk stripes, or otherwise," on the ground that, as stated in the opinion, "the question is not whether the fabric under consideration contains a large or small quantity of silk, but whether it is 'composed of cotton and silk.""

The question again arose under the act of 1897, and in G. A. 6044 (T. D. 26373) General Appraiser De Vries, who wrote the opinion, aptly summed up the issue as follows:

Reading paragraph 311 in conjunction with paragraph 322 we have two provisions of the tariff act applicable to goods composed in chief value of cotton. Paragraph 322 is a general provision extending to all goods in chief value of cotton. Paragraph 311 is a more specific provision, extending to those goods in chief value of cotton the minor and substantial portion of which is composed of silk. Reading the two paragraphs together it is manifest that, while both of them apply to goods in chief value of cotton, paragraph 311 is more specific in that it expressly provides for goods in chief value of cotton, but a portion of which is of silk.

From the decisions above quoted it will be seen that merchandise like that here in question has been held dutiable under the paragraphs of the acts of 1894 and 1897, corresponding to paragraph 321 of the act of 1909, and we see no reason now for changing this longcontinued customs practice. The merchandise is clearly within the eo nomine description of paragraph 321, and it becomes unnecessary to look to any other paragraph to ascertain the rate of duty it should pay. The protest is therefore overruled.

(T. D. 33577-G. A. 7472.)

Articles made from pile fabrics-Cotton rugs.

Couch and table covers which resemble rugs in design and coloring, but which are made of pile fabrics not suitable either in material or weight for floor coverings, are dutiable as "articles * * * made or cut from paragraph 325, tariff act of 1909.

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* pile fabrics," under

Congress, in the tariff act of 1909, having placed "rugs of cotton" in the same paragraph and assessed duty thereon at the same rate as on "carpets and carpeting," must be taken inferentially to have intended that the "rugs of cotton," dutiable thereunder, should be those only which are suitable for floor coverings.

United States General Appraisers, New York, June 20,

1913.

In the matter of protests 624118, etc., of W. H. Stiner & Son et al. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.

Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and COOPER, General Appraisers). COOPER, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question, invoiced as couch and table covers and returned by the appraiser as "cotton rugs," consists of articles made of pile fabrics in rich colors and handsome designs. Some are square and others oblong, some have rough edges, while others have edges finished by hemming or overlock thread. Upon these articles the collector collected duty at 50 per cent ad valorem imposed by paragraph 393 of the tariff act of 1909, which is as follows:

393. Carpets and carpeting of wool, flax, or cotton, or composed in part of any of them, not specially provided for in this section, and mats, matting, and rugs of cotton,

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Against this classification the importers duly protested, claiming, among other grounds, that the articles are dutiable under paragraphs 325 or 332, which are as follows:

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325. Plushes, velvets, velveteens, corduroys, and all pile fabrics, cut or uncut, whether or not the pile covers the entire surface; any of the foregoing composed of cotton or other vegetable fiber, except flax, * * if bleached, dyed, colored, stained, painted, or printed, twelve cents per square yard and twenty-five per centum ad valorem: Provided further, That manufactures or articles in any form including such as are commonly known as bias dress facings or skirt bindings, made

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or cut from plushes, velvets, velveteens, corduroys, or other pile fabrics composed of cotton or other vegetable fiber, shall be subject to the foregoing rates of duty and in addition thereto ten per centum ad valorem: Provided further, That none of the articles or fabrics provided for in this paragraph shall pay a less rate of duty than forty-seven and one-half per centum ad valorem.

332. All articles made from cotton cloth, whether finished or unfinished, and all manufactures of cotton or of which cotton is the component material of chief value, not specially provided for in this section, forty-five per centum ad valorem.

A number of witnesses testified for the importers, and their testimony conclusively shows that the articles in question are not known in trade and commerce as "rugs" and that they are not suitable for use as floor coverings, as they are too light in structure for serviceable wear and not stiff enough to lay smoothly or adhere to the floor, but will crumple up when walked upon. They all testified that they are suitable for and are used as couch covers, draperies, and table covers, and can not be used as rugs for floor coverings. The Government offered no testimony in support of the collector's classification.

A review of previous tariff acts shows that the term "rugs of cotton" was used for the first time in the present act. In G. A. 5517 (T. D. 24857) it was pointed out that cotton rugs were not specifically provided for in the tariff act of 1897, and, as the United States Supreme Court had held (Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S., 154) that rugs made on a different kind of loom from carpets were not dutiable as carpets and carpeting, the board held that the cotton rugs there under consideration were dutiable as "manufacturers of cotton" and not as "carpets and carpeting," as returned by the collector. The attention of Congress was called to this decision (see Notes on Tariff Revision), and evidently with the intention of curing this defect in the law Congress made specific provisions in the act of 1909 for "rugs of cotton" in the same paragraph with "carpets and carpeting"; and we are of opinion that Congress intended that the cotton rugs dutiable under this paragraph (393) should be those only which are in the nature of carpets and carpeting and intended to be used for the same purpose (as floor coverings).

The testimony shows that the articles here in question are made on a different kind of loom from rugs used as floor coverings and are of different texture and weave, being made on the same kind of loom as plushes, velvets, and other pile fabrics. We find from the record herein that they are neither commercially known as "rugs of cotton," nor suitable for use as floor coverings, but that they are "articles * * * made or cut from * * * pile fabrics," and we hold that the goods retuned as "cotton rugs" on the invoices covered by protests 645089, 657155, 658099, 663045, and 663046 are dutiable at the appropriate rate under paragraph 325 of

said act, but not less than 47 per cent ad valorem. To that extent the protests are sustained.

Protest 657156, which was abandoned, and protests 624118, 628092, 628093, 630052, 634706, 634707, 636265, 637883, and 645506, which do not make the proper claim, are overruled.

(T. D. 33578.)

Abstracts of decisions of the Board of General Appraisers.

Board 1-McClelland, Sullivan, and

Board 2-Fischer, Howell, and Cooper.

Board 3-Waite, Somerville, and Hay.

BEFORE BOARD 2, JUNE 16, 1913.

No. 32754.-HAY LOADER-HARVESTER-Protest 660851 of Johnston Harvester Co. (Niagara Falls).

Hay loaders assessed under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909, were claimed dutiable as harvesters (par. 476).

FISCHER, General Appraiser: In Abstract 32387 (T. D. 33433) this board held that certain agricultural implements known as Stewart sheaf loaders were specially designed machines for use in harvesting and were classifiable properly under paragraph 476 as harvesters.

We see no reason to conclude differently as to the hay loaders here in question. The term "harvesters" would include hay loaders as that term is generally understood, and the record here offered to show a different meaning in trade falls far short of establishing a commercial point of view different than and other than what the ordinary meaning imports. As we read the record it is rather corroborative than otherwise of the ordinary meaning of the term. It is well settled law that the party who alleges the existence of a commerical meaning of a tariff term, and who seeks to impose such meaning on the law, must show an established usage in commerce and trade to the effect alleged, which usage must have existed at the time of the passage of the act in question and have been definite, uniform, and general, and not local or personal. Maddock v. Magone (152 U. S., 368) and Sonn v. Magone (159 U. S., 417). There is here shown no well-known, general, definite, established, and uniform meaning to the term "harvesters" among trade dealers of such implements, and still less is there here shown a meaning that would make it exclude the hay loader. We sustain the protest and reverse the collector's assessment.

No. 32755.-MACHINES-MACHINE TOOLS-ENTIRETIES.-Protests 671942, etc., of Bosch Magneto Co. (Springfield). Opinion by Fischer, G. A.

Extra and spare parts for milling machines were held properly classified as manufactures of metal under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909, and not dutiable with the machines as entireties, as claimed. Johnson v. United States (T. D. 33309) followed as to the brass cuts for engraving machines. Lathes accompanied by special equipment were held dutiable as entireties under paragraph 197, as claimed.

No. 32756.-ADHESIVE FELTS FOR SHEATHING VESSELS.-Protests 680216-4181, etc., of Woodward, Wight & Co. (New Orleans). Opinion by Fischer, G. A. On the authority of G. A. 7451 (T. D. 33302) adhesive felt for sheathing vessels was held free of duty under paragraph 564, tariff act of 1909, as claimed.

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