Mr. RUBIN. I should think so. Mr. HINSHAW. The over-all difficulty should not be too great, should it? Mr. RUBIN. The over-all difficulty in compiling a list of persons who were in the Philippines and who were repatriated I should think would not be great. In connection with the question of repatriation, I should like to submit for the record a copy of the State Department release containing the statement by Acting Secretary of State Grew as the statement issued as of August 4, 1945, to which reference has at one time or another been made during these hearings. I would like to call particular attention to the sentence in this statement of the then Acting Secretary of State, which reads: Never at any time has the State Department put pressure on any signer of a promissory note to repay the United States Government if he were unable to do so. The rest goes on to point out that the State and War Departments were able to make arrangements for the repatriation of American nationals from the Philippines without requiring the signing of a promissory note which was the case in repatriation from other areas where American nationals were warned to leave. The CHAIRMAN. That will be made a part of the statement. No. 585 For the press. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, August 4, 1945. The Acting Secretary of State, the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, announced today details of the repatriation program which it has been operating with the cooperation of other Government agencies since 1939. Under this program of repatriation a committee consisting of representatives of the State and Navy Departments and of the Maritime Commission was formed in August of 1939. Arrangements were made with the United States shipping companies to speed the turn-around of their vessels and in some cases to reduce the number of ports of call, thus making more voyages available for the evacuation of United States nationals. The use of certain well-equipped fast freight ships to carry passengers was also authorized and as required emergency consular certificates were issued permitting United States vessels to carry passengers in excess of their regular licensed capacity, within certain limitations imposed by considerations of safety. In addition to this, certain special vessels were sent to Europe chartered and operated by American shipping companies who were guaranteed against loss by the Department of State. These measures resulted in some 56,000 individuals reaching United States shores. This includes aliens as well as United States nationals but does not include persons who came to the United States by way of Canadian ports. Similar measures were taken for the repatriation operations in the Far East resulting in the return to the United States of some 5,000 individuals. Exchange operations under the direct auspices of the Department of State resulted in the return from enemy countries in Europe of 2,124 United States citizens and 776 nationals of other countries, mainly from South America and Canada. Two thousand five hundred and seventy-four United States nationals and 482 nationals of other United Nations, again mainly South American and Canadian nationals, were repatriated from the Far East through similar exchange operations. Since VE-day the Department has initiated a program of repatriation from the Near East and India involving some 1,500 individuals-1,000 United States citizens and the rest other United Nations nationals. Since the liberation of the Philippines the Army and Navy have repatriated 6,974 United Nations nationals, of whom the great percentage are United States citizens. It has been a concept of the policy of the United States Government that it is not an obligation of the Government to repatriate at public expense United States nationals who may have become stranded or destitute in foreign countries. Similarly it has not in the past been considered an obligation of the Government to defray from Government funds the cost of the return to the continental United States of needy American nationals residing in overseas possessions or territories under the sovereignty of the United States. However, the Government has customarily endeavored to facilitate the return of its nationals from places where danger threatens and with this policy in view, and in order to make it more effective, the Department of State in the years preceding the war instructed diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the United States in foreign countries to take appropriate steps for the protection and, if necessary, the evacuation and repatriation of United States nationals in threatened areas. Official warnings were repeatedly issued to Americans concerning the risks involved in remaining in danger zones and special transportation facilities were made available to assist those willing to heed their Government's advice to return to the United States. Many American nationals heeded these warnings and did return to the United States. Many others, for personal reasons or reasons beyond their control, did not return and as a result of the war fell into enemy hands. It should be noted here, however, that American residents in the Philippine Islands, a territory under United States sovereignty, were not publicly warned to leave before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In view of the steps taken by the War and Navy Departments to evacuate from the Philippines all of their nonessential personnel, including families of officers and enlisted men, the United States nationals who remained in the Philippine Islands were presumably aware of the danger that threatened. However, they could not with due regard to the national interest, be advised to leave for the mainland. Therefore, those United States nationals who fell into the hands of the Japanese in the Philippines may well believe that, not having been apprized of the imminent danger, they are entitled to more consideration than United States nationals who remained in foreign countries in the Far East or in Europe despite repeated advice from their Government and its officials to return to the United States while commercial transportation facilities were available. Since 1939 Congress has annually appropriated funds to be used for the protection of American citizens in foreign countries whenever the President shall find that a state of emergency exists endangering the lives of American citizens in such countries. The appropriations acts for the fiscal years 1940, 1941, and 1942 contain the following language: * ** * "Emergencies arising in the diplomatic and consular service: whenever the President shall find that a state of emergency exists endangering the lives of American citizens in any foreign country, he may make available for expenditure for the protection of such citizens, by transfer to this appropriation, not to exceed $500,000 from the various appropriations contained herein under the heading Foreign Intercourse'; and reimbursements by American citizens to whom relief has been extended shall be credited to any appropriation from which funds have been transferred for the purposes hereof, except that reimbursements so credited to any appropriation shall not exceed the amount transferred therefrom." The appropriation act for the fiscal years June 30, 1943, June 30, 1944, and June 30, 1945, contains the following language: "Emergencies arising in the diplomatic and consular service: To enable the President to meet unforeseen emergencies arising in the Diplomatic and Consular Service ** * * $1,500,000, of which not to exceed $25,000 shall, in the discretion of the President, be available for personal services in the District of Columbia; and of which (without in any way restricting the use of other moneys herein appropriated) $500,000 shall be available for the protection of American citizens in any foreign country whenever the President shall find that a state of emergency exists endangering the lives of such citizens; and reimbursements by American citizens to whom relief has been extended hereunder shall be credited to this appropriation." The language of these acts makes it clear that funds so appropriated and so used should be, whenever possible, reimbursed to the Government and should not become a permanent charge upon the American taxpayer. This interpretation of the appropriation acts is also borne out by the detailed discussions each year in the hearings before the Appropriations Subcommittee. The members of this subcommittee made it very clear to the State Department representatives appearing before them that they expected these funds to be repaid by the individuals to whom assistance was given whenever it was possible. In 1939 when the Department commenced its repatriation program from Europe and Asia, repatriates were told that they would have to pay for their transportation and would also have to repay the Government for any other sums advanced to them. Those persons repatriated who were able to pay for their passage did so; the others signed promissory notes representing the cost of their passage and any moneys advanced them for subsistence and other purposes. Never at any time has the State Department put pressure on any signer of a promissory note to repay the United States Government if he were unable to do so. Among the thousands of persons repatriated from Europe and Asia beginning in 1939, there has been a very small percent of complaints against this policy of requiring repatriates to pay their own passage. Late in 1944, some 2 months before our actual landing in the Philippines, the State Department initiated discussions with the War Department regarding the repatriation of American and United Nations nationals held by the Japanese in the Philippines. The War Department then stated that it was in general agreement with the objectives described by the State Department but that before the War Department's general views could be formulated it would be necessary to have General MacArthur's comments. At the same time, the State Department submitted to the Bureau of the Budget a statement of the financial policy under which the Congress had authorized the Department to effect the previous repatriations, both from Europe and the Far East. In this statement the suggestion was made that American citizens from Wake and Guam as well as from the Philippine Islands might be given preferential treatment in relation to those from other areas: (a) because it is obvious that for political reasons they could not be warned officially to return to the United States, as were citizens in Europe and Asia; (b) because these citizens in the Philippine Islands, Wake, and Guam, not having official warning to depart and having been captured on American soil, were entitled to protection and assistance. The Bureau of the Budget responded on February 5, 1945, that any deviation from the previous method of repatriation, by which repatriates were required to sign promissory notes for the actual costs of passage and other moneys advanced, was contrary to the financial program. In these circumstances, it was obvious that the Department had not the money, the authority or the priorities for shipping space necessary to meet the problem of free repatriation from the Philippines. This seemed also to be the opinion of the Congress, as on February 5 Senator Pepper introduced Senate Joint Resolution 24, not as yet enacted, intended to provide such money and authority, in the same sense as Senate Joint Resolution 154 which was not enacted by the Seventy-eighth Congress. The American Consulate General was reopened in the Philippines on March 24 and since that time, substantial services by a limited staff have been rendered there both to American citizens and United States nationals. On this side, both passport and visa requirements were waived for the entry of repatriates to the United States and General MacArthur was informed through War Department channels that State Department funds were available to him for the relief of liberated Americans, subject only to the congressional limitations enumerated above. Agreements were reached with foreign governments for guaranties of their own nationals in terms of transportation to the United States, subsistence while here, and passage onward. By teamwork with the American Red Cross, the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, and the United States Public Health Service, arrangements were made for the proper reception of repatriates upon their arrival, financial assistance was made available when needed and hospitalization and medical care given those who required it. The first repatriates were placed on board Army and Navy transports in Manila under the usual repatriation program; that is, after having signed promissory notes for their passage. Upon the recommendation of General MacArthur, the War Department decided that Americans returning to the United States should do so without cost to themselves and naturally the State Department agreed to this, provided the funds could be found. No charges, in the form of either cash or promissory notes are taken from the individuals who are being returned from the Philippines. A record of such passage is established and the cost of repatriating American citizens from the Philippines has been borne out of War Department funds. As soon as this policy was decided upon, the promissory notes signed by the first repatriates were canceled and all American nationals repatriated from the Philippines have returned to the United States without cost to themselves. The fine cooperation displayed by the War Department is a great tribute to the teamwork which has always existed between these two agencies of the Government. Should the Congress enact Senate Joint Resolution 24 granting the State Department authority to repatriate United States citizens at Government expense naturally the State Department will immediately follow the regulations set down by Congress. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hale? Mr. HALE. I presume the State Department would not presume to express any opinion on the general question of policy as to whether these people should be compensated out of the Treasury of the United States? Mr. RUBIN. I am afraid, Mr. Congressman, that that is not a ques tion which would ordinarily fall within the competence of the State Department. I am even more afraid I would have no authority to speak on it here. Mr. HALE. I quite agree with you. The only thing that the State Department is interested in is the treatment of these Japanese assets; is that right? Mr. RUBIN. That is right. We have been the recipient of a great number of communications with respect to claims against enemy assets in the United States, and it was with a view to suggesting that legislation be worked out which would assess these various claims which have been filed, proponents of which have asked that they be paid out of the enemy assets of the United States that we make the suggestion that these bills are not appropriate. But the Department would certainly have no objection to the enactment of emergency special, legislation providing compensation for these particular claimants. Mr. HALE. That is all. Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Rubin, would you place in the record when you correct your remarks, a statement as to the number of persons repatriated to the United States, who were called upon to sign promissory notes to the Government, the occasion for that signing of promsory notes, and the number of persons who were repatriated by the Government who were not required to sign promissory notes? Mr. RUBIN. I will be glad to do so. Mr. HINSHAW. I understand that those who came back on the Gripsholm did so. I do not know how many more. Mr. RUBIN. I have never handled repatriation matters in the State Department, sir. But as I understand the matter, judging merely from the basis of this release which I read for the first time yesterday, after these hearings, the Department considers that it is compelled to ask for repayment from American nationals whom it does repatriate under ordinary circumstances. The Department apparently felt, after working out the matter with the War Department, that it could waive that claim of the United States with respect to persons who were repatriated from areas as to which no warning was given. I think that is the distinction: that promissory notes were taken from people who were warned to leave a particular territory, but that promissory notes were not taken from people who left areas like the Philippines. Mr. HINSHAW. There is one other angle. A great many people-not a great many-but some from the Philippines-came from internment camps but were repatriated on the Gripsholm earlier. Mr. RUBIN. The statement of Acting Secretary Grew indicates that promissory notes were taken from some of the early repatriates from the Philippines, but that those promissory notes were later canceled in accordance with the policy that I have just outlined. Mr. HINSHAW. If an official statement from the State Department were made a matter of record, I think it would clear up a good many thoughts in the minds of people. The CHAIRMAN. If you can comply with that request we shall appreciate it. Mr. RUBIN. I shall certainly try to do so. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rubin. Mr. RUBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (The information referred to above is contained in the following letter:) Hon. CHARLES A. WOLVERTON, House of Representatives. MARCH 28, 1947. MY DEAR MR. WOLVERTON: I refer to testimony given by Mr. Seymour J. Rubin of the State Department before the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on March 21, 1947, on the subject of the repatriation of American citizens from the Philippine Islands, and to my conversation with Representative Carl Hinshaw on March 24, 1947, on the same subject. At Mr. Hinshaw's request, I summarize below for the information of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, my statements to Mr. Hinshaw during the course of our conversation. One hundred and three American citizens, exclusive of 28 Government officials, employees, and members of their families were evacuated from the Philippines during the war under an exchange agreement with the Japanese Government, and arrived in the United States on the Gripsholm in December 1943. These persons were required to sign promissory notes covering the cost of their homeward transportation from the exchange port of Mormugão, Portuguese India, to New York. Two hundred and thirty-three American citizens were evacuated secretly from the Philippines during the war by submarine to Australia. These persons were furnished with funds by the State Department through the American consulate at Brisbane to pay for their transportation from Australia to the United States and were required to sign promissory notes for sums advanced to them. Probably between five and six thousand American citizens were repatriated from the Philippines after the liberation of the Philippine Island under the auspices of the American military authorities in the Philippines and free of cost to the repatriates. This program of free repatriation terminated with a few minor exceptions on October 15, 1945. The Special Projects Division has substantially complete records of Americans in the Philippines during the war, and of those who were repatriated from the Philippines during and after the war. Information concerning individual Americans in these categories can be furnished upon request. Sincerely yours, J. HOLBROOK CHAPMAN, |