Page images

chimneys of factories. Duty was assessed thereon at the rate of 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 114 of the tariff act of 1909, which provides for

Freestone, granite, sandstone, limestone, and all other monumental or building stone, except marble, breccia, and onyx, not specially provided for in this section, hewn, dressed, or polished, or otherwise manufactured,



The protest made various claims, but the reliance of the importer seems to be that the goods were dutiable under paragraph 480 at 20 per cent ad valorem as unenumerated manufactured articles. evidence as to use of these stones is that furnished by the importer's witness, and discloses that they are imported in different shapes, but are cut so as to fit a circle and are used for the inside lining of chimneys, which chimneys are used in the manufacture of sulphuric acid. The stone is especially adapted to this use, and is designed to protect the lead lining of the outer portion of the chimney, which will not withstand the action of sulphuric acid. The question presented is whether the stone adapted to this use are building stone within the meaning of paragraph 114.

A chimney is defined in the Century Dictionary as—


A vertical structure containing a passage or main flue by which the smoke of a fire or furnace escapes to the open air * *. Chimneys are commonly built of brick or stone. The chimneys of some kinds of factories, as chemical works, are built to a great height, sometimes several hundred feet, and often as independent structures.

There is no limitation of the term "building stone" in the paragraph. The term is not restricted to such stones as are used for the outer walls of buildings. The exception from the provisions of the paragraph of marble, breccia, and onyx would indicate that any stone other than these excepted, used for interior decoration, would be within the provisions of the paragraph. Nor does any good reason occur to us why any stone used in the interior of a building would not be properly designated as building stone. The entire inner surface of this structure is composed of stone of the character here in question. It is carried from the bottom to within two feet of the top of the shaft of the chimney in a solid structure. The structure is built by the use of these stones. Without them its form could not be maintained, and we feel constrained to hold that they are, within the ordinary acceptation of the term, building stone.

The board in sustaining the contention of the importer relied upon the case of Manufacturers' Paper Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., ; T. D. 32353). That case presented a different question. The stones which were imported were not fitted for or adapted to use as building stones in the form imported. It was said of the importation:

True, these blocks might be broken in pieces and portions of them made use of. They might be ground up and used in that form. But in the form in which imported, they are not adapted to use as building stone. The fitness of the native stone for such use has been destroyed, and it has been devoted to a new use.

If the board proceeded upon the view that the case cited was intended to hold that lava stone is not under any circumstances building stone, this was error, for the case did not so decide. The fact that this stone is soft and porous is a fact which may be considered in a given case in determining whether it is adapted to use as a building stone, but when we find, as in this case, that it is not only adapted to but devoted to that use, it falls directly within the terms of paragraph 114. See on this subject United States v. Batterson (T. D. 26319 and T. D. 23030). In the latter case it was said:

The testimony here conclusively shows that lava rock is used as a building stone. The witness for the Government positively proves this fact, and the witness for the importer admits that it may be so used.

In the present case the evidence is still more specific. It goes to the extent of showing not only that lava rock may be so used, but that it is in fact so used, and that the particular importation in question is made for the purpose of use as building stone.

It follows that the decision of the Board of General Appraisers should be reversed and the classification of the collector sustained. It is so ordered.

(T. D. 33124.)

Embroidered screens.



The merchandise is screens of embroidered silk panels with wooden frameworks. Silk is concededly the component material of chief value. These screens are not fairly to be considered "screens of wood," but rather as articles in chief value of silk. They are accordingly dutiable as such under paragraph 402, tariff act of 1909. United States Court of Customs Appeals, January 20, 1913. APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G A. 7371 (T. D. 32582). [Affirmed.]

McLaughlin, Russell, Coe & Sprague (Edward P. Sharretts of counsel) for appellants. William L. Wemple, Assistant Attorney General (Martin T. Baldwin, special attorney, on the brief), for the United States.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, DE VRIES, and MARTIN, Judges. BARBER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in this case is whether certain screens of varying height, consisting of frameworks of wood with embroidered silk panels, are dutiable as assessed by the collector under paragraph 402 or as claimed by the importers under paragraph 214 of the tariff act of 1909.

The two paragraphs in question read as follows:

402. Laces, edgings, insertings, galloons, flouncings, neck rufflings, ruchings, braids, fringes, trimmings, ornaments, nets or nettings, veils or veilings, and articles made wholly or in part of any of the foregoing, or of chiffons, embroideries and articles embroidered by hand or machinery, or tamboured or appliquéed, clothing ready made, and articles of wearing apparel of every description, including knit goods,

made up or manufactured in whole or in part by the tailor, seamstress, or manufacturer; all of the foregoing composed of silk, or of silk and metal, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, whether in part of India rubber or otherwise and braid composed in part of India rubber, not specially provided for in this section, and silk goods ornamented with beads or spangles, sixty per centum ad valorem: Provided, That articles composed wholly or in chief value of any of the materials or goods dutiable under this paragraph shall pay not less than the rate of duty imposed upon such materials or goods by this section: * * *

214. Porch and window blinds, baskets, curtains, shades, or screens of bamboo, wood, straw, or compositions of wood, not specially provided for in this section, thirty-five per centum ad valorem; if stained, dyed, painted, printed, polished, grained, or creosoted, forty per centum ad valorem.

There are several sizes of screens covered by the protests. The exhibit submitted to us, and which is said to be typical in construction of the importations, consists of four sections, each about 5 feet high and 20 inches wide, united by flexible connections so as to permit of folding, of easy moving, and of adjustment. The visible wooden frame of each section is about 1 inch wide and three-fourths of an inch in thickness and extends entirely around it. Into this frame and completely filling the space is inserted one taut panel of silk cloth fastened to a very light inner framework or form, which the panel entirely covers on the front side, while the back side is also covered by an ornamented fabric resembling cheesecloth, backed with paper. This inner framework, so far as we have examined it, also appears to be made of wood.

It is conceded that these panels are embroidered and that silk is the component material of chief value in the completed article.

The Board of General Appraisers sustained the collector's assessment. The gist of the importers' contention here is that the merchandise is screens of wood and therefore specifically provided for in paragraph 214, and, further, that they are not subject to assessment of duties under paragraph 402 because not ejusdem generis with the articles named therein.

The general rule appears to be well settled that when a tariff statute provides for duty upon an article of specified material, without declaring to what extent it must be composed of that material, it is at least confined to merchandise of which the specified material is that of chief value or is the predominant one therein. Arthur v. Butterfield (125 U. S., 70), In re Wise (93 Fed. Rep., 443), Drew v. Grinnell (115 U. S., 477), Schiff v. United States (99 Fed. Rep., 555), Robertson v. Edelhoff (91 Fed. Rep., 642).

These screens are, as stated, composed in chief value of emboidered silk. The framework, which is of wood, is not a screen and can not be used as such. The panels are necessary to make it usable or serviceable as a screen. The embroidery thereon apparently constitutes an important element in the attractiveness and beauty of the screen itself, and the purpose served by the wooden frames is to hold these panels in place and facilitate the use thereof.

We can not believe that in the ordinary understanding of the meaning of the term "screens of wood," as used in paragraph 214, these articles would be so described; the wood is not the component material of chief value, nor is it predominant therein as to the construction or use of the screens.

Neither does there seem to be force in the contention of the importers that these screens are not ejusdem generis with the other articles named in paragraph 402. As pointed out in the Government's brief, this paragraph does not in its terms relate wholly to silk wearing apparel, as claimed by the importers. Many of the articles named therein may or may not be articles of wearing apparel, such as laces and articles made therefrom, which have a variety of uses other than as wearing apparel. Neither do the words "braids, fringes, trimmings, or ornaments" necessarily suggest or imply a limitation of these articles to wearing apparel. Beyond this the proviso of the paragraph, referring to articles composed wholly or in chief value of any of the materials or goods dutiable under the paragraph, suggests that it was designed to apply to articles into the construction or composition of which the specifically mentioned merchandise entered and which might be other than articles of wearing apparel.

In view of what we have said, it seems to be unnecessary to give any extended consideration to other arguments urged by the importers or to specially refer to the cases cited by them, all of which have been carefully examined and considered.

The judgment of the Board of General Appraisers is affirmed.

(T. D. 33125.)

Trophy or prize.

AMERICAN EXPress Co. v. United States (No. 1014).


The provision in paragraph 624, tariff act of 1909, for free entry of "other metallic articles usually bestowed as trophies or prizes" is not limited to such as are ejusdem generis with medals, and a shotgun won in a prize shooting tournament is a trophy or prize within the meaning of the law.

2. Delivery OF THE TROPHY or Prize.

Actual manual delivery abroad of an article awarded as an honorary distinction is not a condition precedent to the free admission of that article.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, January 20, 1913.

APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 29494 (T. D. 32760). [Reversed.]

Comstock & Washburn (J. Stuart Tompkins on the brief) for appellant.

William L. Wemple, Assistant Attorney General, (William K. Payne, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for the United States.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, DE VRIES, and MARTIN, Judges. MARTIN, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

The importation now in question is a shotgun, which was assessed with duty at the rate of $1 and also 35 per cent ad valorem under

the provisions of paragraph 157 of the tariff act of 1909. The importers duly protested, claiming the gun to be free of duty as a metallic article bestowed and accepted as a trophy or prize within the purview of paragraph 624 of the act.

The Board of General Appraisers overruled the protest, from which decision the importers now prosecute and appeal to this court.

Paragraph 624, under which free entry is claimed for the importation, reads as follows:

624. Medals of gold, silver, or copper, and other metallic articles actually bestowed as trophies or prizes, and received and accepted as honorary distinctions.

It appears from the testimony that Westley Richards & Co. (Ltd.), of Birmingham, England, are manufacturers of firearms, and that they offered a single-barrel trap gun as a trophy or prize to be competed for at a tournament which should take place at the New York Athletic Club, and continue throughout a period of six months. The tournament was held by the club at Travers Island in conformity with the terms of the offer, some 30 contestants entering the lists. Mr. Hodgman, who is a citizen and resident of this country, was the successful competitor, and became entitled to the prize. Thereupon the donors finished a shotgun according to the particulars furnished by Mr. Hodgman, as nearly as could be, and shipped the article to this country in fulfillment of the award. The importation was consigned to certain agents of the manufacturers in this country, with instructions to pay all charges and costs of every kind, so that the gun might be delivered to Mr. Hodgman wholly free of trouble or expense on his part.

The sole question involved in this case is whether or not these undisputed facts bring the present importation within the free classification which is established by paragraph 624.

The Government contends against the free entry of the merchandise, and especially presents two arguments in support of its contention; first, that the provision in paragraph 624, for "medals *** and other metallic articles," should be controlled by the rule of ejusdem generis and made to apply to such metallic articles only as are of the same class with medals, the Government maintaining that this class would not include the shotgun in question; and, second, that the provisions of paragraph 624 require an actual receipt and acceptance of a trophy as an honorary distinction by its recipient before free entry is given to the article, the Government claiming in the present case that no such condition existed at the time of the importation.

In order to understand the meaning of the present paragraph and also the relevant decisions of the board and the courts, it is well to copy here the terms of former enactments which granted free entry to similar objects:

(Act of March 2, 1861.) (Act of March 3, 1883.) (Act of October 1, 1890.) or prizes.

Medals of gold, silver, or copper.
Medals of gold, silver, or copper.

648. Medals of gold, silver, or copper, such as trophies

« PreviousContinue »