There was no alternative. No one near the point of release of this terrific force can survive. The acceptance of this policy is increasing rapidly throughout America as cities take steps to make it operational. At present, anticipated warning time would not be sufficient to permit complete evacuation from the densely populated areas of all principal cities. However, even with increased warning time, many cities cannot be completely evacuated because of inadequate highways.

With some 70 million people to be evacuated from probable target areas in case of threatened or actual attack our States, cities, and counties do not have highway facilities equal to this task. The rapid improvement of our highway facilities is therefore, vital as a civildefense measure.

A highway program that will provide for the improvement of highways critically needed for peacetime use will furnish an important service in the event of a civil-defense emergency. The administration's highway program proposes that $25 billion be made available to finance improvements on the National System of Interstate Highways. The rural portion of this system, particularly in the more densely populated areas, and virtually all of the urban portions of such system will constitute the backbone of the highway system required for civildefense purposes.

In 1954 the Federal Civil Defense Administration contracted with Wilbur Smith Associates and the Northwestern Traffic Institute to make an evacuation study of the Milwaukee metropolitan area with a population of 1,010,000. A copy of that study has been furnished the chairman of this committee.

That report shows the estimated number of people that could be evacuated during various periods of time and under various weather conditions. It shows these things with the present street and highway system in the area, and it shows how the numbers of evacuated people could be increased by improvements to the highway systems.

For example, with 3 hours' warning time and with the probable performance during night time emergency, it is estimated that the following results could be obtained: Using the existing routes that would be available now, 600,000 people could be evacuated.

I might say here, Mr. Chairman, the study showed that in the daytime under ideal conditions, we could remove 600,000 in 2 hours and 800,000 people in 3 hours with the present road system, but that it would take us 7 hours to get everybody out with the present road system. We may not have 7 hours. We may have just 3 to 4 to 6 hours. Then with the first stage improvements, which are estimated to cost $321,000 and includes certain administrative regulations, we could remove 615,000 in 3 hours under nighttime conditions.

It might be advisable if it meets the chairman's pleasure to include a very short chapter from this report in the record. It is chapter 8, and I think it is about 7 pages long, double spaced. It discusses this material that forms the foundation for this table and gives this material in detail.

Senator GORE. Without objection it will be included in the record. (The above-mentioned document is as follows:)

CHAPTER 8. HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENTS

Since the time required to evacuate the Milwaukee area is an inverse function of the capacity of routes used, measures that are taken to increase this capacity may be expected to improve the performance of the movement. In view of the

high casualty percentages in the zones of A and B damage, improvements to routes in, between, and from these zones will result in greater savings of life than improvements more remote from ground zero.

A. EXISTING ROUTES

Condition diagrams of the selected evacuation routes were analyzed to determine present capacities and the location and nature of bottlenecks, and a schedule of improvements has been set up on a priority basis as shown in table V. As a practical matter, the recommendations have been influenced strongly by normal highway needs, for the feasibility of a given project is increased if it has both normal and emergency justification.

In establishing the sequence of improvements, the elimination of limited capacity restrictions has been placed in the first stage, along with the regulation of parking practice along specific sections of some streets to insure the availability of particular curb lanes for traffic flow. The total cost of first stage improvements is of such magnitude that they might well be undertaken within existing structures of highway finance.

The second stage includes major capacity increases gained by extensive route widening, and most of the projects included have direct justification in normal highway needs. A group of third-stage improvements was investigated and reported in the earlier report, The Milwaukee Evacuation Study-A Preliminary Statement. Analysis of those improvements showed their expense to be considerable, and their effect on traffic performance negligible. They are not included here, therefore, and the second-stage work is felt to represent the most that should be done with existing facilities.

B. FREEWAYS

In order to investigate the cost and effect of an extensive system of limitedaccess highways on the evacuation movement, a network of freeways especially suited to evacuation is presented here in figure 16. A system of expressways is planned for Milwaukee, but this system lies entirely within the zone of A damage. The freeway network shown here connects with the expressways where possible and with high quality surface streets otherwise; and passes far enough into the safe area to discharge its traffic load without undue interference with other evacuation streams. It is located so as to supplement routes serving movement to the southwest to a greater extent than those to the north or northwest, for the southwestern sector is most deficient in available routes.

Five routes are shown radiating from the city. One taps North Green Bay Road and goes northwestward to West Bend. Proceeding in counterclockwise order, the next route begins at North Avenue and ends west of Hartford. The next freeway connects with the Milwaukee East-West Expressway and runs southwest almost to Eagle. Another route begins at the southern end of the Milwaukee 44th Street Expressway, terminating near Muckwonago on the southwest. The last line starts in South Milwaukee and ends west of Waterford.

These 5 routes comprise a total of 130 miles, excluding all expressway length. At an estimated cost for adequate right-of-way and construction of $600,000 per mile, the total system cost would be $78 million.

C. PERFORMANCE

Performance curves for first and second stage and freeway improvements have been plotted, and in figure 17 they are compared with the curve for existing routes previously shown as figure 10. The conditions assumed are those for probable performance-night emergency, except in the capacity value used for the freeway system. It is expected that the type of construction envisioned would provide 4 main travel lanes of 1,000 vehicles per lane per hour capacity, and 2 lanes on stabilized shoulders that would accomodate 500 vehicles per hour each. It is significant to notice from the curves that first-stage improvements better existing routes materially throughout the entire range in time, and clear the evacuation area about one-half hour earlier. The second stage gives an even more marked improvement, particularly in the 2- to 6-hour range of time. The total area still takes 9 hours to empty, but an 800,000 survivorship is reached after 4 hours. Performance with freeway development is quite impressive, bettering all other conditions evaluated by clearing the area in 51⁄2 hours; and its performance during the early part of the warning period is only exceeded by the curve representing strategic evacuation. After a warning period of 3 hours, 800,000 people survive.

TABLE V.-Priority and estimated cost of improvements to existing routes

7-1 7-2

7-3

7-4

148,000*

183,000

246,000

312,000

317,000

588,000

306,000

6, 629, 000

EFFECT OF ROUTE IMPROVEMENT (PROBABLE PERFORMANCE-NIGHT EMERGENCY)

WILBUR SMITH 8 ASSOCIATES

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS

The findings that have been presented in this report are specific to the Milwaukee area. Not enough is now known about the evacuability of cities to justify the blanket application of the characteristics and performance developed here to other areas. However, some general observations do seem in order.

Planning the tactical evacuation of an urban area, although a complex and difficult problem, can apparently be approached by application of techniques now used in other fields.

There are specific measures that can be taken to expedite the flow of people from cities and thereby save their lives. These include route improvement and construction, as well as preconditioning of the populace.

The prewarning dispersal of any substantial portion of the population to safe areas not only assures survival of the group so dispersed, but also facilitates tactical evacuation of the people remaining in the city.

Any evacuation is better than no evacuation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report could not have been prepared within the time limitations prescribed except for the generous cooperation of people representing the agencies listed below. Their help is gratefully acknowledged.

City of Milwaukee:

Office of the Mayor

Civil Defense Administration

Bureau of Traffic and Electrical Service

Police Department

Board of School Directors

Board of Public Land Commissioners

Milwaukee County:

Civil Defense Commission

Highway Department

Park Commission